CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/03/27

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
03176553
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
9
Document Creation Date: 
March 18, 2019
Document Release Date: 
March 28, 2019
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 27, 1951
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15587364].pdf226.25 KB
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.e Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C03176553 %seInn rnnriNoe 27 March 1951 Copy No. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANCE IN CLASS. i ! 'GED TO: TS S C 1,00 Ti-i: )2.1e .7c Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C03176553 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C03176553 SUMMARY 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) FAR EAST NEAR EAST 7. US Embassy Moscow comments on possible Soviet expansionist moves in Iran (page 7). EASTERN EUROPE 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) 9. Widespread Soviet activity reported in Albania (page 8). WESTERN EUROPE 10. Austria acting to reduce Communist police strength (page 9). TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C03176553 3.5(c) 3.5(c) It mlApproved for Release: 2019/03/14 C03176553 TikN et' J. GENERAL 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h - 3 - TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C03176553 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C03176553 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) -4 1-.0.1)-S ET Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C03176553 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C03176553 TP SECRET FAR EAST 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C03176553 3.5(c) Ella Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C03176553 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 6 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C03176553 3.5(c) 110 � Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C03176553 Ttz0P SEQMIT 7. US Embassy Moscow comments on_possible Soviet expansionist moves In Iran: 3.5(c) In reporting heav3� Soviet propaganda ern-3.3(h)'(2) phasis on US "in olvement" in Premier Raz- mara's assassination and on alleged US efforts to supplant UK domination in Iran, the 1:78 Embassy in nose= points out that the USSR, by thus blaming all dis- *Obances that may occur in Iran on the ',US, could be paving the way for an even more vigorous policy toward Iran. The Embassy suggests that such a policy mi.& involve invoking the 1921 Iranian-USSR treaty and intervening militarily in Iran in order to "defend" that country from foreign domination. As to the possibility that the USSR will achieve its goal of playing a paramount role in Iran without invoking military mea- sures -- and thus without risking a major war -- the Embassy notes how welcome to the USSR is the movement to nationalize the tranian oil indus- try. In the Embassy's opinion, the USSR will increase its pressure on Iran at the present critical juncture. Comment: The USSR is reportedly conducting spring maneuvers on the Ira.nian border, and several references to the 1921 treaty have been noted in Communist propaganda While these un- doubtedly will be utilized by the USSR as part of its war of nerves against Iran, there is no evidence that the USSR is contemplating military action at this time. Present Soviet press attention to develop- ments on the oil question, and earlier reports of possible Soviet prepara- tions (at the USSR-Iranian trade and financial talks) for reopening the issue of oil concessions, suggest that the USSR may now renew its efforts to gain a measure of control Over Iranian oil fields. 3.3(h)(2) TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C03176553 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C03176553 9. Widespread SovietAtctiyity *ported in Albania: SIP 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) the presence of Soviet officials in every branch of the Albanian Government and industry, but reports no Russian troops in the country with the ex- ception of about 50 instructors, , the 3.3(h)(2) other Satellites are required to furnish food and miscellaneous materi- als to support the new Albanian Five Year plan, while the USSR sends about 5 Liberty-type ships monthly, loaded with oil machinery, electri- mal eqUipment and pipeline, into Durazzo harbor. 3.3(h)(2) the general economic condition of the country has im- Droved during the last six months, particularly in oil production. 3.3(h)(2) , the only foreign air traffic permittedinto the country is one Soviet aeroflot plane weekly, while two new YAK-9 fighter planes patrol Tirana, reportedly in order tO stop clandestine overflights. The attache reports that heavily armed guards patrol the blacked-out streets at night. � Comment: Available information on Soviet and Satellite shipments to Albania tends to confirm the reported empha- sis on economic aid, with the probable aim of shoring up the stability of the Albanian regime. The Yugoslav Gpvernment still allows some Soviet overflights orAlbania, but makes such permission contingent on / each plane's landing in Belgrade. 8 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C03176553 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C03176553 - WESTERN EUROPE 10. Austria acting to reduce Communist police strength: 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) Austrian Interior Minister Helmer has assured US High Commissioner Donnelly that the Austrian Government will take im- mediate steps to remove Communists from the police forces; beginning with the discharge of 400 members of the Vienna administrative police. Helmer said that other purge operations would be conducted more slowly because of Soviet opposition and the absence of legislation enabling the government to dismiss police officers on the grounds of pro,-Communist sentiments. Helmer added that he has sent a reliable police officer to Graz (second to Vienna in Communist infiltration) to eliminate those responsible for Communist success there. Donnelly comments that the USSR will strongly resist any measures calculated to reduce Communist representation on the police force and that these developments may bring a "tightening of the general situation" In Austria. Comment: The surprisingly strong pro- Communist vote in the recent Vienna police union elections prompted a US-UK survey of Austrian police, which revealed that Communist strength In the police organization is much greater than responsible Austrian officials ha reviously indicated since then, the US High Commissioner / has pressed the Austrian Minister of Interior for remedial action. Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C03176553 3.5(c)