CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/05/10

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03176556
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: March 18, 2019
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2019
• Publication Date: May 10, 1951

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10 May 1951,
Copy No. ei-1
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
V01.61.4�1#
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASP
I 1 DECLASSIFIED -
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TA Slob.11
NEXT REVIEW DATE'
AUTH: FIR 70-A
DAT Ea 11 REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
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FAR EAST
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4. Communists make propaganda capital on serious health conditions
in North Korea (page 5).
5. Communist China offers Ceylon rice in exchange for rubber (page 5).
7. US Ambassador reports Indonesian attitudes toward Communism
(page 7).
NEAR EAST
8. US Ambassador appraises Iranian Prime Minister's strategy (page '7).
9. Syrian Israeli border situation continues serious (page 8).
EASTERN EUROPE
10. Yugoslays concerned regarding consequences of Western military
assistance (page 9).
WESTERN EUROPE
11. Don Juari comments on current situation in Spain (page 10).
LATIN AMERICA
12. Political crisis in Panama (page 10).
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
FAR EAST
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4. Communists make propaganda capital on serious health conditions
in North Korea (page 5).
5. Communist China offers Ceylon rice in exchange for rubber (page 5).
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7. US Ambassador reports Indonesian attitudes toward Communism
(page 7).
NEAR EAST
8. US Ambassador appraises Iranian Prime Minister's strategy (page 7).
9. Syrian Israeli border situation continues serious (page 8).
EASTERN EUROPE
10. Yugoslays concerned regarding consequences of Western military
assistance (page 9).
WESTERN EUROPE
11. Don Suati comments on current situation in Spain (page 10).
LATIN AMERICA
12. Political crisis in Panama (page 10).
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GENERAL
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4. Communists make propaganda capital on serious health conditions in �
North Korea:
Following a two week build-up in the Soviet
Orbit press, an 8 May North Korean radio
broadcast addressed to the UN accused US
and ROK forces of employing biological war-
fare against the North Korean population.
The broadcast, in addition to mentioning alleged ROK documents con-
cerning plans for the use of biological warfare, stated that the
American Armed Forces had "contaminated with smallpox" the inhabi-
tants in the areas of North Korea which they temporarily occupied.
Claiming that no smallpox had occurred in North Korea for the past
four years, the broadcast reported that a widespread outbreak had
occurred seven to eight days after North Korean territory had been
"liberated. "
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Comment: In addition to providing Communist
forces in Korea with an excellent propaganda device for internal and
international consumption, these claims may be an attempt to conceal
the failure of North Korean public health authorities to prevent the
outbreak of communicable diseases. While the incidence of smallpox
to date in North Korea is unknown, ROK intelligence in the Wonsan
area reported the outbreak of this disease earlier this year.
5. Communist China offers Ceylon rice in for rubber:
in 3.3(h)(2)
early May Communis ma asp- � ed
Ceylon with a proposal to barter 50, 000 tons3.3(h)(2)
of rice for an equivalent value of rubber.
The UK Government has expressed to Ceylon its strong disapproval
of such an arrangement.
Comment: Malaya's restrictions on rubber
exports to China, which were adopted in early April, have forced the
Communists to look for other sources of supply. The Communists
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have already agreed to export 100, 000 tons of rice to India in 1951,
half of which was to be exchanged.for gunny bags. Although China's
food situation is not favorable, the government can dispose of a few
hundred thousand tons of rice in exchange for industrial materials.
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7. US Ambassador reports Indonesian attitudes toward Communism:
During a conversation with President Sukarno,
US Ambassador Cochran referred to enthu-
siastic May Day celebrations as evidence of 3.3(h)(2)
Communist growth in Indonesia. Sukarno
quickly admitted this development and said
measures must be taken to check it.
Meanwhile, the new Indonesian Foreign
Minister, Subardjo, has reaffirmed Indonesia's "neutralism" in foreign
relations. When questioned regarding the export of strategic Indonesian
raw materials to Communist China, Subardjo stated that Indonesia
planned to sell "even to the devil" if the interests of the Indonesian
people are therby served.
comment: The Republic of Indonesia thus
far has refused to take a firm stand against Communism either with
regard to domestic problems or to external policy. There are no
indications that the new government will be more aggressive in this
respect Subardjo has pursued an opportunistic career and has a
record of associating with so-called "national Communists,"
NEAR EAST
8. US Ambassador appraises Iranian Prime Minister's strategy:
The US Embassy in Tehran has made the
following appraisal of the future course of
the Mossadeq government: The government
will concentrate on the oil problem to the
exclusion of other considerations, dropping electoral and budget re-
forms if such measures arouse opposition. Members of the Joint Oil
Committee will probably be promptly selected, at which time Prime
Minister Mossadeq will move cautiously. It is doubtful whether�
Mossadeq has any concrete plans as yet on how the nationalization
processes will be implemented. Aside from the above, Mossadeq's
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present strategy is probably designed to avoid friction with the Majlis,
and these tactics should keep him in office for at least three months
or- until the oil committee presents its recommendations to the Mains.
Factors which might cause an earlier upset are his poor health and�
popular impatience over the oil issue.
Comment: Mossadeq's National Front has
wide popular appeal but few Majlis representatives, and Mossadeq's
Cabinet Ministers - mostly old-line politicians - are Oikely to sup-
port measures that threaten their own interests. It is likely that
friction with the Majlis will develop.
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0. Syrian-Israeli border situation continues serious
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According to US Ambassador Davis in Tel
Aviv, the border situation between Israel
and Syria is still "far from encouraging."
Davis reports that Foreign Minister Sharett, 3.3(h)(2)
who is acting-Prime Minister while Bei..-
Gurion is in the US, is in a difficult position
in regard to the border issue because (a)
the Israeli public is disappointed over the
foreign reaction to the border incidents, and (b) the Israeli Army,
headed by Chief of Staff Yadin, lacks confidence in the Mixed Armis-
tice Commissioo. Meanwhile, US Minister Cannon in Damascus re-
ports that the tense atmosphere within Syria and the popular bitterness
resulting from the frontier incidents are increasing the difficulties of
the Syrian Government in any approach to a settlement of the dispute.
Cannon is concerned that Israel may annex the demilitarized area,
since colonization of this small but fertile region would help to release
the pressure on Israel's immigrant staging centers.
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Comment: Reports from the Palestine area
Indicated that fighting on a major scale ended, for the time being at
least, as a result of the UN Security Council cease-fire order of 8 May�
Skirmishes reported subsequently in the demilitarized zone north of
Lake Tiberias indicate, however, the continued seriousness of the.
Syrian-Israeli border troubles, which might again result in heavier
fighting. There is still some danger that the Israeli Army - hostile
toward the Mixed Armistice Commission, the Syrians and the local
Palestinian Arabs - will force the hand of the Israeli Government by
seizing part or'all of the demilitarized zones and presenting the UN
with a "fait accompli" that would be difficult to change.
EASTERN EUROPE
10. Yugoslays concerned regarding consequences of Western military
assistance:
US Ambassador Allen in Belgrade has been
informed
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that their
Government would make every effort to keep Western forces out of 3.3(h)(2
Yugoslavia in the event of war. Allen has learned that the Yugoslav
made a similar statement to Yugoslav of-
ficials there. Ambassador Allen comments that the Yugoslav Govern-
ment is aware that anti-Tito Yugoslays within Yugoslavia and abroad 3.3(h)(2)
are pressing for a US-UK commitment to send troops into Yugoslavia
in case of war.
Comment: These assurances by high Yugo-
slav officials are apparently calculated to allay the fears of Yugoslav
Communist Party members concerning the possible consequences of
the Western military assistance that the Tito government is now
seeking. Some Communist Party members undoubtedly fear that the
West would attempt to use its military forces in Yugoslavia to replace
the Communist regime with a pro-Western government
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WESTERN EUROPE
11. Don Juan comments on current situation in Spain:
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The special assistant to the US Ambassador
in Lisbon reports a conversation with Don
Juan, the Pretender to the Spanish throne, 3.3(h)(2)
in which the latter appeared for the first
time to be "cautiously optimistic" that Franco
would not be able to last much longer. In the
Pretender's opinion, no solution of Spain's
economic problems is possible unless the
present policies of the regime are drastically altered - - and this, he
believes, Franco is not willing to do. He stated that he was still con-3.3(h)(2)
sidering a meeting with Franco.
Comment:
Franco appears
to be making a serious effort to ins uce on uan o assume the throne
under his auspices in order to protect his position of leadership should
the internal situation continue to deteriorate. In this effort, he would
be supported by more conservative Monarchist elements who fear for
their own interests if the situation reaches the point of general public
disorder or if the present regime gives way to a constitutional Monarchy
in which the non-Communist left would have a major voice - - as it would
under commitments that Don juan.has made. Don Juan still appears
determined to wait until he can assume the throne in response to an
invitation of truly national proportions and on his own terms.
LATIN AMERICA
12. political crisis in Panama:
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The recent run on the Caja de Ahorros, the
savings bank patronized largely by the working
class, appears to have been President Arias'
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excuse for setting aside the 1946 Constitution,
dissolving the National Assembly, suspending
habeas corpus, and placing the justices of the 3.3(h)(2)
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Labor
Court "on a temporary basis." While the government insists that the
banking crisis was instigated by the Communists, other observers feel
that it may have been of the Government's own making in order to create
an appropriate atmosphere for a return to the 1941 Constitution. Top
US officials
are convinced that the 3.3(h)(2)
Communists have had relatively little or nothing. to do with recent
crises. A general strike against Arias has practically paralyzed the
capital, and there have been reports of a shooting incident in that city.
The press further reports that truckloads of Arias' supporters are
beginning to arrive in the city from outlying areas in government trucks.
There have also been reports of clashes between the National Police of
Colonel Remon and the Secret Police of Arias.
Comment: A return to the 1941 Constitution
would extend President Arias' term of office from 1952 to 1954 - -a 3.3(h)(2)
move he has desired for some time. Colonel Remon, Chief of the
National Police and usually considered as the chief factor in the sta-
bility of Panama, is not likely to continue supporting Arias unless the
latter restores the 1946 Constitution - - which Arias has already re-
portedly refused to do.
Popu-
lar reaction may force Remon to announce a decision shortly. Mean-
while, both sides are building up forces and riots can be expected to
continue. It is doubtful that these disorders will constitute any im-
mediate threat to the Canal Zone.
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