Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
May 24, 2019
Document Release Date: 
May 30, 2019
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 16, 1952
PDF icon CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15638440].pdf222.58 KB
Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 C03176568 , %.01 I ur 11E. SECURITY1NFORMATION 16 March 1952 Copy No.4 c) CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TO a C.; NEXT tiEVIEW DTF. AUTH: HR 70- DATE12,141 ...REVIEWER Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TOP RET SECUIU INFORMATION Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 C03176568 Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 C03176568 TOP ET SUMMARY FAR EAST 1. Sino-Soviet negotiations on Korea and Formosa reported (page 3). 2, Koenig may sic leed De Lattre in Indochina (page 3). NEAR EAST - AFRICA 3. Egyptian Government threatened by increasing domestic problems (page 4). 4, British Cabinet defines concessions to be offered Egypt (page 4). 5. Pakistan offers to delay presentation of Tunisian issue (page 5). WESTERN EUROPE 6. Spanish reported pessimistic on inclusion in Western defense (page 6). -2 Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 C03176568 Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 C03176568 -SECRET 3.5(c) FAR EAST 1. Sib-Soviet negotiations on Korea and Formosa reported: 3.3(h)(2) Sino-Soviet negotiations' on poli- cies for Korea and Formosa, which began on 15 February, were still in progress on 1 March. The USSR is said to desire that the Korean talks be delayed indefinitely, so that India and other Asian states can press for UN or Big Three discussion of the Korean question and all Asian problems, The Chinese, who consider the conquest of Formosa their primary objective, reportedly fear that an attempt to invade Formosawould provoke fife United States to extend the war into China. The USSR prefers that the Formosa operation be postponed pending a Big Three meeting. Comment: The USSR has made several attempts to transfer the Korean talks to the UN Security Council, where decisions would be subject to Soviet veto. The USSR made several feelers during 1951 regarding a Big Power meeting, but there have been no new overtures in recent months. Peiping's propaganda has frequently demanded control of Formosa as a condition for a Korean settlement and has often called for an international conference to settle outstanding Asian problems. Many sources have reported that Peiping still hopes to acquire Formosa as part of a general Asian settlement 2. Koenig may succeed De Lattre in Indochina: the posts of High Commissioner and Commander in Chief of French Forces in Indochina are again to be held jointly by a military man, probably General Pierre Koenig, Gaullist deputy in the National Assembly. - 3 - 3.3(h)(2) EfECI.ET Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 C03176568 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 C03176568 TC'SECRET 3.5(c) Koenig's appointment to this post would be acceptable to French civilian and military authorities in Indochina. Comment: Chairman of the Assembly's Na- tional Defense Committee, Koenig was formerly Chief of French Forces in Germany, where he succeeded De Lattre on the Allied Control Council. NEAR EAST - AFRICA 3. Egyptian Government threatened by increasing domestic problems: the Wafd 3.3(h)(2) Party has ordered a revival of student agitation and a renewal of the so-called "Liberation Battalion" operations against Rritisti military forces in the Suez Canal zone. former 3.3(h)(2) Premier Nahas Pasha, leader of the Wald, and Ali Maher, Prime Minister Hilali's immediate predecessor, have agreed to join forces against King Farouk. King Farouk, has been compromising Hilairs efforts e eLlmlnaLe govern nentaior- ruption by trying to obtain cabinet appointments for two "corrupt and un- scrupulous" palace favorites. Comment: The American Ambassador in Cairo has pointed out that Hilali has little support other than that of the palace, and that even this is of questionable value. During the past few weeks the Wafd Party has apparently been reorganizing for a showdown with the Premier. 3.3(h)(2) 4. British Cabinet defines concessions to be offered Egypt: The British Cabinet has authorized Ambassa- dor Stevenson to offer the Egyptian Government the progressive withdrawal of all British combat troops from the Canal zone in return for Egyptian participation in a Middle East defense organization. - 4 - 3.3(h)(2) TOP RET Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 C03176568 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 C03176568 A proposed joint communique would commit both governments in principle, leaving the implementation of the agree- ment to subsequent negotiations which would include other interested powers. Stevenson is given discretion to promise that, if conditions with- in Egypt permit, some British forces will be evacuated as soon as formal Anglo-Egyptian negotiations get under way. With regard to the Sudan, Britain will propose that the Governor General form a "Sudan Council of Ministers and Parlia- ment," whose interim decision on the issue of King Farouk's "symbolic sovereignty" over the Sudan will be accepted by the United Kingdom. Foreign Secretary Eden has told the US Am- bassador in London that he feels the Cabinet has made what for the moment are its maximum concessions to Egypt. Comment: The British and American Ambassa- dors in Cairo have both insisted that nothing short of Britain's recognition of King Farouk's new title will induce Egypt to begin negotiations for a general Anglo-Egyptian settlement. For reasons of general prestige the British Cabinet has been very reluctant to take any action which could be inter- preted as a repudiation of previous pledges to make no constitutional changes affecting the Sudanese without consulting them. 5. Pakistan offers to delay presentation of Tunisian issue: 3.5(c) According to a Pakistani Foreign Office 3.3(h)(2) spokesman, his government informed France that it would delay presentation of the Tunisian issue to the Security Council provided France were _ willing to release the mprisoned nationalists and stop repressive measures. �tle added that Indonesia is actually the prime mover in presenting the Tunisian problem, although Pakistan has assumed the chairmanship. - 5 - TOP �ET Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 C03176568 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/08/08 C03176568 TbPSECRET 3.5(c) Comment: The French Foreign Office is at- tempting to dissuade Pakistan from presenting the issue, but continues to insist that, before nationalist leaders can be released, the Tunisian Government must withdraw its petition for Security Council arbitration of the French-Tunisian disagreement. 3.3(h)(2) Pakistan is not an enthusiastic sponsor in this instance, but agreed to act in order to improve its position as a leader of the Moslem world. Iraq, not Indonesia, is the most active supporter of the Tunisian cause. WESTERN EUROPE 6. Spanish reported pessimistic on inclusion in Western defense: 3.3(h)(2) on Spanish press charges that France will veto any effort by the United States to include Spain in NATO, states that optimism initially created by Portuguese support during the NATO meeting in Lisbon has 'given way to a "profound depression." Ile attributes the change to the silent reception given the Portuguese Minister's plea for Spanish participation and to a recent announcement of increased US mili- tary and financial aid to France. Comment: With the fall of the British Labor government, France became the chief target of Spanish attacks for allegedly. obstructing Spain's participation in Western defense. Anti-French feeling has reached such heights since the Lisbon meeting that the rearmament of France is now characterLed as a to Spain. The Madrid government may, therefore, be preparing to press n the forthcoming US-Spanish negotiations for a tri- partite military agr,�ement among the United States, Spain, and Portugal, based on the Pyrenees line. TO' .RET Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 C03176568 3.5(c)