CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1956/11/07

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• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03176909
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• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2019
• Document Release Date: October 31, 2019
• Publication Date: November 7, 1956

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BULLETIN
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3.5(c)
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DOCUMENT NO.
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141.7 DATE'. �
:XT REVIEW
7 .November 1956
SC No. 05742/.56
Copy No. 112

DATE 744 cWTftI4T,7pJrR. _ �9-6-.�-1-112
I4 "
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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CONTENTS
1. THE SUEZ SITUATION
(page 3).
2. BRITISH AND FRENCH ACCEPTANCE OF SUEZ CEASE-
FIRE (S..scset)aiage 5).
3, SOVIET REACTION TO HOSTILITIES IN EGYPT
(page 6).
4. RHEE APPROACHES CHIANG AND DIEM ON MILITARY
ACTION AGAINST COMMUNISTS
(page 8).
5. THE HUNGARIAN SITUATION iggauderrtralr(page 9).
t/
6. WESTERN EUROPEAN REACTION TO HUNGARIAN CRISIS
404r-et�NefernThpage 11).
7. RUMANIAN REACTION TO HUNGARIAN DEVELOPMENTS
(S.e4Petttpage 13).
1. POLAND READY TO NEGOTIATE US AID (Coakieterragr
(page 14).
.7
9. GOMULICA SEEKS SUPPORT OF ALL POLISH FACTIONS
CCoafieterrtrE) (page 15).
10. SUSLOV SPEECH REAFFIRMS DECISIONS OF SOVIET
20th PARTY CONGRESS(Gettfidentra-I)Tpage 16).
11. LAST-MINUTE HITCH IN SINO-BURMESE BORDER TALKS
(page 18).
ANNEX--SNIE 11-9-56: SINO-SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE
SUEZ CRISIS (aeJeretr(page 19).
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1. THE SUEZ SITUATION (information as of 2200, 6 November)
Egypt has not yet indicated unequivocal
acceptance of the UN-announced cease-
fire which was to zo in effect at 1900
on 6 November.
impression
that the Nasr government is still anxious
o co-operate with the US in a settlement
and does not wish to accept Soviet help.
Despite indications that there is some
disillusionment with the regime among
certain groups, there is no organized
opposition. Nasr is in control of the
armed forces and the civilian popula-
tion accepts his leadership.
Cairo may be seizing on the announce-
ment of Anglo-French willingness to accept the cease-fire
as an opportunity to improve its own bargaining position.
Cairo radio said following the announcement that Egypt would
continue fighting "as long as there are aggressors on Egyp-
tian soil:' Other Egyptian conditions for accept-
ance of a cease-fire were that no outside help be furnished
the combatants, and that combatant forces be withdrawn be-
hind armistice lines--a reference to Israeli presence in Sinai.
Anglo-French forces announced capture
of the key. Suez Canal city of Ismailia, central point on the
canal on the main road to Cairo, shortly before the cease-
fire deadline. It was not indicated whether the force which
allegedly took Ismailia advanced overland from Port Said,
attacked from Sinai, or made an airborne landing. Previously,
the Anglo-French command announced that it had gained con-
trol of Port Said town and that its forces were advancing down
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the road to Ismailia. By noon on 6 November at least
7,000 Anglo-French troops had landed in the Port Said
area. If the cease-fire is implemented it will not, ac-
cording to Prime Minister Eden, prevent the landing of
"necessary supplies and administrative troops."
A cease-fire in the Suez conflict would
leave unresolved the problems of Israel's relations with its
other Arab neighbors. Terrorists from both Syria and Jor-
danduring the last few days,
and
Once the operatars have en-
tered Israel their recall is almost impossible. Should a
cease-fire in Egypt not be followed by something like a
cease-fire in practice on Israel's northern and eastern bor-
ders, Tel Aviv might still be tempted to send forces to
occupy West Jordan. Whether the Israelis would in fact
do so would probably depend basically on the seriousness
with which they regard the Soviet warnings to Israel and
Soviet promises of support for the Arabs.
Aside from a token force of Saudis
which has reportedly entered Jordan, no new Arab troop
deployment has been announced. Twenty MIG-15 jet fighters
were apparently redeployed from Egypt to Syria prior to
1 November,
Damascus radio on
6 November announced that two syrian aircraft had inter-
cepted and shot down one of three British Canberra jet light.
bombers which violated Syrian territory. It was claimed
that the aircraft crashed in Lebanon.
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2. BRITISH AND FRENCH ACCEPTANCE OF SUEZ CEASE-
FIRE (information as of 2200, 6 November)
Quick acceptance by Britain and France
of a cease-fire with Egypt under condi-
tions considerably less than they had
demanded on 5 November evidently re-
flects a sharp turn toward caution
following receipt of threatening notes
from Moscow.
The cease-fire terms accepted by the
two nations notably fail to provide for
any approach to a general Middle East
settlement or for any regime for the
Suez Canal itself, as demanded by Eden and Mollet.
Acceptance enables Britain and France
to evade the risks inherent in trying to maintain a position
athwart the length of the canal without destroying the Egyp-
tian army and seizing Cairo and the Nile delta. From their
present holdings they can block any canal arrangement un-
satisfactory to them. French premier Monet has claimed
to have all the necessary equipment on the spot to reopen
the canal, but the British Admiralty estimates it will take
two to three months to reopen it.
The overthrow of Nasr presumably re-
mains an important objective, especially for Paris. Though
apparently obliged to forego his overthrow immediately, the
British and French still hope to induce the Egyptian people
to replace him.
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3. SOVIET REACTION TO HOSTILITIES IN EGYPT
� Egyptian public information office appealed to the world for
volunteers, arms and other help. An unscheduled Moscow
news bulletin on 6 November broadcast the Egyptian plea and
stated, "she needs your help."
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It is possible that the Soviet government
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wanted the public appeal for help as justification for uni-
lateral action. Shepilov's promise of "other immediate
effective meanOrhowever, was sufficiently vague to sug-
gest that Moscow has not yet decided to take unilateral
action.
Soviet and Communist Chinese broad-
casts report mass rallies in Russian and Chinese cities
since 2 November to condemn the Anglo-French "aggres-
sions." TASS on 6 November stated that, in the defeat of
the Soviet motion in the UN on 5 November, the United
States "openly sided with the aggressors" and would be
primarily responsible for a spread in the conflict.
According to a press report on 5 Novem-
ber, the Soviet spokesman who disclosed the Bulganin and
Shepilov messages to newsmen stressed the USSR envisaged
action in co-operation with other nations.
On 6 November, the British embassy
compound was broken into by Moscow crowds. The British
ambassador asked the Soviet Foreign Ministry for adequate
police protection through Ambassador Bohlen. The demon-
strations may have been intended only as reprisals for re-
cent attacks on Soviet embassies in Western capitals, but
Ambassador Bohlen commented that "the fact remains the
Soviet people are being conditioned for any action which the
government may be preparing to taker
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4. RHEE APPROACHES CHIANG AND DIEM ON MILITARY
ACTION AGAINST COMMUNISTS
President Rhee has sent letters to the
presidents of Nationalist China and
South Vietnam, advising them that now
is perha7s the time to attack the Corn-
munists,
Rhee also
in
any war in Asia, the Communists must
appear to be the aggressors or the United States would
forsake Korea.
The American embassy in Saigon re-
ports that the Korean minister to South Vietnam delivered
a "personal letter" to President Diem on 5 November. the
contents of which were not disclosed.
We AUL" thin min-
ister's affability and self-satisfaction "had reached a point
of incandescence at complete odds with his verbal expres-
sions of worry and despair over the situation in Hungary
and the Near East:'
Comment The uprisings in Eastern Europe have
renewed President Rhee's hope of uni-
fying Korea by military force. He apparently is thinking
in terms of "rescuing" the North Korean people in the un-
likely event they respond to his efforts to encourage a re-
bellion against Communist rule. The possibility of an
incident to provoke fiehtina is still under consideration.
Both Diem and President Chiang Kai-
shek are sympathetic to Rhee's ambition to unify Korea, by
force if necessary. They are unlikely to agree to any joint
operation, however, unless they expect direct participa-
tion of American forces after fighting starts.
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5, THE HUNGARIAN SITUATION (information as of 1700,
6 November)
Although armed patriots continue to re-
sist Soviet attack in Budapest and in at
least two areas in the provinces, the
Hungarian revolution is for all practical
purposes at an end. The American lega-
tion in Budapest has reported that Hun-
garian security police were back in uni-
forms and, under the protection of Soviet
troops, were already searching houses
and arresting people.
Radio Pecs announced at 0530 on 6 Novem-
ber that all those still bearing arms could return home un-
harmed if their weapons were surrendered by 0800. Although
this was only noted on a regional radio network, presumably
such an amnesty was in effect throughout the country. It
represents an extension of the amnesty announced on 5 Novem-
ber.
The Budapest legation reports that the
Soviet forces in their efforts to storm the Kilian barracks--
one of the last rebel strongholds--fired on a children's clinic,
ignoring the protests of several Western legations. The lega-
tion also reported that the Soiiiet troo,ps had fired on the
Yugoslav legation and "killed one younger diplomat, while
wounding several others."
The Kadar regime is faced with a seri-
ous problem in restoring the nation's economy. Hourly ap-
peals over most of the nation's radio stations reveal the size
of the job now confronting the regime: foodstuffs, medicines
and other staples are in short supply, transportation is at a
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virtual standstill, and most industrial plants, if in opera-
tion at all, are working with skeleton labor forces. On
5 November, Moscow announced that the Soviet government
would send free food, building supplies and medicines im-
mediately, as well as raw materials and fuel in advance of
the regularly scheduled time of shipment. This was in
apparent response to a plea for aid by Kadar to all Com-
munist countries.
Western relief supplies have been held
up at the Austrian-Hungarian border since the renewed
Soviet offensive of 4 November.
Kadar's regime has continued to promise
a national Communist program, dedicated to Hungarian in-
dependence within the socialist camp and an internal policy
characterized by moderation and economic reform.
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6. WESTERN EUROPEAN REACTION TO HUNGARIAN CRISIS
Comment on:
The Soviet Union's repression of the
Hungarian rebellion has aroused greater
concern in Western Europe than the
situation in the Middle East. Public
opinion in several countries tends to
regard Western impotence to deal with
Soviet brutality in Hungary as a sign
of grave flaws in the Western alliance.
In West Germany, the Adenauer govern-
ment interprets Hungarian developments as a warning of
what could happen in East Germany. According to the press,
the Bonn government is considering a program to form a
corps of troops ready for immediate action. A crash build--
up of two or three divisions was reportedly discussed at a
cabinet meeting on 5 November. Foreign Minister Brentano
told the American embassy immediate action is necessary
to restore the Western unity disrupted by the Anglo-French
moves in Egypt.
In France, the press echoes the government's
criticism of the slowness of the United Nations to condemn the
Soviet Union while it was quick to act against the British-French
intervention in Egypt.
Portions of the British press friendly to
Eden deplore Britain's intervention in Egypt when world at-
tention should be focused on Hungary. Editorials critical of
the government's Middle East policy state that the attack on
Egypt may have tipped the scales in Hungary.
All speakers at the North Atlantic Council
session on 5 November urged positive measures against the
Soviet Union. The Netherlands proposed UN action to send
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observers to Hungary. The Italian representative, how-
ever, did not advance Italy's tentative suggestion, made on
4 November to the American embassy in Rome, that all
Western nations consider breaking off relations with the
entire Soviet bloc.
The Scandinavian press condemns the
� Soviet Union in the strongest terms, and expresses the
opinion that events prove the impossibility of peace and co-
existence with the USSR.
Chancellor Raab and the Austrian cabinet
do not appear concerned over possible extension to Austria
of the hostilities in Hungary, according to the American em-
bassy in Vienna. Vienna evidently expects, however, that
Soviet press charges of Austrian interference in Hungary may
be followed up with official protests. iNO.E0Pa+)--
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7. RUMANIAN REACTION TO HUNGARIAN DEVELOPMENTS
The American legation in Bucharest has
rpepiveri information
that repressive action
was taken last week against students in
three universities in western Rumania.
One thousand students were arrested in Timisoara University
immediately following a student meeting, where the students
had been encouraged by invited authorities to speak freely.
Many arrests were also reported in Targu Mures University,
and the Cluj Hungarian University has been closed.
party first
secretary Gheorghiu-Dej was summoned to Moscow on 31 Oc-
tober and had not returned by 4 November. On the morning
of 2 November, the extreme nervousness on the part of Rumanian
officials, was replaced by a show of complete confidence, which
Indicated that this was the date on which the So-
viet decision to move additional forces into Hungary was com-
municated to Bucharest.
Comment The Rumanian regime appears to have the
situation under control, despite limited un-
rest and discontent, particularly among the large Hungarian
minority in Transylvania. To forestall any outbreak, it has
taken a number of precautionary measures during the past two
weeks. Identity cards are being checked, factory guards have
been doubled, surveillance of diplomats has increased, and
diplomatic travel has been sharply and arbitrarily restricted.
The USSR's strong action to quell the Hun-
garian revolt has served further to intimidate the general popu-
lation and has reinforced the regime's sense of security. The
legation in Bucharest believes that the Rumanian regime will
resist popular pressures for the removal of Soviet troops.
jf,jEcjitErr-
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8, POLAND READY TO NEGOTIATE US AID
The Polish news agency's announcement
of 3 November that Poland is ready to
conclude aid agreements with the United
States suggests that the Poles are pre-
pared to negotiate regardless of the outcome of future eco-
nomic talks with the Kremlin. The pointed insistence, how-
ever, that such agreements should not be conditioned by
various forms of control indicates that the Poles will not ac-
cept economic assistance involving an American voice in
the use of the aid. Poland is acting in accord with its own
concept of sovereignty but at the same time probably wants
to reassure the USSR of its orientation. Poland may also
fear that the United States may raise the question of com-
pensation for the nationalization of American property in
Poland.
The announcement indicates that the
Warsaw regime is more interested in credits than grants,
and would probably like to negotiate a long-term loan as
well as favorable trade exchanges.
While current food shortages could intensify
Poland's need for immediate aid, Ambassador Jacobs in War-
saw believes that the Poles may not pursue the matter further
unless the United States replies to the Warsaw note of 8 Octo-
ber calling for an American Polish discussion of "all prob-
lems, the settlement of which would contribute to normaliza-
tion and widening of Polish-American relations."
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9. GOMULKA. SEEKS SUPPORT OF ALL POLISH FACTIONS
Polish first secretary Wladyslaw
Gomulka is taking further measures,
including attempts to gain the sup-
port of a variety of political factions,
to ensure Poland's "independent" po-
sition. In a 4 November speech he
appealed to the nation to refrain from
demonstrations, and stated that every-
one--including former socialists and
pro-Soviet Communists--who believes
in the party's present policies should
be allowed to work for the party, be
elected to party organs, and be judged
according to the quality of his work.
This policy will probably be attractive
to many socialists who were purged in 1948, when the social-
ists merged with the Communists. While most of the pro-
Soviet party leaders have already been dropped by Gomulka,
he probably thinks that the leaderless elements of the pro-
Soviet faction pose no serious threat.
According to an official Polish announce-
ment, 35 Russian officers in the Polish armed forces, in-
cluding five generals, have been replaced by Polish officers.
Gomulka has also promised that the scope
of the security apparatus will be reduced and that secret po-
lice methods will be changed. He added that the regime "can-
not, however, let anybody spit in our faces." He also stated
that press statements must conform to the party's program,
and only if they do so will the need for censorship be elimi-
nated. (coNFIDENTrAT)
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10. SUSLOV SPEECH REAFFIRMS DECISIONS OF SOVIET
20TH PARTY CONGRESS
The speech delivered by party presidium
member Suslov at the Soviet revolution
anniversary celebration on 6 November
maintains the Soviet leaders' commitment
to the broad lines of foreign and domestic
policy established at the Soviet 20th Party Congress last
February.
In the field of foreign affairs, Suslov gave
no indication that the setbacks to Soviet policies and prestige
caused by recent events in Eastern Europe and the Middle
East will lead the Soviet leaders to abandon or substantially
alter the general policy orientation established by the party
congress.
Suslov stated that despite Western efforts
to increase international tension, the past year has witnessed
a further relaxation which has improved the prospects for
consolidating peace. He stressed the USSR's willingness to
meet the Western powers half way in the settlement of out-
standing problems and its determination to improve relations
with the United States, Britain and France.
Suslov offered no new proposals for deal-
ing with the Middle East crisis. He noted Bulganin's letter
to President Eisenhower calling for joint Soviet-American ac-
tion to end the fighting in Egypt and repeated the standard
charges that Britain and France, by attacking Egypt, are try-
ing to halt the "steady crumbling of the colonial system:'
There was no reference of any kind in the
speech to Poland's bid for greater independence from Soviet
controL Suslov's lengthy discussion of recent events in Hungary
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followed the established line that reactionary antisocialist
elements, directed by international reaction, were attempt-
ing to restore the capitalist order. He argued that a victory
for "reaction and fascism" would have created a danger to
other socialist countries "by bringing their frontiers closer
to the imperialist bases." As for the future, Hungary will
continue to be a member of the "family of socialist countries:'
Suslov indicated that the main lines of
Soviet internal policy will remain in effect. Priority of heavy
Industry, the agricultural program including the new lands
campaign, and recent measures for improving the welfare of
the people were among the policies reaffirmed. As was the
case in the public speeches at the 20th party congress, the at-
tack on the cult of Stalin was not emphasized, however.
4CONFIDErNTIA-t)
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11. LAST-MINUTE HITCH IN SINO-BURMESE BORDER TALKS
3ino-Burmese border negotiations have
)ecome deadlocked because of the re-
usal of Kachin representatives on the
lelegation headed by U Nu to agree to
"ession of the Hpimaw tract to Commu-
rifst 'China,
The Chinese are insisting on an over-all settlement,
and have given the impression that their demand for Hpimaw
is firm. Since the Burmese delegation foresaw no prospect
for a change in Peiping's position, it planned to return to Ran-
goon on 6 November.
Comment With the exception of the small Hpimaw
area, Peiping has accepted all of Burma's
border terms. Rangoon's willingness to jeopardize an other-
wise favorable settlement attests to the importance it attaches
to conciliation of Burma's sizable minority groups which in-
habit most of Burma north of Mandalay. These groups have
long feared a "sellout" by Rangoon, and they would be strongly
tempted to follow the Machin example if the latter carried out
the threat of their leaders to secede from the union if Hpimaw
is given to Peiping.
Central government leaders, who are all
prepared to sacrifice Hpimaw, probably will attempt to over-
come Kachin objections by some compensatory concession be-
fore Chou En-lai visits Burma in early December.
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ANNEX
Special National Intelligence
Estimate 11-9-56 of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee, dated 6 Novem-
ber 1956 and titled "Sino-Soviet Inten-
tions in the Suez Crisis," follows:
1. The Soviet notes to Eden and Mollet constitute strong
threats of military action against the UK, France, and Israel
In connection with the Suez crisis. These threats are im-
precise, however. They do not include a definite expression
of Soviet intent to take unilateral military action; they still
specifically call for UN action. Nevertheless, they are clearly
intended to imply that the USSR may act alone.
2. There are several reasons for strong Soviet action
in the Suez crisis:
(a) to reassert the Soviet position as the
champion of Egypt and of anti-colonial countries gen-
erally;
(b) to distract attention, both within and out-
side the Bloc, from the situation in Hungary;
(c) to damage the interests and prestige of the
UK and France and further divide and weaken the Western
Alliances;
(d) possibly, to re-establish the fear of the use
of Soviet military force as a primary factor in world af-
fairs.
3. We believe that our previous estimate that the USSR
wishes to avoid general war continues to be valid.
4. It is our present estimate that the USSR:
(a) will almost certainly not attack metropol-
itan UK or France - primarily because such an attack
would make general war practically certain;
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(b) will probably not employ Soviet forces
on a large scale in the Eastern Mediterranean - pri-
marily because their capability to do so at an early
date is inadequate, also because the risk of general
war arising from such action would be very great;
(c) may make small-scale attacks by air
or submarine against UK and French forces in the
Eastern Mediterranean - for the purpose of creat-
ing further pressures toward a UN settlement satisr
factory to themselves, and showing themselves as
the reliable champion of Egypt;
(d) will continue to furnish military aid in
the form of materiel, technicians, and logistics to
Syria, and through Syria to the other Arab States,
probably on an increased scale. They will probably
send volunteers;
(e) will at the least continue by threats to
seek to create alarm in the West, in order to produce
a UN settlement tolerable to the USSR.
5. With respect to the implied threat to the UK of using
"rockets" (presumably guided missiles with nuclear warheads),
the USSR is estimated to have the capability of delivering low
yield atomic weapons by ballistic missiles with 800 nautical
mile range which could reach the UK if launched from the
Satellites. The 800 mile missile could reach major Israeli
and Cypriot targets but not Egypt itself. Air-to-surface mis-
siles, and probably submarine launched missiles with nuclear
warheads are also within current Soviet capabilities and could
pose a threat to all areas. We do not believe that the USSR
would employ guided missiles with nuclear warheads in the
Egyptian-Israeli conflict.
6. To attack Israel or Franco-British forces in the East-
ern Mediterranean (except those on Cyprus) from present Bloc
bases, the USSR would have to use aircraft of the Long-Range
Air Force, or use IL-28 jet light bombers on missions involv-
ing no return to the Bloc. Establishment of bases for IL-28
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\vie'
bombers in Syria, Jordan, or Iraq is an alternative possi-
bility, but would involve considerable problems of logistical
support and defense of such bases, especially if they were
used for sustained operations.
7. With respect to the Far East, we believe it possible,
though it does not at present seem probable, that the Suez
crisis might develop in such a way as to cause the Chinese
Communists to take advantage of it by an attack on the British
Crown Colony of Hong Kong.
8. This estimate is based on intelligence received up
to 1100 hours EST, 6 November. In the fast developing situa-
tion our estimates of this situation must be kept under constant
review. The flow of events will be drastically affected by day
to day decision and action of the main participants, including in
particular the USA, and the estimate the Soviet Union reaches
as to the probable course of action of the USA, and the UK and
France.
7 Nov 56
�Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 21
Approved for Release: 2019/10/24 C03176909