CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/05/19

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03179249
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: May 19, 1960

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19 May 1960
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19 MAY 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Statements of Khrushchev and other So-
viet spokesmen in Paris designed to give
impression USSR will continue bitter line
on U-2 incident but take no other action
in next few months to increase tension. CD
Mikoyan may be slated for removal.
Soviet-Iraqi relations evincing gradual
deterioration.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Nehru considering two-day visit to Khru-
shchev next week.
Turkey--Menderes' prestige at all-time
low in Istanbul.
South African Government refuses to
terminate state of emergency.
New Zealand premier's statement sug-
gests desire for early recognition of
Communist China.
South Vietnam�Diem regime deprecates
"manifesto" by disaffected officials but
moves to head off further criticism.
III. THE WEST
�Former Castro cabinet minister said to
feel recognition of Peiping by Cuba is
imminent.
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CENTRAL INT
ELLIGENCE BULLETIN
19 May 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: ahrushchev's final press conference on 18 May
and the iThe being taken both publicly and privately by other
Soviet spokesmen in Paris are designed to give the impres-
sion that while the Soviet premier, for the foreseeable future,
will vigorously press his bitter anti-American campaign on
the U-2 issue, he does not intend to make any sharp reversals
In the other major lines of his foreign policy. Foreign Minis-
ter Gro:myko told British Foreign Secretary Lloyd
0 that the USSR would take no action in the months im-
mediately ahead which would increase tensions or make trouble.
*This point was echoed by Yuriy Zhukov, chairman of the
State Committee for Foreign Cultural Relations, Khrushchev,
Gromyko, and Zhukov all seemed to assume that negotiations
on disarmament and a nuclear test ban would continue. Zhu-
kov indicated that Khrushchev had played "this one by ear,"
that even those in his own retinue did not know what he might
do from one minute to the next, and that a central committee
meeting and a subsequent bloc conference were virtual cer-
tainties (Page 1)
*USSR: Mikoyan is slated for removal from the Soviet lead-
ership, according' to some of the rnmmliniRt enrrPsnondPnts
now in Paris.
Mikoyan differed
with Khrushchev over the latter's harsh reaction to the U-2 inci-
dent. An unconfirmed press report states that Mikoyan, who has
not been identified in Moscow since 7 May, is "on holiday." The
removal of the durable Armenian, who has played a large part in
� the making of Soviet foreign policy--particularly in recent years
would probably also mean the removal of a moderating influence
on Khrushchev. (Page 3)
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USSR-Iraq:araqi security services since 10 May have und r,
taken intensive surveillance of the Soviet Embassy and homes of
bloc diplomatic personnel] (While Moscow and Baghdad officially
remain on good terms, the Iraqi ambassador to Moscow reportedly
commented during a recent trip to Baghdad that the two countries
are "not as close as they were a few months ago" and that Soviet
it leaders are increasingly less well disposed toward Qasing These
1 developments tend to substantiate the gradual decline in Iraqi-
Soviet relations marked by Qasim's refusal in February to license
the orthodox Communist party, the failure of Mikoyan's April visit
to produce significant results, and recent signs that Baghdad would
like to improve relations with the West.
(Page 4)
[I. ASIA-AFRICA
India-USSR: [Nehru, en route home from the Commonwealth
conference, on 16 May was reportedly considering a two-day visit
to Moscow for talks with Khrushchev, probably around 26-27 May,
before returning to India. Nehru
had received letters from Khrushchev repeating an
earlier invitation to come to Moscow as soon as possible and was
awaiting further word before making final plans. Nehru, now in
the UAR, probably has been badly shaken by developments at the
summit. Any decision to go to Moscow now presumably, depends
on his revised assessment of the situation and on whether he feels
his personal intervention would help ease tensions:1
Turkey: The prestige of Prime Minister Menderes is at an
/ all-time low in Istanbul, and opposition elements there have gained
a new sense of confidence. LTurkish security forces expect a large
- demonstration in Ankara on 19 May, a Turkish youth and sports hol-
idayj Page 5)
South Africa: The South African Government apparently intends
to maintain its present authoritarian policy, despite mounting crit-
icism within the country's white community. In parliament on 16
May, Justice Minister Erasmus refused to yield to .vociferous oppo-
sition demands that the seven-week-old state of emergency be lifted,
stating that the emergency regulations must remain in force at least
19 May 60
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until 20 alleged Communists who are fugitives in neighboring
British-controlled territories are returned to the Union. The
American Embassy in Cape Town notes an increasing govern-
ment tendency to blame the recent disturbances on Communist
agitation. (Page 6)
New Zealand:[Prime Minister Nash's 13 May statement
that The' Commonwealth conference in London generally recog-
nized "the early need for Chinese participation in disarmament
measures" suggests that he may be contemplating recognition o
Communist China, partly to fulfill a pledge of the Labor party
1957 platform, before the next elections in November. Nash,
however, would presumably seek some prior consultation with
New Zealand's principal allies, inasmuch as he considers recog-
nition a question of timing, and would seek to avoid any timing
damaging to Western prestigej
(Page 7)
South Vietnam: Ellie Diem regime, while outwardly ignoring
the miiCE:Fth"ITEWed "manifesto" for democratic reforms issued
� in Saigon recently by a group of former officials, is maneuvering
to head off more serious criticism. The government is taking pains
to retain the loyalty of student elements, and has instigated a smear
campaign in the press against the opposition group, labeling it "for-
eign inspired?' Diem apparently plans more direct repression, but
is withholding action until he can calculate international reactiopj
(Page 8)
I I L THE WEST
Cuba - Communist China: Castro's former minister of finance
Is reported to have commented privately on 16 May that the Cuban
Government is "under heavy pressure" to recognize Communist
China immediately and that he felt the move is imminent. Many
regime officials are sympathetic to the Chinese Communists. Cu-
ban Armed Forces Inspector General William Galvez Rodriguez
recently had two audiences with Mao Tse-tung. According to the
New China News Agency, Galvez said in Peiping on 12 May that the
Cuban people want to intensify their "intimate relationship" with the
Chinese people and to unite with them "in opposition to the imneri-
aliRts nf fhp TIq
19 may to
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IV, WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
[On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the Unite
States Intelligence Board concludes that3
A. Iso Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hos-
tilities against the United States or its possessions
In the immediate 1uture2
B, CNo Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to
initiate direct military action against US forces
abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the orbit
In the immediate futurej
CAPPlicable to both above conclusions
Cwith respect to the breakup of the summit conference,
no Soviet bloc military activity has been detected which
conveys threatening implicationfili
C. CThe following developments are susceptible of direct
exploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action which
could jeopardize the security of the US in the imme-
diate futurtg
ale Situation Regarding Berlin and East Germany)
L_While there are no indications that the Soviet Union in-
tends in the innimediate future to turn over Berlin access
controls to the East German regime, there are indica-
tions that the USSR will increase pressure on the West
with regard to the Berlin issue, including specific steps
toward a separate peace treaty with East Germany
19 May 60 DAILY BRIEF
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I. TH.E COMMUNIST BLOC
1Chrushchey's Post- urrilnit Policy
[Khrushchev's 18 May press conference suggests that he
will vigorously press his bitter anti-American campaign in
an attempt to brand the United States as responsible for pre-
venting a summit meeting. Moscow has already requested an
urgent meeting of the UN Security Council and will probably
also keep the issue alive with the trial of the American pilot.]
CHowever, Ithrushchey's extemporaneous remarks on
other East-West issues tncrethpr with thp linP takAn by For-
eign Minister Gromyko
are designed to give the impression that
Moscow does not intend to make any sharp reversals in the
other major lines of its foreign policy. Both Khrushchev and
Gromyko dealt with the disarmament and nuclear test ban con-
ferences in a manner which implied that they expected the nego-
tiations to continue. Khrushchev warned, however, that the
USSR would resume nuclear testing if the United States did so
and that Moscow would not tolerate "procrastination" on dis-
armamentp
LIn response to Lloyd's questioning, Gromyko stated that
the USSR intended no action to increase tensions or make
trouble during the six- to eight-month interval proposed by
Khrushchev before another summit. He avoided a direct an-
swer as to whether Khrushchev would sign a separate peace
treaty during his visit to Berlin, and repeated the standard
Soviet position that, if no agreement were reached, Moscow
would be forced to sign a separate treaty. Khrushchev took
a similar position in his press conference, but he warned that
the USSR had almost reached the "limits" of its effort to con-
clude a treaty with both Germanys and that, when this point
was reached, the treaty would be signed and announced to
the world_03
C..Yuriy Zhukov, Soviet cultural relations leader, con-
firmed the general line taken by Khrushchev and Gromykofy
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Lon future Soviet policy, saying that "neither side would wish
to push tension to a point which would make a later meeting
impossible," and that the disarmament and test-ban confer-
ences and the cultural exchange program should "go forward6
L:Zhukov said the�USSR had felt even before the U-2 inci-
dent that the Americans were reneging on "previously given
assurances of a desire to achieve a mutually satisfactory
Berlin settlement." fie maintained that in the U-2 incident
the USSR had given the United States "several possible outs"
but American statements closed these "escape batches" one
by one!)
Both Zhukov and a Pravda. correspondent expressed doubt
that e USSR now would act unilaterally on Berlin, but Zhukov
added, "I'm not a gypsy." Zhukov gave the impression that
the USSR had been led to expect greater flexibility in the US
position in Berlin.]
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Mikoyares Status in Doubt
Communist correspondents in Paris are saying that
Mikoyan will be the "next man to leave the Communist hier-
archy in the SnviPt Urrinn " seenrcling tn a Weatprn npwa
source.
Mikoyan had criticized Khru-
shchev for overplaying the U-2 incident.
according to some information" ivnicoya.n
told Khrushchev that the limits of exploitation of the inci-
denthad been reached� and that he should moderate his of-
fensive tone in order to preserve the fruits of the success.-
ful initial handling. "it
is said" that Mikoyan had criticized 1Chrushchev's harsh ac-
tion in the affair.
Mikoyan apparently was absent from Moscow during the
week preceding the opening of the summit conference, prob-
ably the most critical period in the formulation of Soviet
policy on the U-2 incident and the summit conference. He
attended the Supreme Soviet session which ended on 7 May,
but was not present at the 9 May celebration marking the
anniversary of the defeat of Germany, nor, was he on hand
for Khrushchev's departure for Paris on 14 May. All other
full members of the party presidium were present for both
events. One Western news service, in an unconfirmed dis-
patch datelined Moscow, 14 May, stated that Mikoyan was
"on holiday."
Mikoyan, who has been primarily concerned with Soviet
foreign relations for several years, has long seemed to be
the most "Western-oriented" member of the Soviet regime.
His relationship with Khrushchev, which was especially
close, was apparently based on mutual respect and similar-
ity of views. The removal of Mikoyan, heretofore one of the
most durable of the Soviet leaders, would also remove one of
the strong moderating influences on Khrushchev.
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Soviet= Iraqi Relations Continue Slow Decline
[The USSR and Iraq are "not as close as they were a few
months ago" and Soviet leaders are increasingly less well dis-
posed toward Qasim,
This
conclusion is in line with growing signs that while Moscow and
Baghdad remain officially on good terms an-a bloc aid programs
have not been affected, relations have slowly declined as a re-
sult of the Qasim regime's moves against Iraq's Communists and
indications that Baghdad would like to improve its ties with the
West. The visit to Iraq of First Deputy Premier Mikoyan in
early April failed to counter these trends.
Moscow is particularly irritated over Qasim's efforts to split
Communist ranks by his continued backing of a splinter group
which was licensed in February as the "Communist party of Iraq."
This group, which is having difficulty in developing even a rudi-
mentary political machine, was recently given a six-month ex-
tension to fulfill Iraqi legal requirements for calling a party con-
vention. The Qasim government has also continued to refuse to
give recognition to the Moscow-backed Communists as a legal
party.
Soviet annoyance with Qasim has been reflected as
in March when a quasi-official lecturer. in Moscow censured the
Iraqi leader for "using" the Communists, but the Soviet press and
radio have withheld open criticism.
ion the Iraqi side, Qasim's growing suspicion of bloc activ-
ities is shown in intensive surveillance by Iraqi security service
starting 10 May of the Soviet Embassy and the homes of bloc diplo-
matic personneD During the past few weeks Qasim has placed anti-
Communist officers in command of several air force squadrons, and
the influence of the pro-Communist commander of the air force,
Brig. Jalal al-Awqati, has been curtailed. Baghdad has also re-
cently allowed two anti-Communist papers, which had been previ-
ously closed down, to resume publication. Both are strenuously
attacking Communists.
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,ffiler
II. ASIA -AFRICA
Turkish Internal Situation
The prestige of Turkish Prime Minister Menderes' regime
is reported at an all-time low in Istanbul, and articulate opin-
ion now is described as "universally anti-Menderes." Opposi-
tion elements in the Republican People's party (RPP), the press,
and the universities, according to the American consul general
in Istanbul, are confident of their ability to resist and ultimate-
ly defeat the government.
CA_ large-scale demonstration reportedly is planned for Ankara
on 19 May, the Turkish youth and sports holiday, but otherwisej
the country remains relatively quiet. The next move appears up
to the government; the RPP continues its recently adopted posi-
tion of 'watchful waiting.
Meanwhile, business is reported at a standstill in Istanbul,
with businessmen uncertain about the future and general services
totally dependent on continuation of martial law. The city's re-
turn to normal police control, the reopening of the universities,
or the re-establishment of a relatively free press would result
In new and probably more violent disorders, according to the
consul general.
The army on the surface is maintaining its traditional role
of aloofness from internal politics, but there are increasingly
frequent reports of intervention by senior army officers to
restrain the police or government from excessively repressive
measures. Many junior and middle-grade army officers, de-
scribed as economically dissatisfied. are believed sympathetic
to the opposition.
--SEeitEr-
19 may 60 CENTI2A1 INTFI I ICZFKICF RI II I FTIN
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CONFIDENTIAL
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South Africa to Continue Authoritarian Policies
The South African Government apparently intends to main-
tain its present authoritarian policy, despite mounting criticism
within the country's white community. In parliament on 16 May,
Justice Minister Erasmus refused to yield to vociferous opposi-
tion demands that the seven-week-old state of emergency be
lifted. He said that 157 Communists were behind the recent dis-
turbances and that 20 of these leaders had escaped to neighboring
British-controlled territories. He said that the emergency regu-
lations would remain in effect at least until the agitators were re-
turned to the Union for trial.
Conservative members of the ruling Nationalist party have
renewed their campaign to establish closer control over the op-
position press. A leading Nationalist member of parliament
warned on 16 May that the government "will have to be prepared
either to close down newspapers or at least summon those re-
sponsible for them and tell them what is expected of them?' This
statement brought an immediate denial from Interior Minister
Naude, a relatively moderate Nationalist.
Although Prime Minister Verwoerd may move to moderate
some of the harsher aspects of apartheid when he resumes lead-
ership of the government, the Nationalists have shown no indica-
tion of letting up in their drive to suppress the "agitators and
gangsters" whom they consider responsible for the riots last
March. Since conservative Nationalists usually characterize
the opposition press and relatively liberal political parties as
"agitators," pressure on these groups may be increased. In ad-
dition, the American Embassy in Cape Town notes an increasing
tendency�typified by Erasmus' 16 May statement�to blame the
recent disturbances on Communist agitation.
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New Zealand Prime knister Possibly Considering Recognition
Of Red China
[New Zealand Prime Minister Nash's 13 May statement that
the Commonwealth conference in London generally recognized
the need for Communist China's participation in disarmament
measures suggests that he may plan, before New Zealand's na-
tional election in November, to fulfill a pledge in the Labor
party's 1957 platform to recognize the Peiping regime. He
stated that the policy of keeping China "at arms length is one
of diminishing returns and may not be in the best interests of
our peace and security....
Nash may feel that such a move would lessen current East-
West tensions, at least in the disarmament field. During his
visit to the USSR in April, Nash praised Khrushchev's disarma-
ment policies, and his generally laudatory comments on the
Soviet internal situation raised considerable speculation in
Wellington that he might follow up his trip with a policy shift
toward ,Peiping:j
/Although there is comparatively little opposition in New
Zealand toward either recognition of Communist China or its
admission to the UN, Nash has justified postponement of the
move as a question of timing and in deference to the United
States' position. Responsible New Zealand officials have re-
peatedly asserted that Nash would take no steps without prior
consultation with New Zealand's principal allies, and the prime
minister presumably wcluld be reluctant to take action damag-
ing Western prestige following upon the collapse of the summit
conferencej
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South Vi 20etnam vetnment Maneuvetts-Against Local Critics
ahe Diem regime, despite a show of unconcern, realizes
that the much-publicized "manifesto" for democratic reforms
issued in Saigon last month by a group of former officials and
civic leaders could lead to more serious criticism. The gov-
ernment accordingly is taking immediate steps to bolster its
prestige, while seeking to stigmatize its critics before popu-
lar opinion. Thus far, however, the widespread public dis-
content over the government's authoritarian excesses has
taken no organized forinj
With the recent events in South Korea in mind, the govern-
ment is turning particular attention to student elements, and
hat3 decided on an organizational program designed to assure
their loyalty. At the same time, under the pretense of protect-
ing the public against hoodlums, authorities reportedly have
already arrested a number of youths suspected of antigovern-
ment sentimentj
CThe Vietnamese press, apparently at government instiga-
tion, is characterizing the small opposition group as "foreign
inspired." Stressing that the group's press conference was
held before "foreign journalists" in a "foreign hotel"--Air
France's elegant Caravelle in Saigon--editorials in progovern-
ment papers have warned that this reliance on foreigners
would lead to loss of Vietnamese sovereignty if the group had
power.]
L-The government apparently is considering more direct re-
pression of the group, which has just applied for registration
as a legal opposition party. Ngo Dinh Nhu, President Diem's
brother and political adviser, has described the group's pub-
lic criticism as illegal, and has stated that the government has
little choice but to apply the law. Thus far, however, the gov-
ernment has maintained an official silence on the matter, with
Diem taking stock of international reaction�particularly Ameri-
can- -before showing his hand. In a rare presidential press
conference held recently, Diem stated that "critics are always
acceptable provided they are fair and Impartial
CONFIDENTIAL
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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