CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/12/19

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03179260
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: December 19, 1959

Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03179260
Tvivi 1 I r OIC�11.1C I
E
DOCUMENT It 411".
CO CHLEOE iN
OLCUSSMNIA
CLASS. CNAKhEZ TOf Is 0
NEXT R.VI,W t4TLI
AUTNif hA42
AV" MO
BEVIAWins
19 December 1959
3.3(h)(2)
Copy No. C to3u5(c)
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN'
-TOP-SECRET-
ZArfpr:ecfffrTRI:a4:"2c:ST/cf.21S1"C"oci f9Aff
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03179260
'r0-1,,-SECRE-r
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03179260
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03179260
Nose '*erse'
19 DECEMBER 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Moscow lecturer gives impression Soviet
leaders particularly, resent earlier Chi-
nese claims to have nearly caught up with
USSR in progress toward Communism. 0
Chou En-lairs latest note proposes early
meeting with Nehru on border dispute;
makes no concessions.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
UAR-Israeli tensions likely to be height-
ened as result of an Israeli attempt to
send cargo through Suez Canal.
Laos--Reformist group, excluded from
new cabinet, apparently hoping to re-enter
government by royal decree.
Report that South Korea will attack north-
ward as result of repatriation program
believed of doubtful validity.
Japanese Government foresees mounting
popular sentiment for establishing rela-
tions with Peiping as result of general
relaxation of international tensions.
I.
I I I. THE WEST
West Berlin--Mayor Brandt calls for
plebiscite on whether city should retain
�its ties with Federal Republic.
Fl ram
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03179260
'
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03179260
%NO
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
19 December 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-China: A recent lecture to Moscow schoolteach-
ers given by a Soviet specialist on China was notable for its
patronizing tone regarding Chinese pretensions. While bal-
ancing criticism with praise, the talk as a whole gave the
Impression that what may nettle the Soviet leaders most a-
bout their Chinese allies is their earlier claims to have leaped
Into a position of near parity with the Soviet Union in progress
toward communism. The Chinese were portrayed as "over-
enthusiastic," attempting cultural plans that are a "little
dreamy and unrealistic" in a poverty-striken economy that
is "17 or 18 years away from the attainment of full socialism."
The communes were characterized as a "mess" which is only
gradually being straightened out. (Page 1)
Communist China - Nepal: Chou En-lars letter of 17 De-
cember to Nehru, like Peiping's earlier communications on
the border dispute, makes no substantive concessions but seeks
to mollify Indian opinion by portraying the Chinese as eager for
immediate negotiations. The Chinese premier suggests that
Nehru begin talks with him on 26 December either in Chinas,
where there are "no activities hostile to Sino-Indian friendships"
or in Rangoon. He rejected Nehru's demands that the Chinese
evacuate the Ladakh area and refused to withdraw Chinese forces
from Longju without a simultaneous withdrawal of Indian forces
from ten other disputed outposts. Nehru endorsed the principle
of talks between the two prime ministers in his letter of 16 No-
vember, but he probably will not regard Chou's latest counter-
proposals as reflecting the "interim understanding" which he
set as a condition for such a meeting.
(Page 3) (Map)
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03179260
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03179260
vs TOP SECRET
IL ASIA-AFRICA
UAR-Israel: Press reports indicate that Egyptian cus-
toms officials have asked that a cargo of Israeli-produced
cement be unloaded from a Greek ship which arrived at Port
Said, This Israeli attempt to test the UAR's conditional
willingness to allow goods of Israeli origin to pass through
the Suez Canal is likely to produce additional tension between
the two countries.
Dag Hammar-
skj old had previously notified Cairo that the Israelis were
sending this cargo from Haifa to Djibouti f. o. b. and without
publicity as specified in informal UAR conditions and had
urged that the UAR allow it transit.
(Page 4)
Laos: The young reformist group (CDNI) recently ex-
cluded from Premier Phoui's new conservative cabinet ap-
parently hopes to re-enter the government by royal decree
after the present National Assembly's term lapses on 25 De-
cember. A CDNI communique criticizing Phoui's recent moves
asserts that when the assembly expires all powers revert to
the King, and it implies that the King's proper course would
be to appoint a new provisional government including the CDNI
pending April elections. The King is considered sympathetic
to the CDNI. Should he disappoint the reformists on this issue
and some compromise not be worked out, they might attempt a
power move against Premier Phoui with army backing.
South Korea
President Rhee will order an invasion of North Korea
following the departure for North Korea on 21 December of
n V. the second group of Korean repatriates from Japan. While
V " Rhee is worked up over South Korea's failure to block the re-
patriation and might be considering rash action, it is morq
19 Dec 59
DAILY BRIEF ii
TOP SECRET
\Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03179260'
\
\\\\�;
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03179260
01)
(likely that this threat was deliberately circulated in an ef-
fort to induce the US to intervene to halt the repatriation.
South Korean forces have been on an alert since 13 Decem-
ber but there is no evidence of preparations for an attack,
and any order for one would almost certainly become known
command before it could be implemented.
(Page 6)
Japan: The Japanese Government expects popular sen-
timent for the establishment of normal relations with Com-
munist China to intensify as a result of a relaxation of in-
ternational tensions which it believes will flow from the
exchange of visits between President Eisenhower and Khru-
shchev. The Japanese Foreign Ministry has requested sev-
eral diplomatic missions to ascertain the views of local
influential groups on the timing and the manner in which
various governments may be planning to recognize Peiping
a
in order to use thr data "for handling,- this situation and Ps
tablishin policv.'
-
III. THE WEST
West Berlin: Mayor Brandt recently expressed his seri-
ous apprehension over possible Western moves at a summit
meeting which could weaken West Berlin's ties with the Fed-
eral Republic. Pointed Soviet attacks on the links between
West Berlin and Bonn are at the base of Brandt's concern.
*Replying to these attacks, Brandt urged in a speech to
the city assembly on 17 December, that West Berlin's far-
reaching integration into the Federal Republic be continued
"under the umbrella of the unchallengeable rights of the West-
kOFORN
ern Powers in Berlin." He said his government will be readl
at any time to support a four-power agreement concerning a
plebiscite in Berlin, "if the USSR wishes to determine the de-
sires of the population of Berlin regarding our city belonging
to the Federal Republic."
19 Dec 59
DAILY BRIEF
lApproved for Release: 2020/02/21
C03179260
111
m�,
Approved for Re-lea: 2020/02/21 C03179260
"*Avrif
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Criticism of China in Soviet Public Lecture
In a lecture on 11 December to Moscow schoolteachers,
V. I. Danilov, Soviet specialist on Communist China, sharply
criticized certain Chinese practices and views. The lecture,
while balancing criticism with praise for genuine accomplish-
ments, was notable for its apparent tone of patronizing belit-
tlement of Chinese pretensions. It supported the impression
that what may nettle the Soviet leaders most about their Chi-
nese allies is their earlier claims to have leaped into a posi-
tion of near parity with the Soviet Union in progress toward
communism.
The lecturer alleged that the creation of the communes in
1958 was a "mess" which is only gradually being straightened
out. He said the Chinese had enlarged their cooperatives by
combining many of them and then had "unfortunately" named
them communes, which led poorly educated Communists to
conclude that the commune must be some sort of jump to com-
munism. Actually, Moscow has been concerned that a similar
conclusion was being drawn by other bloc Communists. Khru-
shchev had discussed the issue with the Chinese leaders, ac-
cording to the speaker, and they had redefined the communes
as socialist rather than communist, but much confusion still
remained to be corrected. In fact, he pointed out, China is
still 17 or 18 years away from full socialism, ,and since the
USSR is so far ahead, Soviet aid to China will increase.
Danilov extended criticism of the Chinese into the cultural
and educational fields, an area which Moscow had avoided be-
fore. The Chinese were said to have a correct basic approach
and to have made great advances in the field of culture, but
they are over-enthusiastic and their plans are a little dreamy
and unrealistic. In this respect, their timetable is off by 20 or
30 years. In addition, their "literature is very sick" because
most of their writers joined the "right opposition" in 1957 and
have not yet found themselves, and the few good revolutionary
writers are too busy with political work to write.
The Chinese standard of living is so poor, Danilov said,
that Soviet technicians have to be specially prepared before
-CONFIDENTIAL_
19 Dec 59
e.rki-rn A I ikrrm ir�wore ni II I
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03179260
Page 1
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03179260
Nine
being sent to China. He noted that the Chinese have gone too
far in demanding outside physical work of their students, who
become so exhausted that they sleep over their studies. Dan-
ilov ridiculed Chinese explanations that this extra work is
beneficial, saying that this only provokes a Soviet smile be-
cause the Russians know the real reason lies in China's pov-
erty.
Apparently because the lecture was intended to describe
conditions within China, foreign policy topics were avoided
n d nn mAntinn 7 made of the Sino-Indian border dispute.
CONFIDENTIAL
19 Dec 59 eCkITD A I 11.ITC1 I ir�ekiee DI III CTIkl
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03179260
Page 2
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03179260
Atiwe Nisol
i .%\
������-% JAMIVI...,,,,_
AND KASHA
�..) (Status in dispute) . ..�....
....,
i'll-Tgat '-----VV:� ,
)''�
::. �.. � %
\
...., -," \A
.....; .......,
-1-1 �..
PAKI TAN
NEW DELHI
Selected road
-- �Selected trail
18 DECEMBER 1959
MILES 200
UNCLASSIFIED
9 12 18
Road constructed by
inese in 1957
Boundary shown on Indian maps
� Boundary shown on recent
Chinese Communist Maps
Boundaries are not necessarily those
recognized by the U.S. Government,
Gartok
TIBET
CHINA
NEPAL
Kanpu
KATMANDU
1M
Gangto
Gyangtse
Shillong�
EAST PAKISTAN
IN1301..51.1
ago
uensang
BURMA
30790
ixit ::g 5 II RI orNIAZ.710 MiTiAl CiTb4:1
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03179260--
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03179260
%NO *reis4
Peiping Calls for Chou-Nehru Meeting
Premier Chou En-lars letter of 17 December to Prime
Minister Nehru, like Peiping's earlier communications on the
border dispute, sought to mollify inflamed Indian opinion by
portraying the Chinese as eager for immediate negotiations.
Chou suggested a meeting with Nehru to begin on 26 December
"any place in China," because there are "no activities hostile
to Sino-Indian friendship" there, or in Rangoon. Chou ex-
pressed agreement with Nehru's proposal that neither side
send out patrols from their frontier posts and declared that
Peiping had in fact stopped such patrols.
Peiping� however� flatly rejected Nehru's demand that the
Chinese troops evacuate Indian-claimed territory in Ladakh
pointing out that the Chinese had made no corresponding demand
on New Delhi to withdraw its forces from the Chinese-claimed
area south of the McMahon line. As a "partial solution" pend-
ing agreement on his proposal of 7 November for a mutual with-
drawal along the "entire borders," Chou agreed to the evacuation
of Chinese forces from Longju outpost in Assam, but only on
the condition that the Indians withdraw also from ten other dis-
puted outposts, most of which are located on the western sector
of the frontier.
New Delhi is not likely to find Chou's proposals acceptable.
Indian doubts regarding Peiping's real intentions in the border
area will be reinforced by Chou's insistence on maintaining
the "status quo" in Ladakh, thereby retaining possession of
large slices of Indian-claimed territory� and by his refusal to
withdraw from an outpost forcibly seized by Chinese troops un-
less Indian forces evacuate ten other points. In his letter of
16 November to Chou, Nehru endorsed the principle of early
talks between the two premiers� but stressed that a meeting
would be fruitful only after preliminary steps were taken to
reach an "interim understanding." Nehru is not likely to re-
gard Chou's reply as fulfilling this condition.
CONFIDENTIAL
19 Dec 59
r"Ekrrn A I 16.ITEI I 1"r1.1,-.r nhtIIr,9hI
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03179260
Page 3
Approved G 202/02/21 C03179260
*me Nur
IL ASIA-AFRICA
UAR Detains Another Israeli Cargo
What was ostensibly an unpublicized Israeli test of the
UAR's willingness, under certain conditions, to allow passage
through the Suez Canal of cargoes of Israeli origin apparently
has misfired. According to a press report from Port Said,
Egyptian customs officials there--following an earlier press
report that they were examining a cargo from Israel�have
asked the captain of the Greek-flag freighter Astypalea to un-
load its cargo of cement from Israel. Confiscation or "deten-
tion" of the cement would exacerbate UAR-Israeli tensions
and undermine UN Secretary General Hammarskjold's efforts
to resolve the long-standing dispute over Israeli use of the
canal.
Hammarskjold had notified the UAR that Israel was send-
ing this cargo f, o. b. from Haifa to Djibouti, French Somali-
land, and that the Israelis had said they had imposed strict
censorship on the matter. This was in accordance with the
conditions of the "effective position" which Cairo had privately
stated with regard to Israeli shipping. Cairo's public policy
prohibits cargoes from Israel� as well as Israeli-flag vessels,
from transiting the canal. Nile UAR also stipulated
that cargoes bound through the canal from Israel were to be
shipped f, o, b, and that those en route to Israel were to be
c. i.f. --Israel then would not legally own any of these cargoes-4
e resumption of Israeli shipping according to these pro-
visos, which Hammarskjold had negotiated, was to begin a
gradual return to the situation which obtained in 19582 in which
transit of both Israeli-chartered ships and Israeli cargoes was
permitted, although not of Israeli-flag vessels. UAR Foreign
Minister Fawzi had indicated to Danish officials this week that
unpublicized transit of the Astypalea might be a "useful precedent"
for release of the Inge Toft, the Danish ship that has been detained
at Port Said since May with its cargo from Israel.
The new incident in the canal dispute comes at a time when
the World Bank is considering approval of a loan to the UAR for
TOP SECRET
19 Dec 59 r=kITD AI IkITCI I unckirc RI II I =TIM
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03179260
Page 4
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03179260
fte' stale
canal improvements. Israel has been waging a diplomatic and
propaganda campaign against granting the loan because of the
restrictions against Israeli shipping through the canal.
Meanwhile, the Israelis are also agitated about alleged
Syrian transgressions on Lake Tiberias. Israel claims the
Syrians have installed pumping apparatus near the shore of
the lake and have put pipes across the Israeli-controlled ten-
meter zone on the northeastern shore. Israel also contends
the Syrians are fishing on the lake without the "necessary"
Israeli permits, and that 196 Israeli fishing nets have been
destroyed and 92 nets stolen.
if the UN Truce Supervision Organization fails to effect a
stoppage of such activities. Israel will have to take "nnlieett
action.
TOP SECRET
19 Dec 59 CFNTRAI IKITFI I IMPKIrP RI II I PTIKI
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03179260
Page 5
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03179260
*we
President Rhee Allegedly Planning to Order Invasion of
North Korea
President Rhee
intends to order an invasion of North Korea following the de-
parture from Japan of the second group of Koreans on 21 De-
cember for North Korea. Rhee is said to hope that such ac-
tion will cause international intervention and bring the repa-
triation question before the United Nations. South Korean
forces were alerted on 13 December, but there has subse�-
quently been no evidence of military preparations; such an
order would almost certainly come to the attention of the UN
Command before it could be implemented.
� The most likely possibility is that this threat is being
deliberately circulated in an effort to induce the United States
to make representations to Japan to halt further repatriation.
Rhee recently stated that Washington was his last hope of block-
ing the repatriation, that be did not want a shooting incident,
and that he intended to confine himself to political action. It
is also possible that this report is a desperate maneuver by
the South Korean mission chief in Tokyo, who is under a cloud
for having misled Rhee into believing that the repatriation
could be stopped.
Rhee's growing concern over the failure of allied policy to
secure Korean unification, however, suggests that some rash
action to draw attention to the Korean problem should not be
completely discounted.
SECRET
19 Dec 59
f-PKITD A I IKITPI I inpkorr RI II I CTIK1
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03179260
Page 6
Approved for 14-e-leas-e75-05-0705721 C03179260
%se *ftsi#
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretory for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03179260
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C031792bu
TOP SECRET
p�ro�v e�d for Release: 1050701/2-1 CO317926O