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August 14, 2020
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August 27, 2020
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January 4, 1961
PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15815579].pdf411.87 KB
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03179294 3.5(c) 41, I %or 3.3(h)(2) 4 January 1961 Copy No. C CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03179294 tombpt Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03179294 -,01:-SEGRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03179294 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03179294 4 JANUARY 1961 I. SPECIAL ITEM Situation in Laos. II. THE COMMUNIST BLOC III. ASIA-AFRICA Cambodian Prince Sihanouk reportedly "overwhelmed" by recent visit to Com- munist China; may tighten Cambodian ties with bloc. Iraqi foreign relations line criticizes Western attitudes as forcing Arabs toward closer ties with Sino-Soviet bloc. CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03179294 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03179294 TOP LCRFT tqw CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 4 January 1961 DAILY BRIEF I. SPECIAL ITEM *The Situation in Laos: 'he military situ Khouang Province is obscure. the reoccupation of Xien ers dropped nearby on 1 Januar in general the Pathet Lao advance has been stalled. Hanoi radio, how= ever, asserts that Xieng Khouang town is still in Pathet Lao', hands. Meanwhile, government troops north of Vientiane are reported preparing to attack yang Vieng, site of the Kong Le - Pathet Lao build-up prior to their drive eastward to- ward Xieng Khouang. It is not clear how many antigovern- ment troops remain at yang Vieng, an area considered by Western observers to be highly defensible) The National Assembly has convened in Vientiane to give belated approval to the provisional government of Prince Boun Oum. Such action would bring the Boun Oum govern- ment's creation into full conformity with normal constitution- al recognition. Moscow has quickly attacked the assembly session as a device to give a "semblance of legality" to the Boun Oum regime. A summary version of an article appearing in the New Year's edition of Red Flag, the major theoretical journal of the Chinese Communist party, apparently addressing it- self to Laos, implies that local wars can be contained when the bloc is victorious but that if the West "gets what it wants," local wars may become world war. Peiping, however, does not pledge itself to any specific course of action in the present case of Laos. North Vietnam has termed latest US military TOP SECRET ' paratroop 0 /< - )4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03179294 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03179294 BURMA CHINA NAMTHA Non' ong Saly PHO G SAL? % LUANG PR me1(.00g ANG uang Praba �Dien Bien Phu Ban Ban* Plaine des K h loeunagng Janes ^ XIENG KHOUANG Sam Neua SAM NEUA NORTH VIETNAM U0fIg Peun � Nong Het 4 yang Vieng VIENTIANE Vientian THAILAND Selected roads STATUTE MILES 100 UNCLASSIFIED 31439 iPak Sane -5" 0 KHAMMOUANE Savannakhe CAMBODIA SAVANNAKHET CHINA GULF OF TONKIN SARAVANE Pakse CHA PASSAK S TH VIET ATTOREU Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03179294 XX\ \ Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C0317929\4 TOP SECRET moves in the Pacific as "brazen acts of provocation." The airlift into Laos by Soviet IL-14s continued through 3 January with ten aircraft making at least 12 but possibly 15 sorties. Six Soviet transports were re- ported on the Xieng IChouan airfield on 2 January, accord- ing to a Laotian intercept. Photos e area considerable development of the area has taken place since the Communists gained con- trol on 28 September. Warehouse-type buildings have been constructed, and 35 vehicles were noted in the area.;) 2'14- tO'n'irniastt-61Iiink:?rinc-e s6olg�t--d Dverwhelmed" by his reception in ommunist China that, he may move uamPoala into closer ties with the bloc, and with Peiping in particular, to the ultimate exclusion of the West. It is doubt- ful that Sihanouk would intentionally compromise Cambodia's neutral position, but reports that tne uninese reception and the amount of aid pledged to Cambodia have brought the prince "into utmost 4 Jan 61 \\& DAILY BRIEF �TOP�SECRET 0 k Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03179294 \w\\ Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03179294 kieri TOP SECRET sympathy with the Chinese Communists signed no military agreements with the reiterated Communist China's intention aid in the ei_reiltc.aggrcoj,ye attas1 5 bloc, Mao Tse-tung to enme to Cambodia's --aitlough Cambodia ArieV Trielraqi Government is developing a ioreign re14.- K tions line paralleling that of Nasir in its emphasis that West- ern attitudes are forcing the Arabs toward closer association ,cuit.,tt with Sino-Soviet bloc policy. Reports that Israel, with Frenchao.3 assistance, is constructing an atomic bomb have intensified 1', .4 , Iraqi anti-Western sentiment. In the past few days even Iraq's) (e1/4_ relatively pro-Western foreign minister has made unprecedent- edly strong and specific attacks on the United States regarding the Congo and Algerian issues. (Page 1) 4 Jan 61 DAILY BRIEF lii �TOP�SEC�Rg-T_ �v. Lv k4q Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03179294 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03179294 Nisf Growing Arab Resentment Toward Western Powers Iraq, like the UAR, is developing a foreign policy line which emphasizes that Western attitudes on such issues as Algeria, the Congo, and Israeli nuclear progress are forc- ing the Arabs into closer association with Sino-Soviet bloc policies. In the past few days even Iraq's relatively pro- Western foreign minister has made unprecedentedly strong specific and public attacks on the United States. Prime Minister Qasim has declared that if France and "other imperialist states" are determined to help Israel ob- tain atomic weapons, it will mean "the perpetuation of ag- gression on our homeland for many decades!' The Iraqi press and radio have intensified their attacks on the Western powers and have called upon all Arab League states to institute an im,- itical and economic boycott of France. In late December the UAR made an attempt to stimulate a significant direct Iraqi economic move a ainst the French. Cairo ordered that articles be planted in the Beirut press attacking Qasim for fail- ing to nationalize France's 23.75-bercent share of the Iraq Pe- troleum Company. A similar but less vehement reaction has been evident in other Arab states. Saudi press coverage has been heavy and generally in line with the UAR position. Prime Minister Tal- huni of Jordan has talked of "freezing differences" with the UAR and other Arab states in order to join a united front in the face of "the new Israeli threat." The Sudanese Government, which still differs sharply with the UAR and Iraq on policy to- ward the Congo, on 31 December severed diplomatic relations with France following the third French nuclear test in the Sahara. A meeting of Arab League foreign ministers has tentatively been scheduled for 15 January in Beirut to discuss these world TOP SECRET 4 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03179294 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03179294 Imre 1_100 problems. It is likely to be characterized by an unusual measure of agreement on a strong anti-Western line. The chiefs of the Arab missions in Washington have decided to recommend to their governments that the issue of Israel's erection of an atomic reactor capable of producing atomic weapons be presented to the Securit Council and General Assembly of the United Nations. 4 Jan 61 TOP SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03179294 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03179294 NOV N." THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense � The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03179294 / _ _ _ _ , ,, ,� m Wproved for Release: 2020706/1-1 60-31-7927//e7 I 7,/ . TOP SECRET ' fi ...7 01 tz e d�ref ef, 1'17; 1:4 fef 0 � 1 -04/4, 2.2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03179294