CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/03/14

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03180490
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: March 14, 1957

� � i-Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03180490
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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
14 March 1957
Copy No. 131
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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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A'sk.
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_ I
CONTENTS
. GAZA STRIP SITUATION
(page 3).
i1 0 2. KING SAUD SEEKS SYRIAN AND EGYPTIAN VIEWS ON
RECEPTION FOR RICHARDS MISSION
(page 4).
C.193. EXTENSIVE UNDERGROUND ACTIVITY REPORTED IN
HUNGARY (page 5).
C,1�4. REVOLUTIONARY ATTEMPT IN CUBA
c#5. STATE OF EMERGENCY ENDED IN THAILAND
(page 7).
age 6).
O 6. COMMUNIST POLICY ON ECONOMIC AID TO LAOS
(page 8).
07. S UKARNO'S REVISED CONCEPT
(page 9).
U NU SUGGESTS SINO-BURMESE BORDER AGREEMENT
BE SIGNED DURING VISIT TO KUNMING
(page 11).
14 Mar 57
* * * *
THE TAIWAN STRAIT
(page 12)
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-EL 1-4
10 GAZA STRIP SITUATION
Comment on:
Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's statement
in the Israeli parliament on 13 March
that "for the present" his government
is taking "political measures" to oppose
Egyptian attempts to regain control of
the Gaza strip indicates that the Israelis
are awaiting the outcome of Foreign Min-
ister Meir's urgent appeal for American
intervention before deciding on further
steps. Ben-Gurion told the parliament
that if military action became "appropriate and necessary,"
it would be taken without any prior notice.
In making her appeal to Ambassador Lawson
on 12 March, Mrs. Meir accused UN secretary general Ham-
marskjold of serious bias against Israel and said she believed
the Egyptian appointment of an "administrative governor" for
Gaza had been made with Hammarskjold's knowledge, if not
with his consent. If it became necessary to send "our boys"
back to Gaza, Mrs. Meir said, "it would be with full knowl-
edge that the UNEF would still be there."
In Gaza, the situation was
to have been "very calm" on 11 March, owing
principally to the Danish UNEF contingent's forceful handling
of crowds. "fedayeen" had appeared in uni-
forms early during the UNEF take-over, but apparently had
been withdrawn or gone underground. On 13 March a large
demonstration denouncing US policy reportedly was dis-
persed peacefully.
Colonel Harkabi, the chief of Israeli mil-
itary intelligence, has stated that the situation on the perim-
eter of the Gaza strip is very difficult since the border is not
clearly marked. Harkabi said he feared that UNEF patrols
might run into Israeli ambushes placed along the border, and
implied that his troops might be "trigger-happy" though they
had no intentions against the UNEF.
14 Mar 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin
Page 3
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V
2. KING SAUD SEEKS SYRIAN AND EGYPTIAN VIEWS ON
RECEPTION FOR RICHARDS MISSION
Comment
This appears to be a form of
pressure by Saud on Nasr, who probably
does not want to define his attitude toward the United States
�at this time but does not want to antagonize Saud. Nasr may
well try to temporize further, possibly by asserting that such
definition should now await a settlement of the status of the
UNE F.
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3. EXTENSIVE UNDERGROUND ACTIVITY REPORTED
IN HUNGARY
Three main centers of organized resist-
ance in Hungary have become increas-
ingly active during the past month and
are in communication with one another,
the underground groups exist among workers on
Csepel Island (south of Budapest), miners in Pecs (south-
west Hungary), and military personnel in Debrecen (south-
east Hungary). The Csepel group allegedly has liaison with
less well-organized university students in Budapest.
the main pur-
pose of the underground groups is to organize strikes as
economic and moral pressures against the regime. Peace-
ful demonstrations--the form not yet agreed upon--are
planned for "a day in March." if
the regime uses arms against the demonstrators, the coun-
try will be summoned to open revolt.
Comment This information appears to confirm re-
ports received in January by the US lega-
tion in Budapest concerning a workers' underground movement
on Csepel, which claimed to be a successor to the outlawed
Budapest Central Workers' Council. The legation believed
that this group was attempting to establish reliable contacts
throughout the industrial areas of the country and was having
some success.
Other reports have indicated that resist-
ance groups in Hungary have been unable to agree upon a form
of protest for 15 March, the traditional national independence
holiday, and have also stated that most groups hope to avoid
bloodshed.
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4. REVOLUTIONARY ATTEMPT IN CUBA
Comment on:
The armed civilian attack on the presi-
dential palace and a radio station in
Havana on 13 March was probably in-
tended to spark a full-fledged revolution
to oust President Batista. Participants
were primarily students and included
Jose Echeverria, leader of the Commu-
nist-infiltrated Federation of University
Students, who was reported killed. The government appears
to have the situation under control. The prompt military ac-
tion against the rebels will discourage new outbreaks in
Havana. Rebel forces may attack government installations
in Oriente Province, however, where there is strong pub-
lic opposition to Batista, who seized power five years ago
this week.
On 12 March a rev-
olutionary group whose main force was led by Echeverria
was ready to act, convinced that any uprising begun in Havana
would succeed. Last summer the student leader signed a
pact with rebel leader Fidel 'Castro, who,
has called for an island-wide general strike for
15 March.
While the military appears again to have
supported Batista, there have been indications of continuing
unrest in the military. Prolongation of serious political un-
rest may reduce army support of Batista.
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5. STATE OF EMERGENCY ENDED IN THAILAND
Comment on:
Marshal Sarit's relinquishment of his
temporary command of all the armed
forces and police and the announcement
ending the state of emergency indicate
that a new modus vivendi has been nego-
Hated, between the factions led by Sarit and police director
general Phao. Sarit has gained in prestige, but his oppor-
tunity for carrying out his reported objective of removing
Phao and his followers from all positions of influence ap-
pears to have passed.
The composition of the new government,
to be announced when the new legislature convenes on 14
March, will shed light on the degree to which Sarit's power
has increased and Phao's has declined. Sarit may become
minister of defense. There are indications that Phao may be
dropped from the cabinet, although retaining his post as po-
lice director general.
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6. COMMUNIST POLICY ON ECONOMIC AID TO LAOS
Comment on:
any Chinese Communist aid program for
Laos is to be limited to economic devel-
opment and is not intended to replace
American aid. the aid would
not be used for the support of the Laotian army and police.
The Pathets, who have hitherto made a request for Chinese
aid a condition for settlement of their dispute with the Lao-
tian government, were cautioned that the loss of American
aid would result in the overthrow of Souvanna Phouma, on
whom the Communists feel the success of their negotiations
depends.
Hanoi's sensitivity to Souvanna Phouma's
possible overthrow indicates that the internal political situa-
tion in Laos is the primary factor determining the nature of
the proposed Chinese Communist aid program. Although
Souvanna Phouma had indicated his own willingness to accept
Chinese aid, the cabinet and crown prince are apparently op-
posed to it at this time,and negotiations are now deadlocked on
this issue.
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A
7, SUKARNO'S REVISED CONCEPT
President Sukarno will announce a re-
vised version of his proposed concept
for Indonesia's government by 18 March,
A new cabinet replacing that of All Sastroamidjojo
will also be announced prior to the 18th.
although the National Party and Nandlatul Ulama will
hold the key positions in the cabinet, the Masjumi will feel
compelled to accept an offer of a minor role in order to avoid
being linked with the Communists, who will be excluded.
Sukarno plans to proceed with the forma-
tion of an advisory council which would include Communist
representation. A new feature has been added to his concept,
however, in the form of a proposal to set up a Reconstruction
Planning Board under former vice president Hatta. In tenta-
tively accepting this position, Hatta reportedly has laid down
conditions that no Communists be on the board and that the
cabinet be committed to carry out the board's recommendations.
Comment
The relationship between the advisory
council and the planning board is unclear.
Sukarno's reported concessions may be a ruse to give the im-
pression of meeting the chief demands of the various dissi-
dent movements in Indonesia. The Ali government would be
removed, Hatta restored to office, and the promise held out--
through the person of Hatta--for greater local autonomy and
economic development, with the Communists still excluded
from the cabinet.
This would, however, be only a temporary
solution to Indonesia's problems. The various provinces will
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continue to demand a greater share of the national wealth,
and Sukarno�with his Communist and nationalist support-
ers�will continue to resist the trend toward federalism.
The army remains the key as to whether
such a settlement will be implemented, and there have been
suggestions that it may seek to establish a military junta.
The army's position is likely to be decided at a 15 March meet-
ing of the general staff in Djakarta to which all ranking officers,
including those who have been leading the autonomy movements
in the outer islands, have been invited.
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8. U NU SUGGESTS SINO-BURMESE BORDER AGREEMENT
BE SIGNED DURING VISIT TO KUNMING
Comment
Burmese prime minister U Nu has sug-
gested to Chou En-lai that Nu's visit to
Kunming, beginning on 26 March, would
be an appropriate occasion for the sign-
ing of the Sino-Burmese border agree-
ment.
Now that Burma has succeeded in over-
coming the objections of the Kachin
minority to the cession of three small villages to China,
Rangoon is anxious to get early signature of an agreement
which is essentially favorable to Burma.
Chou En-lai may well offer some pre-
text for further delay at this time.
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SUMMARY
13 February - 13 March 1957
THE TAIWAN STRAIT
a /70�; /0 r
Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group
for the Taiwan Strait Problem
1. There were no significant combat operations in the area
during the period.
2. Small vehicular-type revetments have been completed at
Lungtien, Lungchi, Chingyang, Huian and Nantai airfields. This
construction may be an indication that a more advanced degree of
readiness has been established at these airfields. There continue
to be no aircraft, however, at any of the Communist airfields along
the Taiwan Strait,
3. Aerial photography confirms a minimum of 100 Chinese
Communist artillery pieces on Amoy Island, an increase of 29 over
the total observed last July. Signs of activity around a number of
covered emplacements suggest that the actual number of such weap-
ons on Amoy is perhaps in the neighborhood of 150. This probably
does not represent a recent build-up, since artillery organic to the
Chinese Communist army units accepted as being on Amoy would
total about 150 pieces.
4. Indications are that the Chinese Nationalists intend to in-
crease the number of 155-mm, artillery pieces in the Quemoys
and Matsu group from some 40 to 70 in the near future. These ad-
ditions would enhance Nationalist capabilities to harass ships at-
tempting to enter Amoy and Foochow harbors.
5. In their propaganda on Taiwan in recent weeks, the Chi-
nese Communists have intensified appeals for Nationalist defections
in order to bring about a "peaceful liberation." Portraying the
United States as an unreliable ally, the Communists charge that
Americans are supporting elements on Taiwan critical of the Na-
tionalist government.
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