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September 20, 2019
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September 26, 2019
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April 21, 1955
PDF icon CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15722666].pdf399.13 KB
Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03181196, ;/� ;2, Zr/r r "ertir �orz �.ferof �of, z �:"; efJ TOP SECRET 21 April 1955 Copy No. 94 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO 1./ NO CHANGE IN CLASS. [I DECLASSIFIED CLASS'. CHANGE-D TO: TS S C NEXT REVIEW DATE: tO / AUTH: FIR 70-2 DATE: /AV REVIEWET1; , Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TOP SECRET 'Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03181196 Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03181196 %am, 'NNW SUMMARY GENERAL 1. Bohlen comments on significance of change in Soviet position on Austria (page 3). SOUTHEAST ASIA 2. Viet Minh reported planning "stay-behind" struggle in central Vietnam (page 4). 3. End of Thai-Burmese "co-operation" predicted (page 4). 4. Sukarno reportedly invites Nehru, Chou and Nasr to remain as state guests (page 6). THE FORMOSA STRAITS (page 7) * * * * 21 Apr 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03181196 Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03181196 *rmil Nig GENERAL 1. Bohlen comments on significance of change in Soviet position on Austria: Ambassador Bohlen doubts that the Krem- lin seriously expects it can significantly impede implementation of the Paris agree- ments merely by changing its position on Austria. He is convinced that Moscow realizes the only sure way of preventing West German rearmament would involve the sacri- fice of the Soviet position in East Germany, a price it has so far been unwilling to pay. Bohlen believes the USSR is still deter- mined to hold East Germany, and that its next move will be to sound out the Bonn government on establishing relations with Mos- cow in return for West German recognition of the East German government. While it is doubtful that the USSR would be prepared to have a four-power meeting on unification, it might conceivably have in mind a four-power agreement to limit rearmament in both parts of Germany. Bohlen thinks, however, that any undue delay in setting up a Soviet bloc security system after the Paris accords take effect, or any exclusion of East Germany or special status for it, would probably be a sign of some shift in Soviet policy on Germany. Comment: The rapidity and manner in which the USSR recently bas moved on Austria indicate that it intends to use an Austrian settlement to arouse German confidence in the sincerity of Soviet proposals for unification, in an attempt to impede West German rearmament. Moscow may now suggest conferences on other issues and make new proposals for Germany, even though it does not intend to give up East Germany. 21 Apr 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for R�ere-a-Sj.: 2019/09/17 C03181196 Approve-d�fo�r Rerea-*se: 2019/09/17 C03181196 SOUTHEAST ASIA 2. Viet Minh reported planning "stay-behind" struggle in central Vietnam: The Viet Minh is secretly reorganizing party cells in the remaining Viet Minh regroupment area along the coast in South Vietnam, according to a Vietnam- ese government report (see map, p. 5). High party officials are considering locating their headquarters and ammunition stocks in the strategic plateau area in southern Annam where cadres are presently attempting to win the allegiance of the ethnic minorities. Preparations for the "stay-behind" struggle along the coast include teaching the population tech- niques of non-co-operation with the national government and spreading propaganda that a wave of reprisals and assassina- tions will follow the arrival of the army. Comment: Viet Minh evacuation of this regroupment area is to take place between 22 April and 16 May. The effectiveness of Viet Minh disrup- tive efforts will be largely contingent on the ability of the Viet- namese government to solve its economic problems and to establish an efficient administration. How successful Saigon's administration has been in other regroupment areas is not Imown. 3. End of Thai-Burmese "co-operation" predicted: There is every reason to believe that the "sham" of Thai-Burmese co-operation may soon end, in the opinion of the Amer- ican army attache in Bangkok. He cites a report from the American consul in Chiengmai that the Thai police recently 21 Apr 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 n�r rr Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03181196 Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03181196 100 1 05 10 . ' C H . N A f' i......�,. Aleng-tz u Wen-shen T � Ssu-meo . .� � 4... ao Kay \ G v. . __ nh Thu ---) ri . ' . ' ning ,-. ----�.1 Cao Ba g Bac Kan l^g . Mina-r^ 1 N. em Ch ,---- / ong 5;17'. b r''' � ? 'k Yen Bay ' Tuyen Lang Son . 1,,,, Quang on Cay .�-�----' p J.1 BURMA Bac Ninh ga yard , ,�... ^1. '6 111 Sam Neua %se ILE CAC BA :1 s.'. !lei XuPehn� It. AMIDINH N .3..., tA---- a ., i Muang - --- -- ) 'n Chiug h -inh G U L 1' s4., han (- � I ...� Chiang Rai ,f� .---- \ . � Luang Prabang Thanh Hoa .1 .1 Y. ' �� Muoce Soo/ r----- g (le HA L8. N.' \ OW S ng 0 F Iv- ,-/ T 0 A' A* [ N r, ' .. Qhiengmai v., vi..g \ .. . Muang ..-4 . -1,... p� . X , HAINAN '� u Dien -, ." ,E ( NH Muang 1,0 .,.. 1 Lampang 9 Mitang_Rbye ht er Tinh \ .Mbang Loei Muang Udon Thani Nakhon Phanoin ,___,...\ ong Hoi al. eirq---- '-"...,,.. \ -,_,..-- --..,--- N-. DEMARCATION LINE INDOCHINA 21 APRIL 1955 Muang Kho Kaen Meld:Men Qupng Tri --��,..� Se ha Sarakham nnakhet Muorre P0nek41, HUE ../- "\--.��,., ' Viet Minh THAIL ND . TOURANE \ , r'' e �� .-- ' regrou "oSerayr V-�-' `i,� ' -� 1 area ment 1 - , Mon , -3, �P se .1":5 Quang ak -.'6.. bon i 15 I � Su in *A ttO P e U ) "I \,...,0,�- C,' \ .. ::_,.......... J.,......,...������,"" ,. s.�,�,�, ,�.� , --1._ (onto,,,,,,. . . ..� ..x r�� \,..,...�...r. , v., , J ..._... t ,r, . Pleiku , -........,,?, .. poi, ,. . oho C es ,'\ ___. 4:'5:�,3, or Nhon i/ -me .*ng Colar--'�toog .Siern Reap 7.,07-.< . �M P.�� 1 ODIA ... .V._ Pura 2\., ompong Thom ) Ban Me 4. Kratie �, moot /VIM, Ho , (,..' , -7. Nha Irene Khrum Chhna re 4-' �S ...e. I rnpong Chem ..." Dalat �/ ., _ . s( Lac Ninh r_._ _ . �"' --:, Ze \( PHNOM PENH : ' .- o \ .1 2 DrirMe Ifitan Rang.�,' ' 0 4 m S Ubel, Takeo. i livelt9g L.\ , ts.66'- ..1- \ - ---- --�, ,------ k � .....-,. An� r ""' ...-1 � GON n 'Met A.A,KAS RONG3Re..; Karnpo '1 0 "r�- .t...., Ha Tien ,. __Z '43YPTe? \k IS. o o r) 11, , 11 �,___,:_ Cap Saint-Jacques 4 I ...���� International boundary 0PHU QUO ..�, .. .es AN T � 10 _ ._ 7c.h_ s .,.. ___ _ cyjnh 0 Kb. � National capital --e� C:.�.' 74. a 4��� ,, Soc irong . �:��Bac Lieu --= Selected railroad Selected ____ road Scale 1:7,500,000 �.1,,_ r 0 2,0 49 87 120 Hiles L 1.1E5 DE , 0 20 40 80 120 Kilometers C e.7 POINTE DE CA MAU 4..L..- j APOU CONDORE LO 1 105 Base 12516 11-53 110-- PRESENTATIONS DIVISION Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03181196 50420 2 � Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03181196 Nue permitted the shipment of 150 bags of rice and 4,000 cartons of cigarettes to the Chinese Nationalist irregulars on the Burma side of the border. The attache also reports that a border inci- dent in early April resulted in considerable tension between local Thai and Burmese officials. Comment; Thai-Burmese relations have been traditionally cool, and onlyZiring the past 12 months has there been an apparent improvement. Thai police director general Phao agreed to seal off the Thai-Burmese border in order to assist the Bur- mese in their current offensive against the Chinese guerrillas. It now seems, clear from recent reports that he did so only after the guerrillas had been forewarned and he could feel certain of their ability to survive the Burmese campaign. In the event the Burmese learn of the reported Thai shipments to the guerrillas, they will be more in- clined than ever to blame their lack of success to date against the guerrillas on the Thai and to hold the United States partly responsi- ble. 4. Sukarno reportedly invites Nehru Chou and Nasr to remain as state guests: President Sukarno has invited Premiers Chou En-lai, Nehru and Nasr to remain as state guests after the close of the Bandung conference, Comment: Sukarno apparently sees Nasr as the likely candidate among Arab leaders to be won over to the point of view of Asian neutralist leaders. At the invitation of Burma's premier, Nasr stopped over in Rangoon, along with Chou and Nehru, on his way to the conference. Chou is reportedly seeking Nases favor by indicating that Communist China is ready to increase its pur- chases of Egyptian cotton if a trade arrangement can be negotiated. 21 Apr 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03181196 Approved for Release: 2016/09/17 C03181196 *al THE FORMOSA STRAITS Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group for the Formosa Straits Problem This report is based on information received in Washington up to 1100 hours 20 April 1955. 1. Seven additional BUTCHER (IL-28) twin-jet light bombers were arriving at Tsitsihar on 14 April from Chita in the USSR. Again, the aircraft callsigns used were of Soviet naval subordination. This brings to 29 the total num- ber of BUTCHERS (IL-28's) arriving at Tsitsihar from Chita since 25 March. Another late development concerning these bombers oc- curred on 18 April, what is believed to have been the flight of at least four jet tight bombers from Tsitsihar to Chiaohsien in the Tsingtao area. Chiaohsien is the site of a naval air school and a BUTCHER (IL-28) regiment of naval sub- ordination. Should all the Tsitsihar BUTCHERS (IL-28's) be trans- ferred to Chiaohsien, it is probable that the Chinese Communist naval air force is in the process of activating a jet light bomber divi- sion of two regiments with a total strength of 52 BUTCHERS (IL-28's). The acquisition of additional BUTCHERS (IL-28's) by the naval air force would be significant in that the Chinese Communist naval air force, particularly the 1st Division, took a leading role in air attacks on the Tachens. 2. A summary of Formosa Straits Reports for the week end- ing 20 April is attached. 21 Apr 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 n Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03181196 Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03181196 %le WEEKLY SUMMARY FORMOSA STRAITS REPORT 20 April 1955 1. During the period there has been almost a complete lack of military operations in the Formosa Straits area. For the first time since last September, a week has passed with no artiller fire against Quemoy. Bad weather prevailed throughout the period. 2. Reports continue to indicate Chinese Communist efforts to im- prove air capabilities in the coastal area. Developments were high- lighted bT a. Photographic confirmation of 39 BUTCHER (IL-28) jet light bombers at Hangchow, near Shanghai, and evidence that they are part of Communist China's most experienced jet bomber division. b. The new airfield under construction near Chingyang, just 22 miles northeast of Big Quemoy, is expected to be completed by September. It will apparently be a large and modern airbase. 3. The Chinese Nationalist coastal interdiction patrol north of the Matsus has made no interceptions and has been reduced in strength. 4. Chinese Communist propaganda concerning Formosa remains at a low level. A considerable amount of attention has been given to the crash of the Indian airliner carrying Chinese Communist officials to the Bandung conference. Peiping has declared that the crash was caused by US-Chinese Nationalist sabotage and that therefore its "determina- tion to liberate" Formosa has been "sharpened." 21 Apr 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03181196 Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03181196 Ituol CHINA -FORMOSA SITUATION Nautical miles �I Statute miles 0 5'0 5p ipo 100 150 150 Selected road I III Railroad +++4-+4- Proposed railroad A.Q. � A OPERATIONAL � A SERVICEABLE � A UNKNOWN � A OTHER COMMUNIST AIRFIELD LEGEND USEABILITY MIS-IS, MIG-17, TU-4, IL-28 I TU-2, IL-10, LA-9/ I I, LI-2, etc. � unknown * Fields not considered capable of supporting sustained operations at present. * NATIONALIST AIRFIELD EH HANKO HUNANc. 28 � CHANGSHA NA CHANG HUAINING DESIGNATIONS PRIMARY: considered most important in area, with prepared runway generally 5000 feet or longer. SECONDARY: auxiliary or emergency bases, or fields of lesser importance-runways generally less than 5000 feet. OPERATIONAL: consistently used by military & civilian aircraft. SERVICEABLE: capable of use by aircraft. UNKNOWN: current status undetermined. OTHER: under construction, abandoned, or unserviceable. 18 ^ 120 KIANGS r HANGCHOW ) CHUICHTANG )1' e. CHUHk CHINHUA EKIANG SHANGJA 0 LUCHIA \ -24 DER) K WA U N G CON RUCAI SWA TOW N ill_CANjON SWA TO � Hong Kong (G.B.) aq.o � Port.) .- 114 116 CH INGYAN AO' 9 WENCHOW 1 r. CHI NOU 'I ' -2-, NINGP 122 32 GHAI CHOUSHO1 '- Oit4OP CHAo- crpil 0 TAcHENS 28- E A S T C II I N A IMATSUS t�\ /cb CH IA. UEMOY 0 � F R'I'PESCADOR 0 SOUTH CHINA SEA 118 120 SEA TAOYU IS 26- UNGSHAN El �LAN 24- 22- - 122 PRESENTATIONS DIVISION Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03181196 50420