CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/04/21

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03181196
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: September 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Publication Date: April 21, 1955

Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03181196,
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21 April 1955
Copy No. 94
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO 1./
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
[I DECLASSIFIED
CLASS'. CHANGE-D TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: tO /
AUTH: FIR 70-2
DATE: /AV REVIEWET1; ,
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Bohlen comments on significance of change in Soviet position on
Austria (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. Viet Minh reported planning "stay-behind" struggle in central
Vietnam (page 4).
3. End of Thai-Burmese "co-operation" predicted (page 4).
4. Sukarno reportedly invites Nehru, Chou and Nasr to remain as
state guests (page 6).
THE FORMOSA STRAITS
(page 7)
* * * *
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GENERAL
1. Bohlen comments on significance of change in Soviet position on
Austria:
Ambassador Bohlen doubts that the Krem-
lin seriously expects it can significantly
impede implementation of the Paris agree-
ments merely by changing its position on
Austria. He is convinced that Moscow realizes the only sure way
of preventing West German rearmament would involve the sacri-
fice of the Soviet position in East Germany, a price it has so far
been unwilling to pay.
Bohlen believes the USSR is still deter-
mined to hold East Germany, and that its next move will be to
sound out the Bonn government on establishing relations with Mos-
cow in return for West German recognition of the East German
government. While it is doubtful that the USSR would be prepared
to have a four-power meeting on unification, it might conceivably
have in mind a four-power agreement to limit rearmament in both
parts of Germany.
Bohlen thinks, however, that any undue
delay in setting up a Soviet bloc security system after the Paris
accords take effect, or any exclusion of East Germany or special
status for it, would probably be a sign of some shift in Soviet
policy on Germany.
Comment: The rapidity and manner in
which the USSR recently bas moved on Austria indicate that it
intends to use an Austrian settlement to arouse German confidence
in the sincerity of Soviet proposals for unification, in an attempt
to impede West German rearmament. Moscow may now suggest
conferences on other issues and make new proposals for Germany,
even though it does not intend to give up East Germany.
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. Viet Minh reported planning "stay-behind" struggle in central
Vietnam:
The Viet Minh is secretly reorganizing
party cells in the remaining Viet Minh
regroupment area along the coast in
South Vietnam, according to a Vietnam-
ese government report (see map, p. 5). High party officials
are considering locating their headquarters and ammunition
stocks in the strategic plateau area in southern Annam where
cadres are presently attempting to win the allegiance of the
ethnic minorities.
Preparations for the "stay-behind"
struggle along the coast include teaching the population tech-
niques of non-co-operation with the national government and
spreading propaganda that a wave of reprisals and assassina-
tions will follow the arrival of the army.
Comment: Viet Minh evacuation of this
regroupment area is to take place between 22 April and 16 May.
The effectiveness of Viet Minh disrup-
tive efforts will be largely contingent on the ability of the Viet-
namese government to solve its economic problems and to
establish an efficient administration.
How successful Saigon's administration
has been in other regroupment areas is not Imown.
3. End of Thai-Burmese "co-operation" predicted:
There is every reason to believe that
the "sham" of Thai-Burmese co-operation
may soon end, in the opinion of the Amer-
ican army attache in Bangkok. He cites
a report from the American consul in
Chiengmai that the Thai police recently
21 Apr 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
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PRESENTATIONS DIVISION
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permitted the shipment of 150 bags of rice and 4,000 cartons of
cigarettes to the Chinese Nationalist irregulars on the Burma
side of the border. The attache also reports that a border inci-
dent in early April resulted in considerable tension between local
Thai and Burmese officials.
Comment; Thai-Burmese relations have
been traditionally cool, and onlyZiring the past 12 months has
there been an apparent improvement.
Thai police director general Phao agreed
to seal off the Thai-Burmese border in order to assist the Bur-
mese in their current offensive against the Chinese guerrillas. It
now seems, clear from recent reports that he did so only after the
guerrillas had been forewarned and he could feel certain of their
ability to survive the Burmese campaign.
In the event the Burmese learn of the
reported Thai shipments to the guerrillas, they will be more in-
clined than ever to blame their lack of success to date against the
guerrillas on the Thai and to hold the United States partly responsi-
ble.
4. Sukarno reportedly invites Nehru Chou and Nasr to remain as
state guests:
President Sukarno has invited Premiers
Chou En-lai, Nehru and Nasr to remain
as state guests after the close of the
Bandung conference,
Comment: Sukarno apparently sees
Nasr as the likely candidate among Arab leaders to be won over
to the point of view of Asian neutralist leaders. At the invitation
of Burma's premier, Nasr stopped over in Rangoon, along with
Chou and Nehru, on his way to the conference.
Chou is reportedly seeking Nases favor
by indicating that Communist China is ready to increase its pur-
chases of Egyptian cotton if a trade arrangement can be negotiated.
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THE FORMOSA STRAITS
Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group
for the Formosa Straits Problem
This report is based on information received in Washington
up to 1100 hours 20 April 1955.
1. Seven additional BUTCHER (IL-28) twin-jet light bombers
were arriving at Tsitsihar on
14 April from Chita in the USSR. Again, the aircraft callsigns used
were of Soviet naval subordination. This brings to 29 the total num-
ber of BUTCHERS (IL-28's) arriving at Tsitsihar from Chita since
25 March.
Another late development concerning these bombers oc-
curred on 18 April, what is
believed to have been the flight of at least four jet tight bombers from
Tsitsihar to Chiaohsien in the Tsingtao area. Chiaohsien is the site
of a naval air school and a BUTCHER (IL-28) regiment of naval sub-
ordination.
Should all the Tsitsihar BUTCHERS (IL-28's) be trans-
ferred to Chiaohsien, it is probable that the Chinese Communist
naval air force is in the process of activating a jet light bomber divi-
sion of two regiments with a total strength of 52 BUTCHERS (IL-28's).
The acquisition of additional BUTCHERS (IL-28's) by the
naval air force would be significant in that the Chinese Communist
naval air force, particularly the 1st Division, took a leading role in
air attacks on the Tachens.
2. A summary of Formosa Straits Reports for the week end-
ing 20 April is attached.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY
FORMOSA STRAITS REPORT
20 April 1955
1. During the period there has been almost a complete lack of
military operations in the Formosa Straits area. For the first time
since last September, a week has passed with no artiller fire against
Quemoy. Bad weather prevailed throughout the period.
2. Reports continue to indicate Chinese Communist efforts to im-
prove air capabilities in the coastal area. Developments were high-
lighted bT
a. Photographic confirmation of 39 BUTCHER (IL-28) jet
light bombers at Hangchow, near Shanghai, and evidence that
they are part of Communist China's most experienced jet
bomber division.
b. The new airfield under construction near Chingyang, just
22 miles northeast of Big Quemoy, is expected to be completed
by September. It will apparently be a large and modern airbase.
3. The Chinese Nationalist coastal interdiction patrol north of
the Matsus has made no interceptions and has been reduced in
strength.
4. Chinese Communist propaganda concerning Formosa remains at
a low level. A considerable amount of attention has been given to the
crash of the Indian airliner carrying Chinese Communist officials to the
Bandung conference. Peiping has declared that the crash was caused
by US-Chinese Nationalist sabotage and that therefore its "determina-
tion to liberate" Formosa has been "sharpened."
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CHINA -FORMOSA SITUATION
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A.Q.
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USEABILITY
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generally 5000 feet or longer.
SECONDARY: auxiliary or emergency bases, or fields of lesser
importance-runways generally less than 5000 feet.
OPERATIONAL: consistently used by military & civilian aircraft.
SERVICEABLE: capable of use by aircraft.
UNKNOWN: current status undetermined.
OTHER: under construction, abandoned, or unserviceable.
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