CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/04/23

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03181197
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: September 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Publication Date: April 23, 1955

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. 45--
NO CHANGE IN CLASS,
IA DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE- 20 /
HR 70-2
DATE:dhinCL. REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Tito suggests more explicit neutralism in Yugoslav policy
(page 3).
2. Balkan pact military talks leave co-ordination with NATO still
undecided (page 4).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Soviet shipments to Viet Minh may .start on Haiphong takeover
(page 4).
4. Bao Dai proposes plan for new government in South Vietnam
(page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Comment on murder of high Syrian army officer (page 6).
6. Jordan's prime minister may resign before end of May (page 6).
7. Turkish prime minister presses for American economic aid
(page 7).
THE FORMOSA STRAITS
(page 9)
* * * *
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GENERAL
1. Tito suggests more explicit neutralism in Yugoslav policy:
Yugoslavia is
determined to contribute to an eventual
rapprochement of all European states,
an plans neither to return to the Cominform as the USSR desires,
nor to join NATO. He said that he welcomes the prospect of
Austria's neutralization and feels that Soviet withdrawal of troops
from Austria and the neighboring Satellites would compensate
for any losses.
He felt that Germany would inevitably
be reunified, and that it could not then be expected to associate
itself exclusively with either East or West. He questioned whether
the West should continue to regard Germany exclusively in mili-
tary terms. He suggested that consideration be given to a "cor-
don sanitaire" consisting of Sweden, a reunited Germany, Austria,
and Yugoslavia. He saw no reason why countries such as the
Netherlands could not be included.
Tito said that he had no objection to
"purely technical" defense talks with the West, but that talks on
strategic or tactical problems, even secret, could not fail to have
an unfortunate effect at the present time. He said he knew this
stand would be mistakenly attributed to a reorientation of Yugoslav
foreign policy. "If I am told2 na talks no aid, I will give up aid,"
he stated.
Comment: Tito 's statements strongly
imply that Yugoslav thinking is becoming more outspokenly neu-
tralist. There have been several reports that the USSR is work-
ing for Yugoslavia's inclusion in a belt of neutral nations.
Because of their often repeated belief
that world tensions have abated in recent months, the Yugoslays
feel no current pressure to accede to Western desires that they
co-ordinate their military planning with NATO, either directly or
through the Balkan pact.
By "purely technical" defense talks,
Tito probably has in mind a renewal of American-British-French
talks with Yugoslavia, largely concerned with military aid, which
were last held in 1953.
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2. Balkan pact military talks leave co-ordination with NATO still
undecided:
the general staff conference of the Balkan
affiance held in Belgrade from 5 to 17
April opened with the Turks proposing a
discussion of strategic plans which would involve NATO support
for Greece and Turkey. The Yugoslays refused to discuss the
question, insisting that political decisions were a prerequisite.
The conferees finally agreed to consider
strategic military plans contingent on later political decisions.
Turkey then requested Yugoslav commitments in the event of a
Soviet attack from the East. The Yugoslays responded that their
capabilities would be small because of the remoteness of eastern
Turkey.
Technical-level conversations concern-
ing intelligence, logistics, and communications were labeled by
both Greeks and Turks as "generally satisfactory."
Comment: The reports on this meeting
support other indications thaf a serious cleavage exists in the
Balkan alliance as to the direction it should take in terms of over-
all Western defense planning. Unless a workable compromise can
be achieved, the ultimate effectiveness of the tripartite military
alliance may be seriously weakened.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Soviet shipments to Viet Minh may start on Haiphong takeover:
23 Apr 55
All shipments were
to begin after the Viet Minh takes over
Haiphong in mid-May.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Comment: With the exception of the
Sino-Viet Minh agreement on the restoration of communications
in North Vietnam, this is the first known large-scale Orbit eco-
nomic support made available to the Viet Minh since Geneva. It
is possible that such shipments have been deferred until the mod-
ern port of Haiphong becomes available. (Concurred in by ORR)
4. Bao Dal proposes plan for new government in South Vietnam:
Bao Dai has proposed a master plan for
a solution to the crisis in Vietnam. As
outlined to the American embassy in
Paris on 20 April by his chief adviser,
the first step, as soon as France and the United States approve,
would be to bring Phan Huy Quat to France, where he would be
charged with forming a new government. Bao Dai promised that
this move would be handled so as to preserve Diem's authority
and "face."
The government would consist of two
policy-making bodies whose disputes Bao Dai would arbitrate--a
cabinet of approximately 12 nonpolitical technicians and a high
council of some 18 members representing political groups, the
sects, the army, the peasantry, artisans, and the trade unions.
The high council would serve until a national assembly could be
elected by universal suffrage at some indefinite date. Bao Dai
believed that the establishment of a provisional government pend-
ing elections would be "madness," and that any thought of national
elections in the immediate future would be totally unrealistic.
Bao Dai, who sees his own role as that
of an "arbitrator and catalyst," would guarantee the good behavior
of the sects and the Binh Xuyen. He regards the plan as the best
possible means of "replacing Diem without antagonizing the
United States." Bao Dai recognized that no plan could be put into
effect without prior French and American approval but asserted
it was absolutely essential that the United States take "no visible
role" in connection with his plan.
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If the United States continued to back
Diem, Bao Dal would no longer be responsible for events in Viet-
nam, but he wished to state formally that he would yield to Ameri-
can views if the United States opposed his plan and continued to
support Diem. He explained that Vietnam's national interest did
not permit it to oppose the United States.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Comment on murder of high Syrian army officer:
The assassination on 22 April of Colonel
Adnan Malki, the Syrian army chief of
operations and training, removes from
the scene an army officer who was asso-
ciated with the leftist, anti-Western clique that dominates Prime
Minister Asali's coalition cabinet. This clique has been pushing
for a Syrian-Egyptian-Saudi Arabian defense pact.
Malki was shot by an army sergeant who
reputedly was a member of the Syrian Social National Party, a
small, nationalist group that believes in Iraqi-Syrian union cen-
tered on Damascus, not Baghdad.
The murder occurs at a time when the
struggle for power within Syria has been threatening to erupt into
military action. Malki's superior and friend, Chief of Staff Shawkat
Shuqayr, appears currently to be courting open rebellion from Syrian
army officers who oppose his policy of ridding the ranks of pro-
Iraqi officers. Malki's death will probably induce the chief of staff
to move swiftly in his attempts to tighten his control.
23 Apr 55
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Comment:
Because no other Jordanian politician
could wield the dictatorial control of Abul Huda, his resignation
would probably presage a resurgence of the Communist and anti-
Western extremist activity which flourished before he assumed
office a year ago.
7. Turkish prime minister presses for American economic aid:
Ambassador Warren reports that when
he endeavored on 20 April to caution
Turkish prime minister Menderes on
prospects for increased American eco-
nomic aid, the prime minister reacted with bitterness and "an
intensity of conviction and determination."
Menderes said that in the economic field
the United States alone is unwilling to extend credit to Turkey, and
he added that his country could get along without American economic
aid. He said that he had heard only criticism and cries of inflation
from Americans since he came into office. Washington does not
appreciate, he warned, the importance of Turkey against the Soviet
Union and the need for continued political stability "in this critical
spot."
Comment: The prime minister's pique
reflects the degree of tension which, in the judgment of top Ameri-
can officials in Turkey, has reached a stage that might affect all
American activities there. In mid-March, Ankara reiterated last
year's unsuccessful request for a $300,000,000 American loan for
economic purposes and requested a definite reply or the cessa-
tion of economic talks then under way.
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Economic conditions in Turkey have
seriously deteriorated during recent months, largely because of
Ankara's unwillingness or inability to cope with large foreign
commercial debts and general economic imbalance.
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THE FORMOSA STRAITS
Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group
for the Formosa Straits Problem
This report is based on information received in Washington
up to 1100 hours 22 April 1955.
1. No significant activity has been reported.
23 Apr 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9
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