CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/04/26

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03181198
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: September 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Publication Date: April 26, 1955

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO / r
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: nh16?0, _REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WO/. 1147/10134
Copy No. I, 4
�*11//
�//
26 April 1955
-T-0-12-SE-C-RET"
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SUMMARY
SOUTHEAST ASIA
1. Saigon embassy comments on Bao Dal plan for new Vietnamese
government (page 3).
2. Thai foreign minister reported to have become more neutralist
at Bandung (page 4).
SOUTH ASIA
3. Comment on Indian reaction to Afro-Asian conference (page 4).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
4. French agreement seen unsatisfactory to Tunisian nationalists
(page 5)
WESTERN EUROPE
5. USSR reportedly submits commodity deliveries list to Austrian
government (page 6).
6. Comment on the Lower Saxony elections (page 7).
7. Bao Dai planning "to act" on 27 April (page 7).
THE FORMOSA STRAITS
(page 9)
* * * *
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
1. Saigon embassy comments on Bao Dai plan for new Vietnamese
government:
The American embassy in Saigon notes
that Bao Dal's plan for a new government
in South Vietnam closely resembles French
proposals previously regarded by the em-
bassy as undesirable and unworkable. The embassy suspects that
the French and Bao Dai have collaborated on this plan, and advanced
the name of Phan Huy Quat for premier as "sugar-coating" for an
otherwise bitter dose. The requirement that France and the United
States adopt a hands-off attitude after agreeing in principle to the
plan, it points out, would leave the French in an infinitely better
position to influence Bao Dai, the sects, and other groups through
long-established channels.
The embassy fails to see how the impres-
sion can be avoided under Bao Dates plan that Diem has lost and
the sects have won. Bao Dal's proposal that the sect problem be
resolved by the integration of the sects' forces into the national
army ignores the fact that the financial and practical impossibility
of doing exactly this lies at the root of much of the current crisis.
The embassy is firmly convinced that Bao Dai's proposal to appoint
army representatives to the "Council of National Union" is unde-
sirable.
Comment: Bao Dal's plan, as outlined to
the American embassy in-15a-71-20 April, would establish two
policy-making bodies--a cabinet of about 12 nonpolitical technicians,
to be headed by Phan Huy Quat, and a council of some 18 members
representing various groups including the army, the peasantry, and
"the artisanry." The respective powers of these two bodies would
be determined by negotiation. Bao Dai saw his own role as that of
an "arbitrator and catalyst."
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2. Thai foreign minister reported to have become more neutralist
at Bandung:
Prince Wan, the Thai foreign minister,
became progressively more "neutralist"
at the Bandung conference,
attributed this shift to Chou En-lai's assurances that Thailand had
nothing to fear from the "Free Thai" movement and that former
Thai premier Pridi Phanomyong would be restricted to Peiping
and its immediate environs.
Comment: Wan is a leading advocate
within the Thai government of close relations with the United States.
His opening speech at Bandung was strongly pro-Western but he did
not figure importantly in subsequent debates. In view of his elec-
tion as rapporteur of the political committee, he may have felt com-
pelled to assume a nonprovocative role.
A leading Bangkok newspaper has reported
speculation in Bandung that Chou, who recently referred to Pridi
as a "political refugee," might offer to restrict the latter's activi-
ties in return for Thai support for Communist China's entry into
the UN.
SOUTH ASIA
3. Comment on Indian reaction to Afro-Asian conference:
rime Minister Nehru's failure to domi-
ate the recent Afro-Asian conference
as even more marked than his lack of
uccess at the first Colombo powers
meeting in April 1954. He is likely to increase his earlier oppo-
sition toward any permanent organization developing from the
conference in Bandung.
The initial satisfaction expressed by the
Indian press over the "good start" of the conference gave way to
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sharp criticism of the pro-Western countries in attendance, as
well as of the United States, when Nehru's repeated efforts to
keep the sessions on a noncontroversial course were thwarted by
effective anti-Communist speeches.
General Indian press approval of Chou's
"restraint and moderation" suggests that Communist China's tac-
tics at Bandung impressed Indian public opinion. Nehru's failure
to comment on Chou's proposals on Formosa suggests, however,
that he is irked because Chou's proposals seemed offered in re-
sponse to Kotelawala's strong anti-Communist speech, whereas
nothing had resulted from the earlier talks which he and Krishna
Menon had had with the Chinese premier.
The irritations which developed at Bandung
between Nehru and the Ceylonese and Pakistani prime ministers
are likely to hamper the success of forthcoming conferences of the
Colombo power d leaders. Difficulties may thus arise in May both
at the proposed India-Pakistan meeting on Kashmir and at the Asian
economic conference at Simla.
NEAR EAST AFRICA
4. French agreement seen unsatisfactory to Tunisian nationalists:
The agreement in principle announced in
Paris on 22 April by the French and
Tunisian governments is nothing more
than an armistice and fails to settle vital
issues,
Salah ben Youssef, secretary
general of the nationalist Neo-Destour
party, will probably refuse to accept the arrangement.
The American ambassador in Paris
points out that further hurdles may be expected when the agree-
ments are drafted as well as in connection with their ratification
by the National Assembly. A meeting to initial several as yet un-
drafted conventions is scheduled for 30 May.
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Comment: Other reports also state that
both the Tunisian and FrerViiegotiators, in their desire to termi-
nate the talks which commenced last September, finally agreed in
principle so that they could recess during Ramadan, the month of
religious fasting which began on 23 April.
The agreement has already been denounced
by Ben Youssef, leader of the extreme wing of the Neo-Destour,
and by French settlers in Tunisia, who declared on 23 April that
they would fight it in every way possible.
WESTERN EUROPE
5. USSR reportedly submits commodity deliveries list to Austrian gov-
ernment:
Soviet high commissioner Ilichev on 20
April gave Chancellor Raab a list of goods
which Austria is to deliver in the next six
years to cover the projected payment of
$150,000,000 stipulated in the draft state treaty,
Scheduled annual deliveries would include
5,000 tons of sheet steel, 5,000 tons of galvanized sheets, 2,000 tons
of copper sheets, 1,000 kilometers of power-line cable, and 2,000
tons of rolling mill equipment.
Comment: Copper sheets and rolling mill
equipment are subject to 1Friargo under East-West trade controls9
and some of the specific items which would be delivered under other
commodity categories are probably also subject to controls. In the
past, however, the Soviet bloc has been obtaining annually larger
quantities of these or equally strategic goods from Soviet-controlled
enterprises in Austria. (Concurred in by ORR)
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6. Comment on the Lower Saxony elections:
The results of the Lower Saxony elec-
tions, in which the Social Democrats
won a plurality, should not be interpreted
as an indication of a significant increase in West German senti-
ment against rearmament. The election returns follow the gen-
eral pattern set in other West German state elections during 1954,
the issues and personalities being essentially local. Debate on
foreign policy did not occur until the last stages of the campaign
when Chancellor Adenauer and Social Democratic chairman
011enhauer entered the campaign.
The Social Democrats gained 35.2 per-
cent of the vote this year as compared with 33 percent in the last
state elections in 1951. In 1951, Adenauer's Christian Democrats
were in an alliance with the rightist German Party, and together
they polled 23.8 percent. This year, the two parties, running
separately, garnered a total of 39 percent, or 15.2 percent more
than in 1951. Both the Communists and extreme rightists made
a very poor showing in the latest elections.
f
No decision has yet been reached on the
formation of a new state government. Another Socialist coalition
government would merely mean the continuation of an anti-Adenauer
representation in the Bundesrat. Lower Saxony's five Bundesrat
votes, however, will probably not be necessary for future federal
legislation on rearmament.
�
7. Bao Dai planning "to act" on 27 April:
Bao Dal is proposing "to take action" on
27 April and hopes that the American re-
action to his suggested plan will be re-
ceived before that date, according to
guyen De his chief adviser. Bao Dal believes the urgency of
the situation is such that he must act "before it is too late."
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Comment: The action referred to is
presumably an order to Phan Buy Quat to come to France to start
negotiations for the formation of a new government. In outlining
Bao Dai's plan last week, Nguyen De said that Bao Dal believed
the tension in Saigon would end as soon as it was known that his
plan was being acted on. At that time, however, De stated that
American agreement was a prerequisite to implementation of the
plan.
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THE FORMOSA STRAITS
Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group
for the Formosa Straits Problem
This report is based on information received in Washington
up to 1100 hours 25 April 1955.
1. No significant developments have been reported.
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