CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/05/05

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03181206
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: September 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Publication Date: May 5, 1955

Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03181206,
TOP SECRET f
5 May 1955
Copy No. 1,4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
El DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
'7/MM TOP SECRET V -A
Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03181206
Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03181206
'Niro
SUMMARY
FAR EAST
I. Comment on Japan-Communist China trade agreement (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. Binh Xuyen reportedly plans to hold out ten miles south of Saigon
(page 3).
3. Phnom Penh embassy assesses Cambodian neutralism (page 4).
SOUTH ASIA
4. Indian home minister anticipates failure of Indo- Pakistani talks
(naae 5).
5.
EASTERN EUROPE
6.
THE FORMOSA STRAITS
(page 7)
5 May 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03181206
Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03181206
vgre
FAR EAST
I. Comment on Japan-Communist China trade agreement:
An unofficial Japan-Communist China
trade agreement for one year, calling
for $84,000,000 in trade each way, was
signed on 4 May in Tokyo. The negotiations for the agreement,
between a private Japanese group and official Chinese Commu-
nist representatives, had been stalled for several weeks over the
Communists' demands that the Japanese government guarantee a
payments plan and permit an exchange of permanent trade mis-
sions with diplomatic status. Prime Minister Hatoyama finally
agreed to offer official "co-operation," but not "assurances" that
the agreement would be fulfilled.
a high percentage
of Japan's proposed exports consist of embargoed items. Con-
sequently, only a small portion of the trade agreement is likely
to be implemented. The agreement will have the effect, however,
of increasing pressure on the Hatoyama government to work for
an early relaxation of CHINCOM controls.
Hatoyaina's decision probably resulted
from constant reminders from the press, opposition parties, and
trade associations of his promises to work for increased trade
with Communist China.. He will probably agree to an exchange of
trade missions after testing American reaction.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. Binh Xuyen reportedly plans to hold out ten miles south of Saigon:
On I May the main body of Binh Xuyen
forces was ten miles south of Saigon,
where it intended taremAin,
i nese forces plan to avoid a pitched battle with the national
army, however, and if necessary to retreat to the coastal area,
where they can hold out "with already committed French assistance."
5 May 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
evTI
Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03181206
Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03181206
*41111Ie
Remaining Binh Xuyen positions in the Saigon area, such as the
national police building in the French sector. re exDected to
capitulate for lack of supplies.
Comment: The Binh Xuyen will probably
prove a long-term police problem, but it is no longer a serious
threat to the stability of the Diem government.
The government is pressing the French
to expel remaining Binh Xuyen units from the French sector. The
French have warned that an attack on these Binh Xuyen elements
would be considered an act of hostility against French forces, but
they have been unwilling to assume responsibility for the expulsion
of the Binh Xuyen from their sector. The government has cut off
the police building's water and electricity.
3. Phnom Penh embassy assesses Cambodian neutralism:
Ambassador McClintock in Phnom Penh
believes that while the Cambodian govern-
ment is inclined to take an increasingly
impartial attitude as between East and
West, there are important limits to this trend. He believes two
crucial factors make Cambodia's attitude toward the Communist
bloc different from that of India: firsthand experience with a Com-
munist invasion, and an urgent desire to be strong enough to resist
internai subversion and external infiltration.
Any attempt to draw Cambodia into active
co-operation with regional security arrangements is likely to be
resisted at the present time, according to the.ambassador. Over
the long pull, however, as the country's leaders come to realize
that American interest is not a subterfuge for exploitation and as
Communist pressure builds up, Cambodia's neutrality may be ex-
pected to assume a "Swedish tinge."
5 May 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 003181206
rs A* s-� ere
Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03181206
**le Nor
SOUTH ASIA
4. Indian home minister anticipates failure of Indo-Pakistani talks:
Home Minister Pant told Indian newsmen
during a briefing held about 2 May that
he did not expect any substantive results
from the Indo-Pakistani talks scheduled
5.
to take place on 14 May,
Pant said he felt the Pakistani govern-
ment desired to hold discussions with India in order to bolster its
own position at home. He doubted that there would be any tangible
result from the talks unless Pakistan agreed to a Kashmir isettle-
ment on the basis of the status quo. India, he said, would not
abandon any of the territory it now occupies in Kashmir.
Comment: Indo- Pakistani disputes other
than that on Kashmir are gradually being solved to mutual satis-
faction. No suggestion on Ishmir raised by Pakistan is likely to
be seriously considered by India, however, especially since New
Delhi is aware that Pakistan desires an immediate settlement of
that problem to end the drain on the government's time, energy
and finances.
5 May 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
-' Pt r4 Pri
Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03181206
w.rt tiro teal to,
Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03181206
%or
EASTERN EUROPE
5 May 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6
-Ter SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03181206
�an �
Approvedfor Feler-'asre:7019/09/17 C03181206
NW'
THE FORMOSA STRAITS
Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group
for the Formosa Straits Problem
This report is based on information received in Washington
up to 1100 hours 4 May 1955.
1. No significant developments have been reported.
2. A summary of Formosa Straits Reports for the week ending
4 May is attached,
5 May 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7
rlf,
Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03181206
� Appro7Q7orT4Wa7e71619/09/17 C031,81206
stood Nue
WEEKLY SUMMARY
FORMOSA STRAITS REPORT
4 May 1955
1. The Communists have continued the repair and con-
struction of roads and the improvement of field fortifications on
the Peiling Peninsula., north of the Matsu Island group. Numerous
explosions were heard from both the Peiling Peninsula and the Min
River estuary, west of the 1VIatsus. The majority of these sounds
probably were blasting associated with the construction work.
2. The presence of at least two Communist PT boats in
the Matsu area is indicated by recent sightings. Their aggressive
employment could restrict Nationalist naval operations in support
of these islands. The Nationalist nighttime coastal interdiction
patrol Ilas not reported any interceptions. There are continuing
reports of Communist seaborne logistic activity in the Matsu area
during daylight hours. Chinese Communist submarine strength
has been increased by two long-range submarines to a total of six
submarines capable of limited war patrols.
3. Aerial reconnaissance disclosed continued construction
on East China airfields, with no unusual trends noted.
4. Chinese Communist comment on President Eisenhower's
and Secretary Dulles' press conference statements charges that the
statements failed to deal with the question of withdrawal of US
forces, the "crux" of the question of eliminating tension in the
Formosa area. Peiping asserts that there is no need for a cease-
fire, as there is no war between Communist China and the US.
5. Chinese Communist propaganda broadcasts to Formosa
have greatly increased since 1 May. Whereas propaganda was pre-
viously directed to Formosa four hours a day on two transmitters,
it is now being beamed 12 hours a day on eight transmitters, all
of which are believed to be in the Foochow area.
6. Peiping continues to issue propaganda on the subject of
the alleged sabotage of the Indian airliner. The present propaganda
campaign is probably part of the Chinese Communist effort to ex-
ploit British nervousness over the status of Hong Kong in order to
minimize British co-operation with the US on Far Eastern issues
such as Formosa.
5 May 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8
Pim d'''t 11-1 17-, PT(
Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03181206
Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 003181206
�
'Inoperable
LOYUAN
CHUANSHEEI
ISLAND
MEIHUA
SANTL1 INLET
PEILING
PENINSULA
HUANGCHI
CHHICHU ISLAND
(SPIDER ISLAND)
40, KAOTENG
PEIKANTANG
ea
.1571,11ATSU
a
EAST CHINA SEA
PAICHUAN ISLANDS
(WHITE DOGS)
HSICHUAN c7
TUNGCHUAN
et
LANGTAO
(LARNE ISLAND)
MATSU AREA
Selected Road
0 5 10
I 1 1
Statute Mites
0 5 10
I 1 I
Nautical Miles
50325
Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 003181206