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January 13, 1958
rrr)//7 re AMved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293t NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS CONTINUED CONTROL 7 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) / 13 January 1958 SC No. 00035/58 Copy No. DOC...11ME IT Ti). (-LASS. TS FI tr.l. AUTH: DINI E. F 143 REviEwER: 372044 1 OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an un- authorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detri- ment of the United States. THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE KEPT IN COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS AT ALL TIMES It is to be seen only by US personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE information; its security must be maintained in accordance with COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS. � No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantages to be gained, unless such action is first approved by the Director of Central Intelligence. Top SECRETz Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293 Irmol �Lid Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293 CONTENTS 1. USSR PROPOSES EXTENSION OF NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE IN EUROPE (Confidential) (page 3). git 2. POLES PLAN CAMPAIGN FOR RAPACKI PLAN IN WEST GERMANY (Secret Noforn) (page 4). 9--k 3, SOVIET ARMY POLITICAL CHIEF REPLACED (Secret) (page 5). 4. NEW CHIEF OF STATE IN RUMANIA (Confidential) (page 6). 5., INDONESIAN DISSIDENTS HESITANT ON BREAKING WITH Aa we DJAKARTA (page 7). 6, INDONESIAN COMMUNIST TACTICS (Confidential Noforn) (page 8): 7. PROBABLE RIGHTIST-LEFTIST MERGER INCREASES LIKE- LIHOOD OF VIOLENCE IN GUATEMALA (Secret) (page 9). 8, THE VENEZUELAN SITUATION (Secret) page 10). 9. HAITIAN STABILITY THREATENED (Secret) (page 11). -1-44'14 6777.� '7;6 /1, er-ft 10. PRESIDENT RHEE TO REJECT US-PROPOSED SOUTH KOREAN ARMED FORCES REDUCTION (Secret Noforn) (page 12). A,0 11, TURKISH REACTION TO NEW BRITISH CYPRUS PROPOSAL (page 13). Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2 QflFT� Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293 13 Jan 58 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293 TLALAL JIM.ILAL I .11..Z.CA.A.4 Now, via* 1. USSR PROPOSES EXTENSION OF NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE IN EUROPE Comment on: he Soviet Union has stepped up its iplomatic efforts against the NATO greement in principle to establish ided missile bases in Western Eu- ope. The Rapacki plan originally proposed banning nuclear weapons in both Germanies, Poland, and Czechoslovakia., Premier Bulganin's letters to the pre- miers of Norway and Denmark on 10 January call for the addition of Scandinavia and Finland to the "nuclear-free zone," and the prohibition in the zone of "all types of rocket weapons" as well. On 11 January, Foreign Minister Gromyko suggested to an Italian "Peace Partisan" delegation visiting Moscow that Italy and apparently Albania be added to the zone. Bulganin's expression of satisfaction with the refusal, of Norway and Denmark to allow no nuclear weapons and missiles on their territories and his proposal to include northern Europe in the Rapacki Plan reflect the Soviet leaders' belief that they can take advantage of the strong neutralist sen- timents in these countries to detach them, in effect, from full military participation in NATO. Moscow is probably also con- cerned with indications that Sweden may soon initiate produc- tion of atomic weapons. The Bulganin letters term a new heads-of- government meeting the "most expedient" means of resolving East-West differences and berate Western skepticism over Soviet motives, stating that the 6 January announcement of a Soviet armed forces cut constitutes a "manifestation of good intentions" over reduction of international tensions. (CONFIDENTIAL) 13 Jan 58 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3 ifymprillONTTI AT. Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293 NNew4 ''Tft�pv 2. POLES PLAN CAMPAIGN FOR RAPACKI PLAN IN WEST GERMANY Comment on: enior Polish officials and Polish journ- lists stationed in West Berlin and the ederal Republic met on 11 January to 'scuss the manner in which the Rapacki plan for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe can be pro- moted in influential circles in West Germany. The meeting, in West Berlin, also examined ways of influencing West German public opinion during the coming months in favor of expanded diplomatic and cultural ties and increased trade between the two countries. The Poles now may feel that the climate of public and official opinion in the Federal Republic is swinging toward improved relations with Poland. They have probably been encouraged by reports that the Rapacki plan struck a responsive chord among some West German polit- ical figures. Poland is interested in establishing full diplo- matic relations with West Germany, but Bonn fears such a step would imply acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line. (NOFORN) 13 Jan 58 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 4 .SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293 3. SOVIET ARMY POLITICAL CHIEF REPLACED Comment ont Colonel General A. S. Zheltov has apparently been relieved as chief of the main political administration of the Soviet armed forces, a position equivalent to a chief of a department of the party central committee. According to the 10 Janu- ary issue of Pravda, the post is now held by Colonel F. I. Golikov, former commander of the Armored Forces Academy. Several reports at the time of the ouster of Zhukov alleged that his relations with Zheltov were strained over the problem of political indoctrination and training in the armed forces. Since that time, however, there have been in- dications that the political training is still insufficient, and this may account for Zheltov's removal. No new position has been announced for Zheltov, who had held the political administra- tion job since 1953. Golikov, a specialist in mechanized war- fare, has held staff, field4, and diplomatic posts. He has no discernible connections with any members of the top party lead- ership, and his assignment to a political post does not appear consistent with his purely military background. (SECRET) 13 Jan 58 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 5 �SRCR 1'T Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293 11.411,1 11,1E� AJLFIL;41. .11,.CALK4 4. NEW CHIEF OF STATE IN RUMANIA Comment on: extraordinary session of the Grand ational Assembly on 11 January lected Ion Gheorghe Maurer to suc- eed the deceased Petru Groza as chair- man of its presidium--titular chief of state. A lawyer, economist, and experienced diplomat, Maurer is probably one of the ablest men in the Rumanian regime. His election was probably designed, at least in part, for its effect on the diplomatic community in Bucha- rest, which holds Maurer in relatively high esteem. Although he has long been considered a close associate of party First Secretary Gheorghiu-Dej, Maurer's appointment as foreign minister in July 1957 marked his emergence from comparative political obscu- rity. In his conversations with Western diplomats in Bucharest�particularly the former American minister-- Maurer has shown interest in increasing trade with the United States and understanding that domestic concessions would be necessary to improve Rumanian-American rela- tions. He has been relieved of his duties in the Foreign Ministry. (CONFIDENTIAL) 13 Jan 58 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 6 rilltIFTTIFATTT A T. Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293 vreil9 5. INDONESIAN DISSIDENTS HESITANT ON BREAKING WITH DJAKARTA Comment on donesia's dissident colonels who have een meeting in Sumatra are by no means nited as to how fast they should move in stablishing an independent regime ote of caution prevailed over the meet- ng due to the desire of all participants o avoid civil war and establish a "normal, fficient, and democratic government" of Indonesia. the dissidents have agreed to issue an ultimatum to acting President Sartono de- manding the establishment of a new government under former Vice President Hatta and the Sultan of Jogjakarta, and to set up a rival "provisional government of all Indonesia" if the ultima- tum is ignored. The dissidents, however, set no exact date for issuing their ultimatum, although they are presently plan- ning to act before the return of President Sukarno. They also made no decision as to the ultimate disposal of Sukarno and Army Chief of Staff Nasution. Another weakness of their plan is the fact that Hatta has indicated that he would not assume government leadership during Sukarno's absence, and the Sultan is about to leave Indonesia on a trip to the United States. There are strong indications that the pres- ent government intends to stand its ground, at least for the present. On 8 January it issued a decree ordering the outer regions to cease their barter trading. The finance minister has backed the decree with a threat to cut off the subsidies that Djakarta has continued to pay out if the regions do not comply. The current army raids, which reportedly have re- sulted in the arrest of several thousand persons, appear to be designed as a show of force in support of an earlier warning that strong action would be taken against anyone who might be planning to "change the government." 13 Jan 58 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 7 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293 1.46.F.I. � At JILAJJ1.0.4. *ego/ wie00' G. INDONESIAN COMMUNIST TACTICS The Indonesian Communist party (PICI) appears content at this time to con- tinue posing as the government's cham- pion and to exploit opportunities created by the government's anti-Dutch drive. PM satisfaction with current trends is indicated by numerous reports, in- cluding one which states that the party believes that, although the time is not yet ripe to assume leadership, the confis- cation of Dutch firms is a significant ad- vance in the process of making Indonesia a socialist country. Two Indonesian newspapers have reported that secret PKI instructions had criticized the army for prevent- ing strikes and further seizures of businesses by the workers and had urged Communists to infiltrate key government positions. The PM plans to sue the more anti-Communist of these newspa- pers over the charges, which the American Embassy believes could be bona fide. The Communist-influenced Djakarta town military command is conducting a series of raids with the an- nounced intention of seeking out "illegal arms caches and sus- pected terrorists." Accompanying arrests could well develop into a roundup of the more important non-Communist leaders there. Several anti-Communist newspaper editors have already been taken into custody for "questioning." It is likely that the raids will further enhance the Communistb' position by reduc- ing opposition potential. (NOFORN) 13 Jan 58 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 8 CONFITIPNTIA T. Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293 "IS 7. PROBABLE RIGHTIST-LEFTLST MERGER INCREASES LIKELIHOOD OF VIOLENCE IN GUATEMALA Comment qn: The probable pre-election deal between rightist Guatemalan presidential candi- date Ydigoras and the Communist-infil- trated Revolutionary party (.), which may re- sult in an Ydigoras vistory at the polls on 19 January. Ydigoras has promised the PR four cabinet posts, including the key Min- istry of Interior which controls the police, in return for its support. The Communist minority in the PR, which can be expected to step up its efforts to gain control of the party, would find such an arrangement almost ideal for attaining its objective: the consolidation of its political position for a future bid for full power. Bloodshed appears inevitable, with the most likely time immediately after the elections. If center presidential candidate Cruz Salazar wins, Ydigoras and the PR are practically certain to charge fraud and resort to mob violence to upset the election results, as they did last Octo- ber. Ydigoras has publicly declared that "civil war" would follow any attempt to "steal" the election from him. his sup- porters are being told to converge on the capital after the elections. On the other hand, if Ydigoras wins the PR sup- port, the army may attempt to keep him from assuming power. Such an attempt would be certain to result in bloodshed. 13 Jan 58 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 9 Trl?FT Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293 Num./ nrEmp.=_TrAisusITUATION Comment on: The composition of the new Venezuelan cabinet formed on 10 January tends to confirm that President Perez is a figure- head of the military and that his tenure Is subject to their will. At the inaugura- tion of the new cabinet, Perez admitted that the changes were made to achieve harmony among the armed forces and were in agreement with their wishes. Ousted National Se- curity Chief Estrada and Interior Minister Vallenilla, the strongest civilian supporters of the Perez dictatorship, who were both resented by the officer class, have left the country, and two key officers, arrested for implication in the 1-2 Jan- uary revolt, have been released. The military now control key posts in the new cabinet, which is in part a shuffling or retention of for- mer incumbents. The new minister of the interior, General Llovera, was a member of the junta which governed from 1948- 1952, and may be inimical to Perez. General Fernandez, new defense minister and apparently still armed forces chief of staff, fell into disfavor with Perez in 1956 because of his al- leged presidential ambitions. The air force and naval com- manders have also assumed important positions in the govern- ment. The military, however, may be forced to make some concessions to the heretofore passive civilian op- position in order to avoid violence, as indicated by the 10 Jan- uary demonstration in Caracas against the dictatorship. For- mer President Betancourt, exiled leader of the outlawed Dem- ocratic Action, has claimed that the three principal opposition factions have agreed to unite against Perez. These parties apparently conducted some negotiations to co-ordinate their efforts in opposition to Perez' re-election last December. 13 Jan 58 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 10 RECRFT Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293 NNW 9. HAITIAN STABILITY THREATENED Comment on: The stability of Haitian President Duvalier's two-month-old govern- ment is threatened with an early re- sumption of the riots and coup at- tempts which obtained throughout most of 1957. A marked rise last week in the size and activity of Du- valier's recently organized palace police evidently is causing apprehension in the army under Brigadier General Kebreau, to whom the President has pre- viously been subservient. There are increasing indications that Kebreau is considering assumption of the presidency, posSibly with a military junta. Blame for any resulting vio- lence might be diverted to opposition groups who object to Kebreau's power and have tried to cause a split between the army and Duvalier. Duvalier's popularity has declined con- siderably since his inauguration. His failure to implement his campaign promises, particularly those regarding eco- nomic recovery, has disappointed even some of his own fol- lowers. His failure to establish a coalition government, his sweeping implementation of the spoils system, and the arbi- trary arrests and mistreatment of opposition partisans have encouraged numerous antigovernment plots. Kebreau, how- ever, is probably aware that an army coup, even if successful, would probably be opposed by all political groups and could not establish stability. 13 Jan 58 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 11 FeRFT Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293 NNO 10. PRESIDENT RHEE TO REJECT US-PROPOSED SOUTH ORCES REDUCTION re uc ono eau 60.000 -man cut. he South Korean defense minister, the hairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and e army chief of staff are all firmly sup- orting President Rhee in seeking to limit orized strength of the armed forces to a the President will not agree to a 100,000-man reduction proposed by the US. The UN Commander, General Decker, expects Rhee to exert strong pressure on the US to back his stand. Although outwardly courteous and friendly toward American officials conducting the negotiations, Rhee is said to be quite angry over US "discourteousness" in setting forth the higher figure after he had decided to accept what he considered an earlier proposal for a 60,000-man reduction. Actually; Rhee's "acceptance" was con- tained in a counterproposal which would primarily have elim- inated many unfilled table-of-organization slots, without any significant reduction in actual strength. The US has argued that only a 100,000-man reduction in authorized strength, now set at 720,000, or a 60,000-man reduction in actual strength will suffice to meet reduced American military assistance funds. Rhee hopes to block any reduction until at least some of his forces receive weapons adaptable for nu- clear warfare. (NOFORN) 13 Jan 58 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 12 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293 vouro 11. TURKISH REACTION TO NEW BRITISH CYPRUS PROPOSAL Comment on: The new British proposal for a Cyprus solution, calls for a seven-year period o se -govern- ment, after which the Greek and Turkish communities would have separate and equal rights of sell-determination. London is seeking official Turkish reaction before approaching the Greeks and Archbishop Makarios. The provision for the possibility of even- tual partition meets Turkey's basic demand but runs counter to the Greek position and may thus lead to an early renewal of violence on Cyprus. Turkish officials apparently question whether peace between the communities could be maintained during the intervening period of self-government. An air of pessimism is spreading among Greek Cypriots over Governor Foot's progress in London, and EOICA has already threatened to unleash renewed violence if Foot returns with "too little." 13 Jan 58 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 13 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293