CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/04/14

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03184090
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: April 14, 1958

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T9PSECRET
14 April 1958
Copy No. 140
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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14 APRIL 1958
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR continues to urge Iran to accept
economic assistance.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Indonesia - Dissidents report Djakarta
naval force off Padang beaches; Djakarta
says two battalions have deserted from dis-
sident forces.
Ghana - Pan-African Conference this
week will not be "African summit
talks."
III. THE WEST
British will urge Adenauer to over-
come French objections to free trade
area.
French rightists in reconvening As-
sembly will demand Gaillard take Tu-
nisian border problem to UN Security
Council.
Cuba - Rebels continue hit-and-run
sabotage tactics.
N. ANNEX
The Indonesian military situation - a
consolidated study.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
14 April 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-Iran: Soviet Ambassador Pegov continues to
press the Shah to accept "unconditional" Soviet economic
assistance. The Shah will probably continue to refuse to
accept major Soviet credits, but this will not affect the
expansion of existing trade relations between the two coun-
tries. Survey work on joint development of three border
rivers is to begin soon. Nevotiations on a civil air agree-
ment are still deadlocked.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Indonesia': A 13 April report from Padang states that
a government destroyer and four Corvettes are standing off-
shore, and that the dissident command expects them to shell
the beaches prior to a landing by government forces. Indo-
nesian army headquarters claims, that two dissident battalions
in the Padang area have defected, a development which would
drastically reduce dissident strength. The pro-American army
vice chief of staff, Colonel Jani, is concerned over the growing
belief in the Indonesian Army that the United States is helping
the dissidents. He is also worried about the fact that the ex-
pected delivery of bloc weapons may weaken the Indonesian
Army's generally anti-Communist attitude. Army Chief of
Staff Nasution--who is, in the opinion of Indonesian army of-
ficers, strongly anti-Communist�is achieving broad political
and economic power as well as enhanced prestige from govern-
ment military successes in Sumatra. He does not appear strong
enough, however, to change President Sukarno's attitude toward
the Communist party. (Page 1)
\
TOPS T
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404. TOP ET
Pan-African conference: The 15 April Pan-African
conference in Accra will not be the African "summit
meeting" envisaged by Ghana's prime minister who spon-
sored the meeting. Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, Morocco,
the Sudan, and Tunisia will be represented by foreign
ministers or lower-ranking officials. Only Liberia and
Ghana will have heads of government in attendance. Tu-
nisia and Morocco will undoubtedly try to focus attention
on the Algerian question, but political issues may be gen-
erally subordinated to cultural and economic issues in
view of the absence of leading area personalities. So-
viet propaganda has already begun commenting favorably
on the conference, stating that the meeting will play a great
_rolP-An_thPAfrir_n_n_ne-nril_P-e-gfmuggle against colonialism.
III. THE WEST
Britain - free trade area: Macmillan apparently in-
tends to press Adenauer very hard, during the Chancellor's
16-19 April visit to London, to exert German influence on
France to accept the projected free trade area. Macmillan
told the American ambassador on 11 April that abandonment
of the free trade area project would exclude Britain from
Europe and would lead o the enmn1M-P withdrawal rif A itish
troops from Germany. r
French tactics on Tunisian issue: Gaillard will be under
strong pressure from, some rightist elements for immediate
reference of the Tunisian-Algerian border question to the UN
Security Council when the National Assembly emergency de-
bate begins on 15 April. Moderating counterpressure from
the Socialists, next Sunday's cantonal elections, and general
14 Apr 58
DAILY BRIEF
TOP SECRET
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11111
fear of the possible political consequences of a long crisis
now will probably deter his opponents from an all-out at�
-
tack. Nevertheless, an early move to "apprise the Securi-
ty Council" cannot be ruled out as a face-saving move, par-
ticularly in view of public complaints about "American pres-
sure." (Page 5)
Cuba: The rebels, though posing no immediate threat
to the Batista regime, are continuing their hit-and-run at-
tacks in many localities, even outside Oriente Province.
Despite some recriminations over last week's failure, they
evidently hope to launch some further concerted action
against the government. (Page 6)
IV. ANNEX
Indonesian military situation:
14 Apr 58
(Pages 7-12 .and Maps.)
DAILY BRIEF
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#10, SECRET
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Situation in Indonesia
Army Chief of Staff General Nasution has achieved
broad political and economic power as well as enhanced
prestige as the result of government military successes
in Sumatra, according to the American ambassador in
Djakarta. Various sources confirm that all important
decisions are made either by him or by President Su-
karno. Despite Nasution's increased power, however,
he does not appear sufficiently strong to challenge Su-
karno on the issue of Indonesian Communism. An ex-
ample is Sukarno's blocking of Nasution when he tried
to remove the pro-Communist deputy town commander
in Djakarta.
The American Embassy believes that after govern-
ment forces occupy Padang and Bukittinggi, Nasution
may favor negotiation with the dissidents in an effort to
prevent long-drawn-out guerrilla warfare. There is
some indication that President Sukarno may adopt the
same attitude,
the
military campaign alone cannot solve the dispute with
the rebels and that a political approach should be adopted.
dissident guerrillas
recently have appeared around Pakanbaru.
Col. Kawilarang, recently Indonesian military at-
tach�n Washington, is undecided as to whether to ac-
cept the dissident offer to become commander in chief
of all dissident forces. In North;Celebes, dissident lead-
er Lt. Col. Sumual directed an appeal in his order of the
day for 13 April to the commanders of the revolutionary
air force who were appointed on 9 April to "carry out your
task as best as possible for the sake of the safety of our
fatherland."
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v
Colonel Jani, vice chief of staff of the army, told the
assistant US army attache he was worried over the grow-
ing belief in the army that the United States is helping the
dissidents. He was further concerned that the expected de-
livery of Soviet bloc weapons may weaken the army's gen-
erally anti-Communist attitude. Soviet Ambassador Zhukov
allegedly has officially informed the Indonesian Government
that the USSR will provide training for Indonesians in the
USSR z The offer includes training in "practically any field
desired," with initial emphasis on pilot training, aircraft
and technical equipment maintenance, and various fields of
marjrtime training.
rei?"E'
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Independent African States to Confer in Accra This Week
Representatives of eight independent African states
convening in Accra on 15 April will endeavor, by their
manipulation of issues bf broad and immediate concern
to all Africans, to project a distinctively African "per-
sonality" onto the international scene. Complex cultural
and political differences and conflicting policy objectives
among the participating states--Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana,
Liberia, Libya, Morocco, the Sudan, and Tunisia�will,
however, tend to inhibit agreement on joint action except
in the less controversial spheres.
As all the conferees are committed to rapid political
advancement for Africans, they can be expected to con-
demn European colonial policies and racial discrimination.
The Algerian problem, included in the revised draft agenda
at the behest of the North African states, is certain to come
in for special attention.
Liberian President Tubman, if he attends as now ex-
pected, will be the only chief of state present, most of
the other countries being represented by their foreign
ministers. Although Ghanaian officials have insisted that
no observers from dependent areas will participate offi-
cially, Algerian rebel representatives en route to Accra
will apparently be attached to the Tunisian delegation. It
seems probable that nationalist leaders from other nonin-
dependent territories will likewise be on hand and in close
touch with the official delegations. Observers for Sino-
Soviet bloc countries may also be in Accra as news cor-
respondents.
Moscow has already begun to publicize its favorable
attitude toward the Accra meeting but will probably avoid
any overtinterference in the expectation that conference pro-
nouncements will in themselves further the USSR's immediate
policraims in Africa.
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SE
I I I. THE WEST
Britain to Press Adenauer Hard for Support on Free Trade
Area Project
Prime Minister Macmillan indicated to Ambassador
Whitney on 11 April his strong concern over the impasse
in negotiations over the free trade area caused by French
opposition. He said he proposed to tell Chancellor Ade-
nauer during his 16-19 April visit to London that only Ade-
nau.er's influence with France can avoid a "Balkanization"
of Europe which would force Britain to form a competitive
economic unit of its own. Macmillan said he also will tell
Adenauer that Britain would withdraw its four divisions from
Germany "the minute it became clear that the free trade area
was not to be basic in the new economic concept for Europe."
Britain has on various previous occasions sought US
support for its concept of a comprehensive European trade
agreement to be reached before the six-nation Common
Market tariff reductions start coming into effect on 1 Janu-
ary 1959. France has held out for a slow and piecemeal
approach, reserving the right to maintain special protec-
tion for certain sectors of French industry until after the
effects of the first Common Market tariff cuts can be eval-
uated.
West German Economic Minister Erhard, who is ac-
companying the Chancellor to London, agrees with the Brit-
ish concept of a European free trade area, but Bonn has pot
yet supported it as strongly as London would like. Adenauer
thus far has shown relatively little interest in the project,
being apparently more concerned with improving relations
with France in his efforts toward making Europe strong po-
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SQRfT
Gaillard Still Under Pressure to Take Algerian Frontier
Issue to UN
Despite the French cabinet's acceptance on 12 April
of the US-UK good offices mission proposals as a basis
for negotiations with Tunisia, Premier Gaillard is still
under strong pressure from some elements of the right
for immediate reference of the Algerian frontier ques-
tion to the UN Security Council. The cabinet's decision
is to be debated by the National Assembly, which was
recalled from its Easter recess for an emergency ses-
sion beginning 15 April, and there is no indication that
the rightists' demands have lessened.
Gaillard may be able to ward off some of the rightists'
pressure by moving to raise the French-Tunisian dispute
in a special session of the North Atlantic CounciL A French
diplomat hinted on 11 April that such a move might be made
very soon. While the Assembly's propensity for rallying
to nationalistic positions would normally favor the rightists,
a number of domestic considerations will act as a partial
brake. The Socialist party is slowly evolving toward dis-
sociation from tough policies regarding North Africa. All
parties want to avoid a government crisis during the can-
tonal elections of 20 and 27 April, and there is widespread
fear that a prolonged political stalemate might end in Gen-
eral De Gaulle's return to power.
Nevertheless, an early move by Gaillard to "apprise
the Security Council" cannot be ruled out as a face-saving
device, particularly in view of public complaints about the
cabinet decision's having been taken under "considerable
pressure from Washington."
SEC
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mot
Cuban Rebel Activity Continues
The Cuban rebels, although unsuccessful in their
first major attempt to call a general strike and incite
a popular uprising, appear determined to continue their
attacks against the Batista regime and may be preparing
another large-scale effort. They have resumed their
hit-and-run attacks in many localities, causing consid-
erable destruction on 11 April at El Cobre, shrine of
Cuba's patron saint, about 12 miles west of Santiago in
Oriente Province. Other incidents have occurred through-
out the island, and the US consul in Santiago reported on
12 April that the transportation situation remains uncer-
tain.
Despite the charges of in-
adequate support for last week's effort,exile groups in
several Middle American countries have apparently been
sending arms and men to the Castro rebels.
II. �
There are other reports of a new reb-
el landing in Las Villas Province, where clashes between
rebel and government troops have occurred in at . least
two towns.
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74C-ECRET 111
IV. ANNEX
THE INDONESIAN MILITARY SITUATION
(As of 1600 hoursa 13 April 1958) ,
The civil war in Indonesia appears to be nearing a
climax. Government forces are at the point of launching
final air, sea, and land attacks on dissident strongholds
in Central Sumatra and are increasing their pressure on
North Celebes. Dissident capability to resist these at-
tacks is questionable because of the lack of manpower,
the absence of any air or naval support, and doubtful
morale. Their assets are relatively good leadership and
the rugged areas they are defending.
The Ground Warfare
Regular Indonesian Army troops comprise about 200,000
officers and men, the quasi-military National Police Mobile
Brigade, 20,000, and "rebel" volunteers another 10,000. The
battalion is the highest tactical unit in the Indonesian Army.
Battalions are assigned to one of twelve military district
commands (see map #1) which may be subdivided into two or
more regimental areas. The military district commands are
directly responsible to the army chief of staff. Army head-
quarters is organized on the United States model of a few
years ago and was designed primarily by two of the six Indo-
nesian graduates of the US Army Command and Staff College.
The Indonesian Army invaded Central Sumatra between
7-12 March by air and sea and since then has overcome dis-
sident resistance in the marshy eastern approaches to the
dissident centers in the mountainous west coast area. The
government has committed about 3,500 men thus far to this
operation against dissident troops estimated at 4,500. At
present, government forces are pushing toward the insurgent
strongpoints of Padang and Bukittinggi from two directions.
The attack from the north has reached a point about 70 miles
from Bukittinggi and the movement from the east is at a
similar distance from Padang. (see map #4) These columns
have been slowed by stiffened dissident resistance in rough
terrain but the government apparently 4alans to overwhelm
resistance by an early air-sea a ack from the west coast of
TOP ET
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Central Sumatra. It claims that two dissident battalions in
the Padang area have now defected, thus drastically reducing
dissident strength.
In North Sumatra, an uprising in mid-March by upwards
of 1,000 government troops in sympathy with the dissidents
took place in Medan. These forces were quickly dispersed,
and the remnants have regrouped both northwest and south of
Medan, including the Tapanuli area adjacent to Central Suma-
tra. They are alleged to have recruited additional men.
Latest reports state that dissidents south of Medan plan to
launch a counterattack northward, but government troops
have begun to invade Tapanuli, probably en route to Central
Sumatra. The military commander in Tapanuli has given
the dissidents sanctuary and has refused to obey government�
orders but has not yet committed his forces to the dissident
side. (see map #4)
In Celebes, the dissident& control is largely confined to
the long northern neck of the island where they have 5,000
troops. On 29 March, two battalions of government troops
landed at the southern end of the neck and captured two towns.
They were opposed by two dissident battalions, one of which
defected. (see map #5) The government is now preparing
to build up its forces in this area for a campaign to overcome
dissident forces to the north. Balikpapan on Borneo has
been designated as the forward military headquarters for
operations against north Celebes until it can be shifted to
that area.
The Indonesian Army is equipped with individual and
light atomatic weapons Of Varied origins, and types, including
Dutch,British, US, and Japanese. More than 80 percent of the
weapons and 60 percent of the equipment is obsolete by US
standards, and maintenance is poor but has proved generally
adequate.
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TC,SECRET
Indonesian Air Force Operations
Combat aircraft in operational units of the Indonesian
Air Force (AURI) total 12 F-51's and 13 B-25%. Transport
aircraft total 30 C-47's and trainer aircraft 66 T-61s. Ad-
ditionally, there are 8 DH-115 jet trainers and 18 miscel-
laneous types. A majority of training craft are believed
nonoperational. Reconnaissance aircraft include 8 PBY-5A's
and 15 light and liaison types. There are 59 miscellaneous
aircraft among which are 6 helicopters.
Permanent home stations of operational squadrons are
shown on map #2. In the conduct of missions in support of
operations against the dissidents, however, mission air-
craft have been temporarily deployed to other fields in Suma-
tra, Celebes, and Borneo.
The AURI has supported government military actions
against the rebels with small-scale, sporadic bombing and
strafing raids employing piston-engine light bombers and
fighters. In some cases these attacks have been success-
ful in breaking up concentrations of insurgent troops and
vehicles and thereby assisting in the advance of central gov-
ernment ground forces. One achievement of air strikes has
been the demoralization of dissident forces. AURI transport
aircraft (supplemented by transports from the Indonesian
civil air line) carried out two successful paratroop drops,
the first in connection with the recapture of Pakanbaru in
Central Sumatra on 12 March, and the second when para-
troops were dropped in the Medan area in support of gov-
ernment operations to retake the city after the brief rebel
uprising there. AURI transports also have been noted in
some missions in support of ground forces, carrying both
troops and supplies. AURI aircraft appear to have been
used fairly extensively for reconnaissance missions.
What success has been achieved by AURI in support of
government ground operations has been due largely to the
absence of a rebel air defense capability. Even so, there
are reports that one B-25 light bomber and two F-51 fighters
have been damaged or destroyed by rebel fire. The govern-
ment air effort is hampered by obsolete aircraft; shortage
of spare parts; and low standards of leadership, tactical
proficiency and maintenance.
TOP
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LI 11.,....1t)-X=relIT I
AURI representatives are included in the Indonesian
arms purchasing mission which has been active in Eastern
and Western Europe since early this year. It is quite
obvious that some aircraft have been purchased, but the
number and types have been the subject of a series of con-
flicting reports. The only figure now fairly firm is 11
IL-14 twin-engine transports, which were contracted for
in Czechoslovakia, and which now are being prepared for
a flight to Indonesia. The aircraft are to be flown across
the USSR. China. Burma. and into Indonesia,
It also appears quite
probable that MIG-type jet fighters and possibly some jet
light bombers also have been purchased--probably from
Czechoslovakia.
Delivery of aircraft
is expected to begin this month.
At present, a number of Indonesian Air Force person-
nel, including at least 10 pilots, are apparently receiving
flight and maintenance training in Czechoslovakia, and at
least one course of instruction (nature unknown) is under way
in Poland. Egypt also appears to be affording some training
assistance to AURI.
Indonesian Navy Operations
Indonesian naval operations to date have necessarily
been confined to mining, shore bombardment, troop ship
convoy, and blockade of shipping. Reportedly the offshore
approaches to Padang in Central Sumatra and Bitung in
North Celebes have been mined. The Indonesian Navy has es-
tablished a blockade over the harbors of Padang and Bitung
that has been reasonably effective. However, small craft
can probably operate with success, especially at night, in
running the blockade. The only incident of note in the block-
ade operation has been the shelling and capture of the Danish
freighter 'Bretagne, as it attempted to leave Padang. The
only shore bombardment reported has been a relatively inef-
fective effort against the harbor installation of Padang by
the Indonesian destroyer Ga( ada and by a corvette.
TOP ET
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" TOP #111
The Indonesian Navy in conjunction with the Merchant
Marine has been able to deploy troops by water transport
whenever the occasion demanded. The most notable
achievement to date has been the landing at Palu in lower
North Celebes where two battalions and an armored pla-
toon were landed without opposition. The type of transport
used is not known.
The Indonesian Navy's main base is at Surabaja, and
normally most of the navy's ships are stationed there.
Logistics, repair, and support facilities are located in
Surabaja. Djakarta's port of Tandjung Priok is second in
importance. Minor naval stations with 100-200 personnel
and a few patrol craft assigned are located at Belawan
(Medan), Sabang, Makassar, Tandjunguban (Riouw Archi-
pelago), Amboina and Pontianak. (see map #2)
The Indonesian Navy has only the nucleus of an air
arm and its pilots at present serve with the Air Force.
The Navy does not have any aircraft as yet and no bases
have been designated. Naval facilities at Surabaja include
a seaplane station.
The Indonesian Navy has the following ships:
1 DD
4 PF (Patrol Escort)
2 PGM (Motor Gunboat) One of these is in reserve.
5 LSIL One or two not operational.
4 YTL (Small Harbor tugs)
14-16 MSI (Inshore Minesweeper)
29 YP (Patrol Craft) Several not operational.
2 AKL (Light Cargo ship)
1 AO (Oiler)
the
destroyer and the four Prs were standing offshore, and
that the dissident command expects them to shell the
beaches prior to an early landing by government troops.
The MSrs, Yrs, 60 small craft of the Sea Police, 50
small craft of the Department of Shipping, and 25 small
craft of the Customs Department are disposed throughout
Indonesia, with concentrations in the Riouw Archipelago and
the Makassar Strait and Molucca Sea areas.
RET
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Tiae-sEeRET
In addition, four LST's are available for amphibious
lift.:.-one owned by the Indonesian Army and three owned
by the government and converted for commercial shipping.
The Marine Corps possesses 24 LVT(4)'s.
Total naval personnel, including marines, (Korps Com-
mando - KKO), is 11,713. The Korps Commando with head-
quarters at Batudjadjar consists of 67 officers and 2,232
well equipped men. Relative to other Indonesian units, the
KKO's combat proficiency, state of training, and morale is
good to excellent.
The Iudonesian Merchant Marine consists principally of
small coastal freighters. At present, 122,000 tons (GRT) of
shipping is government controlled. This total is made up
of 87,000 tons government owned and 35,000 tons chartered.
The 87,000 tons owned by the government includes 17,000
tons of shipping recently acquired from Soviet sources which
will be operated by Soviet crews.
Two PCE's (Patrol Escorts) ordered from Italy are
presently en route to Indonesia. Arrival is expected in
early May. Two De's (Coastal Destroyers) are on order.
E
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Permanent home stations are shown. In conduct
*
Korps Komando Main Base
of missions aircraft are temporarily deployed to
Naval Stations
other fields.
�
Ports Reportedly Mined
*
Airfield
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MAP 5
- A5-
1101,ET
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ta (AL V &itJd'1 ILLALL
DISTRIBUTION
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Operations Coordinating Board
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
CO
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. .
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I lir iuru1/
fear of the possible political consequences of a long crisis
now will probably deter his oppop'ents from an all-out at-
tack. Nevertheless, an early dove to "apprise the Securi-
ty Council" cannot be ruled ot as a face-saving move, par-
ticularly in view of public ci plaints about "American pres-
sure." age 5)
Cuba: The rebels, though posing no immediate threat
to the Batista regime, are continuing their hit-and-run at-
tacks in many localities, even outside Oriente Province.
Despite some recriminations over last week's failure, they
evidently hope to launch r concerted action
against the government. (Page 6)
IV. ANNE
Indonesian militar situat*
14 Apr 58
(Pages -12 and Maps.)
DAILY BRIEF
Page iii
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