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August 14, 2020
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August 27, 2020
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March 9, 1961
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Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093 %Or acumc 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 9 March 1961 Copy No. C CENTRAL N'alir- TELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093 Iwo TOP SECRET LATE ITEM USSR: Sputnik IX was launched from Tyura Tam at about 0629 GMT (0119,EST) 9 March 1961. The period of the orbit appears to be about ninety minutes. Preliminary data re- ceived suggests the satellite may be similar to Sputnik V and VI.which both carried dogs as part of the payload. Sputnik V was successfully recovered on 20 August 1960 after about 25 hours in space while Sputnik VI burned up on re-entry prob- ably during a recovery attempt. It is probable that the Soviets will attempt a recovery of Sputnik IX within about 24 hours. TOP SECRET A Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093 r 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO3184093 ; lifidSECRET �sod 9 March 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Situation in the Congo. (Page t) 2. India: Nehru believes Khrushchev attempting to iso- late New Delhi from African neutralists. (Page t) 3. Burma: General Ne Win to visit USSR, (Page ti) 4. West Germany: Adenauer cool to Brandt in meeting prior to latter's visit to US. (Page ti) 5. West Germany: Bonn may be less forthcoming in financial negotiations with US following currency re- valuation. (Page Li) Communist China: Peiping postpones program to communize Tibet. (Page lit) 7. Rumania: Local disturbances and peasant dissatisfac- tion reported in southern Rumania. (Page tit) 8. Watch Committee conclusions. (Page iii) -SEeltEr Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093 " Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093 Banan Brazzaville 1,4 Luanda 31594 D 9 Mar 61 MALAYA 150 Gemena IN 1,150 TUNISIA MALAYA,: 6 tQL MOBUTU Scattered _Forces (7)1-4_/i r/VILLE, Leopoldvill-e ysviUe MOROCCO ANA 1,?00 Approximate area controlled by: Kasavubu-Mobutu Gizenga EZ:1 Kalonji Tshombe United Nations Forces _ 7.172:: Selected railroad Selected airfield X Cut railroad STATUTE MILES a I 1001 of the Congo MOBOTLT lt6OZ -t FrancqUI, uluabourg Bakw Basoko � Luputa .0pala LIBERIA Usurnbura TnnqC,T,", iileyville El HP PIA E HIOPI NIGERIA Kongolo At NIGERIA Elisa hv Ile CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093 orat...nr, Noe CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 9 March 1961 DAILY BRIEF Congo: Tshomb4 has so far held the center of the stage at the Tananarive conference. He is apparently playing on the general opposition of the participants to the UN in an attempt -/r) to create a united front and bring about increased military co- jetAP operation. Mobutu is still touring Equateur Province. In re- tr,(1) 5,1 sponse to repeated urging from Leopoldville officials, he has reportedly agreed to launch an attack against Orientale Prov- ince, However, EVIobutu remains reluctant to undertake the 7 operation. Moreover, the troops that he had brought into Equa- teur, except for 800 in Bumba, have been disDersed in small units and will be difficult to reassemblel a visiting Ghanaian delegation agreed that arms now in Cairo would be sent to Gizenga via Accra. The details of this agreement have appar- ently not yet been worked out. (Backup, Page 1) (Map) India-USSR: Eehru apparently has interpreted Khrushchev's recent letters on the Congo and UN reorganization problems as a deliberate attempt to isolate India from the leading African neu- tralists and thus counter New Delhi's restraining influence. For- eign Secretary Dutt reportedly described Nehru in early March as irritated and puzzled by the Soviet leader's unusual action in pub- licly expressing flat disagreement with Indian positions. Dutt characterized Khrushchev's proposal that the UN operation in the Congo be replaced by an African commission as a personal affront to Nehru, since the prime minister had already made his contrary position clear to Moscow. New Delhi apparently belieupj -TOP 5ECRE- /4� Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO3184093 VOYP�SfeRE-T-- PA at a recent proposal of further economic aid from Soviet First Deputy Premier Kosygin implies an attempt to black- ail the Indian Government into changing its independent olicies. Nehru probably is also concerned that Indo-Soviet friction will make it more difficult for New Delhi to pursue its tactic of trying to play off Moscow against' Peinince-) Burma- SR: General Ne Win will visit Moscow for two weeks beginning 30 March, While Ne Win in the past has been opposed to the procurement of Soviet military equipment, he reportedly now feels American influence in the army is "excessive." (Backup, Page 3) West Germany: aloth Chancellor Adenauer and West Ber- lin Mayor Brandt apparently intend to use their forthcoming visits to the United States to enhance their positions with the West German public prior to the election campaign this fall. In preparation for his visit, scheduled to begin 11 March, Brandt met with Adenauer on 1 March. Adenaueris reception of Brandt was formally correct but "frigid." He avoided giving Brandt any guidance for his trip, indicating that he now regards him strictly as a political riv.�, (Backup,. Page 4) West Germany: American officials in Bonn believe that as a consequence of the 4 March revaluation of the mark, West Germany may be less forthcoming in current financial negotia- tions with the US on debt prepayment and military orders. On the question of aid to underdeveloped areas, the Bonn cabinet seems to be near agreement that future German contributions should be limited to one percent of the gross national product, or approximately $700,000,000 at the 1960 rate. According to embassy officials, the primary factor in the decision to revalue the currency was the sudden realization that the government and central bank were unable by other means to cope with grow- ing inflationary pressures only six months before national 9 Mar 61 DAILY BRIEF ii m OP SECRET A Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093 Ers P SECRET ,golOr elections. Embassy officials do not believe the move will have a lasting impact on West Germany's trade or balance of payments and expect that the only significant effect will be short-term money movements in which foreign specula- tors will withdraw funds to take their profits. Communist China: 'ale Chinese Communists have post- poned their program of communizing Tibet in the face of per- sistent opposition there. The Tibetans have been told that �cob/ further "reforms" have been deferred for four years. In ad- 1-,Apt dition, some of the land already collectivized is being returned to its former owners, - political indoctrination meetings have been suspended, pri- vate trade is being resumed on a small scale, and harassment of religious activities has been halted. Internal Chinese prob- lems, particularly food shortages, probably contributed to the regime's decision against committing the resources and man- power needed to force the Tibetans into the Communist mold at this ti! ej (Backup, Page 6) Rumania: several isolated local disturbances resulting from peasant dissatisfaction have taken place in the past month in southern Rumania. These difficulties apparently are caused by peasant opposition to the regime's program for agricultural collectivization and compulsory purchase of livestock. In one local demonstration, several militiamentwere rumored killed or wounded. The reported unrest is reminiscent of similar outbreaks in .eastern R 58, which the regime was readily able to control. (Backup, Page 7) WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee the United States Intelligence Board concludes that: A. No change from last week. 9 Mar 61 DAILY BRIEF iii 6.)11 -�"�51. -;727 �-gz , Aft, � : '7;4 *11 'W4F / Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093 �416P�SfeRET INS B. No change from last week. C. In Laos, Communist attacks at the Phou Khoun road junc- tion do not appear to have been planned as the start of a major counteroffensive against government forces, but Communist success in this instance may lead them to seek further limited military gains. D. Significant political compromises among the factions in the Congo in the near future appear unlikely while Gizenga continues to have reason to hope for outside support. The probable replacement of Dayal may permit a less partisan and more effective UN operation in the Congo and will re- move one of the obstacles to the return of UN forces to Matadi and Banana. The deteriorating economy and rapidly growing inflation in the Congo could lead to disorders. 9 Mar :61 DAILY BRIEF iv �Ter SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093 SPOP SECRE1 Situation in the Congo dikrumah's 7 March General Assembly speech, in which he called for a strengthening of the UN under a "primarily" African command, further modifies his earlier proposals which would have excluded European units in the UN force and would have put Asians in a subordinate role. He told American officials earlier in the day that his desires would be met with the designation of an African or Asian as UN mil- itary commander and some increase in Afro-Asian member- ship in the UN staffs. He presented these proposals which may have originated with General Alexander, the British com- mander of the Ghanaian army as a means for stimulating a willingness among uncommitted nations to contribute troo_p_s27 Mobutu reportedly is unhappy over the failure of civilian officials in Leopoldville to consult him before setting up the Ileo government. He apparently is traveling around Equateur, his home province, paying little attention to political develop- ments. He has reorganized the upper echelons of his command in an attempt to strengthen his control and may ask Belgium to provide him with military advisers who could serve with his forces as "civilian" technicians. Plans for his military opera- tion into Orientale envisage the capture of the gasoline supplies at Aketi, with Stanleyville a possible second objective. Mobutu reportedly is approaching the operation "like a sheep going to slaughter"; he seems to believe he will be killed during the campaign. Furthermore, no attempt has been made to keep up training or increase discipline] the Ileo government,meanwhile, has sent the UN a proposal for reorganizing the Congolese army, according to the American embassy in Leopoldville. Although the Congolese suggestions are carefully hedged to retain final Congolese control over the pro- gram, their substance is fairly moderate. The proposals envis- age establishment of a joint UN-Congolese defense council, headed by a "neutral" officer responsible to Kasavubu. The message also expresses the Leopoldville government's willingness to permit the UN to begin with the reorganization of Mobutu's troops, provided firm agreements are made for similar steps to be taken with other Congolese forces. There is no indication that these pro- posals would be accepted by the troops concerned, who ar9 TOP-SECRET 9 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093 Nirri TOP SECRET Glready wary of possible disarmament moves and who are largely unresponsive to civilian authorityji the Soviet Gov- ernment has asked permission to transport 3,000 tons of gas- oline by rail across Kenya and Uganda for shipment into areas in the Congo loyal to Gizenga. No other information is avail- able concerning this request. If Gizenga should receive petro- leum products through this channel, one key aspect of Mobutu's blockade of Orientale Province would be broken. Uganda offi- cials comment that such a shipment could not legally be denied if payment is arranged outside of East Africa; however, the British in Kenya and Uganda are unlikely to permit its passage unimpedeaj The US ambassador in Khartoum has been assured by high Sudanese officials that the Sudan, despite its recent statements critical of the UN and its withdrawal of troops from the Congo, will not change its position regarding denial of transit rights for movements into the Congo not under UN auspices3 , � CDR first contingents of Indian troops are being readied for a scheduled departure from New Delhi on 14 March en route to Leopoldville. The airlift is to be completed during the follow- ing two weeks. New Delhi now is planning to send a brigade group, which with 3,000 infantry troops and supporting units will total 4,731 men3 � r_t_lh Gizenga has expressed, is displeasure with the passive attitude taken by the Ghanaian UN force in Luluabourg at the time of the abortive in- cursion into that area by Stanleyville troops. Gizenga complained that he had expected active support from the Ghanaian command and considers himself betrayed by its failure to assist in secur- ing control of the area for Stanleyville. He asked for clarifica- tion of Nkrumah's position, evidently in an effort to determine how much reliance he can place on arrangements to use Accra as a transshipment noint for moving arms from the UAR to Stanleyvillej TOP SECRET 9 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093 Burma May Obtain Soviet Arms there have been persistent rumors of projected Burmese arms purchases from the Soviet Union, including an unsubstan- tiated press report of a $20,000,000 purchase agreemeatg al. 1957 a military purchasing mission carried on negotia- tions with European satellite governments but failed to obtain satisfactory terms for the materiel they sought. With the ex- ception of small quantities of Czech small arms and transport equipment for the military police, the army is equipped largely with British materiel, supplemented by supplies from Israel, Japan, Sweden, and Yugoslavia. Under a 1958 contract, Burma has purchased much of its modern materiel from the United States and negotiations are under way for extending these pur- chase_ although the bloc was not responsive to Burmese efforts to obtain military supplies in 1957, since early 1960 it has made extensive efforts to build up its economic relations with Burma and, in connection with this economic offensive, there have been several efforts to introduce military equipmeng Efn,January 1960 the Soviet Union presented Burma with "samples" of small arms--from carbines to heavy machine guns--and General Ne Win has had a standing invitation to visit Moscow as a state :vest since his resignation as prime minister in April 1960. he projected military mission to Moscow, which Ne Win apparently will lead, reportedly is be- ing sent at the invitation of the Soviet Governmen9 Burma's current irritation over the Chinese Nationalist irregulars and their supplies of allegedly American materiel w7ld also make the Burmese more willing to accept Soviet arm,s] 9 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093 "s CONFIDENTIAL Brandt Seeking Enhanced Prestige in US Trip aandt reportedly hopes to use his forthcoming visit to the United States to enhance his prestige in the West German political campaign this fall by "proving" to the German electorate that he is on a par with Adenauer in dealing with the United States and that American leaders accept him as a possible chancellor. Brandt also seeks to impress US officials that they have nothing to fear from him as chancellor. The least he hopes to achieve is a neutral US attitude toward the election outcome:) L�I'D leaders are worried over the damaging effect of the current CDU smear tactics against Brandt, because he spent most of the war fighting in the Norwegian underground against the Nazis. He is being assailed for deserting the fatherland and returning to Germany in a foreign uniform. His illegitimate birth, as well as his change of name during the Nazi period, has also come under heavy CDU fir_q an response to Brandt's complaint to Adenauer about these attacks, the chancellor replied that he regretted them but was not responsible for them and that a political cam- paign is "rough and difficult to control. [-Brandt's close associates are also worried over his failure to win complete support of SPD elements who have in the past opposed his independent political thinking and complained over his failure to win the SPD many votes in last fall's local elections.) atheir meeting, Chancellor Adenauer said that Foreign Minister von Brentano had given him a fairly gloomy report on the "increasingly negative" attitude of the American press and people toward Germany. Adenauer said, however, that he did not believe the situation to be as bad as pictured by several opposition Socialist leaders who recently visited the United States. The chancellor also in- dicated that he considered the Berlin situation "very serious," in view of the Soviet intention to push for an interim solution 9 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093 CONFIDENTIAL -too ((->n Berlin this year and Soviet insistence that Berlin be dealt with apart from other East-West issues] Vhile in the United States Brandt will make a conscious attempt to demonstrate that he is more flexible on the Ber- lin question than is Adenauer, whom he has often criticized for failing to take a sufficiently strong stand in defense of the city's interests. He has cited specifically Bonn's reluctance to continue annual Bundestag meetings in West Berlin. Brandt firmly believes that West Berlin's interests must be consid- ered in any negotiations on'the city's future, and will to reserve the right to approve any future solutions) CONFIDENTIAL 9 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093 Socialization of Tibet Postponed Again [Peiping's postponement of socialization in Tibet marks the second time that the Communists have had to suspend their program for transforming Tibetan society. The first, announced in February 1957, was presented as a six-year moratorium reversing the programs set in motion a year earlier with the establishment by Peiping of the Prepara,- tory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region. This pe- riod of grace came to an abrupt end in 1959 with the Tibetan uprising and Peiping's subsequent decision to Sinicize Tibet as quickly as possible. Implementation of this decision in- cluded the introduction of numbers of Chinese into Tibet as well as a new attempt to impose socialist "reforms." Fol- lowing the same general pattern as was used within China, the Communists plunged into a program of land reform, moving from that to mutual-aid teams and cooperatives. Efforts were also made to halt private trade and weaken the Lamaist Church7 Eoespite Peiping's claim that the Tibetans eagerly ac- cepted these changes, the regime now acknowledges that "too many errors" were committed by Chinese and Tibetan cadres, intimating that their highhanded practices aroused a good deal of wrath among the public. The Tibetans are also disgruntled by local food shortages as serious as those plaguing China itself. In addition, the imposition of Chinese will on a recalcitrant populace is made difficult by Tibet's position at the end of a very long supply line. This line is all the harder to maintain as a result of the current fuel shortage in Ching the regime is making it clear that the retreat is only tactical. Tibetans are being told by Peiping that the political need for reforms persists, and the likelihood is that the process of socializing Tibet will be started again whenever the circumstances are deemed favorable, even if the promised four-vear grace period has not elapsed CONFIDENTIAL 9 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093 l'uLeeNFf0E-N-T-I*L-- Peasant Unrest in Rumania While the Rumanian populace, with the exception of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, has been passive to- ward the Communist regime, the peasants have, on occasion, maintained a more independent position and the government has moved somewhat more slowly than most other East European states in collectivization. There are rumors that peasants in the Arges and Oltenia regions of southern Ruma- nia have petitioned for authority to withdraw from collectives, made a series of oral complaints about agricultural policies, and conducted public demonstrations. The regime's recent actions tend to support these rumors. Party leader Gheorghiu-Dej and politburo members Borila and Ceausescu visited Arges region from 16 to 17 February on a tour which the American Legation speculates may have been a reflection of official concern over developments in the area. On 28 February, the regime promulgated a liberalized resolution dealing with the purchase of cattle in a move which may have been designed to minimize popular discontent over the compulsory sale of livestock to the state. Furthermore, the regime, after initially pushing its collectivization vigor- ously in the early part of this winter, has slowed down its efforts during the, past month. Five separate trip requests by US diplomatic officials for travel to the areas of reported unrest were refused during the period from 24 February to 6 March, although this may have been because of military activities. CONFIDENTIAL 9 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093 A.% A 1. yr. v Imr v pry I Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093 Nwod um, THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director CONFIDENTIA L Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093 y i itz ./zzrzzzzzzz