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August 14, 2020
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August 27, 2020
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March 11, 1961
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wr pproved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 11 March 1961 Copy No. C CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN -MID-SECRET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 0% Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 ---TOP-SEeRET- --TOP-SEGRET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 7/ Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 sew 1 l./1" JLLINL i z:2 11 March 1961 , CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Situation in the Congo. (Page i) 2. Laos: Khrushchev suggests further bilateral talks with US on Laos; Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces reported yester- day to have occupied Muong ICassy south of Phou Khoun road junction. (Page t) 3. USSR: Khrushchev plays down urgency of nuclear test ban. (Page ti) 4. USSR: Moscow continuing to purchase oil tankers out- side bloc. (Pzge tit) 5. Vietnam: Hanoi orders Communists in South Vietnam to disrupt presidential election to be held 9 April. (Page ttt) 6. East Germany: Economic delegation to Moscow receives little satisfaction in efforts to reduce dependence on im- ports from West Germany. (Page ttt) 7. West Germany: Bonn officials fear emphasis in US foreign policy is shifting away from Europe. (Page tv) 8. Ethiopia: Disorders in Addis Ababa may occur upon execution of leader of revolt. (rage tv) 'FOP SECRET r Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 lisp/ Nor CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 11 March 4961 DAILY BRIEF Congo: in a 9 March discussion on the Congo with an ok, American official, Hammarskjold expressed the belief that further outbreaks in the Lower Congo were unlikely for the /'a't f? time being. Relations between the UN and local authorities,i3AAjt_ however, remain uneasy. He indicated that he had not yet found a replacement for Dayal and said that Makki Abbas of p. Sudan, the interim appointee for the job, was "not the best man in the world but would be all right." Hammarskjold is also hopeful that several additional countries will contribute contingents to the UN for Another Another UN official has said that the Somali and Malagasy republics might contribute a battalion each within a month. The Tananarive conference, by conceding the existence of several de facto centers of power in the Congo, has strengthened Katanga's claim to autonomy and has enhanced Tshombe's position as the leading figure in the anti-Gizenga bloc. (Backup Page 1) *Laos: E his remarks to Ambassador Thompson on Laos, Khrushchev took a generally positive line, pointing out that the US and the USSR agree that the objective should be neutrality for Laos, that this represents a step forward, and that bilateral conversations should be continued. He said that neither the US nor the USSR stands to gain anything from a continuation of the fighting and that this would only damage relations between the two countries. He warned, however, that any prolonged delay in reaching a solution would complicate the problem and could cause the fighting to flare up. He alA93 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 "Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 Ikai9P-16'Eff&& agid any Western move toward "aggravating the military con- flict" would lead to the defeat of the Boun Oum government. Khrushchev offered no new proposals for arranging a settle- ment and confined himself to reaffirming Soviet support of Souvanna Phouma as the lawful government and for Prince Sihanouk's proposal for a 14-nation conference. Khrushchev said he would welcome a neutral Laos on the Austrian model, pursuing a policy like Cambodia's and Burma in Laos, military pressure by .mong Le - Pathet Lao forces west of the Plaine des Iarres continues to increase. Muong Kassy, an important point on the Vientiane - Luang Prabang highway, is reported to have been occupied by the enemy on 10 March. This report follows the withdrawal earlier this week of government troops from the strategic Phou Khoun road Junction north of Muong Kassy. The Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces evidently are continuing to press this initial ad- vantage, but information available as of 0500 EST today is insufficient to tell whether they have embarked on a maioref- fnrf acraingf crnuchrnmPnf ft-IrrPc in filo ran *USSR: (Ambassador Thompson feels that Khrushchev's remarks on a nuclear test ban during their private conversa- tion on 9 March indicate that the USSR has less interest than formerly in a treaty and may intend to use the question of French adherence as an excuse for failure to reach agreement. After stressing that the main question was complete and gen- eral disarmament and not a test ban, Khrushchev stated that the USSR was willing to sign a treaty but questioned whether France would adhere. In reply to the ambassador's question on Communist China's adherence, Khrushchev pointed out that France was conducting tests whereas China was not. He added, however, that the Chinese may "achieve progress" in this field and that it would be necessary for both France and CoWinunist China to sign an agreement Khrushchev's attempt to play down the urgency of a test ban agreement contrasts with his recent public pronouncements on this issue. Khrushchev may feel his freedom of actionlgi 11 Mar 61 DAILY BRIEF A ii /4. �TOP�SECRET� Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 Simp4* aegotiations will be sharply limited by Peiping's determination to achieve a nuclear weapons capabiling (Backup, Page 3) USSR: Moscow is continuing its efforts to acquire large oil tankers to transport rising Soviet petroleum exports. Since the USSR embarked on its tanker procurement program in the latter half of 1960, more than 20 tankers have been ordered 04 from the Netherlands, Japan, Italy, West Germany, and Yugoslavia. Delivery of these tankers will raise the ton- nage of the Soviet tanker fleet from about 990,000 in mid- 1960 to at least 1,580,000 tons. ,Backup, Page 5) North - South Vietnam: North Vietnam has ordered Communists in South Vietnam to disrupt "by every means possible" the presidential election scheduled for 9 April and to arouse more popular support for the Tnvement to overthrow South Vietnam's President Diem. Meanwhile, Diem has indicated that he intends to prevent the Commu- nists from interfering with the election. (TOP SECRET DINAR) (Backup, Page 6) East Germany:EThe East German economic delegation headed by State Planning Chief Bruno Leuschner, which re- cently returned from Moscow, reportedly received little satisfaction in its efforts to reduce its dependence on im- ports from West Germany. The USSR apparently does not consider that making the East German economy independent of West Germany is urgent enough at this time to warrant the shifts in bloc economic planning which would be necessary, and probably desires to effect only a gradual shift in East Germany's trade pattern. The initiation of such a gradual shift is reflected in the 1961 trade protocol signed by the two countries on 23 February. This agreement provides for..!.) 11 Mar 61 DAILY BRIEF iii TOP SECRET // - / � / / Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 AApproved for Re!ease: 2020/08/11 CO3184094 b4.00 Am, -percent increase in the level of trade over 1960, includ- ing greater Soviet deliveries of chemicals and engineering products--commodities for which East Germany now depends in part on West Germanlj, (Backup, Page 7) West Germany: ETwo leading members of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee who accompanied Foreign Minister Brentano on his recent visit to the US they gained the impression that the emphasis in US foreign policy is shifting away from Europe and focusing on the uncommitted nations. They drew the conclusion that Europeans needed to close ranks in a power grouping that could stand by itself and vigorously pursue its own interests. They also anticipated US pressure on Bonn to revise its policy toward Eastern Europe--in particular to recognize the Oder-Neisse line as Pnlandis wpste n boun- darID Page 8 (Backup, Ethiopia: There may be disorders in Addis Ababa at the conclusion of the trial of General Menghistu, the former com- mander of the Imperial Body Guard, who is expected to be ex- ecuted for treason. Menghistu, �who played a prominent role in last December's abortive coup, is gaining acceptance among elements of the populace of Addis Ababa as a revolutionary hero and as a symbol of the need for reform in Ethiopia. (Backup, Page 10) FA Yo/ 11 Mar 61 , DAILY BRIEF iv TOP SECRET v/2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 Sari I Situation in the Congo According to a UN military official in New York, the 1,000-man Moroccan contingent in Katanga seems to have embarked on a systematic program of harassment and non- cooperation with the UN Command. Their morale is said to be completely broken, and they allegedly have "laid down their arms." fflammarskjold had hoped to send the group to Matadi in a show of force, but the troops reportedly stated � that they would obey directives only from Rabat. Rabat has ordered this group--the only remaining part of a force which originally totaled 3,200--to withdraw from the Congo, but it has been delayed by transportation difficulti_e_D The Tananarive conference apparently has agreed that the existing central authority should be scrapped, along with the present provincial structure. In their place a group of new states, based largely on tribal lines, would be created, with an ill-defined "community of united nations" arrange- ment for a central authority, presumably in Leopoldville, which would become a "neutral city." The participants ap- parently are agreed that any solution reached at the conference will be an interim one and that any definitive reform must wait until the country is pacified. The absence--and presumably the nonconcurrence--of Gizenga will make implementation of these proposals difficult and will probably lead to opposi- tion to them among his international supporters. Tshombe seems to have been successful in his efforts to reach agreement on replacing the present structure with a loose confederacy. Except for Albert Kalonji of southern Kasai--who is largely dependent on Tshombe's patronage-- the other participants have an interest in retaining some type of central authority--ICasavubu and Ileo by virtue of their positions in the present central government, and Leopold- ville Provincial President Kamitatu because of his long as- sociation with Lumumba's ideals of a unitary state. However, local ties still have considerable importance for most of them, and none seems to be willing to face up to strong pressure� SECRET 11 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 --erCtICET Nevi from Tshombe. As a result, the conference has been able to issue a vague communique recognizing states now exist= ing "by right or in facto" The only well-defined point on which the participants agree seems to be opposition to the UN. For the most part they are trying to limit their discussions to general princi- ples, leaving contentious details to be worked out in a larger conference tentatively scheduled for the end of March in Elisabethville. Such a conference, which might be attended by as many as 400 leaders of varying political stature, would be likely to become involved in extensive wrangling. �SEC-RE-T-- 11 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 COLIN 1 144b� NNW Khrushchev Minimizes Urgency of Nuclear Test Ban Agreement LKhrushchev began his remarks on the nuclear test ban issue by stating that there had been no tests for over two years and that "we were not living badly." He claimed that the USSR had a sufficient stockpile of weapons and that even If tests were stopped, weapons production would not be. He repeated that if the US accepted the Soviet plan for complete and general disarmament, the USSR would accept full control. Khrushchev also told the ambassador that he had read Am= bassador McCloy's recent speech on disarmament and felt that he had been talking instead about armame.lip Eihrushchev's generally negative approach probably re- flects the conflicting pressures which the USSR faces as the talks resume in Geneva on 21 March. As a result of the role which disarmament, a nuclear test ban, and Chinese desires to achieve a nuclear weapons capability played in the Sino= Soviet dispute, Khrushchev must weigh the advantages the USSR could derive from further prolonged negotiations and a possible agreement against the obvious risk that this course will impel the Peiping regime to discard the precarious truce produced by the Moscow Communist meeting. The Chinese almost certainly will view the USSR's behavior at Geneva as the first major test since the Moscow conference of Khru- shchev's intentions regarding the whole range of Soviet policy toward the US and its allies. The Soviet premier, on the other hand, is well aware that the Western powers will be applying a similar test and that developments in the Geneva talks will have a strong bearing on the West's attitude toward high-level negotiations on major East-West questions, such as Berlin and Germany. Although the precise course of Soviet policy at Geneva will depend in part on Moscow's assessment of Western inten- tions after the initial phase of probing of positions, Soviet spokesmen have indicated to Western sources that Moscow still considers the Chinese Communist factor more of an in- centive than an obstacle to an agreeme& It is likely that Khrushchev's ultimate decisions on this ques- tion will be determined by two higher priority considerationsj ___6014r4gtgisauL__ 11 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 LA-PPirTilLIN 1AL Nausii NOVI Ellhis over-all evaluation of the effects of the USSR's present posture of relative moderation and restraint toward the US and its Western allies in obtaining a summit conference on favorable terms, and 2) Chinese Communist reaction and Moscow's judgment of the effects of this reaction on the USSR's nosition in the Communist world. 11 Mar. 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 I I I LJL1 1 let Li USSR Buys More Non-bloc Tankers The USSR has recently contracted with Japan for the construction of two 35 000-dead-weight-ton (DWT) tankers, In addition to the four it ordered last December. Two Japanese- built tankers bought by the USSR last fall are already being used for Soviet deliveries to Cuba. During recent trade negotiations with Italy, the USSR arranged for the purchase of as many. as 11 tankers. At least one, and possibly three, 48,000-DWT tankers will be delivered this year. Six to eight 35,000-DWT tankers are to be built for the USSR during 1962-1965. Negotiations for tankers from West Germany have also been conducted by Moscow but have not yet resulted in firm commitments. The new Soviet - West German trade agreement lists tankers in a clause calling for Ger- many to supply some $37,000,000 worth of ships to the USSR during 1961-1963. Moscow, in addition, is seeking to buy one 32,000-ton tanker from Spain. The Netherlands, which delivered one large tanker to the USSR in 1960, apparently has agreed to supply several others. Earlier this month Yugoslavia turned over a newly constructed 25,000-ton tanker to the USSR and may have agreed to supply one more. CONFIDENTIAL 11 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 Ns 1 LW Jr.,C,KE North Vietnam Orders Efforts to Break Up South Vietnamese Elections a'resident Diem has predicted that the Communists will step up bombings and assassinations in South Vietnamese ities in an effort to win some control in urban as well as ural areas. There has recently been an upsurge in guerrilla ctivity, following a comparative lull since late December. or several months, however, there has been increasing em- phasis by the Communists on political activity and agitation, including anti-Diem peasant demonstration As part of an effort to counteract popular discontent, Diem is reorganizing his government and has pledged to add an elected representative from his loyal Republican Youth organization to the village councils, now entirely appointive. One of Diem's cabinet ministers has stated that the government's "only hope" is to end its "mandarin spirit" and effect a drastic imnrovement aLofftcia]s at the highest and lowest leve9 specified organization of anti- Diem demonstrations at polling places and armed attacks on "soldier gangs who force the compatriots to vote." pommunist cadres with anti-Diem s use in "guiding the compatriots in their struggle." told guerrillas they should have South Vietnamese lo- c nse units and village authorities "dispersed and demor- alized" by the end of March and should "coordinate the annihila- tion with a propaganda campaign." the Communists are anxious to get a more widespread following for the National Liberation Front, which they organized in December� cadres are told to organize separate "liberation" oups otlrouth, women, older people, children, and students. Instead of restricting the leadership of these groups to "key per- sonnel and sympathizers," the Communists are told that "only a few party members are needed" and that executive committees will be largely composed of personnel "from outside the party." 11 Mar 61 TOP SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 Novi5LCItf1 I Soviet - East German Trade Relations drade between East Germany and the USSR is planned to reach a level of over $2 billion this year. Soviet deliveries of many commodities, including ferrous and nonferrous metals, are scheduled to increase in line with the provisions of the long-term agreement, while deliveries of chemicals and engineering products are to be higher than the amounts stip- ulated by the agreement. The total increase in trade is not sufficient to enable East Germany to reduce significantly its reliance on West Germany as a source of many necessary materials. West Germany now accounts for about 11 percent of East Germany's total trade and is second only to the USSR as East Germany's most important trading partnejg CE_ast Germany will probably seek alternate sources for traditionally West German imports in other Western countries as well as in the satellites. Trade with the industrial countries of the West, however, would be limited by East Germany's in- ability to provide goods of sufficient quality and quantity to pay for therx2g Lin at least one key industry�chemicals�East German of- ficials reportedly already feel that earlier estimates concerning the reduction of dependence on West German deliveries were overly optimistic and must be revised. They fear that it may take as long as three years to become independent of West Ger- man chemical deliveries and five years to achieve independence from other Western countries. Other areas of the East German economy--machine building and metallurgy�are probably even more sensitive to any interruption of Western imports. While East Germany has affirmed its great interest in continuing in- terzonal trade, Deputy Premier Heinrich Rau hinted at a press conference at the Leipzig Fair that the regime intends to change the character of such trade. "It may be that we may no longer need the same goods," he said, "but we shall need other goods Instead; g99ds for which we can overnight switch over to other suppliers."J -SECRET -- 11 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 Nod %we US - West German Relations Brentano found American officials "mistrustful" of Bonn's intentions and doubtful of its genuine willingness to "right Nazi wrongs." However, he felt that "the lack of sentimentality" on the part of Adenauer and President Ken- nedy might provide a common basis of understanding between the two men when the chancellor meets with the President next month. Brentano's report of growing anti-German feel- ing apparently prompted Adenauer's press conference state- ment on 10 March that he fears further damage to West Germany's reputation from the impending trial of Adolf Eich- manninIsrael. In reply to a reporter's question, Adenauer also stated it was "quite possible" that Bonn might arrive at a kind of nonaggression pact with Poland but indicated that negotiations were dormant for the time being.? adenauer has recently made cautious overtures to Warsaw in anticipation of a more flexible US policy toward Poland. He favors improving relations by undertaking a number of concil- iatory moves such as extending economic aid and increasing trade, but he opposes diplomatic relations because the Poles continue to insist that Bonn first accept the Oder-Neisse line-- something Bonn refuses to do chiefly because of domestic polit- ical considerations? [A-denauer's strong desire for continued close ties with the US was clearly indicated by his press conference statement that he did not believe the administration's review of policy to- ward Germany would lead to any basic changes, since the alli- ance is based on "political and geographic facts which remain the sampj aevertheless, Adenauer's underlying fear of a possible decision by the United States to reduce its European commit- ments, including the withdrawal of US military forces in Europe] -SECRET_ 11 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 wftel Gs a factor in prompting him to consider drawing closer to France in some kind of continental groupinsi:j Cauttenberg, who is normally close to Adenauer in outlook, is known to favor the establishment of a separate European nu- clear capability as the only way to assure a dependable deter- rent to Soviet aggression 11 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN page 9 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 Nome JCA,RG, Ethiopian Dissidence Growing The Emperor has not carried out reforms for which there has been considerable pressure and his recent government ap- pointments represent essentially a reshuffling of the conserva- tive old guard. Such inaction is increasing the widespread discontent among the young educated class, whose minimum demands include the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. Antiregime leaflets, which have been distributed in Addis Ababa by dissident elements since last December, are becom- ing more menacing in tone; some recently have threatened that the Emperor would be assassinated if Menghistu were executed. Efforts by the security forces to determine the origin of the leaflets are believed unsuccessful to date, although large num- bers of students and other suspects have been arrested. Sub- versive slogans are appearing on public buildings, and rumors are being spread that clandestine radiobroadcasts are calling for uprisings and attacks on the homes of prominent government officials. Officials in Ethiopia's Interior Ministry believe the outcome of the trial against Menghistu and other rebels is a foregone con- clusion and that they will be convicted and publicly executed. The government, however, does not expect public disturbances, de- spite the indications of growing unrest. The deteriorating political situation in the capital appears to be spreading to eastern Ethiopia, large numbers of former Imperial Body Guards- men--absoivea ot blame for the recent coup but reassigned to units in the remote Ogaden region--deserted their new posts with full equipment in late February. The whereabouts of an additional 850 guardsmen who were scheduled to arrive in the area some time ago is also unknown. There is also information that a group of middle-level army officers, dissatisfied over low pay scales and conditions in gen- eral, is joining the malcontents who favor the objectives of the SECRET 11 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 10 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 11led (1., I rebels. There is no firm evidence, however, that there is yet a strong leader capable of attracting sufficient support among the dissidents to pose a serious threat to the regime. 11 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 11 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 va 14-4a � a sa AO/ NOV THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director --C-ONRBENT-f-A-L- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094 0,7Z. WZZA ZrZrZ, rZZZ rrrrr/ /11. / Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO3184094iur Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184094