CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/08/13

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03185151
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2016
• Case Number: F-2014-02699
• Publication Date: August 13, 1960

Approved for Release:
f (b)(
(b)(3),
(b)(3).
(b)(3)I
(b)(,
� �
13 August 1960
Copy No. C 71
CE:\TRAL
NTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. 3 6.
NO &NANCE IN CLASS.
o DECLASVFIRD
CLASS. ;'NL.';'.} TO: TS S
NLXT DATE ,20()
AWN:
9. JUN 1980
DATE: REVIEWERt
f
0
OPSECRET
0
0
0
/Zj rZi Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185151;
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185151
�Nii�V
The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
in this publication is based on all sources, including
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-
resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated
specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.
WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized persons, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Dr
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185151
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185151
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185151
,
,
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185151
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
13 August 1960
DAILY BRIEF
�
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China - Indonesia: Peiping is following up its
conciliation on boundary questions with Burma and Nepal with
moves to soften its dispute with Indonesia. Chinese Communist
Foreign Minister Chen Yi has expressed satisfaction with Dja-
arta's regrets over last month's incident in which two Overseas
hinese were killed, and he has promised. to consider ending
eiping's abusive radio attacks. [Ija addition, Communist China
as agreed to the designation of a new Indonesian ambassador
ho was previously indicated cceptableA
IL ASIA-AFRICA
0 16
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Mali: Discord between leaders of Senegal and Soudan--the g)
constituent states of the newly independent Federation of Mali
is sharpening to such an extent that it could lead to an early
break-up of the federation. Senegalese leaders have become in-
creasingly antagonized by Soudanese attempts to dominate the
TO (b)(3)
lApproved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO3185151\ \
,
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185151
(b)(3)
I WI #.1
federation, and the Soudanese apparently are backing away
from an earlier commitment to support Leopold Senghor,
Senegal's top leader, for the presidency of Mali in a vote now
scheduled for 27 August.
III. THE WEST
Organization of American States: Wenezuela is demanding
1 that a resolution calling for a complete break in relations with
the Dominican Republic be passed at the first of the two Organ-
ization of American States (OAS) meetings beginning 16 August
in San Jose, Costa Rica. Peru will support a break in diplo-
matic relations --a step already taken by Lima--but not a break
in commercial relations, according to the American charge in
Lima. At the subsequent meeting on the Cuban issue, which
Peru proposed, it will back a strong resolution condemning Sino-
Soviet interference in the hemisphere. Unless Cuba makes new
attacks on the OAS or on Peru, the Peruvian Government would
not, however, want to support a resolution against Cubal
LATE ITEMS
*Laos: The Revolutionary Committee's announcement in Vien-
tiane that the Somsanith government is on the point of submitting
Its resignation is unconfirmed, and may be overly optimistic.
14/
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
N, In order to strengthen his hand in any show- 1�) (b)(1)
ovirn-izyr-rlegorrano.c--1,3 -with the rebellious units in Vientiane, Phoumi
kss
Is making urgent plans for the transfer to Savannakhet of the 200 Lao
paratroopers in training in Thailand. Meanwhile, the latest commu-
niques issued by Captain Kong Le, leader of the Revolutionary Com-
mittee, are considerably more moderate in tone than those imme-
diately following the take-over of Vientiane on 8 August. They � -
\ ,
\ �
\ ,
ss ss
13 Aug 60 DAILY BRIEF ii
\ '
�705�SECREZ
lApproved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185151
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185151 (b)(3)
gar
assert the Revolutionary Committee's respect for the monarchy
and the constitution, and do not give support to press reports to
the effect that all American personnel would be expelled from
Laos and that Communist bloc assistance would be sought.
Radio Hanoi reports that the pro-Communist Pathet Lao
movement has expressed "full support" for the coup group in
Vientiane, has proposed the prompt formation of a "national
coalition government," and has called for joint action by Lao
government and Pathet Lao forces to forestall countermoves by
�the US and pro-American forces in Laos.
13 Aug 60
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
DAILY BRIEF lii
Zt Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185151
JPEGREI (b)(3)
-z�rs,
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185151
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185151
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185151
-*ow
Peiping Displays Softer Attitude Toward Indonesia
To help dispel an appearance of unreasonableness, Pei-
ping is following up its conciliation on boundary questions with
Burma and Nepal with moves to calm its dispute with Djakarta
over Indonesian treatment of Overseas Chinese. This dispute
was sharpened considerably a month ago when two Overseas
Chinese who resisted resettlement measures were killed by In-
donesian troops in Tjimahi, West Java. Foreign Minister Chen
Yi recently told two Indonesian journalists in Peiping he was
satisfied with Djakarta's expression of regret over the incident,
and he promised to consider an end to abusive radio attacks
which have greatly annoyed the Indonesians. President Sukarno
refused for over four weeks to receive the Chinese ambassador,
who was eager to present "urgent messages" from Peiping.
4Communist China has also agreed to accept the new Indo-
nesian ambassador who it had previously indicated was not wel-
come. Peiping had stalled on accepting the ambassador, whose
;name was submitted at the time of the Tjimahi incident, in or-
der to show its displeasure over the Overseas Chinese issue:-
Chinese Communist propaganda is pointing to Peiping's
ability to resolve disputes with other Asian countries to sug-
gest that Indian rather than Chinese stubbornness is responsi-
ble for the impasse in Sino-Indian border negotiations.
13 Aug 60
e�ekrrri A I ikrrel I i"ekl1-40 DI II I C1111,1
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185151
Page 2
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185151
'MOW"
Senegalese-Soudanese Friction Shaking Mali Federation
Discord between Senegal and Soudan�the constituent states
of the newly independent Federation of Mali�has recently inten-
sified to such an extent that an early break-up of the federation
is possible. This latest and most serious in a series of such
crises between the federal partners--whose basic outlooks and
temperaments diverge widely--is the result of increasing resent-
ment on the part of the moderate Senegalese over Soudanese at-
tempts to dominate Mali. The Soudanese, whose top leader,
Modibo Keita, is foreign minister as well as head of the Mali
Government, have been placing a disproportionate number of
their people in federal positions. They have also been trying,
quite openly, on at least one recent occasion, to induce younger
elements in the Senegalese Government to work for the more vig-
orous domestic policies and the more aggressive, pan-African-
oriented foreign policy favored by Soudan.
This heightened friction, already reflected in a wrangle over
� the naming of a chief of staff for the Mali Army, appears to be
� building up toward a showdown in connection with the election,
now scheduled for 27 August, of a federal president by the com-
bined legislatures of Mali, Senegal, and Soudan. A top-level
decision reached last May supposedly cleared the way for the
election to this post of Leopold Senghor, Senegal's principal
spokesman and the chief architect of the Mali Federation. Now,
ihowever, the Soudanese are insisting they agreed only that the
presidency should go to a representative of Senegal.
Senghor's supporters are reacting to these indications with
aire predictions implying a possible move by Senegal to secede
from the federation if Senghor is not chosen.
-SEC-RET,
13 Aug 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185151
Page 3
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185151
Possible DeirKopments at OAS Meetings
Utenezuela is demanding that a resolution calling for a com-
plete break in relations with the Dominican Republic be passed
at the first of the two Organization of American States (OAS) meetings
beginning 16 August in San Jose, Costa Rica. Peru will support
a break in diplomatic relations--a step already taken by Lima--
but not a break in commercial relations, according to the US
chargd in Lima. At the subsequent meeting on the Cuban issue,
which Peru proposed, it will back a strong resolution condemning
Sino-Soviet interference in the hemisphere. Unless Cuba makes
new attacks on the OAS or Peru, the Peruvian Government would
not, however, want to support a resolution against Cuba_j
Lihe Trujillo regime now has no supporters among the Latin
American states. In its propaganda efforts and in the statements
of its officials, it is showing a bitterness against the United States
which, in many aspects, closely parallels that of the Castro regime
in Cuba. The two regimes, heretofore generally considered at op-
posite ideological poles, may well find themselves allies at the
foreign ministers' meetings. In a letter to air force officers prior
to his departure for Europe on 7 August, General "Rarnfis" Tru-
jillo, the dictator's son, stated that the United States has turned
against both Trujillo and Castro because both attacked US business
interests--"When those people's dollars and cents are touched, no
one can shut them up." The American Embassy interprets the let-
ter, a bitter tirade against the United States, as clear indication
that dictator Trujillo intends to retain control andthat he is "to some
extent at least sympathetic to Castro."
[Communists and other pro-Castro groups in Costa Rica are
evidently, planning disturbances during the conference, including
picketing the conference site and holding public meetings denounc-
ing the OAS. However, there is no large group of dissatisfied in-
dividuals in the Costa Rican capital that would be readily exploit-
able in mob action, and any disturbances are likely to be carried
out by individuals and small groups which could be controlled by
Costa Rica's 2,400-man civil security force. The American Em-
bassy reported on 11 August that minor disturbances are probable
and violence is possible hut PithPr will nrnhahlu hp rnntrnl1earl-7
314LeRE.
13 Aug 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185151
Page 4
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185151
14.0 1..1=7.14.....,
WNW
Situation in Laos
Emissaries continue to shuttle back and forth between
the Somsanith government temporarily seated in Luang
Prabang and the Revolutionary Committee holding forth in
Vientiane, but these indirect negotiations thus far have been
inconclusive. Claims by the Revolutionary Committee that
the government is about to tender its resignation are unsub-
stantiated and may be overly optimistic. Government lead-
ers may be stalling for time in order to assess their political
and military strength throughout the country before entering
into serious negotiations or initiating possible military counter-
action.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
There are growing signs that Captain Kong Le, leader of
the coup group, is operating on a shoestring and is attempting
to stampede the government into a quick settlement before his
situation becomes readily apparent. His exhortations over the
Vientiane radio for the Lao people to rise up and support his
reform movement have evoked no discernible response thus far
from either civil or military quarters outside Vientiane.Lrtebel
strength in Vientiane is about 1,200 men, but all of these ap-
parently are not strongly loyal to Kong Le. The troops, fatigued�
EtLIRE�T_
13 Aug 60 Approved for Release: " �20-16/07/0E .60.37F1.51 Page 5
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185151
(from practically continuous duty since 8 August, are be-
coming shabby and are on short ratinng.
The latest communiqu�issued by the Revolutionary
Committee are considerably more moderate than its
initial statements following the takeover on 8 August It
announced on 12 August that the term "Revolutionary
Committee" is inappropriate, and that "coup d'etat com-
mittee" is preferable inasmuch as the committee has no
desire to change the system of administration and fully
respects the king and constitution. It also stressed that
no political group or foreign nation was behind the coup.
Press reports to the effect that all American personnel
would be expelled from Laos and that Communist bloc as-
sistance would be sought were termed "completely unfounded."
The situation in Vientiane is outwardly calm, but food
supplies are dwindling and the Revolutionary Committee has
warned merchants against hiking prices. Rumors are rife,
and a local USIS employee reports that the people believe
the "Communists" have taken over the town.
The Communists are exploiting these developments.
According to Radio Hanoi, the dissident Pathet Lao move,-
ment has voiced "full support" for the coup group in Vientiane,
has proposed the prompt formation of a "national coalition
government, "and has called for joint action by the Lao govern-
ment and Pathet Lao forces to forestall countermoves by the
US and pro-American forces in Laos. Hanoi has lauded the
policy of "peace and neutrality" proclaimed by Kong Le and
has assured the Laotian people of the "sympathy and support
of peace-loving people throughout the world." Peiping,
breaking almost three days' silence on the coup, has begun to
carry extensive reports on the situation in Laos. Moscow radio
comments that events in Laos are another expression of the
process taking place in various countries linked to the United
States by "aggressive military blocs."
�-i�epeaz
13 Aug 60 rrKITD A I MITI I irIckurc DI II I ETIkl
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185151 Page 6
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185151
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185151
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185151
1...."1
-"NNW
(b)(3)
(b)(
(b)(
Moscow could be expected to accompany such demands by of-
fers of economic and technical assistance to the Congo Govern-
ment, despite disclaimers by First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuz-
netsov to Ha.mmarskjold on 10 August that the Soviet Union would
be willing--in contrast with normal Soviet policy�to channel its
aid to the Congo through the UN. (b)(3)
The Soviet Union has already provided some direct aid (b)(3)
e form of food, medical assistance, and one transport aircraft.
(b)(3)
1)
3)
in
TOP SECRET
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
13 Aug 60 e"..r.h.rrrt Al ih1rri I 1����1..11.1e.ir rsi II I r�rik
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185151
Page 8
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185151
CONFTBOSNMAL,
'New Nerf
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
-CONFIREALTIAL
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 003185151
telaVsEcrw
orf
. 0000%
A p ro ved for Release: 2016/07/05 C031851511/ //Z/Zjef /My' erni
ET fe,