CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/08/15

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03185152
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2016
• Case Number: F-2014-02699
• Publication Date: August 15, 1960

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15 August 1960
Copy No. C 70
CENTRAL
IYTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intelligence in this publication is based on all sources, including
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-
resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated
specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.
WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793,794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized persons, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
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III. THE WEST
Belgium: [While no decision has been taken to cut the Bel-
gian defense budget in line with Prime Minister Eyskenst an-
nouncement on 9 August that Belgium will revise its NATO com-
mitments in view of Congo developments, political pressure
continues for a drastic reduction of $120,000,000�one third of
the budget. Cancellation of the F-104G fighter-plane program and
a partial withdrawal of Belgian troops from West Germany are
considered likely first steps in the event such a reduction is or-
dered. According to a high Belgian defense official, the whole
future of Belgium's military forces is very fluid and depends on
events in the Congo, especially the effect on the public of loss
of the Ki.mina base and the removal of troops from Ruanda-
Urundi: A
15 Aug 60
DAILY BRIEF ii
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*Laos: The rebel-controlled Vientiane radio has announced
that King Savang has designated National Assembly President
Souvanna Phouma to form a new government. This action follows
Savang's acceptance on 14 August of the resignation of the Som-
sanith government, which had received a vote of no confidence
the previous day from the assembly in Vientiane. The assembly's
vote, which was "unanimous',' apparently had been forced by the
rebel Kong Le group controlling Vientiane, and Premier Som-
sanith and other government leaders in Luang Prabang initially
dismissed it as illegal. The king presumably acted to avert
a military showdown, which was becoming increasingly likely
with the failure of repeated efforts to negotiate a settlement
with Kong Le
Souvanna Phouma engineered the short-lived integration
settlement with the Communist Pathet Lao dissidents while
premier in 1957. �He still feels that Laos' best interests can
be served by a rapproachement with the Pathet Lao and
pursuance of a policy of strict neutrality.
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DAILY BRIEF iii
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The Situation in the Congo
The entry of UN forces into Elisabethville and the begin-
ings of a Belgian troop withdrawal from Katanga have not
brought any resolution of the political status of the disputed
province./ (b)(1)
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Although spokesmen for Tshomb6 have characterized his
talks with Hammarskjold as "cordial," it appears likely that
there are considerable areas of disagreement. Hammarskjold
almost certainly failed to recognize the "independence" of Ka-
tanga, and probably indicated that he could not permit Tshombd
to establish the number and nationalities of the UN soldiers to
be moved into Katanga.
Congo Premier Lumumba's 13 August demand for the with-
drawal of white contingents of the UN force appears likely to
meet an equally negative response from the Secretary General.
Lumumba possibly hoped that an all-African force would be sus-
ceptible to pressure for the forcible unification of the Congo if
sufficiently pressed by himself and his Ghanaian and Guinean al-
lies. The anti-white sentiment implicit in Lumumba's demand,
however, will increase the apprehension of Europeans in both
the Congo and Katanga.
On 14 August, Congo President Kasavubu broke a long silence
with a radio speech in which he urged Congolese to support the cen-
tral government. He stopped short of endorsing Lumumba's pol-
icies, however, and his plea appears unlikely to halt anti-Lumumba
plotting among elements of the Abako party. Spokesmen for Lu-
mumba have hinted at the imposition of press censorship, and
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Lumumba has alluded to "special tribunals" which would be set
up to judge any persons who "provoke trouble" by their attitudes
or writings.
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Drastic Cuts Theeatenea in Belgian Defense Budge-et
e American Embassy in Brussels reports continuing polit-
ical pressure for a one-third reduction of the Belgian defense
budget, in line with Prime Minister Eyskens' announcement on
9 August that developments in the Congo will result in a revision
in Belgium's NATO commitments. Cancellation of the F-104G
fighter-plane program and a partial withdrawal of Belgian troops
from West Germany are considered likely first steps in the event
such a reduction is ordered:3
cording to a high Belgian defense official, the whole future
of Belgium's military forces is very fluid and turns on the outcome
of events in the Congo, especially on public reaction to the loss of
the Kamina base and the removal of troops from Ruanda-Urundi.
The embassy expects considerable "in-fighting" at the highest lev-
els of the government before the defense issue is resolved.'
t. his press conference on 9 August Eyskens, embittered by
whaf he considered lack of support from Belgium's NATO partners
during the Congo crisis, announced that his government would ini-
tiate an "austerity program" involving reductions in orders for
military equipment within the framework of NATO and amortization
of the Belgian bases in the Congo, which were built in the rearma-
ment period following the Korean war at a cost of $70,000,000.
Some Belgian political leaders have already privately criticized
Eyskens' statement as "untimely and childish;.:1
[prior to the Congo crisis, however, parliament had already
trimmed the defense estimates calling for an 8-percent increase
over the 1959 budget and the Senate had asked to reconsider de-
fense expenditures in the fall. The weak Eyskens coalition gov-
ernment, sensitive to a strong public sentiment in favor of reduc-
ing defense spending, has never fully met its NATO requirements
since it took office in November 1958. Moreover, the Belgian
press, angered by the Security. Council's resolutions on the Congo,
has stressed the uselessness of continuing costly military efforts
within NATO when the Western powers have demonstr catelLeomnlete_
indifference to Belzian interests1
ExeiRzt_
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SEtKitj:,
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Situation in Laos
King Savang has designated National Assembly President
Souvanna Phou.ma to form a new government, according to the
rebel-controlled Vientiane radio. This action follows Savang's
acceptance on 14 August of the resignation of the Somsanith
government, which had received a vote of no confidence the pre-
vious day from the National Assembly in Vientiane. The assembly's
"unanimous" vote apparently had been forced by the rebel Kong Le
group controlling Vientiane, and Premier Somsanith and other
government leaders in Luang Prabang initially dismissed it as
illegal.
These developments occurred when the government seemed to
be gaining the upper hand over Kong Le, who had been unsuccessful
in extending his control beyond Vientiane and only had about 1200
troops at his disposal. The king presumably acted in the interests
of national unity, since a military showdown was becoming in-
creasingly likely with the failure of repeated efforts to negotiate
a settlement with Kong Le. Lao Defense Minister Phoumi, chief
advocate of direct action to settle the revolt, had already initiated
psychological warfare activities against the rebel paratroop units
in Vientiane with the introduction of Lao special agents and teams,
and was proceeding rapidly with attack plans.
The king's course may have been influenced by fear that Kong
Le might defect with his troops to the side of the Communist Pathet
Lao dissidents if he couldn't derive satisfaction from the government for
his demands for policy reforms. Kong Le has sharply accused the
United States of interfering in Laotian affairs, and advocates friendly
relations with all nations including the Communist bloc.
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Premier-designate Souvanna engineered the short-lived
unification agreement with the Pathet Lao dissidents in
November 1957 while premier, and still feels strongly that
Laos' best interests can be served by finding common ground
with the Pathets and by following a policy of strict neutrality.
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CONII-BENTIAL
%No?
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Dikector of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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