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May 15, 1958
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Z{lr Release: 2019/08/20 ApprovedTOP SECRET 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 0 15 May 1958 Copy No. 140 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN No CHAN G'3. lN C:711. � 'DOCUMENT NO. CLAS3. CriA',NGED NEXT FiEV;EW DATE: AUT DAT TOP SECRET A PREVIEWER._ Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03185638 PRI Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03185638 /10/4 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03185638 Approved for.Release:.2019/08/20 C03185638 15 MAY 1958 I, THE COMMUNIST BLOC Latest Polish statement on bloc- Yugoslav dispute leaves Gomulka in equivocal position, still subject to Soviet pressure. iI. ASIA-AFRICA Lebanon - Fighting and sabotage continue. New attacks on govern- ment security forces likely if out- come of political maneuvering does not suit Chamounis opponents. Indonesia - Dissident commander states his aim is to make military gains in East Indonesia which will bring about negotiations with Djakarta. Israeli Government concerned over revival of Arab terrorism on Gaza strip frontier. LATE ITEM Tyura Tam range activity indicates valid firing sequence with launch time of about 0300 EDT, 15 May. Burmese Premier U Nu enlists sup- port of Communist-dominated political party in factional power struggle. Laotian Communists hope to keep present government in power as tactic to further non-Communist disunity. Tunisian Government fears local French troops may try to join French forces in Algeria. Algeria - General Massu remains defiant of civilian authority. The role of General Salan continues unclear. III. THE WEST France - Governnient under rightist pressure; Communists demonstrate against Pflimlin; chances of a call to De Gaulle increasing. 0 Bolivia - Rebel outbreak in Santa Cruz province increases President Siles' political troubles. TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03185638 Peim 7 1 0 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03185638 I Noe CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 15 May 1958 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Poland: Warsaw's latest response to Soviet pressure in the bloc dispute with Yugoslavia is a Trybuna Luda edi- torial condemning some aspects of Tito's party program but treating Yugoslavia as a "fraternal socialist state." Go- mulka's position creates a dilemma for the Kremlin. Fur- ther Soviet pressure on Poland could threaten the principles of independence on which the continued tenure of Gomulka depends. (Page 1) IAC Current Intelligence Group for the Taiwan Strait Prnh1Pm � Renort for the period 10 April - 14 May f958. (Page 2) (Maps) II. ASIA-AFRICA Lebanon: Sporadic street fighting and sabotage have continued. The army has apparently maintained control of most of Beirut, but has not tried to reassert authority in rural areas. Opposition groups continue to receive money and arms from UAR sources. Chamoun's .opponents may well mount a new effort against the strained security forces if the results of recent political maneuvering do not satisfy them. *Indonesia: the ultimate objective of the dissidents in North Celebes was to bring about negotiations with the central gov- ernment, but that they must first build up their offensive in 1. TOP SECRET \ Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03185638 ;s����1111R-iliktr-41nzmaz-zza . AU. , -"- ------ Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C0318e638 A 1,..11-41...+1 Nine -r- )1, East Indonesia until they are in a position of greater strength. Kawilarang subsequently went to Menado to assume over-all command of the dissident armed forces. (Page 3) Israel-Gaza: The Israeli Government is becoming con- cerned over a revival of Arab terrorism resembling fedayeen activity based in the Gaza strip. So far, this activity has been restricted to mining roads in Israel. (Page 5) Burma: Premier U Nu has gained the support of the Communist-dominated National Unity Front in the struggle between Burmese political factions. This will enhance U Nu's prospects for retaining control of the government but may make him dependent on the front's support. (Page 6) Laos: Communist strategy in Laos appears aimed at keeping the present premier and his cabinet, which includes two former Pathet Lao leaders, in power rather than demand- ing a larger cabinet representation for leftist parties. The Communists would thus hope to allay conservative fears and prevent the development of conservative unity. This plan may be succeeding since a number of conservative leaders he French ambassador are already favoring it. (Page 7) Tunisia: The Tunisian foreign secretary has informed the American charg�'affaites that the government feared French troops might attempt to join forces with those in Al- geria, in which case Tunisia would resist the move and hope for American support. Algeria: General Massu and his "committee of public safety" are apparently in control of the city of Algiers and have succeeded in inspiring the formation of similar commit- tees in several other important Algerian cities such as Oran and Constantine. The role of General Salan, which remains 15 May DAILY BRIEF ii TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03185638 N .,, Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03185638 . �:,.,t ::Q � � - '' .A \ ., klaile %We' ;\ ,, a major factor in determining the effectiveness of any gov- ernment move, is still unclear. All action is still being taken in the name of preserving Algeria for France, and the movement's ultimate objective still seems to be to influence political developments in Paris. (Page 8) III. THE WEST *France: (As of 2400 hours) The Pflimlin government, whi.cE has been strengthened by the decision of the Socialists to participate, appears to be tightening police control on all political activity. Whether these measures will be effective is still questionable, and there are doubts whether the gov- ernment will be able to survive in the ace of _continuing pros- Sure from extrerniSts on .the ,tight and: defiance by the Communists. A new crisis would advance the. Pros- pect of President Coty's calling on De Gau_le�ta_head_o_a_ complete disruption of authority in Paris. (Page 9) *Bolivia: The rebel outbreak on 14 May in the Santa "714) Cruz province in eastern Bolivia and the government's sub- sequent declaration of modified martial law throughout the country will increase the political difficulties of the Siles re- gime. The government party, which is preparing for a conven- tion on 20 May and for congressional elections in late June, is badly -divided. Former President Paz Estenssorots re- turn from abroad on 14 May is also likely to increase unrest since Paz is friendly with leftist labor leader Juan Lechin. Lechin, a leading critic of the US-backed economic stabiliza- tion program, has led the o position to President Siles in recent months. 15 May 58 DAILY BRIEF iii TOP SECRET \ Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03185638 - tv Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03185638 N. , � ��� 1 LA ant..,rtz i Niirl %of 740 LATE ITEM *Soviet missile activity: (As of 0001 hours) After a protracted period of operational and administrative traffic on the Tyura Tam range network, the activity entered the X-8 hours countdown stage at about 2300Z (1900 EDT) 14 May. What appears to be a valid firing sequence reached the X-6 hours stage at about 0100Z, 15 May. Barring unforeseen delays, launch time should be reached about 0700Z (0300 EDT), 15 May. Present evidence precludes a firm determination as to whether the activity involves an ICBM or a space vehicle. On balance, the evidence slightly favors a space vehicle, probably the third Sputnik. 15 May 58 L\ DAILY BRIEF iv \ Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03185638 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03185638 111 1I.' 11-4L I A-I I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Gomulka Enters Bloc Polemics on Yugoslavia In response to continued bloc pressure to depart from his middle-of-the-road policy on Yugoslavia, Polish leader Gomulka on 14 May condemned certain aspects of Tito's party program, but in a significantly milder tone than used in other bloc criticisms. The Polish statement, published in the party daily Trybuna Ludu, implies that while there are ideological errors in the Yugoslav program, they do not constitute suffi- cient cause for reading Yugoslavia out of the socialist camp. The Poles express hope that an ideological and political rec- onciliation can be reached between the Yugoslays and the other Communist parties, and state that there must be no re- turn to "the errors and methods of 1948." Omitting reference to denunciations issued by Moscow and Peiping, which were reprinted without comment by Trybuna Ludu on 10 May, the Poles take particular exception to Tito's analysis that contemporary capitalism is progressing toward socialism by evolutionary means. The Yo,�Ylslays are also condemned for failing to take into account "the funda- mental principle of international solidarity of all socialist forces," a criticism which may be directed as much against a continuation of strong polemics by both Moscow and Bel- grade as against the program itself. In taking the Yugoslays to task for causing ideological confusion in Communist ranks, Gomulka reveals his fear that any split in the socialist camp could point up differences be- tween his program and that of Moscow. The statement avoids comment on those aspects of the Yugoslav program which could have a bearing on Polish internal independence, such as the principles of sovereignty and noninterference in internal af- fairs which have been major planks in Gomulka's program. CONFIDENTIAL 15 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03185638 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 003185638 17� 45 LUNG-CWI Bridge AIRFIEWIder construction)�' 118� DIY _ \ ,_auseway .�1-1:1N"\,/,.. .,.....,�,--- ......-\:\,), ---...\1. Lung-ch'i '-------'-"\), 7-n (r t_ 'AMO ') It ..1�.,,,,_,,,,_.-.\-.,,..-;2.-.,-- ",._. , ' '- ,..;, �' ,...."'--------__SAttig ----..,...._, 40'4- __Tunnel 0.,4wiltue Shih-ma ( K:>' C. ,,� Nci."'"4:k.' ) ---'-'-' u�ndeRrar2:z.lu ,on Hsi-ch'eng � 4" c.."....- * IINI -------N-r' r�M--- e Chu-hsion Ying-ton .Chion-ou Nun-ping Yung-on Foochow T'ung-an Ma-chiang MA-ClIANG AIRFIELD TARVAN STRAIT .24t; An-hai Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 003185638 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03185638 --4-44r--6-bettb-r Nee �104 Report No. 116 of the IAG Current Intelligence Group for The Taiwan Strait Problem Covering the Period From 10 April to 14 May 1958 1. There were no significant combat operations in the area during the period. 2. Chinese Communist naval exercises of an unde- termined nature, involving various types of ships including landing craft, commenced on 12 April and continued at a Very high level as of 12 May. Abnormal naval communica- tions activity also continued in the East China area. The general exercise area is in the Hangchow Bay/Choushan Is- lands region, with increased patrol activity noted at Wenchow sand San Tu Tao. Since 8 May the activity has been extremely high, with as many as 48 units active between Shanghai and San Tu Tao on 9 May. The significance of this activity re- mains undetermined. In the absence-of other possible indi- cators of hostilities, an assessment of hostile intent at this time is not warranted. However, the Chinese Communist capability for hostile action with little or no warning is great- ly enhanced by the immediate availability of such a large number of naval units. 3, work is under way on a short extension of the Yingtan-Amoy railroad lead- ing to the dock area of Amoy. The exact amount of work remaining to be done is not known, but completion within a month or so is feasible. The Chinese Communists may then try to make fuller use of Amoy, the best harbor on the China coast between Shanghai and Hong Kong. If there is an in- crease in the number of ships calling at Amoy, the Chinese Nationalists might take more active steps to effect their port closure, steps which could lead the Chinese Communists to take retaliatory action against the Quemoys. 15 May 58 TOP SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03185638 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03185638 TAIWAN STIMIT SITUATION Ns, STATUS OF AIR FACILITIES OPERATIONAL � Air facilities printed in red are known or evaluated to be consistently used by military or civilian aircraft. SERVICEABLE � Air facilities printed in green are known or evaluated to be capable of use by aircraft. OTHER � Air facilities printed in black are those under construction, unserviceable, or on which the availability of information is such that the current status cannot be determined. *Delineated runways are explained as a defined or marked area on an airfield prepared or selected for landing and takeoff of aircraft. CHUEHSHAN(T IL 0 OHOKOU t.T) Tung- 'ing TATOPU NANHAI (P W CL 24650 MACAO � (PORT.) 114 116 CHANGSHU HSIAN N U N ONO KONG (U.K.) 0 Pangfou HOE El (P) NANKING H g - HUAINING SAT Yingtan Chien T) Claangpi LUNGTIEN (P) 53,00 INGYANG (D) UNGC (is IN KAOC .890' IANIqS ANG (P) E4.HIANG (T) CHIN (TV) LUNG HUA(P) HUA (P) Wencho Jul MATSUS 122 32 ---- LUNGHUA SS CHIANGWAN(P) HUNGCHIAO CHIASING(Pj TINGHAbS,S, 23,000 ANTAI1P". '_4t& SUNGSHAN (P) NGHA( -,1T) HIAO-(P) 28- 2b� so TAQYUAN (P) HSINCHU (P) IAN (P) LUN KUNGKUAN ACHIANG (T) (UC) 1:)000 ,U EM DV 6 TAICHUNG A OW NORTHEAST r P ; wato....,,SaTOW (F') 14,000 TAI'NAN(P) - Railroad Kaohsiung �I� �I� Railroad under construction Selected road 170 200 NAUTICAL MILES PENG,HU (P) ST(T) 24� N CHIA! (P)23 1 000 NGTUGIR BASE " TLINGKONG 100 200 STATUTE MILES 116 118 120 LIICCHUN: I') 27 � SYMBOL AIRFIELDS WITH * DELINEATED RUNWAYS RUNWAY SURFACE 0 7000 feet Grover (P)� Permanent * 6000 feet to 6999 feet (T) � Temporary (N) � Natural * 5000 feet to 5999 feet (UC) � Under Construction (UNK) � Unknown � 4000 feet to 4999 feet t Seaplane station 14 MAY 1958 71213 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03185638 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03185638 kJ Li.J \Li 1� NNW Naar IL ASIA-AFRICA Situation in Indonesia Prior to his recent departure for Menado, Col. Alex Kawilarang is to have stated in Manila that the dissidents' ultimate objective was to force the central government into meaningful negotiations. In the meantime, the dissidents would have to continue their of- fensive in East Indonesia so as to strengthen their bar- gaining position. Kawilarang, who is the commander in chief of the dissident armed forces, estimated that it would take from three months to a year to bring about negotiations. He admitted having been contacted while in Manila by an emissary of Army Chief of Staff Nasution but stated that the central government representative brought no "positive offer" from Nasution. ships "involved in opera- tions" which were proceeding to Ambon is a further indi- cation thatAmbon will be used as a staging area for gov- ernment operations against Morotai, Halmahera, and the east coast of North Celebes. Ambon is vulnerable to dis- sident air attacks, as is Balikpapan On Borneo, which is another staging area for operations in East Indonesia. Military authorities in Djakarta apparently have banned a Communist-sponsored mass rally to protest "foreign inter- vention" which had been scheduled for 16 May. An undisclosed number of 2,000- to 4,000-ton Soviet tankers are en route to Indonesia to carry petroleum prod- ucts from South Sumatra to East Indonesian ports. these tankers have been provided outside the frame- work of he $100,000,000 credit the USSR has extended to In- donesia. In answer to a request for arms in late April TOP SECRET 15 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03185638 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03185638 vl Japan could not officially approve such shipments without consulting the United States, the United States controls sales of American-type arms but would not oppose "disguised" shipments of arms. Japan has officially supported the cen- tral government in Djakarta since the revolution began. TOP SECRET 15 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03185638 .Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03185638 i.-11 4...1Laii...1%.Li 1 Aar' Near' Israeli Concern Over Increased Fedayeen-Type Terrorist Activity on Egyptian Frontier The Israeli Government suspects that a "recrudescence" of fedayeen-type terrorist activity, principally road mining, along Israel's Sinai and Gaza strip frontiers is Cairo-directed rather than mere local harassment by Gaza's Arab refugees. citing a mine explosion on 7 May and evidences of other mining preparations, these incidents have been too numerous and their implications for Israel too serious to be overlooked. Israel Defense Force Chief of Staff Laskov is expected to discuss the situation with General Burns, commander of the UN Emergency Forces de- ployed on the Arab side of the border. The Israelis have ex- pressed little confidence in UNErs effectiveness, and Laskov probably will seek more freedom of action for Israeli securi- ty operations, which are handicapped by the presence of UNEF. The Israelis consider themselves particularly vulnerable to terrorist harassment. increased f ed- ayeen training in Gaza, and in March fedayeen there were es- timated to number 400. In addition, Egyptian regular forces in the eastern Sinai area have been augmented during recent months and further increases are likely. The present Egyp- tian strength in this area is about 10,000, roughly one third the force E gypt had hi the area before the 1956 Sinai campaign,: Egyptian in- telligence parties were authorized to enter Israel, probably to assess the Israeli reaction to increasing Egyptian military activity near Israel. -TOP SECRET 15 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03185638 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03185638 SECRET Burmese Political Crisis Deepens Premier Nu has been promised the 46 to 49 parliamentary votes controlled by the Communist-dominated National Unity Ffont (NUF) in the dispute which has split Burma's govern- ing party, the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League. Nu claims to have made no concessions for this support, but, if he is forced to rely on the NUF votes, he may have to modify his opposition to direct negotiations with the Commu- nist insurgents and to become more accommodating to Othcr leftist demands. Already the Rangoon press has denounced Nuts acceptance as "expediency" aric a windfall for the Bur- mese Communist party, and przAicts it will result in the "birth of real Communist power in Burma." The closeness of the coming parliamentary vote is il- lustrated by the fact that both the Nu and the Ba Swe - Kyaw Nyein factions are offering the Ministry of Finance to an ethnic minority leader in return for the six votes he can de- liver. This leader, however, has announced he will cast his votes "for the winning side." Both factions have disavowed any intention of resorting to violence, but such a development cannot be discounted in the light of Burma's turbulent history. In the present situation, the feuding leaders command personal followings in the armed forces, regular and irregular, as well as among the police, labor unions, and peasant organizations. Army Commander in Chief Ne Win has ordered army leaders to remain aloof from the political struggle, and it is reported that a dusk-to-dawn curfew will be imposed in the Rangoon area from 26 May until the end of the special session of Parliament which begins on 5 June. Ne Win has warned that the inclusion of Communists in any forthcoming government would be a "matter of concern to the army." -SEeRE-T-- 15 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03185638 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03185638 SECRET iudif Sentiment for Coalition With Communists Growing in Laos Sentiment for the retention of Premier Souvanna Phouma and most of his present cabinet, including two former Pathet Lao representatives, appears to be gaining strength in Laotian political circles. The Communists are abetting this trend to maintain the conservatives' false sense of security, thus facilitating Communist plans for an eventual political take- over. Conservative elements, meanwhile, are seizing on this formula as a face-saving device in the wake of their recent electoral defeat. Crown Prince Savang has issued a call for national harmony, and has indicated that the monarchy would acquiesce in Souvanna's remaining as head of a coalition government. Other conservative leaders, in turn, are rationalizing the heavy vote for antiadministration candidates in the 4 May elec - tion as a protest against government corruption or as a popular mandate for national unity rather than a vote for Communism. French Ambassador Gassouin, who also favors retention of Souvanna at the head of a government of technicians drawn from all political affiliations, has reiterated his conviction that the Neo Lao Hak Zat is not Communist but a reform par- ty with high motives. His views are encouraging accommoda- tion with the Communists by government officials who, in any event, are inclined to view them essentially as patriots �SEC�RE-T--- 15 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03185638 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03185638 ...WI NI 1L,Lal I 111L.d Rope Situation in Algeria Joint military-civilian committees of "public safety" modeled upon and supporting the one established in Algiers on 13 May under the leadership of French paratroop gen- eral Massu and local civilian extremists have apparently assumed power in numerous major and minor Algerian cities�including Oran, Constantine, Bone and Philippeville. These developments have been accompanied by strikes, demonstrations, and new disorders which were most in- tense in Oran. Rioting mobs there stormed the government building and manhandled the top civilian official after the radio station had been seized, apparently by reservists in civilian dress. The newly established committees have all re-echoed the call for a De Gaulle government issued by Massu and his Algiers committee. The position of General Salan, France's supreme com- mander in Alget.ia, remains unclear. He has been recog- nized as the ultimate authority in Algeria for the time be-, ing by both Premier Pflimlin and General Massu�who yesterday described Salan as an "emanation of the govern- ment." Salan himself, who earlier announced he had as- sumed power "in agreement" with the Algiers committee, has so far studiously avoided a firm public commitment of loyalty to Paris. Both Salan and the Algiers committee under Massu con- tinue to occupy the paratroop-guarded central government building in Algiers ransacked by European rioters on 13 May. The committee insists, however, that it has no intention of forming an independent government, but intends to hand over authority as soon as Paris installs a government "capable of preserving Algeria as an integral part of France." Late yesterday there were some indications that Massu jght now be willing to settle for something considerably short k d the terms he first laid down. Events in Algeria, however, indi- cated that the civilian extreirnists, now thoroughly aroused, may fomeat new disorders in an effort to bring down even the Pflimlin government,, even if it is further modified. CONFIDENTIAL 15 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03185638 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03185638 1.71-01...,ZIL 1 Nate III. THE WEST The French Political Situation (As of 2400 hours) Premier Pflimlin is attempting to stabilize the situation in France by tightening police controls, arresting rightist extremists, and banning political demonstrations. The Socialists have agreed to participate in his gov- ernment, which may lead to the return of Robert Lacoste to Algiers as minister for Algeria. This development might appease the army leaders in Algeria and restore their confidence in the Paris regime. The other nonextremist French political parties and groups, such as the non-Communist labor organizations, now appear ready to back, at least for a limited time, "com- mon action of all national parties against all seditious ac- tivities." Under these circumstances, the Communists may continue agitation similar to the 14 May street demonstra- tions in an effort to keep alive the idea of a popular front against what they call the new "fascist menace." Pflimlin faces the prospect of continuing civil dis- orders and pressures from the military. the Paris prefect is uncertain whether the entire police force will be reliable in the face of rightist pressures. Should continuing ex- tremist agitation force Pflimlin to give up his attempt to maintain a governMent, President Coty will be under even heavier pressure to turn to De Gaulle. The general, how- ever, has not yet given any sign of his intentions, although various spokesmen continue to make representations on his behalf. SECRET � 15 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03185638