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August 14, 2020
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August 27, 2020
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April 4, 1961
PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15815748].pdf617.31 KB
� Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03186013 Nur �1 %or ac�mc 3.5(c) 4 April 1961 Copy No. C 7, CENTRAL TELLIGENCE BULLETIN TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03186013 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03186013 �11;Flia�bt-bich�l� P-1 -TOP-SEC-RET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03186013 / Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03186013 statiOP SECRET q.so 4 April 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Situation in Laos. (Page t) 2. Congo: Tshombe's position in Manono apparently not yet secure.(Page ii) 3. France-Portu71: Maneuvering against US on UN Cuban issue. (Page ti) TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03186013 0111% Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03186013 o," NAMITHA t 1:71uong Sail LUANG'J PRA tt, Luang Prabang SAYABOURY � am Bac .V/ Sa � \ m Ntua t�( A N G (AM NEUA 4�,-,fitse ...'"\* .-- ..., ..trt :---- X I EN G KHOUANGN -, Muond Sou i r s,��relptcn.,B.an � Phiru Khoun ...) ---110:Xieng Khouang l �_/iT A .. Via-nr-g-, Muon Kas,v ' \iNk. L.Ban Ta / ;Wang Vioang j....4,-. --0-r......�ha "r..h� LT-..�,... .4 VIENTIANE 77 41114Borikhan$% 4 Pak Sane .i et/1 1 ..f. Vientiane I 11 � NORTHERN LAOS 4110 GOVERNMENT Forces in KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS �ROAD TRAIL 0 50 I STATUTE MILES 0 ROUTE NUMBER 610404 100 I Kam Keut Litk Sai) KHAM M guANE. Thakhek tY. Savannakhet 4 4 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03186013 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO3186013 OP SECRET 01 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 4 April 1961 DAILY BRIEF Laos: L__,Vientiane has adopted an official position of "no comment" pending study of the Soviet reply to the British proposal; privately, however, General Phoumi and Premier d,b,t41,e Boun Oum are taking a gloomy line over prospects, stress- ing the weak military situation. A country team appraisal -2'd of the military situation in Laos underscores the defensive psychology of the Laotian Army which is enabling the aggresi'1) sive enemy forces to fight at a tempo of their own choosing, and to build up strength for attack on any point. According to this appraisal, General Phoumi appears increasingly to feel that the Laotian Army alone will be unable to control the military situation and is increasingly anxious for outside he glajor elements of the government force which withdrew from Tha Thom have reached Borikhane, and some control over them has been established. Other government units in the area have been ordered farther north to make contact with the enemy in an affnri- 1-n ci-nhiliwa 1-hp Qithatinn orders all battalions to withdraw quickly to Pak Sane for regroupment, leaving behind one unit to conduct guerrilla activity. It is unclear, therefore, whether the government now intends to establish a blocking position at Borikhane or to withdraw to Pak SaneD ) (Backup, Page 1) (Map) Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03186013 es Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03186013 Brazzaville Banana* Matadi Kitona IN 300 INDIA 1700 SUDAN 400 TUNISIA 3.200 NIGERIA 400 Gemena Scattered, Forces MOBUTU 3 400 EQUATEU .111.1.Coquilhatville j � Boende , -200 Co,. Ikelaoc ETHIOPIA MOBUTU 800 1 r ../N-. ........ er�-,..... 3 INDONESIA 850 MOBUTU 7,200 IScattec Forces LEOPO DVILLE Francqui Leopoldv. hysville GHANA 1600 ...i4Luabourg Bakw 15/3 Approximate area nominally controlled by: Luanda I Kasavubu-Mobutu 610404 2 1E42 00 Gizenga Kalonji Tshombe United Nations Forces Selected road -+Selected railroad Selected airfield STATUTE MILES 400 Luputa INDIA 800 IRELAND' 655 the MALAYA 750 LIBERIA ; 230 tnfeyvUie ETHIOPIA GIZENGA 7,000 _ K.VU Bukavil ETHIOPIA Kaminal NIGERIA 500 Kongolo Albertville NIGERIA 900 �Manono SWEDEN 650 TSHomBE 7,009 hville, Usumbura 4 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03186013 r Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03186013 16�1713--steitE-- Congo:ETshombes position in Manono apparently is not yet secure, although the reinforcements sent there on 1 April will make a 13aluba counterattack difficult. Baluba snipers reportedly are infiltrating the Icatanga army lines and are Inflicting casualties on Tshombe's white mercenaries. The mercenaries, who seem to be the only reliable and aggres- sive elements of Tshombe's forces, apparently are becom- ing increasingly nervous. Further operations by Tshombd will also be hampered by the 1,700-man nclian TIN enntincrAnt is being flown to nearby ICamina- Backup, Page 3) (Map) France - Portugal: Portugal's delegate_uie United Na- tions informed Lisbon Fthe French delegate had suggested the European colonial powers should retaliate against the US policy of cultivating Afro-Asian support and "make the US understand clearly that we will no longer support it in its own problems." He added that the French delegate "apparently wanted to induce me to vote in favor of Cuba and against the US" when the General Assembly takes up the Cuban charge of US intervention�pos- sibly this week. The Portuguese delegate recommended to his government that it consider seeking agreement with France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg to abstain on the Cuban question. The Portuguese delegate also reported that "there would certainly be some votes among the Latin Amer- ican countries against the US policy" on Cuba. "almost cer- tainly including Brazil." (Backup, Page 5) 4 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF II \ TOP SECRET 7/2.V VA Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03186013 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03186013 Laos The apparently growing number of North Vietnamese in- volved on the enemy side is particularly discouragingto General Phoumi, according to American officials in Vientiane.(Amer- ican military personnel formerly stationed at Tha Thom de- scribe the actions taken by the enemy forces during the six weeks preceding the town's capture on 31 March as "profes- sional" and not of a type that could be executed by the average Pathet Lao. Three Soviet IL-14s on apparent air-drop mis- sions in the Tha Thom area were seen by reliable observers on 31 March, and additional drops in the same general vicinity reportedly occurred on 30 March. So sudden and furious was the enemy action at Tha Thom that it appears that all the gov- ernment's crew-served weapons, including two 105-mm. how- itzers, were captured intacq General Phoumi,Vehose moods alternate between extremes of confidence and depression, was especially pessimistic over the Kam Keut situation. When he discovered that this situation � was not as critical as first imagined, he regained his cheer- fulness for a few hours until news of the fall of Tha Thom plunged him again into despondency. He has since recovered some of his confidence and is speaking of an offensive in the Muong Kassy area. 1�_en1or American officials in Vientiane believe that the leadership of both the Laotian Army and government is "ter- ribly uncertain" and vulnerable to factors and forces over which the leaders feel they have little control. One such fac- tor is the enemy's military potential, which General Phoumi feels is greater than his own at this time. A second crucial factor is US political, economic, and military support; if this appears to weaken or waver, a further loss of cOnfidence can be expected, and with rapiditY".3 In his recent discussions with Admiral Felt, Phoumi re- vealed that he has a standing agreement with South Vietnam for a Vietnamese division to enter southern Laos as an inter- vention force in case he asks for assistance. He stated that he has not yet called for entry of this division since the situa- tion does not warrant intervention. TOP SECRET 4 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03186013 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 003186013 �4"7TC115---SEeftET- as a result of the current Operational Zone was being formed. Soviet propaganda has underscored Moscow's contention that the way is now open for a peaceful solution in Laos. Presi- dent Kennedy's remarks on the 1 April Soviet reply to the Brit- ish proposals on Laos have been widely circulated. Moscow radio carried the text of the President's statement and reported that it is carried in full in the 3 April issue of Pravda. Soviet broadcasts have also reported an article in the Peiping People's Daily of 1 April which called for an enlarged Geneva conference as the "only way" to solve the Laotian problem. Moscow, in broadcasting the remarks made by Chen Yi in Djakarta, omitted any reference to his threat to send Chinese troops to Laos. The Soviet broadcast quoted Chen Yi as saying that Peiping "will not remain indifferent in the event SEATO launches direct military Intervention in Laos." Terming the Soviet reply to the British note "practical and correct," Hanoi's official newspaper Nhan Dan on 3 April called for prompt convocation of an international conference. The conference also was endorsed by Pathet Lao leader Prince Sou- phannouvong and by the Xieng Khouang "government." Souphannou- vong, in a 1 April statement, and Souvanna Phouma's Xieng Khouang "representative" Quinim Pholsena, in a statement of 2 April, both demanded withdrawal of "US, Thai, South Vietnamese, and Kuomintang military personnel." The emphasis on this with- drawal suggests it is a point which may be used to prolong any cease-fire negotiations such as the USSR said should be hld be- tween the "interested parties of Laos." @oviet airlift operations into Laos continue to be scheduled. Apparently only one of the seven IL-14s scheduled for flights to Phong Saly on 2 April actually made the trip. The others returned to Hanoi shortly after take-off because of heavy fog. However, sev- en IL-14s were again scheduled for Phong Saly on 3 April. Also scheduled for 3 April were eight IL-14A 1-n flv from Hanoi to Xieng Khouang and returp3 TOP SECRET 4 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 003186013 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03186013 NaeFeP�SteRtur Sittiation in the Congo iTshombe's white mercenaries from South Africa reported- ly are annoyed by the Belgians in command of the African units at Manono. The Belgian officers apparently are taking credit for the capture of the town, although their African troops re- portedly refused to fight and the brunt of the fighting was borne by the white legionnairegT) General ti. I. Alexander, the British commander of the Ghana- ian Army, is increasingly concerned over the UN Command's failure to react to Nkrumah's proposal for the reorganization of the Congolese Army. Alexander told Accra's delegate at the UN, "Unless there is some news soon of a plan to bring order, for morale reasons alone I will have to recommend gradual running down of Ghana's military contribution to the United Nations mil- itary effort." Although such advice would run counter to Nkrumah's present policy of strong support for the UN, Alexander is one of the Ghanaian President's most influential advisers. Moreover, Alexander's position is characteristic of the concern in African iveness of the UN operation:i Lyi Belgium, Paul-Henri Spaak, who apparently expects to be named the next foreign minister as a result of the 26 March elections, reportedly believes that Brussels has been helping Katanga too extensively and that more effort should be expended in support of the Leopoldville regime. The Belgian caretaker government reportedly agreed on 24 March to make available to Leopoldville $4,000,000, but the actual turnover of the funds Is likely to be delayedis In New Delhi yesterday, Nehru took note of the "campaign against Mr. Rajeshwar Daya1" and made public his opposition to the replacement of Dayal now "or in the near future." He said removal of Dayal "would also have some effect on the main- taining of our forces" in the Congo. Dayal, the Indian diplomat who has served as Hammarskjold's personal representative in TOP SECRET 4 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03186013 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03186013 NaiTOP SECRET vor (she Congo, is now in New York for consultations and is not ex- pected to return to the Congo for several weeks. Dayal alienated many Congolese officials, and there has been apprehension in Leo- poldville that his return may genet p new t-enAinns n�possibly touch off new anti-UN disordersp TOP SECRET 4 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03186013 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03186013 OP SECRET France May Use Cuban Issue in UN to Press US France has continually opposed what it considers the United States' indiscriminate efforts to win the political sup- port of the Afro-Asian states in the UN. Paris is motivated partly by fear of establishing precedents which will pave the way for increased UN activity in Africa to the detriment of French interests, particularly in Algeria. Principally, how- ever, De Gaulle views the UN as a heterogeneous mixture numerically dominated by new states, fundamentally incapa- ble of action but increasingly tending to assume the respon- sibility of the large powers for the maintenance of peace. The US vote in the Security Council on 15 March in favor of the Liberian resolution calling for UN consideration of the Angolan question probably was the immediate occasion for the French suggestion to the Portuguese. Various French political commentators have recently berated the US for failure to "stand with its allies." The influential and usually pro-American Raymond Aron said in an article on 22 March in Le Figaro that the US "double standard" will backfire when "the Marxists train their guns on US 'imperialism' in Latin America." Paris can be expected to continue to urge the other colonial powers to utilize the Cuban resolution or any similar resolutions, particularly those critical of US policy in Latin America, as an opportunity to make this point forcefully. Lisbon's sharply hostile reaction to the recent US vote suggests that it will give serious consideration to the French tactic. Portuguese officials believe the US position has en- couraged Afro-Asian attacks on the colonial powers, and Lis- bon has been seeking ways to induce the US to change its Af- rican policies. The vitriolic anti-American press campaign and demonstrations in Portugal have linked the US stand with that of the Soviet Union and have singled out Ambassador Stevenson as the chief villain. A leading editorial on 29 March in the government-controlled newspaper Diario de Noticias stressed that the US bases in the Azores had been granted with the understanding that Portuguese sovereignty would be re- spected in all of the Portuguese colonies, that Portugal had TOP SECRET 4 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03186013 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03186013 OP SECRET ierri only joined the UN on the insistence of the US and Britain, and that the loyalty and solidarity Lisbon had given the NATO al- liance had been forgotten. The Cuban request for UN General Assembly considera- tion of "the clear threat to international peace and security" posed by "the various plans of aggression and acts of interven- tion" of the United States against the Cuban Government was originally submitted last October. Cuba has subsequently further detailed its charges against the US in several formal din the UN.I Indonesia and Guinea plan to submit a res- olution in the General Assembly recommending that the US and Cuba make every effort to settle their differences by peace- ful means. .. in bilateral discussions," and "refrain from any act that might further aggravate tension between the two goy- . prnments." the Cuban Governmen is ac ve y p For some weeks, Cuba's public position has been that it is willing and anxious to engage in bilateral discussions with the US, provided such discussions are on a "basis of equality and with an open agenda," but that the present US attitude pre- vents such discussions. In its note of 8 March rejecting the Argentine offer of good offices toward easing US-Cuban "dif- ferences," Havana reiterated these views but added, "The conduct of the US Government and the statements of its offi- cials" would make any effort toward bilateral discussions at this time "useless." TOP SECRET 4 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03186013 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03186013 Ow� THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investi'gation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03186013 ,