CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/03/14

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03187388
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: March 14, 1959

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14 March 1959
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
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14 MARCH 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR - Mikoyan may become foreign
minister.
Chinese Communists deploy addi-
tional jet fighters to East China
coastal area.
Tibetan unrest continues; Dalai Lama
representative aarees to "struggle for
Independence."
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Tunisia - Bourguiba under increasing
pressure from Algerian rebels in Tuni-
sia; bloc contributions to rebels bypass-
ing Tunisian channels.
�Chinese Nationalists approve plans to
resupply Indonesian rebels in the Cel-
ebes.
()Japan would shelve plans for repatria-
tion to North Korea if South Korea nego-
tiated fishery issues.
III. THE WEST
�Portuguese seciarity forces thwart move
against regime; further attempts possible.
0 Bolivia - *reading strikes and growing
tension cause evacuation plans for US
nationals to be considered.
0 Cuba - Disillusionment with Castro
spreading.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
14 March 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: 6....,here is continuing speculation among foreign
diplomats in Moscow that First Deputy Premier Mikoyan
may replace Gromyko as foreign minister. Khrushchev may
desire to have a more authoritative spokesman at a confer-
ence of foreign ministers. Mikoyan's international stature
was considerably enhanced by his visit to the United States
and he has recently been making more frequent pronounce-,
ments on foreign policy: thus such a shift would be logical-1
*Communist China: LA_.. flight of at least 45 Chinese Com-
munist jet fighters arrived at Lungchi, near Amoy on the
East China coasts, on 11 March. The bulk of these aircraft
came from the Nanchang area. The reasons for this in- (
crease at Lungchi, where there have been an estimated
35 jet fighters, are not clear, but the move may reflect
Communist sensitivity to the recent step-up in Nationalist
overflight activity, a build-up at Lungchi, or a continuing
rotation of units based on the coastal fields]
Tibet:
a
representative of the Dalai Lama is reported to have attended
an anti-Communist meeting on 1 March and to have agreed to
or independence'
The exact role of the Dalai Lama in the present
is unclear, as are his whereabouts and condition
(Page 1)
unres
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
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Tunisia: President Bourguiba appears to feel more and
more isolated and increasingly subject to pressure from
Algerian rebels within Tunisia. Rebel soldiers are becom-
ing more cocky, while Soviet-bloc contributions to the more
than 90,000 Algerian refugees inside Tunisia, heretofore
channeled through the Tunisian Red Crescent, now are de-
livered directly to the Algerian Red Crescent in Tunisia.
(Page 2)
Nationalist China - Indonesia: Khinese Nationalist secu-
rity chief Chiang Ching-kuo has approved in principle a plan
for further supplying the Indonesian rebels in the Celebes
"at an appropriate time." Rebel representatives in Taipei
have requested in addition that Chinese crews for four rebel
owned aircraft reportedly now on Taiwan be placed on alert
status. Nationalist authorities have never admitted supplying
a large shipload of ammunition last December which appar-
ently has contributed greatly to increased �llssident activity
in the Celebes during the past few weekA..
(Page 3)
Japan-Korea: Prime Minister Kishi indicated to Ambas-
sador MacArthur on 11 March that it might be possible to
shelve indefinitely the plan to repatriate Koreans to North
Korea if South Korea could be persuaded to accept a "reason-
able solution" of the "Rhee Line" issue and the return of de-
tained Japanese fishermen. Kishi would rather settle these
issues in direct negotiations with South Korea than submit,
them to the TIN or to engage in direct negotiations with North
Korea. Seoul, however, has shown no willingness to compro-
mise on the fisheries issue.
Page 4)
III. THE WEST
Portugal: a plan by a civilian group with military sup-
port to move against the Salazar regime on 12 March has bee
thwarted by the security forces. In view of the disconteng
14 Mar 59
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&eluding that among junior army and navy officers, and
doubt over Salazar's health, further attempts against the
gime are possiblq
(Page 5)
*Bolivia: The US Embassy is going ahead with unobtru-
sive evacuation of nonessential US citizens because of spread-
ing strikes and growing public tension over financial policy.
On 13 March the Government said it was incorporating into a
decree a proposal of the International Monetary Furd.strongly op-
posed by the politically powerful armed miners.
(Page 6)
Cuba: Disillusionment with the Castro regime seems to be
spreading. Castro's position as arbiter of all official actions
and policies hinders efficient functioning of the government,
and his preoccupation with certain projects, such as social and
agrarian reform, is delaying economic recovery. He has ali-
enated certain commercial, professional, and political groups,
including some of his former supporters, but his popularity
with the lower classes is apparently undiminished.
(Page 7)
14 Mar 59
DAILY BRIEF - iii
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Further Details on Tibetan Unrest
aacu.tionai information about unrest in Lhasa, center of Chi-.
nese administration in Tibet. The rebels are reported to have
"besieged the radio station"--presumably in Lhasa--and to
"con fro], :he Dalai Lama's "home."
an organized anti-Communist movement participated
in by Tibetan religious leaders developed in the Lhasa area and
perhaps elsewhere in Tibet early in Marcq
be exact role of the Dalai Lama in the movement is un-
clear, as are his whereabouts and condition, but his represent-
ative is reported to have attended an anti-Communist meeting
on 11 March and to have agreed to "struggle for independence."
Some of the Tibetan lay aristocracy apparently have sided with
the Chinese. Further dissension within the Tibetan ranks is in-
dicated in the disagreement which is said to exist between anti-
Communist forces in Lhasa and those in West China_:.)
.,nce the Communist occupation of Tibet in 1951, Peiping's
policy has been to use the Dalai Lama as much as possible in
carrying out the Communist program, but he is believed to have
responded with only minimum cooperation. At the same time,
the Communists have been grooming the rival Panchen Lama--
a Chinese puppet--as a counterbalance to the Dalai Lama. If
the Dalai Lama fails to cooperate fully in ending the dissidence,
Peiping may attempt to replace him with the Panchen Lama)
an- suppressing the unrest, the Chinese Communists risk
incurring adverse international criticism. Indian officials are
already disturbed over the diplomatic problem they would face
should Tibetan rebels try to take refuge in India or Bhutan)
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Tunisian President Pessimistic Over North African Situation
President Bourguiba is becoming increasingly pessimistic
concerning the North African situation, particularly prospects
for a settlement in Algeria. This attitude may stem from
lessened Tunisian control over the activities of Algerian rebels
in Tunisia,, as well as Bourguiba's growing diplomatic isola-
tion. The rebels now are operating more openly than in the
past, and this may cause a new crisis in Tunisia's relations
with France.
Rebel troops seem to be growing more cocky and now are
seen on the streets of western Tunisian cities in uniform. An
earlier decision that the Tunisian rather than the Algerian Red
Crescent was to receive all relief supplies destined for the 90,-
000 Algerian refugees in Tunisia is being circumvented. A
37-ton shipment from the Rumanian Red Cross was delivered
in January to the Algerian Red Crescent, and Algerian Rea
Crescent and trade-union officials apparently will take delivery
of shipments from Czechoslovakia and from Soviet trade unions
soon to arrive.
Having made repeated but fruitless bids last month for a
meeting with De Gaulle to discuss an Algerian solution, Bour-
guiba now is telling news correspondents that his government
cannot withstand the general drift toward Communism which
he fears will occur in North Africa unless the Algerian ques-
tion is resolved. While this line may in part be "psychological
warfare," Bourguiba's relations with France are growing more
difficult, and he is already isolated from the United Arab
Republic--with which he has competed for maximum influence
among the Algerian rebels. Even cooperation with Morocco
seems to be slipping; Bourguiba is, in fact, peculiarly sensi-
tive to the possibility that Moroccan relations with France may
improve while Tunisia's relations deteriorate.
In the view of the American ambassador in Tunis, Bour-
guiba is "stuck with the Algerians," and the Algerians, particu-
larly those in rebel military circles, view him with no great
esteem in spite of the Tunisian facilities they enjoy.
CONFIDENTIAL'
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.109
Chinese Nationalibib Disty zwbum upwing, inaonesian Rebels
Chinese Nationalist security chief Chiang Ching-kuo has
approved in principle a plan for further supplying of theIndo-
nesian rebels in the Celebes "at a p. appropriate time."
if support is renewed, the
decision should be made soon enough to exact commercial and
mining concessions from the rebels before Nationalist aid be-
comes of less importance to ther_n3
ebel representatives in Taipei have requested that Chi-
nese crews for four rebel aircraft--two PBYs, a B-26, and a
C-54--reportedly now on Taiwan shouldbe placed on an alert
status:i
Crhe last Nationalist shipment of supplies to the rebels was
made last December; although Chiang Ching-kuo has insisted
to an American observer that no arms have been sent since last
July. The December shipment, transported on a 1,000-ton
rebel ship, consisted mostly of small-arms ammunition, med-
ical supplies, boots, and uniforms in sufficient quantities,
to maintain the dissidents for six
months. The shipment arrived safely and the rebels soon
thereafter began to score successes against the government.
It is probably this record of success which has tempted the
Nationalists to consider sending more aldj
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Japan May Shelve ricw,10 w rtepctiriace spreans to North Korea
6-Japanese Prime Minister Kishi told Ambassador MacArthur
on 11 March that he thinks it is possible to find some formula for
indefinite shelving of the plan to repatriate Korean residents in
Japan who desire to go to North Korea. This would be contingent
on South Korean willingness to accept a reasonable solution on
the questions of the "Rhee Line" and the return of detained Jap-
anese fishermen. Kishi said he would rather settle all issues
with Seoul by direct negotiations than submit them to the United
Nations, as demanded by some conservative party leaders and
other elements in Japan]
r&-?uth Korea continues to demand that Japan unconditionally
drop the repatriation plan. President Rhee probably views the
worsening of relations with Japan as a welcome opportunity to
divert both domestic and foreign attention from an internal polit-
ical crisis and has shown no willingness to compromise on the
fishing line. However, he might agree to renew negotiations
with Japan in view of the threat of UN action,1
tfrhe International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) plans
to take no action on the Japanese request to screen Korean res-
idents for possible repatriation unless the Red Cross societies
of both Japan and North Korea ask that it be carried out under ICRC
auspices. Pyongyang opposes any screening, probably fearing that
its claim that 100,000 Koreans desire repatriation to North Korea
is greatly exaggerated; however, it may be willing to send a Red
Cross delegation to Geneva to discuss the questionD,
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III. THE WEST
Move Against Pw. i.u.kiptc 1--1 u num. 11..e.td t/ 1 Le U iiiwirted
a_3ortuguese security police claim to have frustrated oppo-
sition plans to move against the government on 12 March.
The plans called for an attack on the residences of Pres-
ident Thomaz and Premier Salazar and the seizure of arms
stored at the headquarters of the Portuguese Legion Naval
Brigade in Lisbon. The arrest of two civilians revealed that
a civilian group with military support was behind the ploy
he police are not convinced that the army is loyal as
the ai-my minister maintains. A 70-year-old army reserve
captain is also under arrest, and another captain and a naval
brigade officer are implicated. There have been reports of
considerable discontent among junior army and naval officers
over promotion policy and also over the failure of the regime
to remedy its political and economic shortcomings. Opposi-
tion groups in Oporto have tried to obtain the support of army
elements in a move to oust Salazar. The reserve officer in-
volved in this plan is reportedly a key member of the National
Independent Movement, headed by former presidential candi-
date General Humberto Delgado, who has been in asylum in the
Brazilian Embassy in Lisbon since 12 January-i
(The possibility that the 70-year-old Salazar may be un-
able to resume his energetic direction of the government be-
cause of his recent illness could spur opposition groups with
military support to make further attempts against the regime.
Ambassador Elbrick reports that when he saw Salazar on 11
March, he looked tired and somewhat drawn hut hp wns men-
tally aler..1
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NEP"
Bolivian Financial Crisis May Cause Anti-American Violence
The US Embassy is going ahead with unobtrusive evacua-
tion of nonessential US citizens in Bolivia because of spreading
strikes and growing public tension over financial policy. On
13 March the Government said it was incorporating into a de-
cree a proposal of the International Monetary Fund for settling
a hotly contested wage question in the tin mines. Bolivian Pres-
ident Siles had said his government was unable to impose this
recommendation on the armed Bolivian miners. The 'IMF had
insisted that its recommendation on mine wages be accepted as
a condition for continuing financial aid. Bolivia's foreign-
exchange position of minus $29300,000 on 12 March threatened
a shutdown of the Central Bank.
The tin miners' strike protesting the proposed wage deci-
sion entered its second week on 12 March, and sympathy strikes
have spread through the country. The International Federation
of Miners' Unions, an affiliate of the Communist-dominated
WFTU, has sent a sympathy cable to the Bolivian miners.
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New Signs of Disillusionment With Castro Government
Signs of disillusionment with the Castro government are
increasing, and,
, the seeds of counterrevolution are being sown. The
government has been slow to attack the many economic, polit-
ical, and social problems the revolution promised to correct,
and Prime Minister Fidel Castro's position as sole arbiter of
official policies and actions is a continuing deterrent to ef-
ficient government.
� Castro's preoccupation with agrarian and social reform
has kept the government from taking more direct steps toward
economic recovery, Certain moves by the new government,
such as lowering rents and cutting utility rates, have been
designed to appeal to the lower classes without regard for
the effect on the economic structure.
The "war crimes trials," which have lowered Castro's
prestige abroad, now are being criticized in Cuba, particu-
larly following the retrial and sentencing to long prison terms
of several air force personnel originally acquitted of genocide.
Castro's decision, announced on 12 March, to extend the death
penalty to persons guilty of misusing public funds will cause
further speculation that he is more interested in revenge than
in justice.
Opposition to Castro is undoubtedly developing among
commercial and political groups, although he probably retains
his great popularity among the lower classes.
Adam Clayton Powell long a stanch supporter of Castr
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_ uuivr MIN
Nire
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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