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September 20, 2019
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September 26, 2019
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June 10, 1955
PDF icon CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15722765].pdf422.88 KB
Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03189003 TOP SECRET 10 June 3.3(h)(2) 1955 3.5(c) 14/ / Copy No. 94 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO, NO CHANGE IN CLASS. El DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C NEXT REVIEW DATE � / AUTH: HR 70-2 DATE: SV/h5f2_ REVIEWER: Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY =FO-P---SifeRE Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03189003 Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03189003 'v. TOP SEC RE NEW SUMMARY GENERAL 1. USSR desires diplomatic relations before general settlement with Japan (page 3). FAR EAST 2. South Korea may propose "neutralization" of Korea by Big Four (page 4). 3. SOUTHEAST ASIA areas of Viet Minh strength in the south EASTERN EUROPE 4. Greeks see Yugoslav enthusiasm for Balkan pact undiminished by Soviet visit (page 5). 5. Comment on increased Soviet interest in Balkan affairs (page 7). 6. Yugoslav non-Communists reportedly fear closer Yugoslav-Soviet ideological ties (page 8). 7. Polish officials pleased with Belgrade pronouncement (page 9). * * * * 10 June 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03189003 Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03189003 No* TOP SECRET GENERAL 1. USSR desires diplomatic relations before general settlement with Japan: During the first substantive meeting of the Soviet and Japanese representatives in London on 7 June, Soviet delegate Malik gave the impression that the USSR rmalization of relations precede negotia- tions on outstanding problems, according to a senior official of the Japanese embassy in London. The official told an American embassy officer that Japanese delegate Matsumoto, without developing the Japanese position, proposed the following list of subjects for discussion: repatriation of Japanese subjects, the Habomai and Shikotan Islands, the Kurils, South Sakhalin, fishing rights, trade, and admission of Japan to the United Nations. Malik replied that discussion of some of the subjects would take a "long time," but others he thought were already solved. He asked for a postpone- ment until 14 June of the next meeting of the negotiators, presum- ably to give him time to consult Moscow. In answer to a question by Malik about the American attitude on the negotiations, Matsumoto said that his government would not deviate from existing commitments, but that the United States was in no position to interfere. Comment: In order to achieve the normalization of relations with Japan, including a formal end- ing of the war and an exchange of diplomatic representatives, Moscow might make minor gestures such as returning Japanese prisoners of war or agreeing to negotiate concerning Japanese fishing rights. It probably will retain the former Japanese terri- tories as a lever for influencing Japan's future international orientation. Tokyo probably will hold out for at least a partial settlement on some of the issues before agreeing to nor- malize relations, despite the Hatoyama government's commitment to promote closer ties with the Sino-Soviot bloc. 10 June 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for 201/09/17 C03189003 Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03189003 Noe TOP SECRET FAR EAST 2. South Korea may propose "neutralization" of Korea by Big Four: Under Pyun's proposal, the Chinese Communists would withdraw from North Korea and the United States from South Korea, and South Korea would agree not to per- mit American bases in its territory. South Korea, however, would retain a "defensive force" and the right to maintain defensive alli- ances and would request UN-supervised elections throughout Korea. Pyun also mentioned the possibility of a nonaggression pact with the USSR and Communist China. Comment: Pyun's reported proposal is but a slight modification of the stand taken by South Korea and the UN at Geneva a year ago. It leaves unclear such key questions as the timing of the troop withdrawals and the disposition of North Korean forces. The Communists have long favored a withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea. At last year's Geneva conference they rejected any UN supervision over the elections, stated that military treaties were "incompatible" with peaceful unification, and insisted on procedures which precluded genuinely free elections. Pyun has expressed his concern that the USSR might put forth a neutralization proposal at the summit meeting, and may wish to assure that South Korea's views are given con- sideration by American officialdom. 10 June 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 ApproTeCr for Release: 2E9/09/17 003189003 Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03189003 Nalii TOP SECRET SOUTHEAST ASIA 3. areas of Viet Minh strength in the south: Viet Minh influence south of the 17th par- allel is predominantly in two main belts, one in the western part of central Annam and the other in the southern mountainous strip extenaing mum, ouiiinc hi. n a . There are also relatively small areas of influence in Cochinchina near the Cambodian border, north of Saigon, and in coastal areas to the south and west of the city (see map, p. 6). In addition, the Viet Minh has established clandestine political or paramilitary networks in areas extending southward from the demarcation line, near Qui Nhon, and near the Cochinchina border. There are also efforts in the villages to sponsor youth movements, create basic cells among peasants, a.nd intensify propaganda calling for the re-establishment of north-south relations. Comment: Viet Minh strength south of the demarcation line has been estimated at 7,000 to 10,000 not including Viet Minh sympathizers. It is concentrated in largely underpopu- lated areas which are relatively inaccessible to national government authority. The groundwork has thus been laid for the establishment of relatively secure base areas from which the Viet Minh can extend its influence to more important areas in the absence of effective security measures on the part of the national government. EASTERN EUROPE 4. Greeks see Yugoslav enthusiasm for Balkan pact undiminished by Soviet visit: Greek foreign minister Stephanopoulos told the North Atlantic Council meeting in Paris on 8 June he was confident that �10 June 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved fOr�Reie-is;:-25-1709/17 C03189003 Vinr1.7?'"K Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03189003 NAN, 100 105 0 . ( c \. ._ H --,, ....., Th �� , . . l.. ' .Lao Kay I . \ N h \����"... 'N...e� . nh T th? - - ' an-ning � Cao Ba g I 1. (-..... � X \ , / , et, 1...1._al Chan' - 11. .Bac Kan Na Chen Ning-eene '13 Tuyen Lang Son l' 0 IP1h o n g S.a.17.w. r� � i Yen Bay 11 ,La eng Tung , Dien Rien'eliu I � . �.). , muot, Sing Quang .1�... u Tho Tien Ye . on Cay pe f,a, ,,,K2Bayard .61- � 1 '.... � �� Sam Neua , 7-"- 'ILE CAC BA TONKIN ' ,..� NO1,, XuPaig' illiv,AM ;DINH I 13a? UcimaiiSrai .....,,.) C g ..) N h Sinh (; c Ch5ung:Ishan ' ' -- "-- - ..� Chiang Rai .. *Luang Prabang .,S - Thanh He t� _ 0 ../.' 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Greek general staff chief Dovas, who re- on ft7June Irom a 12-day tour of Yugoslav military commands, told Amer can officials in Athens that his party had been warmly re- ceived throughout Yugoslavia and that his Yugoslav hosts, including the army chief of staff, gave an impression of complete forthright- ness. Dovas indicated that the Yugoslays stressed close Yugoslav- Greek co-operation within the framework of the Balkan alliance. Comment: Greek optimism concerning Yugoslavia's intention to continue co-operation with Greece and Turkey appears to have been reinforced. According to Ambassa- dor Perkins' report, the Turkish North Atlantic Council representa- tive supported the Greek analysis of Belgrade's position. Ankara may therefore now become less suspicious and relax its pressure on Yugoslavia for a formal linking of NATO and the Balkan alliance. 5. Comment on increased Soviet interest in Balkan affairs: Soviet propaganda treatment of the Bel- grade communiqu�einforces other Indications that rapidly developing Soviet diplomatic initiatives prior to Big Four talks may include new proposals involv- ing the Balkan nations. Since the Soviet leaders' brief visits to Sofia and Bucha- rest, Soviet propaganda has emphasized the "important conse- quences" for southeastern Europe of the recent talks between So- viet and Yugoslav leaders. As part of Soviet preparation for new European security proposals, Moscow may be devising proposals to be made directly to Athens and Ankara, possibly for the crea- tion of an enlarged Balkan bloc independent of East and West. Greece and Turkey would not accept such a plan, since it would require withdrawal from NATO. 10 June 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03189003 Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03189003 -TOP SECRET During the talks with the Yugoslays, Soviet leaders asked whether Bulgaria might join the Balkan alliance. 1Chrushchev told the Greek ambassador to Yugoslavia that the success of the Belgrade talks was leading to closer rela- tions with Greece. The Soviet ambassador in Turkey expressed an interest on 28 April in improved relations, and the volume of Soviet propaganda material directed to Turkey has increased four- fold during the last month. 6. Yugoslav non-Communists reportedly fear closer Yugoslav-Soviet ideological ties: Yugoslav circles op- posing the Tito regime are stunned by the failure of the Western press to real- ize that Article 30 of the Soviet-Yugoslav communiqu�rovides for the same co-operation as that for which the Cominform was created. This article states that "the two governments have agreed to assist and facilitate co-operation among the social organizations of the two countries through the establishing of contacts, the ex- change of socialist experience, and a free exchange of opinions." These circles also reportedly feel the common ideology of the Soviet and Yugoslav Communist parties is such that Yugoslavia will increasingly serve not only its own inter- ests, but those of the USSR in the ideological field includi f- forts to undermine the capitalist governments. Comment: This interpretation of the wording of the joint communiqu�s overdrawn. The resolution establishing the Cominform defined its task as organizing and ex- changing the experiences of Communist parties, and co-ordinating their activities. Nevertheless, Yugoslav officials do not deny that the paragraph quoted might cover the possibility of future ties with the Soviet party. The Belgrade press, however, emphasized on 7 June that nothing has changed in Yugoslavia's "socialist orien- tation." Borba, points out that Yugoslavia has co- operated with socialist movements and forces irrespective of 10 June 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 ApprovedTOT:Ftelee: 2019/09/17 C03189003 Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03189003 TOP SECRET ideological and political differences and that it would be contrary to previous practice if Belgrade did not exchange socialist experi- ences with the USSR as well. The Tito regime has made special efforts to foster relations with Scandinavian and Asiatic socialists. 7. Polish officials pleased with Belgrade pronouncement: ccording to American ambassador illon in Paris, the French ambassador n Warsaw reported that when he asked olish foreign minister Skrzeszewski's pinion of the Belgrade communiqu�e eplied immediately and unequivocally hat the paragraph stating that "the dif- erent forms of the development of socialism are the exclusive business of the peoples of the respec- tive countries" was of utmost importance to Poland. Comment: Because of the strength of Polish nationalism, the Belgrade communiqu�ay have made a profound impression on Polish Communists. This concept of the independent development of Communism in Poland was the cause for the purge in 1948 of Wladyslaw Gomulka, the Polish national- ist Communist. The Soviet Union's public reconciliation with Tito and recognition of the Yugoslav "form of development of socialism" will probably stimulate nationalist sentiments both among the Satellite populations and within the Communist parties and may hamper further the so far unsuccessful efforts of the Satellite regimes to gain mass support for their policies. 10 June 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03189003