CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03192654
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: March 23, 1968

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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23 March 1968 3.5(c)
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23 March 1968
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Rumania - Eastern Europe: Bucharest braces itself
for pressure from the USSR and its allies. (Page 4)
Poland: Students abandon strike in Warsaw. (Page 5)
Czechoslovakia: Premier Lenart becomes acting presi-
dent as political factions maneuver. (Page 7)
Hungary: Budapest approves of changes in Prague, but
not at home. (Page 9)
Philippines-Malaysia: Disclosure of Philippine prepara-
tions to infiltrate Sabah aggravates President Marcos'
problems. (Page 10)
India - Communist China: New Delhi concerned that
dissident Naga tribesmen are being aided by Peking.
(Page 11)
Sweden: Er'ander government will persist in criticizing
US over Vietnam. (Page 12)
Southern Yemen: Moderates gain (Page 13)
USSR-Cuba: Trade protocol (Page 13)
Panama: President's trial (Page 14)
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*Vietnam:
North Vietnam: A partial mobilization of new armed
forces in North Vietnam could be taking place.
something unique
Is under way involving the organization and movement
of substantial numbers of armed personnel in newly
organized units. Some 16 military "groups" have now
been identified in North Vietnamese Army Rear Services
communications, apparently under the control of the
Operations Directorate of the Hanoi General Staff.
The identified groups range in size up to 600 men,
and seem to be moving southward through central
North Vietnam as organized military elements.
groups have been pulled together from a variety of
places and include civilians and reserves. Hanoi
might thus be drawing on its paramilitary resources,
such as the regional forces and self-defense militia.
The groups may well be headed for South Vietnam
as part of a stepped up infiltration effort. It is also
possible that they will stay in North-Vietnam, possibly
to free regular troops for duty in the South, or because
of some new Hanoi concern over the danger of an in-
vasion from the South.
South Vietnam: Despite the withdrawal of some
enemy troops from primary attack objectives, Commu-
nist forces may be preparing to strike strategic urban
areas.
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Although the Communists probably do not possess
at the present moment the capability to carry out
another offensive of the magnitude and scope of the Tet
attacks, they are in position to launch widespread artil-
lery, rocket, and mortar attacks against major allied
military targets. Such an offensive could be accompanied
by ground assaults in selected areas, either in the
northern provinces or the western highlands.
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*Rumania - Eastern Europe: The Rumanian regime
appears to be bracing itself for some type of political
or economic pressure from the USSR or its East
European allies.
the regime expects a deterioration in its relations, in-
cluding economic difficulties, with the Soviet Union and
those Communist countries which are "satellites" of
\ Moscow.
Bucharest plans to improve its political and eco-
nomic ties with Belgrade,
The joint Rumanian-Yugoslav mixed economic commis-
sion met in mid-March, subsequent to the Warsaw Pact
meeting in Sofia, to discuss expanded trade relations.
Yugoslav Foreign Minister Nikezic arrived in
Bucharest on an unexpected official visit on 21 March.
He was accompanied by two specialists,
In addition the Rumanian ambassador to the
US has been called home suddenly for consultations.
The Rumanian Government has started to enforce a
two-year-old regulation restricting contacts by Ruma-
nians with foreigners, including representatives of the
other European Communist countries and especially the
Soviet Union,
The Rumanian regime's fears of economic pressures
by Moscow may be justified. In mid-March, Soviet In-
tourist officials cancelled Easter tours of the USSR,
Poland, and Rumania which were to have been carried
on five passenger aircraft chartered from the Rumanian
airline, TAROM. The tours would have earned hard
currency for Bucharest.
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*Poland Tension eased somewhat in Warsaw early
this morning as militant students at the Polytechnic
Institute apparently heeded faculty appeals to abandon
a mass sit-in.
According to fragmentary press reports, some
4,000 students left the school, apparently without in-
cident, after helmet-clad riot police sealed off access
to them. Many left in buses for nearby hostels.
Earlier, the students had appealed for popular
support, displaying posters which read "Warsaw help
us" and "Workers, our cause is your cause." Friday
night riot police quietly dispersed sympathetic crowds
in front of the institute in a move to isolate the protes-
tors.
Leaflets handed out yesterday by the Polytechnic
students made clear that those involved categorically
rejected Gomulka's analysis of the situation. The stu-
dents reiterated their uncompromising will to struggle
against "hypocrisy and cant," and their opposition to the
brutal application of "lupine laws." The leaflet said
students had no course but to continue their protests,
which are aimed at reversal of repressive domestic pol-
icies.
The high morale and organization at the Polytech-
nic has contrasted sharply with the demoralized atmo-
sphere at Warsaw University. There, a sympathy sit-
in broke up when police began to record names. There
is no conclusive evidence that sympathy strikes are
taking place at provincial universities.
According to one student, the demonstrators are
giving the regime until 22 April. to redress their griev-
ances. Although the students made no threats, they re-
portedly will try to get worker support in the form of
strikes and demonstrations if the deadline is not met.
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The emotional student appeals could now evoke a
responsive chord among other elements, especially if
there is new violence. The party continues to stage
rallies of workers in attempts to demonstrate support.
There is an increasing number of reports, however,
that this tactic is failing. One such meeting in a War-
saw plant yesterday reportedly collapsed after the small
number of workers who showed up walked out. Workers
are also said to be collecting money to pay fines for
students arrested last week.
There is continuing activity at the top party levels,
but no new policy pronouncements have been forthcoming
since Gomulkais speech on 19 March. Many persons in
Warsaw reportedly consider the speech inadequate to the
situation, and as a result there is general uneasiness
about the future.
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*Czechoslovakia Premier Josef Lenart has assumed
the duties of former president Novotny.
Lenart will be acting president until the National
Assembly is called together to elect a new chief of
state. Presumably this will not be until after 28 March
when the party central committee meets to discuss
changes in leadership and in national policies.
The ink was hardly dry on Novotny's resignation
when the name of 72-year-old General Ludvik Svoboda
was proposed as a replacement by the association of
Czechoslovak veterans. Svoboda was commander of
Czechoslovak forces which were formed in the Soviet
Union during World War II; he was defense minister
from 1945 to 1950, when he was purged. Svoboda is
ill-equipped to be president and if he were elected, he
would probably be a figurehead, unable to use the con-
siderable powers of the office.
Josef Smrkovsky, a leading exponent of sweeping
reform, is commonly believed in Prague to be the most
likely candidate. The 57-year-old Smrkovsky is a
member of the party's central committee. He had a
good record as an underground leader during World
War IL In 1950 he, too, was arrested on trumped up
political charges. He was rehabilitated in 1963. If
elected president, he would represent the antithesis of
past Stalinist oppression.
Meanwhile, a Czechoslovak Embassy officer in
Moscow has implied that the recent visit of Planning
Chief Cernik may have sown the seeds of the first
serious Czechoslovak-Soviet confrontation--on economic
issues. The officer said that the new Czechoslovak
leadership is deeply concerned with the need for economic
improvement and is preparing to seek aid from the United
States and Western European economic organizations.
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He added, however, that Czechoslovakia's desire
to attract Western aid is complicated by commitments
to the USSR and its allies. It is possible that during his
discussions in Moscow, Cernik attempted to reassure
the USSR about Czechoslovak intentions to maintain
close economic ties, even if it should turn to the West
for aid.
*Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the analytic
interpretation presented here has been produced by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency without the participation of the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, Department of State.
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Hungary: Budapest has expressed approval of the
changes in Czechoslovakia but made it clear that none
are needed in Hungary.
A signed editorial published on 21 March in the main
party daily wished the Czechoslovaks success. This is
the first explicit approval the Czech liberalization has
received from a Warsaw Pact member, although
Rumania has been implicitly in favor of Dubcek.
The editorial warned Prague, however, of the
danger of unbridled dissent under the guise of "complete
liberty." Hungarians, it noted, learned to their sorrow
in 1956 that criticism, originally justified, soon became
excessive and "cost much in blood, personal tragedy,
and material damage."
Hungarian authorities have taken steps to keep the
population calm. On 22 March, for example, unusual
radio broadcasts, concerning a temporary call-up of
reservists for maneuvers, stressed that the matter was
routine. Earlier, government officials reportedly pre-
vented university students in Budapest from staging a
demonstration in support of the Polish students.
In contrast to its reporting on Czechoslovakia,
the tone of Hungarian coverage makes clear that the
leadership takes a dim view of events in Poland.
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Philippines-Malaysia: Public disclosure of a
training camp presumably preparing personnel to in-
filtrate Sabah has aggravated President Marcos' do-
mestic problems.
Marcos has already moved to comply with the
Philippine Congress' demand for a full investigation.
His compliance reflects mounting difficulties with
Congress, where he is already under attack over the
Philippine civic action team in South Vietnam.
Kuala Lumpur will probably take the question up
privately with Manila. It is unlikely, however, to make
a major issue of the matter because of its interest in
regional cooperation.
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India - Communist China: New Delhi is concerned
that dissident Naga tribesmen from northeastern India
are being aided by Communist China,
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi recently told Parlia-
ment that "several hundred" hostile Nagas had gone to
China for guerrilla warfare training.
Naga insurgents have long used northern Burma as
a sanctuary and small groups of them could easily have
passed through the unpoliced region to seek Chinese
support. Although Peking has recently been giving
propaganda support to Naga insurgency, there is no
evidence that the Chinese have extended significant
material assistance.
The Indian Army, in collaboration with state
authorities in Nagaland, recently has been taking stronger
action against some 6,000 rebel Nagas. The local popu-
lation, apparently apathetic toward the rebels, has not
resisted these army efforts. The neighboring Manipur
administration reportedly has also succeeded in driving
back to Nagaland most of the underground groups which
had gradually spread into that area.
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Sweden: The parliamentary debate on foreign
policy this week demonstrates the Erlander govern-
ment will persist in its critical line toward the US
over Vietnam.
In his strongest statement to date upholding North
Vietnam, Foreign Minister Nilsson described the Hanoi
regime as "progressive" and enjoying the support of
the people. There were few defenders of the US or the
Saigon government. Even the non-Socialist opposition,
which also has its eyes on the September national elec-
tions, hesitated to challenge the government on the
issue.
Nilsson sought to picture the recall of Ambassador
Heath as an attempt to put pressure on Stockholm. He
said that even the threat of a deterioration in commer-
cial relations with the US could not deflect the :overn-
ment from its course.
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NOTES
Southern Yemen: Events in Aden on 20 March ap-
pear to have stemmed from army dissatisfaction with
recent extremist activities on the part of the regime.
The upshot appears to have been a boost for the "moder-
ates," with the army being allowed to suppress the
extremists. The Front is still in authority, and it re-
mains to be seen whether its policies will show any re-
versal of recent pro-Communist trends. A Soviet
military delegation arrived on 21 March, presumably
in response to earlier Southern Yemeni overtures.
USSR-Cuba: The announcement of a Soviet-Cuban
trade protocol for 1968 suggests that political differences
between the two countries have not seriously affected
economic relations. The new pact, signed after six
months of negotiations, calls for a ten percent boost in
trade to a planned level of about $970 million. Press re-
ports also mention a Soviet credit of $328 million. Such
a credit might cover refinancing of previous credits,
funds to cover 1966 and 1967 balance of payments deficits
which exceeded expected levels, plus balance of payments
assistance for 1968.
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Panama: National Guard Commandant Vallarino
reportedly intends to seal off the National Assembly
area when President Robles' trial begins Sunday
morning. National Union leader Arnulfo Arias has
instructed his followers to avoid provocative actions
against government supporters or Vallarino's troops,
and he may change the site of the mass rally he had
scheduled in front of the Assembly building during the
trial. Although some radicals are pressing "to fight
it out in the streets" if Vallarino does not remove
Robles from office, Arias will probably avoid action
pending a ruling from the Supreme Court when it re-
convenes on 1 April.
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