Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
January 27, 2020
Document Release Date: 
January 30, 2020
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 28, 1958
PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15772429].pdf727.23 KB
ZrZ/Z/Z/ZZ/ZZ/Z/Z/Z/Z Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03192929 TOP SECRET 3.3(h)(2) 13.5(c) 6-k 28 May 1958 Copy No. 140 CENTRAL INTE.LLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT Not � CFIANE CLF.,rJ I .1 CLVIS. CHANCED TO: NEXT REVIEW DATE: fj AUTH � IA 7 2 DATE REVIEWER TOP SECRET A Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03192929 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03192929 #111% TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03192929 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03192929 � - I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR taking cautious line on De Gaulle, hoping his accession might serve some Soviet interests or lead eventually to a popular-front government. Nonaggression pact offered NATO by Warsaw Pact members in further re- minder of Soviet summit agenda pro- posal. II. ASIA-AFRICA Lebanon - Chamoun's opponents likely to settle for nothing short of his resig- nation. Government forces continue reluctant to take strong action. Indonesian Communist party at peak of strength. (13 Ceylon - Government's declaration of emergency should bring communal strife under control for the time being. (..) Tunisia counters French offer to re- group forces with demand for total evacuation except from Bizerte. II L THE WEST France - Advance paratroop elements probably have prepared drop zones in France in anticipation of air-borne in- vasion by French troops from Algiers. Leftist demonstrations scheduled for today may bring violence. Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03192929 \ Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03192929 Noe C 4 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 28 May 1958 ybo DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC *USSR-France: The Soviet Union has been taking a cau- tious attitude toward De Gaulle against the possibility that he may assume power. Moscow appears anxious to avoid actions which might prejudice its chances of taking advan- tage of those nationalistic De Gaulle policies which Moscow believes would serve Soviet interests. The Soviet leaders probably hope De Gaulle's assumption of power would fa- cilitate French Communist efforts to establish unity of ac- tion with the Socialists and eventually lead to a popular- front government. Page 1) Soviet summit tactics: The draft nonaggression treaty offered by the Warsaw Pact nations to the NATO powers is intended to give added impact to a proposal which the USSR has been consistently proposing for consideration at the summit. The text is basically similar to a pact proposed by the USSR at the Geneva summit conference in July 1955. The proposed signatories on behalf of the Warsaw Pact are the same countries that the bloc has urged be included at a summit meeting: the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania. Soviet military activity: TOP SECRET �ss,s �N\ Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03192929 N.AMM Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03192929 II. ASIA-AFRICA Lebanon: Prime Minister Sulh's public assertion on 9/r 27 May that the government would not seek to change the constitution to permit President Chamoun to run for a second term is unlikely to promote a settlement of the political crisis. Sulh's statement falls short of demands of the extreme opposition, who seek Chamoun's imme- diate resignation, and it may not satisfy even the mod- erate opposition. Meanwhile, the antigovernment forces continue to receive direct assistance from the UAR, while Lebanese military authorities continue reluctant to take strong action against the opposition. (Page 4) Indonesia: The Indonesian Communist party, with an estimated membership of as many as 750,000 and the sup- port of one fifth of the electorate, has attained more in- fluence than ever before. Any effective anti-Communist action in the foreseeable future would depend on army ac- tion and on President Sukarno's support of such an under- taking. The party's current strategy, however, appears to be to avoid giving any provocation which might precipitate army action, and to work toward improving its electoral following for the 1959 general elections. Page 6) Ceylon: As a result of widespread disorders, the Bandaranaike government declared a state of emergency on 27 May, accompanied by a ban on Singhalese and Tamil extremist groups responsible for the disturbances. The government's action probably will be supported by most of the public and should bring the communal conflict under control for the time being. Coming at a time when pro- longed strikes are severely straining the economy, how- ever, this development will lead to stronger political pressures against the government. (Page 8) 28 May 58 \ DAILY BRIEF TOP SECRET 11 \ \ArkN\ \ N Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03192929 s\W Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03192929 wow Irre Tunisia: The Bourguiba government has rejected an offer of the French Government to remove immediately from Tunisia some 2,000 troops, located largely in the south, and has demanded instead a timetable for the evac- uation of all French forces outside Bizerte, numbering some 9,000. Tunisia has also offered to begin negotia- tions on the status of the Bizerte base, but only if a time- table for withdrawal is agreed on. (Page 9) III. THE WEST *France: Pflimlinis offer to resign in spite of the vote of confidence given him by the National Assembly further weakens the forces opposed to the return of De Gaulle to power. President Coty may turn to De Gaulle in an effort to avoid widespread disorders and a possible move against Paris by the Algerian junta. Drop zones are reported to have been prepared in France by advance paratroop ele- ments and an invasion by air-borne troops may take place on 28 or 29 May, depending on the weather. Reports of new public restlessness over the crisis may increase the prospect of violence during leftist demonstrations sched- uled for today. (Page 10) 28 May 58 DAILY BRIEF \ TOP SECRET 111 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03192929 Approved for Release: 2-67-1/08/20 C03192929 Noe I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR Taking Cautious Attitude Toward De Gaulle The USSR has been taking a cautious public line to- ward General de Gaulle in order to gain the best possible relations with him and to take advantage of those of his policies that Moscow feels would serve its interests. Am- bassador Thompson believes that Moscow is uncertain whether De Gaulle would seek to establish a dictatorship and suppress the Communists and consequently is playing the situation by ear. While Moscow presumably hopes that the situation will eventually lead to a popular-front government, its immediate concern is merely to encourage Communist-Socialist cooperation. There have been signs that the USSR expects that De Gaulle would damage NATO unity and seek closer relations with Moscow, but it probably is also concerned about the possibility that De Gaulle might be able to adjust the Al- gerian situation in such a way as to undercut the National Liberation Front and thereby reduce the chances for Com- munist influence in North Africa. Soviet propaganda, while critical of De Gaulle, has centered its fire on the military leaders in Algeria and other right-wing groups, and specific criticisms of De Gaulle have been attributed to the French Communists or have been made only by Soviet correspondents in Paris. The French Communist propaganda attack on De Gaulle has inte sified, however, and now includes the claim that ,M USSR opposes him. CONFIDENTIAL 28 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03192929 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03192929 Nee Nee Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03192929 PfP 'PPT A:proved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03192929 Kirovograd ISRAEL Yedrovo 28 MAY 1958 RECENT MOVEMENTS BY SOVIET AIRBORNE FORCES TRANSPORTS 11TH TACTICAL Al? ARMY EAD,QUARTRS Tbilisi CAPJAN? SEA `�� TOP SECRET ROUTES SHOWN SCHEMATIC 0 MILES 800 28 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 01111111111110111111111111111111111 Lake Balkhash 80527 4 Page 2 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03192929 Approved for Release: 2019/08/7 C03192929 Nore Soviet Military Activity in Black Sea Area Air-borne Forces Transports from Yedtovg, Kirovo- grad, and Krivoy Rog, located in the northwestern and southern European USSR,t were noted flying into Nikolayev in possibly logistic operations. By 25 May as many as 20 Yedrovo-based transports were at Nikolayev. TOP SECRET 28 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03192929 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03192929 "Iwo II. ASIA-AFRICA Lebanese Situation Prime Minister Sami Sulh in a broadcast to the Leba- nese people on 27 May declared that his cabinet "will not present any bill to Parliament for an amendment of the con- stitution. The statement, planned for delivery to Parlia- ment but broadcast because of the lack of a quorum, has already been rejected by extremist opposition leader Saib Salam, who still demands Chamoun's resignation. It is even doubtful that it will be acceptable to leaders of the "Third Force," which has been attempting to bring about a compromise solution to the political impasse. Sulh's statement, which included a long indictment of UAR sub- versive activities and intervention in Lebanon during the past two years, noted that when such Egyptian interference began, a second term for Chamoun was not an issue. Thus, he declared, opposition efforts to blame Lebanon's present troubles on Chamoun's second-term aspirations are with- out fouridatioL, �711P�se_curitv_situati eaionan ed. some securi- ty forces operating in the north are isoiatea oy tne destruction of numerous bridges and are being supplied by airdrops. Anti- government forces continue to receive arms and ammunition as well as personnel reinforcements from the UAR. 30 busloads of armed men were sent over from Syria on 26 May via the Damascus-Beirut highway. Lebanese military authorities, especially General Shihab, appear reluctant to take strong action against either opposition leaders or insurgents fighting the security forces. The much- heralded "Balabakk campaign" against the rebels has amounted to little more than occupation of the streets, with rebels holding the remainder of the town. SECRET 28 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03192929 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03192929 %we The explosion of a bomb in a loaded streetcar on 26 May and Saib Salam's outright rejection of Sulh's statement may work to the disadvantage of the extremists and incline the moderate opposition more toward the Chamoun camp. Shihab might as a result take more effective action against terrorists and insurgents in the countryside. Cairo radio states, however, that Salam has "warned" that "the people's forces in Lebanon" will "appeal to the Arab states" for volun- teers if the Lebanese Government utilizes citizen auxiliary security forces. The long-term effects of the current disorders are be- coming obvious to the entire Lebanese public. Commerce is at a complete standstill, considerable amounts of capital have taken flight, and Lebanon's previous position as the "Switzerland" of the Middle East has been seriously impaired. It is doubtful that Lebanon will regain its status as a haven for foreign investment. The economic loss during the past three jweeks equals the value of the country's important ap- ple op--$7,000,000. g n-r,e7 28 May May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03192929 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03192929 *we The Indonesian Communist Party The Indonesian Communist party (PM) is the largest political party in Java and the second largest in the coun- try. Of Indonesia's numerous parties, the PM is the best disciplined and hardest working, arid its leadership is able and dedicated. It is in a position to influence government policy through four cabinet members who are at least fel- low travelers, and through 18 Communists and sympathiz- ers among the 45 members of the National Council estab- lished as part of President Sukarno's "guided democracy" concept. The Communists also wield great economic power through SOBSI, Indonesia's largest labor federation, whose claimed membership is 2,000,000 and whose affiliates con- trol vital oil, plantation, and transportation workers' un- ions. These unions form the nucleus of PM strength out- side Java. The PM has been steadily developing grass-roots support through a variety of front organizations. The Communists have exploited the central govern- ment's preoccupation with the dissidents in the past three months to increase their influence in the management of Dutch firms seized during the anti-Dutch campaign late last year. Their position has also been strengthened by the strong support they have given to Sukarno's "guided demo- cracy" concept and, more recently, to the central govern- ment's campaign to suppress the dissidents. In addition, the Communists stand to benefit from the propaganda and material support the bloc has been extending to Indonesia. In view of the ineffectiveness of Indonesia's non-Com- munist political parties, any effective anti-Communist action in the foreseeable future would have to be taken by the army, and its success would depend on Sukarno's support. Army spokesmen have indicated that in the absence of provoca- tion, there would be no outright suppression of the Commu- nists; however, the army has recently taken a few steps to curb Communist activity and Chief of Staff Nasution has claimed he will "take care" of the Communists after the dissidents are eliminated, provided he is given American arms. Sukarno has also indicated a desire for closer rela- tions with the US, but it remains to be seen whether he will SECRET 28 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03192929 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03192929 Niue be willing to sanction effective army action against the Com- munists, who have been his strongest supporters. In the meantime, the PKr s strategy is to maintain its momentum, without resort to violence, in the hope of win- ning the national elections in 1959. The Communists' con- fidence in their ability to come to power through parliamen- tary means is underscored by Secretary General Aidit's recent $tatement in opposition to the dissolution of polit- ical pirties, a cardinal point in Sukarno's program for / r ,dtalizing Indonesia. SECRET 28 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page le' Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03192929 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03192929 IOW NW" State of Emergency Declared in Ceylon The Ceylonese Government's proclamation of a state of emergency and the ban it imposed on 27 May on two ex- tfemist Tamil and Singhalese communal organizations in Ceylon probably will bring under control the riots initiated on 22 May. The principal issue involved in the disorders is the demand of the Federal party�the main political organiza- tion representing the island's 2,000,000 Tamil-speaking mi- nority�that Tamil be given equal status with the official Singhalese language and that Tamil-speaking people of In- dian oi.folo. '.)e given wider political and administrative rights. The agitation apparently was initiated by a militant Singhalese group in an effort to exploit the annual conven- tion of the Federal party held from 23 to 26 May. The riots and demonstrations which it sparked have resulted in about 20 deaths and the intervention of the armed forces. The ex- tremist elements probably do not command the support of the Singhalese-speaking majority. The Federal party's reported decision to postpone un- til sometime before 20 August a civil disobedience campaign which it had previously announced for 23 May suggests the Tamil leaders recognize their loss of some popular support. Furthermore, they have already been assured of parliamentary consideration of their demands despite the abrogation on Q of an agreement reached last year which made some conces- sions 1:0 the Tails, Any Tamil attempts to create trouble while serious strikes and labor violence in Colombo continue would only antagonize the government and lessen the possi- bility of securing favorable legislation. In view of the government's firm action, against the Singhalese extremists, further widespread dis- turbances are unlikely, although minor demonstrations probb1y will continue. -eeNH-141544-1--1-AL_ 28 May 8 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page