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June 24, 1958
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�#714 Z/ZZ IZZZZI IZZ #7/// Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194478 P SECRET 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 24 June 1958 Copy No. C 5 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DocumENT N� stAss if ,4GE- C G , TS 02 6/ 0 -TOP-SEC-RET- Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194478 Approved for Release: 2-019/08/20 C03194478 , r TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194478 24 JUNE 1958 L THE COMMUNIST BLOC Budapest under tight police control. Kadar may be losing out to Stalinist opposition. Yugoslays expect continued Sino- Soviet pressure against them, and call for "support" in fight against Stalinism. Most ow demonstrations against Dan- ish and West German embassies con- stitute Soviet Government reprisals. Czech party's drive to eliminate "bourgeois influences" will create harsher police state. II. ASIA-AFRICA Lebanon - General Shihab now favors cease-fire and political truce. Cippo- sition still insists that Chamoun leave the country and a new parliament be elected. Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194478 1 VI LJE-A,11.1...'d 1 0 liammarskjold prepared to warn Nasir against continued intervention in Leb- anon and to request UN sanctions and condemnation if warning is unheeded. 0 UAR commander in Syria given orders to "engage" on 25 June if Israelis ig- nore warnings to stop digging in Lake Hula area. Cyprus - Security forces in control, with island tense. Greeks in Istanbul fear Turkish action against them. III. THE WEST 0 Rightists in France and Algeria, including Georges Bidault, critical of De Gaulle's agreement with Tunisia on troop evacuation issue. TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194478 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194478 .845,4 TOP SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 24 June 1958 I ii)/(24-6 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Hun ar . In Budapest, the post-Nagy atmosphere is one o terror. Amid reports of new trials in the offing, the police have been reinforced and are said to be arresting persons who talk openly of the affair. The only top official comment on the execution has come from two Stalinists in the party and the regime; this suggests that ICadar's faction may be losing control of the party. [Page 1) Yupslavia: Belgrade expects a continuation of the Sino-Soviet bloc campaign against Yugoslavia that has devel- oped in recent months, The Yugoslays do not discount the possibility of "military pressure." Belgrade has reacted strongly to the execution of Nagy, and sees his "murder" as a "dreadful warning" to those who oppose the return of Stal- inism in the Soviet bloc. The Yugoslays have called on anti- Stalinist elements in the Communist world to give "moral and political support" in the fight against Moscow. USSR: The organized demonstrations against the Dan- ish and West German embassies in Moscow constitute the Soviet Government's reprisal against violent demonstrations against Soviet missions in at least six Western countries, in- cluding Denmark and West Germany. The only precedent for such actions in Moscow occurred in November 1956, when there were nonviolent demonstrations involving the embassies of the countries involved in the Suez crisis. (Page 2) TOP SECRET :1\\N 4,k1 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194478 -=�WN.\\\A\AVXXXX \���XXXV\\XV\W�\\NN, \\NV\XNWNWINW,\4 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194478 Nero Czechoslovakia: Prague's decision to strengthen its security forces and to improve the political reliability of the army is designed to eliminate "bourgeois influences" and will have the effect of establishing a harsher police state. The Czech Communist party declared that this task was of overriding importance if Czechoslovakia is to move forward in the development of "socialism." This decision follows the recent CEMA meeting which will apparently re- sult in a lowered standard of living for Czechoslovakia. II. ASIA-AFRICA Lebanon: Army commander Shihab now favors a mil- itary cease-fire and a political truce to prepare the ground for a more lasting political compromise. Opposition lead- ers still insist that President Chamoun must leave the coun- try and that a new parliament must be elected. There have been no major military developments, but Chamoun believes new rebel offensive actions are likely within the next few days. :Page 3) UN-Lebanon: Hammarskjold is firmly opposed to the introduction of any outside military force, under UN aus- pices or otherwise, fearing it might set off a much larger conflagration. He sees the UN's responsibility as confined solely to the elimination of foreign intervention. If Nasir ignores his warning that the UAR interference must cease, Hammarskjold is prepared to request economic sanctions and to brand the UAR an "aggressor." (Page 5) *UAR-Israel: The UAR joint command in Cairo has or- dered the First Army in Syria to follow a policy which envisages an "engagement" on 25 June to halt Israeli digging activity in the Lake Hula area. The military action, orders for which 24 June 58 DAILY BRIEF TOP SECRET \�\.\ Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194478 � s\ *s\\ \\\\\\\\\\\W\\\o�\\\ \\\*\\ \\\\ \\\\\ \\\ \\\\\\\\N..\ Approved \\*W\ .\\ �MI\ \\\ .\\\\6-\\3*\\4 \\\\*\ \\NN\\\\\\\\ \\\\N\NNW\ W�N\X\\ 478 Lel +.31J16�ItL4 \\\\ \\N %IV � \\Ss\\\ were to be issued by the army commander, is to be under- taken only if propaganda against the Israelis and a warning (Page 6) (Map) conveyed through the UN truce observers nn the Tgraeli- Syrian border fails to obtain results. \\\\\1\ .1�\ 24 June 58 TOP SECRET \\:',N\N\ Cyprus: Security forces on the island are in control, but the situation remains tense. The Greek minority in Istanbul is fearful of the increasingly bellicose atmosphere. There is no evidence of unusual military activity in west- ern or southern Turkey. (Page 7) III. THE WEST France: Rightist elements in France and Algeria, in- cluding Georges Bidault, are sharply critical of De Gaulle's agreement for a partial evacuation of French troops from Tunisia. Their disillusionment with the general will prob- ably intensify, as he moves to withdraw some French forces from Morocco. (Page 8) DAILY BRIEF iii 1:\M Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194478 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194478 h.n.-AortEd I NO1011 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Hungary's Kadar Silent on Nagy Execution The only authoritative Hungarian statements to date on the executions of Nagy and his associates have been made by two Stalinists who are reported to be leading the opposition to Kadar--Antal Apro and Karoly Kiss. This supports in- formed speculation in Budapest that Kadar may be in danger of losing control of the party. Kadar, in view of his close connection with Nagy during the national upris- ing and statements he made at that time in support of Nagy, was "undoubtedly" opposed to this solution of the problem. Kadar may have avoided participation in the announce- ment of the Nagy execution, in an effort to disassociate him- self as much as possible, but his own equivocal position in the affair will play into the hands of his opponents in the par- ty and may lead to the deterioration of his position in Mos- cow. The first reaction of the Budapest populace of shock, horror, and disgust at the Hungarian regime--and even more at the USSR--has now developed into an atmosphere of tension and fear--the most intense since the mass ar- rests of last autumn. Police have reportedly been rein- forced and are arresting anyone who openly discusses these events. Although no overt demonstrations have taken place in Budapest, the wife of a legation employee observed a near-demonstration on 17 June when market workers ex- citedly discussed the matter in loud and angry tones. Hun- garians now feel that Nagy and Maleter, by refusing to ad- mit the regime's charges against them, have increased their stature to the point that they can be regarded as martyrs, ac- cording to the legation. SECRET 24 June 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194478 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194478 I" ILFEdIN 1 1I11 %Ise Soviet-German Demonstrations The violent attacks on the Danish and West German em- bassies in Moscow--organized in retaliation for the demon- strations which took place at the Soviet embassies in Copen- hagen and Bonn over the week end protesting Nagy's execution-- reflect the Soviet Government's reaction to the demonstrations against Soviet missions in at least a half dozen other Western countries. They also are designed to inhibit additional pro- tests in the free world. These latest Soviet actions contrast with the nonviolent demonstrations before the British, French, and Israeli embassies at the time of the Suez attack and do not appear specifically aimed at Denmark or West Germany. Rather they are defensive reactions, revealing the USSR's sensitivity to the extremely adverse world reaction brought on by the news of the Hungarian executions. They were also apparently intended to show displeasure over what Moscow considers the failure of Western govern- ments to exercise adequate control over the demonstrations. Gromyko on 19 June summoned the Danish ambassador in Moscow and protested that the Danish Government, despite advance knowledge, failed to provide necessary protection and that the police encouraged the participants. Similar though less violent demonstrations are known to have taken place at Soviet missions in the United States, Canada, Argen- tina, Uruguay, Switzerland, and Norway. The Moscow demonstration against the West German Em- bassy, coming one day after the 17th anniversary of the Nazi invasion of Russia in World War II, could seriously damage the USSR's efforts to improve relations with Bonn. The crowd is reported to have reached 1,000 in number and the intensity of the attack suggests it may have gotten out of control. CONFIDENTIAL 24 June 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194478 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194478 A ',VA aa,Lai 11.,1 11. 1-a 1 1 Nage' II, ASIA-AFRICA Lebanese Situation Lebanese army commander General Shihab_________ he now favors a mili- tary cease-fire and a political truce which would allow the Lebanese to "catch their breath" and prepare the ground for amore lasting political compromise. The general thought it would be a long time before normal conditions could be restored. Shihab complained of the tiredness of his army and its grumbling over keeping President Cha- moun in power, and said his men needed a week "in which to wash up, and change their boots and socks." However, he reiterated his belief that the President must finish his term of office. Opposition leaders maintain their tough attitude toward President Chamoun and continue their efforts to overthrow the government. They still insist that he must leave the country on 24 July when his term expires and that parlia- ment must be dissolved and new elections held. They favor the designation of an emergency "chief of state" to serve from six months to a year. During this period, the army under General Shihab would keep the peace. A new parlia- ment and then a president would be elected after the interim period. President Chamoun stated on ne ex- pects a large-scale attack by Kamal Jumblatt's Druze forces on 24 June against the roads from Beirut to Damascus and Sidon, as well as an attack on the Beirut International Air- port. Chamoun said he hoped that General Shihab for once would respond to this threat, instead of "producing another plan" of action against the rebels, battles are brewing in the Balabakk area and that any attacks from villages will be met with artillery fire. It is doubtful that Shihab will take any effection action against Jumblatt, since conditions verging on camaraderie P SECRET 24 June 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN page 3 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194478 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194478 LIT LILA,...111:e I between army and Jumblatt units prevail. Army and Sum- blatt men conducting patrols along roads meet frequently to exchange pleasantries, and at times have ridden together in the same vehicles. There have been instances reported where these joint patrols have searched passing cars to- gether. I The general's view of the situa- tion was aptly illustrated when he was queried about his civil- ian attire recently. He replied that "it was Sunday." Despite the presence of UN Secretary General Ham- marskjold in Cairo, the UAR continues its support of rebel forces, one of Nasir's top intelligence chiefs ordered the IJAR am 3assador in Beirut to give extremist opposition leader Saib Salam financial assistance "so that he may continue his work." a request for "40 books" irom the "great man here," presumably a reference to bombs for terrorist activities. TOP SECRET 24 June 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN page 4 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194478 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194478 16,1 fai-ArliLa Hammarskjold Opposed to Use of Any Outside Military Force in Lebanon UN Secretary General Hammarskjold is firmly opposed to bringing any outside military force into Lebanon, under UN auspices or otherwise, fearing it might set off a much larger conflagration. Taking the position that the UN's re- sponsibility is confined to the elimination of foreign interven- tion, Hammarskjold hopes to achieve this by warning Nasir of the serious consequences of continued UAR interference in Lebanese affairs. If unsuccessful, the secretary general is prepared to request the Security Council, and if necessary the General Assembly, to vote economic sanctions against the UAR as an "aggressor." He is scheduled to return to New York on 26 June. Hammarskjold's opposition to a UN military force in Leb- anon stems, in part, from his belief that an adequate force-- which he sets at 7,500 men�could not be raised quickly, if at all, from among the small-member nations of the UN. He regards UN use of forces from the major powers as impossi- ble, presumably because this would entail use of Soviet forces and also because of the precedent set by the UNEF's composi- tion. He believes any UN force would have to fight its way across Lebanon in order to reach the border area, with con- sequent killing of Lebanese nationals. He also fears that the predominantly Christian composition of any UN force would raise an "ugly religious issue" with repercussions throughout the Arab world. Hammarskjold's personal observations and his talks with Lebanese Government leaders have evidently convinced him he cannot now stake the UN's prestige and possible future ef- fectiveness in the Middle East on the Lebanese situation. Con- ceding extensive infiltration by the UAR, which he estimates at 5,000-6,000 infiltrators, he still believes the rebellion is largely an internal affair which must be resolved by the Leba- nese themselves once UAR intervention ceases. TOP SECRET 24 June 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194478 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194478 ISRAELPSYRIAN BORDER ) .f� * Approximate location of Israeli drainage ditch, Demilitarized zone MILES LEBANON Lake has been drained to roughly one-fourth the area shown here. ISRAEL 80624 SYRIA Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194478 Approved for Release: 719/08/20 603194478 %taw, Nine UAR Plans to Counter Israeli Activities in Lake Hula Area Continuing Israeli canal-digging operations in the Lake Hula area along the Syrian border have evoked a plan for United Arab Republic (UAR) forces to counter the Israeli "aggression." The UAR joint command headquarters in a three-stage policy culminating in an "en- gagement" if the digging activities have not ceased by 25 June. The first stage of the plan, to be implemented on 22 and 23 June, was described as a propaganda attack against the Israeli operations. In the second stage, a warning is to be issued to the Israelis through the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). If the digging is still continuing on 25 June, the "engagement" will be ordered. The present phase of the Lake Hula controversy be- gan in late March when the Israelis dug a drainage ditch which crossed certain Arab-owned lands within the de- militarized zone. An exchange of fire between Syrians and Israelis resulted in a survey of the boundary of the demilitarized zone by UNTSO personnel which was ac- cepted by both sides. However, fighting broke out again on 27 and 30 May. A resurvey of the boundary was ac- cordingly made, but former Palestinian Arabs residing in Syria still contend that the Israeli ditch violates their lands. In addition, the Israelis are constructing a road which roughly parallels the border. This may be contrib- uting to Arab apprehensions. 24 June 58 SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194478 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194478 . Cyprus Members of the Greek minority in Istanbul "fear for their lives," according to the American consul general in Istanbul. Isolated incidents, including assaults on several Greeks, have occurred recently as long-time Greek-Turkish animosity has been intensified over the Cyprus controversy. The relatively mild reaction of the press in Istanbul to an- nouncement of the new British proposals for Cyprus may help to calm the tense situation. The reported killing by the British of Colonel George Grivas, alias "Digenis," leader of the Greek-Cypriot under- ground organization EOKA, on 22 June could have far-reach- ing effects.. if true. His death or Imminent capture, how- ever, has been reported several times during the three years since EOKA launched its all-out campaign against the British on 1 April 1955. Grivas has been able to inspire intense loyalty from his followers, and his death would be an incalculable loss to EOKA. The tightly organized, right-wing, terrorist organization has been able by violence and the threat of violence to intimidate a large part of the Greek-Cypriot population to support actively, or at least not oppose, its aims and activities. As most of Grivas' lieutenants have been killed or captured, and there is no one known at pres- ent who could replace him, EOKA might rapidly disinte- grate into small groups, operating without benefit of co- ordination. British efforts to prevent future EOKA attacks would thus be made easier, although isolated acts of vio- lence might still occur. SECRET 24 June 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194478 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194478 110' NW" III. ThE WEST French Rightists Increasingly Disillusioned With De Gaulle Rightist elements in France and Algeria are sharply critical of Be Gaulle's agreement for partial evacuation of French forces from Tunisia. Former Premier Georges Bidault has warned De Gaulle of possible repercussions if French troops "retreat" from Tunisia and subsequently from Morocco. The All-Algeria Committee of Public Safety on 20 June criticized the Tunisian agreement and Be Gaulle's de- cision to bring Socialist leader Guy Mollet with him on his 2 July visit to Algiers. Be Gaulle's visit may serve to crystallize opposition and also to clarify the position of the army, without which the extremist civilian groups would be ineffective. It is unlikely that De Gaulle would undertake this second trip to Algiers un- less he felt sure of complete army support. Meanwhile, extremist leaders continue to organize opposi- tion to Be Gaulle. The Algiers Committee has inaugurated a biweekly newspaper to coordinate the actions of all public safety committees. Paul Antier, leader of the rightist Peas- ant party, says he is working closely with Pierre Poujade and with General Chassin's public safety groups to organize a clandestine resistance to the De Gaulle government. Antier predicts a rightist take-over in France within two months. He believes the majority of De Gaulle's former right-wing supporters have lost faith in De Gaulle's ability to achieve either an Algerian settlement or financial stability for France. The public safety movement in France so far appears to have only limited support, although it will probably grow as De Gaulle's plans for onst ittiti nna 1 raxri c ..on and for North Africa become clearer. -6- �2-- -SECRET 24 June 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194478