INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN 1979 - 1980/04/01

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03291989
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: April 1, 1980

National Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C03291989
Foreign
Assessment
Center
International Terrorism
in 1979
A Research Paper
PA 80-10072U
April 1980
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Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C03291989
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National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C03291989
International Terrorism
in 1979
A Research Paper
Research for this report was completed
on 6 January 1980.
Comments and queries on this unclassified report
are welcome and may be directed to:
Director of Public Affairs
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
[phone]
For information on obtaining additional copies,
see the inside of front cover.
PA 80-10072U
April 1980
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Overview
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International Terrorism
in 1979
Most patterns of international terrorist behavior recorded in 1978 continued
into 1979: attacks on diplomatic and business facilities, simplicity in
operations, and a preference for targets in industrialized democracies. The
number of attacks declined worldwide, however, as did the number and
proportion of attacks against US citizens.
Several terrorist groups stepped up their operations, however, to publicize
their respective causes. Intergovernmental cooperation in combating terror-
ism was spearheaded by a West European agreement on extradition and
prosecution and by the passage of a UN convention against the taking of
hostages.
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Deaths and Injuries Due to International Terrorist Attacks*
1968-79
Figure 1
1,200
1,000
^ Wounded Total: 5,955
EKilled Total: 2,689
800
600
400
200
1968
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
"Casualty figures are particularly susceptible to fluctuations due to inclusion of especially bloody incidents.
Unclassified
77
78
79
581493 2.80
iv
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International Terrorism
in 1979
Trends
For the year as a whole, there was a decrease in the
number of international terrorist incidents (see table 1,
page 14 and figure 2). There has been, however, no
noncommitant decrease in casualties from interna-
tional terrorist attacks (see figure 1). These attacks
caused more deaths and more casualties in 1979 than
during any previous year since we began keeping
statistics in 1968.
The proportion of terrorist incidents apparently aimed
at causing casualties�most notably assassination
attempts�increased, while incendiary bombings,
which generally involve only property damage, fell
from second to sixth place in frequency among terrorist
attacks. This change in targeting patterns accounts in
part for the rise in casualties and deaths. As has been
noted in our previous surveys, most terrorist incidents
are not intended to cause casualties, and only one-
fourth of all attacks between 1968 and 1979 resulted in
casualties.'
Terrorists continue to prefer operations in the industri-
alized democracies of Western Europe and North
America (see figure 3). Nearly half of all incidents
were recorded in Western Europe alone, both by
indigenous organizations and by groups that have
chosen to export their grievances. Perhaps due in part
to increased governmental countermeasures, terrorism
in Latin America and the Middle East has lagged far
below the levels recorded in 1978.
There have been fewer attacks than the previous year
(see table 2, page 14) on US citizens and property in
both relative and absolute terms, but many more
Americans were killed this year than before. At least
12 Americans�including an ambassador�represent-
'Of the 353 international terrorist incidents recorded in 1978,62
incidents (17.1 percent) involved deaths and 57 (16.1 percent)
involved injuries. Of the 293 incidents recorded in 1979, 64 (21.8
percent) involved deaths and 71(24.2 percent) involved injuries.
While these proportions are slightly up over 1978 figures, the
dramatic increase in total casualties appears to be accounted for by
more casualties per incident than in 1978.
1
International Terrorist Incidents, Figure 2
1968-79
Total Incidents: 3,336
1968 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79
Unclassified
581494 2-80
ing diplomatic, military, business, and private interest
(in Afghanistan, Rhodesia, Pakistan, Iran, and Tur-
key), were victims of anti-US attacks.' Infrequent
though deadly operations appear to have replaced the
formerly more common firebombings of American
vehicles.
Officials and businessmen�especially individuals who
are symbols of Western power and wealth�are still
the primary targets (see figure 4). Tourists and other
private citizens are victimized only incidentally (for
example, as passengers on a hijacked airliner). West
2 This figure does not include political violence by domestic groups
within the United States against American citizens.
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Geographic Distribution of
International Terrorist Attacks,
1968-79
Total: 3,336
Oceania 19
Sub-Saharan Africa 124 izTransregional 4
Figure 3
USSR/Eastern Europe 15
North
America
318
Asia
Latin America
/-861
Middle East
and North Africa
531
Unclassified
581539 2-80
Geographic Distribution of
International Terrorist Attacks
Directed Against US Targets, 1968-79
Total: 1,348
Sub-Saharan Africa 32
North America 99\
Asia 105
USSR/Eastern Europe 7
Oceania 3
Figure 4
Latin America
492
Middle East
Western Europe and North Africa
1,267 244
European nationals were victimized in 47 percent of all
reported incidents; North Americans were the second
most frequent targets. Among US victims, business-
men continued to be the most numerous, although the
absolute number of attacks against corporations has
dramatically decreased. Attacks against American
diplomatic installations�fueled by false rumors of US
orchestration of the attack on the Grand Mosque in
Mecca�increased at year's end.
Despite the publicity given to occasional sophisticated
operations, most terrorist attacks continue to be simple
in conception and operation (see table 6, page 16).
Bombings remained by far the most preferred type of
attacks, accounting for nearly 40 percent of all
terrorist operations. Despite preboarding security pre-
cautions that made the smuggling of weapons on board
airliners highly improbable, aerial hijackers have
discovered that pilots generally assume that their
claims of being armed are true and have thus
acquiesced to their demands. Hence, although few
Unclassified
581495 2-80
Western Europe 366
hijackers have been armed, hijackings�by terrorists
and nonterrorists�have increased somewhat over
1978 totals.
Fortunes of Major Groups
Western Europe. The Provisional Wing of the Irish
Republican Army, as well as the Irish National
Liberation Army, has generated substantial interna-
tional publicity with several major operations during
the year, particularly those aimed at symbols of the
British Government and the Crown.
They assassinated Airey Neave, would-be Conserva-
tive Secretary for Northern Ireland; Sir Richard
Sykes, Ambassador to the Netherlands; and Lord
Mountbatten, a member of the British royal family.
The IRA also continued to inflict mass casualties,
injuring 18 persons in a bombing in Brussels and
killing at least 18 soldiers and wounding another eight
in an ambush near the Irish border at Warrenpoint.
' Coverage of this topic necessarily touches on acts of domestic as
well as international terrorism involving these groups.
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According to a recent British Army assessment of the
IRA, the group has adopted a more clandestine
cellular structure, making it much more difficulty to
combat. While this reorganization has increased the
clandestine security of IRA units and thus permitted
successful major operations without leaks to the
authorities, compartmentation may lead to operational
errors. Many observers believed the IRA's successful
assassination of a Belgian banker and the near-
successful assassination attempt on SHAPE Com-
mander Alexander Haig were both cases of mistaken
identity. The IRA's Christmas letterbombing cam-
paign against prominent Britons failed when the group
mailed their deadly packages to the wrong addresses.
Despite popular outcry in the wake of these attacks,
and a papal plea for a cease-fire, IRA operations are
expected to continue to be successful in the near term.
On the European continent, the ETA, a Marxist-
Leninist-oriented Basque separatist organization in
Spain, met with successes similar to those of the IRA.
Factions of the group assassinated several important
military officials, leading to increased pressures on the
government to adopt repressive measures that the ETA
believes would result in increased popular support for
an independent Basque state.
Hoping to combat French-Spanish cooperation against
Basque terrorists who slip across the border, the ETA
temporarily declared war on French business and
tourist interests in Spain. They conducted a vigorous
bombing campaign which in one weekend claimed five
deaths and 113 injuries at an airport and two rail
stations. Spanish rightists, despairing of a firm govern-
mental response to this wave of terrorism, conducted a
series of vigilante raids against Basque leaders in
France. Despite the positive outcome of the 25 October
referendum on Basque autonomy, some members of
the ETA have vowed to continue to use terrorism to
press for complete independence.
Spanish authorities suffered a setback when five
members of Spain's other major terrorist group, the
Anti-Fascist Resistance Group of October 1
(GRAPO), tunneled to freedom from a prison in
Zamora. Earlier in the year the group was apparently
planning to kidnap a high-ranking US military official.
3
Nationality of Victims
of International Terrorist Attacks,*
1968-79
Transregional
Oceania
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Asia
USSR/
Eastern
Europe
Latin
America
Middle East
and
North Africa
Western
Europe
North
America
Unclassified
Total Incidents: 3,336
Figure 5
The percentage of the total number of incidents
around the world appears under the total num-
ber of incidents involving victims from that
region. Percentages sum to move than 100 due
to incidents in which victims were from several
regions.
1979 proporlions are represented by red
sections of bars.
581496 2-80
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West German terrorists had a second consecutive
unsuccessful year, failing to carry out any major
actions and presumably conducting only some support
activities, such as robbing banks and maintaining
hideouts. The Red Army Faction was one of several
groups that claimed responsibility for the assassination
attempt against General Haig. Police discovered sev-
eral terrorist safe houses and arrested several well-
known terrorist leaders, which will significantly ham-
per terrorist planning and operational capabilities.
Terrorism by both the left and the right in Turkey
resulted in an average of four deaths per day, despite
the imposition of martial law in several provinces and
increased pressure by the military on the new govern-
ment for more effective measures. The leftist Turkish
People's Liberation Party/Front was responsible for
most of the seven assassinations of US citizens in
Turkey last year. On the international front, Armenian
exiles, still seeking revenge for Turkish massacres in
1915, expanded the range of their targets. Whereas
they had previously attacked only Turkish personnel
and facilities, numerous non-Turkish airline offices
were bombed throughout Western Europe by individ-
uals claiming to belong to Armenian organizations.
In Italy, there were some noteworthy police successes
against the major groups. Individuals believed respon-
sible for the kidnaping and murder of Aldo Moro in
1978 were arrested in Italy and France. Other
individuals responsible for major rightwing terrorist
attacks were detained in Latin America during the
year. Fissures within the Red Brigade, Italy's well-
known leftist terrorist group, appeared to be growing,
as its factions carried an ideological battle of words in
the country's newpapers.
Despite such reverses, Italian terrorists do not seem to
have been operationally hampered, and terrorist at-
tacks continue at their record-setting rate. Some
operations showed particular daring; the Front Line's
seizure of 200 hostages at a Turin business school
ended with 10 of the victims being shot in the leg. Such
raids led the Italian Government to institute several
stern measures to aid antiterrorist efforts.
Middle East. Anti-US sentiment in Iran reached a
peak in 1979 with the second takeover of the US
Embassy in Tehran. Beyond its unique political
ramifications this takeover also differed operationally
from previous barricade and hostage episodes in
several ways. Usually, the environment around the site
is hostile to the terrorist; in Tehran, the captors had the
support of the host government in defiance of all rules
of customary and codified international legal practice.
After the takeover, security forces, acting in concert
with the terrorists, guarded the hostages and restricted
communications. Rather than actively negotiating for
the release of the hostages, government authorities
reinforced the demands of the terrorists. Outside Iran,
the few planned terrorist attacks in support of this
operation were thwarted by police.
The seizure of the Grand Mosque at Mecca led Saudi
Government officials to reexamine the extent of the
threat posed by domestic dissidents, including their
foreign contacts and organizational capabilities. Sev-
eral attacks on US facilities were made by Muslims
who believed the charges of US involvement in the
Mecca attack. These incidents do not appear to have
been orchestrated by any government or organization
as part of a coordinated campaign.
Disunity continues to beleaguer the Palestinian move-
ment. Several radical Arab governments have taken
advantage of these differences by sponsoring guerrilla
organizations to further their own ends. Bickering
within and among organizations has thus in part
prevented Arab terrorist attacks from reaching the
levels of the early 1970s. Moreover, radical Arab
governments have realized that their previous exten-
sive support of Palestinian terrorism often proved
counterproductive in their dealings with the West. At
least for the time being, there has been a notable
decline in government patronage of international
terrorist attacks.
Fatah held off international terrorist activity pending
the outcome of Yasir Arafat's diplomatic offensive to
obtain Western recognition of the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO). Moreover, Fatah's ability to
conduct international terrorist exploits was restricted
by the assassination in Beirut in January of Ali Hassan
Salameh, reputed planner of Black September's attack
on the 1972 Munich Olympics.
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Saiqa, a Syrian-sponsored Palestinian group that had
not conducted any international terrorist attacks since
1973, made headlines through a series of attacks under
the name of the Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution, a
fictitious name used to mask Saiqa's attacks against
Egyptian interests in Europe and the Middle East. Its
most spectacular operation was the takeover of the
Egyptian Embassy in Ankara, Turkey. After the
takeover ended, Turkish authorities granted permis-
sion for the opening of a PLO office in Ankara,
reputedly in return for PLO mediation with the
terrorists. Saiqa's terrorist activities were halted, if
only temporarily, with the assassination in France of
its leader, Zuhayr Muhsin.
Other Palestinian groups met with similar mixed
success. The Black March Organization, believed by
some observers to be either the Black September
Organization or a cover name for the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), underscored its
opposition to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty with a
bloody attack on the Brussels airport.' West German
authorities thwarted possible similar operations by
arresting several would-be Palestinian terrorists enter-
ing West Germany in late April.
Latin America. Several Salvadoran leftist formations
conducted the most noteworthy international terrorist
operations in Latin America. They seized several
foreign embassies and private installations, assassi-
nated several diplomats and businessmen and kid-
naped others, including Americans, Britons, and the
South African Ambassador to El Salvador. These
organizations hope to be as successful as the
Sandinistas in Nicaragua in toppling the government.
Terrorism farther south has been virtually halted in
some countries because of aggressive crackdowns by
police forces. Although Argentine terrorists have
The PFLP has decreased its international terrorist operations since
the 1978 death of its foreign operations chief, Wadi Haddad. The
organization has apparently been unable to replace him with an
individual with similar organizational and governmental contacts or
terrorist planning skills. However, one of the PFLP's most infamous
operatives, Venezuelan-born Carlos, recently surfaced for the first
time since he led the 1975 raid on an OPEC summit to tell the press
that he would return to prominence.
5
suffered massive losses, the Montoneros showed a
continued capability for at least sporadically mounting
dramatic incidents. And there were continuing indica-
tions that bilateral cooperative arrangements exist
among some Latin American terrorists.
Antiterrorist Countermeasures
Businesses continue to search for defensive methods
tailored to their own needs. Several multinational
corporations preferred to comply with terrorist ransom
and publicity demands rather than cooperate in
government-declared "no concessions" policies. Many
consultative organizations were formed solely to advise
executives on how to cope with political violence.
Others conduct ransom negotiations and payoffs as
part of the services offered to their kidnap insurance
customers.
The growing popularity of these insurance policies
increases the likelihood that terrorist kidnapers will
achieve their monetary goals. These ransoms will, in
turn, fund further terrorist operations. Hence, while
kidnap insurance increases the chances of a victim
being freed safely, its existence is counterproductive in
the long run, defeating deterrence policies.
Regional cooperation against terrorism was especially
evident among European countries. In May, police
chiefs of 17 major West European cities met to discuss
means to combat terrorism and other violent crimes. In
December, members of the European Community
signed a convention designed to resolve some technical
legal difficulties in implementing the Council of
Europe's Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism.
The latest convention calls for extradition or prosecu-
tion of individuals suspected of certain offenses�
including hijacking, kidnaping, use of bombs and
automatic firearms, and attacks on diplomats�what-
ever the motivation. The agreement will come into
effect when all nine members of the EC have passed
necessary ratification legislation.
Cross-regional antiterrorist cooperation�most nota-
bly between Western Europe and Israel�nearly back-
fired. Palestinians charged that West Germany
permitted an Israeli intelligence officer to question an
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Arab guerrilla arrested trying to smuggle explosives
into West Germany last April. The PLO claimed that
Israel later forced the guerrilla to attempt to assassi-
nate a prominent Fatah leader, but that the Arab
committed suicide instead. The PLO threatened to
scuttle its quiet working relationship with West
Germany, while more radical Palestinians vowed to
take more drastic retaliatory measures. These
threats�as well as those directed against the United
States for initially granting Israel's request for the
extradition of an Arab accused of bombing an Israeli
marketplace�did not result in terrorist attacks.
Even certain Communist regimes expressed some
interest in cooperating with the West in combating
terrorism. China, for example, supported the UN
convention on hostages, and Cuba renewed its
antihijacking agreements with Canada and Venezuela
for another five years. After all, Communist states
were not entirely immune to terrorist threats. The
Soviets abroad continued to be attacked by militant
Jewish groups and anti-Communist Cuban exiles.
Soviet official and commercial facilities more recently
have been bombed by Ukrainian exiles and individuals
protesting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
The most notable attempt to combat terrorism on a
global scale was the UN General Assembly's adoption
by consensus of an international convention against the
taking of hostages. The convention, which had been in
various UN committees for three years, calls for states
to prosecute or extradite hostage-takers without
exception whatsoever. Language on the rights of
national liberation movements, the right of asylum,
and the Geneva conventions and protocols on the law of
war was included to allow for greater support of the
final document. The convention was opened for signa-
ture on 18 Decmber and will come into effect when 22
states have ratified it.
Several nations joined the three international conven-
tions on crimes against aviation, as well as the UN
convention on internationally protected persons. The
new round of demarches by the supporters of these
agreements is likely to add further to the list of
adherents.
Outlook
Although individual terrorist attacks rely heavily upon
the element of surprise, general patterns of terrorist
behavior have proven to be predictable. Although there
will be several discontinuities, we expect that a number
of trends from the 1970s will carry over into the next
year:
� While the statistical decreases in the number of
terrorist incidents that we have noted are at first
impression encouraging, the decline may be only
temporary. Terrorist incidents have shown a two-
year cyclic pattern during the 1970s, with 1979
predicted as a valley. Several terrorist groups may
have been improving operational security and sophis-
tication, recruiting and training new members, and
merely waiting out government dragnets. This would
allow them to better adapt to government counter-
measures, thus increasing the likelihood of more
frequent�and occasionally more sophisticated�
attacks in the future.
� The increase in casualties and casualty-producing
incidents�particularly in light of the notable rise of
assassinations�is especially alarming. Although op-
erations deliberately intended to result in mass
casualties have been rare, terrorists may believe that
a larger number of casualties are now necessary to
generate the amount of publicity formerly evoked by
less bloody operations.
� The vast majority of incidents will continue to be
simple in conception and implementation, posing
little risk to the perpetrators. Although added
security precautions at sensitive facilities, a business
exodus from unstable areas, and paramilitary rescue
squads may deter spectacular attacks, these meas-
ures clearly cannot protect all potential�if less
sensitive�targets from simple hit-and-run opera-
tions.
� Regional patterns of victimization and location of
operations are likely to remain virtually unchanged.
Representatives of affluent countries, particularly
government officials and business executives, will
remain attractive targets. Western Europe, Latin
America, and the Middle East again are likely to be
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the main trouble spots. Americans and US property
will continue to be attacked on occasion, although
improvements in US official and corporate security
should deter many potential attacks by small bands.
New developments expected in the coming year
include the following:
� Terrorists will try to adapt their tactics to neutralize
the countermeasures adopted by government and
private security services. They probably will change
target selection, improve planning and trade craft,
and, possibly, increase their technological sophisti-
cation.
� West German terrorists, having suffered reverses
during the past two years, are likely to feel greater
pressure to renew their revolutionary credentials by
engaging in operations at home or overseas. As has
been the case with the PFLP, however, losses of
major leaders�through arrest, death, or retire-
ment has severely cut back their operational
capabilities.
� New groups, motivated by hitherto unpublicized
goals, are likely to emerge. One such movement may
already have come to light in Syria, where Soviets
have been attacked for their actions in Afghanistan.
Other groups may be formed due to the recent
upsurge in nationalism and ethnic consciousness.
Improvements in the general level of education and
affluence had generally been believed to vitiate
parochialism. In several areas, however, such im-
provements are generating a historical consciousness
that results in the pursuit of narrower and more
traditional loyalties, such as ethnic and religious ties.
Often that pursuit will produce violence both within
and across state boundaries.
7
� The support of terrorists by patron states has become
more selective than it had been in previous years, due
to almost uniformly unfavorable publicity, diplo-
matic repercussions, and the inability to control such
operations. The recent unwillingness to provide overt
aid may be reversed if states do not perceive that
their interests are being served by more conventional
means; nonetheless, it is more likely that cost-
effectiveness will become the determinant of whether
to support terrorists.
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International Terrorist Incidents by Category,
1968-79
Total: 3,336
Letter Bombing
100
Total: 186
75
50
25
Assassination
100 Total: 246
75
50
25
Explosive Bombing
Kidnaping
Incendiary Bombing
Theft, Break-in
Total: 78
Aff
Armed Attack
Total: 188
Sniping
Figure 6
Barricade and Hostage
Hijackingl
Total: 100
04,,apit
Other Action2
Total: 87
401,40
1968 69 71 73 75 77 79 1968 69 71 73 75 77 79 1968 69 71 73 75 77 79 1968 69 71 73 75 77 79
1. Includes hijacking of modes of transportation for air, sea, or land, but excludes numerous non-terrorist hijackings.
2. Includes occupation of facilities without hostage seizure, shootouts with police, and sabotage.
Unclassified
581497 2-80
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Appendix A
Interpreting Statistics on
International Terrorism
This study uses computerized data based solely on
unclassified material published since 1968. While this
technique promotes a historical and comparative
perspective, the tallies should be treated with caution.
This appendix explains the conceptual and analytical
issues involved in the development and maintenance of
the data set upon which these statistics are based.
Competing Research Methods
Several research approaches have been used in at-
tempts to examine forms of terrorism systematically.
One technique is to review the literature of terrorism,
focusing on the philosophies of guerrilla theorists and
practitioners. While this may yield an idea of possible
motivations, such an inquiry is limited only to those
groups that have chosen to leave a printed legacy. We
might attempt to solve this difficulty by interviewing
practicing, jailed, or retired terrorists.' Problems of
access, as well as reliability of testimony, cast doubt on
the utility and practicability of such an approach.
Additionally, the terrorist may be unaware of why he
really behaves as he does, and interviewing could
become an exercise in mutual distortion.
Our research has attempted to deal with these prob-
lems by supplementing these methods with an events
data approach, which has been employed more gener-
ally in academic studies of the structure of the
international system. Rather than focusing on individ-
ual actors or terrorist groups, such an approach deals
with the discrete incident as the unit of analysis. This
approach allows us to examine actual behavior, rather
than statements by observers and practitioners about
such behavior.
' The clandestine nature of terrorism, personal predispositions and
institutional affiliations of most researchers will continue to limit
this area of inquiry to the domain of the courageous handful. Other
researchers, however, may profitably attempt to use such data in
constructing long-range secondary psychiatric profiles of specific
individuals. Care must always be taken, however, to ensure that the
terrorist is not using the researcher as another medium of
propaganda transmission.
9
Although the data are collected on individual
incidents, descriptive statistics allow us to aggregate
these events and investigate long-term trends in
terrorist campaigns. This leads to general conclusions
about what terrorists do, how they go about it, and
where they are most likely to strike. Furthermore,
noting the structural characteristics of the incident
provides us with an indication of the boundaries within
which terrorists operate. Physical, temporal, and self-
imposed constraints upon terrorist behavior establish
the parameters of their activities. From observing the
choices terrorists make within these limits, we can
attempt to infer motivations and compare the terror-
ists' stated rationale for their actions with their target
selection. Ideally, knowledge of the range of options
open to the terrorists, as well as their most likely
choices, can lead to potentially effective counter-
measures.
Structural Characteristics of Terrorist Incidents
We have found that intelligence analysis plays several
roles in aiding policymakers charged with coping with
specific incidents of terrorism. For example, establish-
ing general patterns of terrorist behavior from overt
data, while useful in planning protective strategies,
must be supplemented with specific tactical data
regarding the terrorist group conducting the operation,
evidence of what terrorists in similar situations have
done, and estimates concerning how this group is likely
to react to several possible government responses. To
organize our information to meet these needs, we break
down our data into a number of categories, related
generally to a sequence of phases through which most
incidents proceed.
The first phase, common to all incidents, is the
preincident period, in which the terrorist is planning
the operation. This period may include acquisition of
operational intelligence through surveillance, in-
formants, and penetrations of the target by agents of
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the group. The group is simultaneously obtaining
operational paraphernalia, such as arms, documents,
disguises, transportation, and other equipment. After
planning the operation, training often takes place. This
is followed by movement to the scene of the attack.
During this period, those aiming at countering the
terrorists will concentrate their resources on intelli-
gence operations designed to detect and thereby thwart
the group's plans.
The second phase, again common to all incidents, is the
initiation of the attack, which varies from emplacing a
bomb to taking hostages. Compared to the first phase,
which can last for months, this phase is measured in
seconds or minutes. Those needing intelligence support
are the security forces at the scene.
The negotiation phase, which is limited to incidents
involving the seizure of symbols (usually human)
deemed of value to a third party, can range from a
matter of hours in most barricade-and-hostage scenar-
ios to years in some marathon kidnapings. Here the
intelligence analyst serves the negotiator, who may be
a trained psychologist/psychiatrist, government offi-
cial, individual of symbolic value to the terrorists, or a
third-party intermediary.
The climax signals the ending of the incident. In some
cases, it may be nearly identical in time to the
initiation of the incident (for example, a thrown bomb
explodes). Those who depend upon intelligence now
can include the intermediary from the previous phase,
the security forces from phase two, or an armed rescue
squad formed to secure the release of the hostages in
case negotiations break down.
The postincident period closes the description of an
event and often brings us full circle to the planning
phase for the next incident. Those requiring data and
analysis include hospitals and psychiatrists who care
for the victims, as well as court systems to handle the
proper disposition of the offenders. In this phase, as
well as all of the others, government/business
policymakers are involved in developing a comprehen-
10
sive response plan. The news media, as well as
educators, are similarly involved at every step of the
incident.
During this sequence, we are most interested in
understanding the dynamic relationships between
actors and how these interactions can be manipulated
to lead to a favorable resolution of the crisis. Our
definition of terrorism allows us to identify five major
types of actors according to their type and extent of
involvement in the incident: terrorists, victims, hosts,
targets, and audiences. In many incidents, a given
nation-state may assume several of these roles. For
example, a country could be a terrorist "breeder"(that
is, the home country of the terrorist), as well as provide
the location of the attack (host) and be the target of the
demands forwarded by the terrorist. Figure 7 sketches
a few of the relationships between these actors which
might be manipulated, and for which data are readily
available.
Further complicating the situation�although allow-
ing additional opportunities for intervention leading to
the episode's resolution�are secondary actors. Three
subtypes of ancillary actors can be established accord-
ing to their attitudes toward the nonterrorist actors:
malevolent, neutral, or benign. Figure 8 depicts the
types of relationships between primary and secondary
actors for which we collect information.
Malevolent ancillaries may be other terrorist groups or
sympathetic patron states, who provide varying de-
grees of aid to the terrorist groups before, during,
and/or after the event. Such actors may also direct
propaganda to specified audiences in support of the
terrorists' actions. Some events have also included a
third party adding demands to those forwarded by the
perpetrator of the incident.
The neutral third party most often mediates between
the terrorist and the target. The target may also
request the neutral's aid in implementing various face-
saving solutions to the incident, such as granting safe
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Relationships Between Primary Participants in a Terrorist Incident
Figure 7
Security Environment
Pressures for Protection
Unclassified
581498 2-80
haven to the perpetrators at the conclusion of an
incident or publishing a terrorist manifesto. The
neutral, as well as benign ancillaries, may also choose
to grant humanitarian assistance to victims. In addi-
tion, the benign ancillary may provide technical
assistance to the target in the form of intelligence and
security information, equipment, or manpower for
dealing with the crisis.
Data Collection and Cataloguing
To construct the categories for our data set, we
surveyed academic literature and government policy-
makers to identify variables considered relevant to the
description of each incident phase and actor. To
establish the feasibility of treating incidents quantita-
tively, this list was treated as preliminary, and only a
few sources were employed.
Among the difficulties we initially encountered were
the issue of defining terrorism, its international
variants, and what constitutes a separate incident.
How one emerges from these definitional complexities
will affect what is included in the data compilation
and, therefore, the substantive conclusions. For exam-
ple, Risks International's mixing of international and
domestic incidents yields a once-interrupted constant
rise in terrorism during the 1970s, whereas our
11
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Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C03291989
Relationships Between Primary and Ancillary Participants in a Terrorist Incident
Figure 8
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