THE 'ORDER OF BATTLE' PROBLEM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03293621
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: March 20, 1968

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MEMORADIptili
SUB,TICCTt, The "Order of Battle"' Problem
For the past rear1 a growing body of evidence has indicated that
long-standing conceptual and snethodological approach** to the Communist
Order of Battle in South Vietnam had led be a consistent understatement of
enemy litary and political strength. This new evidence was derived from
the wealth of captured documents acquired from enemy headquarters elements
overrun by Allied operations since 1966, supplemented by interrogations in
depth of numerous captives and defectors. Accordingly, our knowledge of
the organisation, composition, strength and roles of the various component*
of the Communist political-militazy forces has increased dramatically in the
past two years.
2. The intelligence corr.znunity has sought to reconcile this new body
of evidence with the official order of battle holdings developed in Saigon by
3-2 MACY. Because of his greater access to the raw intelligence data, his
Larger analytical resources, and his direct command responsibility for
assessing Communist capabilities and strengths, the Washington community
had largely deferred to 3-2 MACV's analyses. In mid-1967, however, during
the preparation of NI E 14.3-67 ("Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists
for righting in South Vietnam"), the Washington community proposed an upward
revision of the strength figures in several, categories blued on the new evidence.
3-2 MACY countered with more conservative figures, and the strengths finally
published in the NEE represented a compromise pending further detailed
research on various aspects of the problem both in Saigon and in Washington.
(3-2 MACV's previous holdings are listed in Column A in the attached table:
the agreed NM figures are listed in Column B.)
3. 3-2 MACY subsequently adjusted the agreed figures to omit the
5pir cad, their new figures tending toward the lower end of the scale. (Column
C in the attached table lists MACV's pre-Tet adjusted holdings.) These and
subsequent adjustments were rationalized on the basis of a systematic accounting
approach which deducts "known" enemy losses from the assessed strength of
SEPT
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specific Communist units and force components. Since the Washington _
community already had serious reservations concerning the completeness of the
data base, it was felt that this bookkeeping methodology exacerbated the problem
of reconciling the new evidence with the officially "accepted" figures.
� 4, Our own. detailed research in recent months On the various components -
of the Communist force structure has led us to, conclude that their strengths �
before the Tett offensive -- were substantially higher than MACVes holdings.
(Column D in the attached table Lists our strength estimates.) Since Tot, ,r-Z
MACV ha* Darther adjusted his holdings of enemy- strengths to account for -
reported Communist losses and allow for the belated acceptance of additional
NVA troops which, infiltrated into I Corps in December and January. (MACY',
currentadjusted holdings are listed in Cobanue Zof the attached table.
Our continuing problems with mAcir are partly methodological,
partly conceptual, and pertly philoeophical. MACY uses a series at tabolatin
methodologies which require "hard evidence" reflecting multiple continuation
before units are "accepted" in the order of battle. Although such methods
ensure careful analysis at the working level, they do not produce best estimates
of an actual state of affairs and inevitably lag behind current reality. This has
been particularly true with regard to administrative service and guerrilla
strengths, where the evidence is admittedly less conclusive than for Main and
Local Force elements. Aa for the political infrastructure, our problem is to
some extent one of clumsy definitions which encompass more than hard core
leadership but exclude many full-time activists. Moreover, MACY is
adamantly opposed to any quantified estimate of "irregulars. " The philosophical
problem derives from our desire to give the clearest possible picture of the
total enemy threat which frequently conflicts with MACV's desire to maximize
the appearance of operational progress and reluctance to acknowledge past
estimative errors.
6. A more immediate problem -- since the Tet offensive -- results
from ILACVIs deducting the entire reported KM total from its military strength
holdings. Thus, even after "accepting" about 20,000 NVA troops, MACY**.
strength figures were reduced by about 21.000. We have not yet adjusted our
pre-Tet estimate for losses since 1 February because: (a) there is no clear
evidence permitting a break...out of the reported losses against the various
Eorce components, and (h) there is yet no evidence permitting a firm assessment
of the extent to which these loose' have been offset by intensified recruiting
and increased infiltration. We feel strongly, however, that whatever KIA
figure ,is used -- and we have serious reservations regarding the reported
ii3ures -- it should be attrited against all enemy forces (i. e., the total
"Insurgency base"), and not against the select groups used by MACY.
n
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7. Our strength, estimates, which are being coorilbuted in the
Washington community do not reflect, for the zr.ost part, a real, increase in
Communist military strength-over recent months. Rather, they largely
represent adjustments to reflect armed components and personnel which have
existed but have been omitted from previous estimates. Most components
(excluding NV& and VC _Main Fort* elements) have actually declined somewhat
from peak strengths reached in 1966 because of subsequent losseur.We
believe thee. figures represent a realistic assessment of current enemy
strength, and one which should be taken into account in our policies and plans.
- 3 -
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COMMUNIST $
A
MACV 11dia AgreedNIE
C(iMPONENT
I'vfain Force-
Local Force 116,552
119,000
.Adrninistrative
$ervices 25, 753 35-40,000
Guerrillas 112,760 70-90,0002
-
Sub-Total 255, 06.5 24-Z49, 000
Self-Defense .. .IN .1 .. .03 Unquantified4
Political Cadre 39,175 *7.5, 000
Total 294,240 299-334,000
IN VIETNAM
C '
�MACV Noldings , CIA Pre-Tot MACV Post-*et
30 Nov 67 'Estimate Holdings
114,77 - 160,000
,�!�.,.,.
,,f'
..,
1ZZ, 9
0-,
i f.�,. ;
4
37,600 - . ,, -
73W,000 33:725 '. ..
: '
, el. /004:;:;.: :';"...:L.. 169-i 40,0 7
� 00*
47 4 0Z
4�k-
-,;_ , ,;,,i,�':.'-i, . ' � , ' -
Iri-3-",-4-17s*.1.,,.:'''',, 1M7firiXiit
8 " 4
Vialausuitifj.ed , 100. 000 ., tiactuantlited
' 84,000
'''''1" '''
'''.:b.,.)-::
80-120,0009
4
,'-''-,
84,000
307,477
,
1
515-600,000
488,126
p
NOTES: 1. Grouped guerrilla and self-defense components into ono category. .
2. Includes guerrilla, strength only;
3. Included with guerrillas.
4. Agreed that no figure would be listed, with statement that Beff-Doience strength ad. reached,
150,000 in tnid.1966.
., , ,
. ,
5. Difference between columns C and D results from our inclusion Of identiiieel units (22,000)
iniiltrated since November, pitlo 24, 000 ia4 specie-144114 010.roefuts no relieOisci in Vi4Crs 4914irtig4
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SEGRET
. Evidence supports an order-of -magnitude estimate of this Size; w4P believe this
increment, which suffers losses and plays a significant roc o should be tucluded
in the "insurgency base.'
4
. Accumulating evidence tends to support the old
Usher end of this spread.
r at:LET
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Th. .Director
GACarver. Jr.
Th. ''Order of Me Problem
This is the brief surnmary yea, requested
outlining our pritiblenis with the Commasist
Orcier of 13att1e Is Vistasvz. This paper
has been coordisatael with the sppreprinte
elements of INDL,
A. Carver. Jr.
Sp.cMI Autstantat Vietnamets. Affairs
Attachment
cc: DM!
ID/OCI
'7
DD/OR
D/01.4M V
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