Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
April 3, 2019
Document Release Date: 
April 12, 2019
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 29, 1976
Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C03303946 � � SAI EL K. I P.-4,JY ;,kwAti, crukin644.4 Ho,e,.!co 11.4=.EA. lU.. Tb-.14., VICE CHAIN A�....N RCH PAY/4, ADL.AI CI ST EV ET...9.0H. JR.. ILL. WJJ4 0. 1,Ar4IASTAT. MAIM*: 0. Ht.10-..,4-5:31-0.1, KY. .10SE.PH11. BICEN, DEL. Fe-DPI:HT M0HCAN, N.C. GARTH Airr, 00I-0. Nov 0'1 P. CASE. N.J. STR�Om -0-itjni.go,D. MARA 0, HATFIELD. ORED. PARRY LOLVAIATER. ARI7.. POPERY' T. STAFFORD, VT. JAKE C,APIN, UTAH MIKE �A ANSFI FLO. MONT., EX OPEICIO HUGH SCOTT. PA.. EX OFF/CIO ',NI...LIAM 0, EILLZN ETATIE DIRECTOR "1Ir, .!-.3 Valli-O. SELECT COMMITTEE ON IMTELLIGE.P10E Exe0.7.rtive 11.xsi3t�ry�T zit ,E0 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yr zfc;,,iez ZarccAern ri EO 13526 /4 11.1-U (ELIR !WAKE TO 9. RES. VA, MTh cow4;vess) WASHINGTON. D.C. 205to SENSITIVE The Honorable George Bush Director of Central Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 20505 Dear Mr. Bush: September 29, /976 REPLY -)?..f.,EAS REFER TO. R#4645 7 7 - QQ.. On September 22 Mr. William Miller requested, on be- half of the Committee, information from the CIA on the recent assassination of former Chilean Ambassador Orlando Letelier. I am grateful to you for the briefing you gave when you met with Senator Baker and myself on September .27. The Select Committee would like to request the following information: 1. There have been reports (see attached article entitled "Chilean Bomb Victim Told FBI of Threats to Life, Friends Say") that Letelier was recently discussed at a high-leve.( policy meeting within the Chilean government. Does the Agency have any information related to this meeting or others in which Letelier was discussed? 2. 3. Attached is an article by Mt. R.2.L=.1.1a,u en- titled "The Tribulation of Chile:"- It ap- peared in the October 10th issue of the SENSITIVE Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C03303946 3.5(c) 3.3(b)(1) 3.3(b)(1) Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C03303946 Nue The Honorable George Bush September 29, 1976 Page 2 4. National Review. Please note pages 1110 to 1112. Would the Agency please comment on the accuracy of Mr. Moss observations. Does the Areticy have ,,my information on the. al- leged di.sembarkment of a nilean secrh pol.Tce- man in New :York on August 25 (see attached ar- ticle entitled "FBI Agents Investigating Letelier Killing Get Tip High Chilean qecret Policeman Flew to U.S. Last Month")? 5. Does the Agency have any information related to the assassination of Chilean General Calos Prats zalez -and the shooting last October of i ean Christian Democrat Bernardo Lei=g4 in Rome? 6. Does the Agency have any information related to Chilean MIR (Movement of the Revolutionary Left) activities in the United States, especially as those activities may relate to the Letelier. murder? 7. Thank you very much for your assistance in this matter. Attachments 3 Daniel Inouye Chairman SENSITIVE Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C03303946 Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C03303946. 44400 s.� The Via c.h4nciton Post September 23, 1976 eltiLean .01 'Threats to Life, Friends Say-': By Stephen .T. Lynlon ��� � and Ronald KeKter Ni3shingto,-, Port St:ar 1-vvitxri Orlando Letelier, former Chilean ambassador to the United Slates for the Marx- ist. All government, told � his friends and co- workers_ that he had re- ceived repeated threats aganst his life before he was killed here Tuesday by a bomb in his ear. Anonymous callers, some , speaking in Spanish. had continually warned him for more than a year that hp would be killed unless he stopped criticizing the mil� itary junta that ousted the late Pr d en t Salvador Allemte,Sept: 11, 1973 Lete- � tier's colleagues said yester; day. le' � � Last week, Letelier re- ceived a letter from a well Placed Chilean, his cowork- ers said. The letter allegedly reported a high-level discus.� sion in the present Chilean e government over whether Lel cher should be killed be- cause of his outspoken criti- cisms of the current regime in Chile. ' � The government in Chile � has disavowed any link with ',etchers death and has de- pineed the bombing. Letelier, 44, who served as Allende's foreign minister and minister of defense in 1973 after his tenure as am- has.sador to the United. Stales, was killed when a bonTh exploded underneath. .11i3 car as he drove to work through SheridairCircle NW Tuesday morning with .two , colleagues. Ronhi �and, Mb' chael Moffitt. Ronni Mortitt � was also � killed. Hee hus- band was hospitalized. brief- ly for shock. ,111 tlirce worked for the Institute for 'Policy Studies, a private research "t Ii inke tank." where Letelier di- rected a foreign- affairs re- search program. 1,11;ia1 S. Mori t cein o, Letelier's assistant, said in an interview yesterday that lie had told her of receiving thrpats against his life about twice a month. "It, usually- came at odd hours (at his office) or at 'fibrne,". she said. The message, in es- sence, she added, was that if he con- tinued his activities against the present junta .of Get7, Augusto Pinochet, Letelier � wbulcl hilted or "eliminated." �;..Patil Weiss, charman of the Institute �: for Policy Studies, recalled that Lete� � Itter';fast, April had told him three or four times of warnings ,by callers who � said, "We're going to get you." ,. _James Petras, a political scientist at the State University of New York; re- � counted a conversation with Letelier Letelier said, according to this account, that he had been warned. b" the Chilean Embassy itself that he would face what Pet ras described as "unforeseen difficulties" if lie con- tinued his attacks on the junta. existence of the letter in which Letelier was allegedly alerted to a 'Chilean government el bate e over whether he should be assassinated ewas disclosed by, Eqbal Ahmed and other coworkers at the Institute for ?Click Studies. They did not produce the letter itself, however. 7 � � ..A.Inried an(' other- institute offielele, tvlin. asked not to be identified, also .deClined to name the Chilean who rrt'edte the letter, saying they wanted � to avoid endangering him. The letter wa Said to have recounted h debate ebet:tv'een Chilean "hawks" who wanted feller killed, and "dove;;" who oh- 'jEcteci. to his suggested assassination. �-��t Vas unclear yesterday whether Leteliee had reported � the recurring threats ageinst. hint to the FBI or 'sought Fla. protection. A. spokesman - for the FBI's Washington field office. which is taking part. in the investige- ., tion:of his death, denied that. Lacher. lied, told Wenn of any such threats. Monteeino said, however, that. Letelier had told her he had reported The warnings in the FBI. In Rome yes- ;1-tediY, Agence France-Presse quoted jiortensia Allende, the former Chi- ll-can president's widow, as saying ;Leteiier had repeatedly requested F13.1. . ,broteetion. � � pb According to Mrs. 'Montecino, Letee eTier had said FBI agents .visited hint ertegularly and were notified when be eihanged his resideneee"The F131 told; im if' anything unusual happened to qeport it to the she, said: - Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C03303946 But Mrs. Monteeina and others noted that Letelier- did not take any _special security precautions himself. "Ile felt, "If I'm going to be afraid of anything, I won't de a thing,' she said: Rafael Otero, counselor for- public .affairs at the Chilean Embassy, said in an interview yesterday that no one Irons the embassy had becer ques- tioned by either the FBI or the Dis� trict pollee about the bombing. Otero said that the Chilean -ambas- sador to the United States, Manuel Trucco, had contacted the State De- partment to offer "full cooperation" in the Investigation. "We're very inter- ested in going on with this investiga- tion because this Is the worst thing that could happen to my country at this moment." Otero said. Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C03303946 �1101 Otero suggested that Let elier.'s 'mur- der, and those of other Chilean exiles in other cotintries that preceded it, have come in the fall and were timed to coincide with the opening of the United Nations General Assembly ses- sion.-' � � "We are asking to help. It's the first Opportunity to find out who is making . this attack aeair.st the Chilean peo., pie," Otero said. � , When asked about reports of threats made here and reportedly in Chile against Letelier; Otero referred - to the lifting cf.Letelier's Ctkilean rift- cnldp on Z-.pt, 10 by thc! - VelniTir.i,-13t. Otero sQid th.-,j, the "Chilean government doeJn't need other means" beyond revoking a per- son's citizenship. � Otero, a short, stout mon, was cairn,. during much of the interview until in- formed' that he was being widely de- scribed by Chilean exiles and leftists � in Washingtors as being the represent- ative of the National Directorate of Intelligence (DINA), the most Impor- tant secret police agency in Chile. �� Hearing this, Otero responded. with � laughter and said that this report was "very funny." Otero denied having .any role in DINA. The reports, lie said. were a way ''for the extreme left to point the finger" at him, and he said he would report the information to the U.S. State Department today since he took it as a threat against him. � Otero also raised and denied . ports that he was affiliated with the CIA in Chile. Describing himself as a journalist, Otero said he had pub- lished SEPA,. an anti-Allende maga- zinc, and that he had been Imprisoned 28 times "during Allende." Otero raised the question a to why!". the explosion of Letelier's car occur- ' red within 100 feet of the Chilean am- bassador's residence ' at 230.5 � MassaL: chusetts Ave. NW. � � .4� At several points during :.the inter- view, Otero repeated his � assertion ' that the Chilean government had not had anything to do with � Letelier's. murder. "We know we don't have any,' thing to do with this murder," Otero. said. "We know . . . It's the .worst thing that can happen." City police and FBI officials re- 'ported no significant developments yesterday in their investigation of the bombing, "This is not going to be eas- ily'solved," said Assistant U.S. Attor- ney Eugene Propper, who is coon. *dinating the investigation. Results of. laboratory studies of evidence col. lected after the explosion will not be available for a week or more, he said 2 -- Sources close to the investigation previously said the blast appeared to have been caused by a skillfully con- structed plastic bomb that was shaped to concentrate the main impact of the explosion upward into the' driver's, seat. The bomb was apparently atta- ched to the car's undercarriage, these sources said, and may have been set off by a rerpote-contro.lect radio de- vice. � Propper met for about Ilk hours pesterday with D.C. police and FBI of- ficials involved in the investigation. Invpstigators, he said, are interview.' in,g and making cla.,cks on airports and rail. � road stations, and compiling a list of. recent visitors to- the United Stat.0, from Chile. A memorial service for Leteli.ei:hare been planned for -3 p.m. Sunday a�; St, Matthew's Cathedral, 1725 Rhode ' land Ave. NW. It will be preceede'ct.bj% a protest 'march, beginning at- 12:34 p.m. at Sheridan Circle, accordirig.I.O. the, Institute for Policy Studies.: Lccte,- lier will be buried in 'Venezuela,�re-- � lative said yesterday. � Yesterday afternoon. several ,hun- dred demonstrators gathered in Du- pont Circle to protest the deaths 'of Letelier and Mrs. Moffitt, which the' blamed on the Chilean government. The demonstrators, who chanted. and 'carried � signs, stayed for about.111/2 � �hours. � � In -Congresi' yesterday, Letelrer's �death set off several controversies. Rep. Toby Moffett (D�Conn.)' Nyak thwarted' in an attempt to Introduce f� by unanimous -consent a resolution, with 135 cosponsors, -condemnIng Letelier's killing. It .was 'blocked � by, � objections from. Rep. John ra.; ' Ath- brook (R-Ohio). � � Later Rep. Donald ItI. FrasIr 'Minn.). chairman of the House Stik committee on International Organiza; tions. issued' a statement charging. that the FBI had failed to investigate Information supplied by his Subcoilit � mittee about the alleged arrival In Ihe. United States. in August of a � pectert Chileamintelligence agent:Xri FBI spokesman termed Fraser's state- ment -"unfair.' Ile' said the FBI ..was trying to reach the man who had sup.- plied Fraser's Subcommittee with, the information. . � � Also contributing to this article' were Washington Post staff writers.- Lawrence Meyer and Joe Ritchie. Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C03303946 Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C03303946 Note LETTER FRCM,1 CHILE T WAS A JOT boy scoutish of them, but the soldiers .t. who overthrew S:iIvdur Allendc thnuf2h: that they id earned the E.rAtude or the American people, and of the West in gerleral. For one thing, they had prevented the transfoN-na;ion of Chile into a sort of Latin American Czechoslo�.-akia, complete wk:Lr Soviet bases. For another, they staunch believers in the mar'Net economy and the Tositive role of foreign investment. They set about deionalizing foreign businesses that h.1.1 been confiscated under Allende, and agreed to pay hancome compensation to American copper companies that had been. taken over �Mort:, in the ease of Cerro, than the hook value that the Cur rcioc itaeif had planed on ie Ch..iri assets If itihi ciftin't make the Chile of the generals a pro-We,,terri country, deserving of friendly support (even f not the miniature Marshall Aid program needed to repair the .�COC".()rilic havoc wrought by three years of Marxist misrule) what would? Alas, how little these soldiers understood the mood of the times in Washington or London. With the spirit of Helsinki about, it is not done to attack Communists too stridently. Since the intellectual defense of capitalism has become a minority cause in most of the countries that owe their' present affluence to it, these disciples of Adam Smith and Milton Friedman were a positive embarrassment. Chile, after all, is a backward, developing country, and the liberal Establishment has been telling us for decades that the only appropriate economic strategy for such"places is the smash- and-grab redistributionism propounded by such bodies as the' UN Economic Commission for Latin America. Any- way, the soft-core masochism of the liberal Establishment has 110w reached such exticmities that any' oittsidar who fails to gr::tify.its need for an endless recital of the crimes and horrors perpetrated by, the West is immediately dis- missed as a fascist beast. Aid, from this perspective. is an. act of expiation: you give it to people who You that you have wronged them and that they. have a right to squeeze you for every penny they can get.. It is not some- thing that you give to people who tell you that they admire you, not for what you are but for what you were and might have been, if you had been able to. sustain a more assertive faith in your own vmiica an:I traditions_ vies lutany tr,ffimi..;ivall,.! about (i-;::::rzt Pinochet U.garte and his colleagnc!;, in thiv t.:note-xt, ic that. they were pro-American. Such presumption hr.ut to be: punished, "We choose our friends," came the shrill rebuke from Capitol Hill. "Our friends do in,t choose.' And how could Chile fait to be an unpopular cause in America, since the coup against Allende was linked, in the public psyche, �vitlt the Watergate era, with disaster in Vietnam, with CIA dirty tricks, and with hanky-panky by ITT? Since the myth that General l'inochet was an invention of Richaid Nixon and the CIA befuddles the view like a pea-soup fog whenever the topic of Chile comes up. I better dispose of it swiftly. I have described the antecedents of the coup in detail elsewhere. It is enough here to make two basic points. First: or course it is true that the CIA was involved in Chile: it had not yet been reduced to a press-cuttings agency. It is also true that iloptt up at the The Tribulation of Chile ROBERT MOSS OCTotititt 10. 1975 Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C03303946 I 105 Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C03303946 . 'cool Nore � White Floa3c \ye% wring out contingency plans. But if the. CIA had reJlLy been ohle tu en7ineer the fall of Allende lot $S miiai --a pittance even compared \\ith what it spent in Chile in the 19603 supporting Christian Democrats and left-wing priests�it would have secured the sale of the century. What it mainly did was to keep alive some of the chief constraints on a wo'Cild-he totalitarian government, such as a free press and independent trade unions. Second: the coup \vas merely the sharp cutting edge of a broad. based, and esstritially-home-grown, coonterrei�ohdion which bore a resemblance, in some respects, to the current popular upheavals against the pro-Communist regime in Portugal. The junta has subsequently isolated itself from some of its original civilian supporters, but there is no 'doubt that it was welcomed by a majority of the Chilean population on September II, 1973. That this simple 'fact has been success- fully camouflaged in much of the reporting then and since is a tribute a) to the lavishly. financed and brilliantly con, cciveiJ Marxist propaganda can]paign that. ha.; been \teJ against Chile, and b) to the amazingly insular approach of modish Americ,an commentators, who write as if nobody but the Ct.'', is capable of setting tip a right-wing regime, ' Remember the appalling legacy of the Allende regime which had destroyed faith in the constitution and the party system and made political violence a way of life in Chile Oh yes, the junta has not served its own image well by its treatment of political dissidents or its unapologetic decision not to return�in any determinate future�to the democratic system. There are serious charges for the junta to answer on human rights, and on the abuse of power by its own security services, and I do not intend to gloss over it. But it is useful at this stage to make one simple observation about the way that this reates to the junta's image abroad. If the military regime in Chile, following the example of all self- respecting Communist revolutionaries, had flatly decided to shut out all foreign reporters, civil rights investigators, and sundry do-gooders for a period of, say, six months after the coup, our diet of horror stories from Chile would have beers meager indeed. It is to the credit of the junta that (unlike the new masters of Cambodia and South Vietnam, and unlike Mrs. Gandhi) it has not imposed a blackout of this kind. Almost everyone has attacked Pinochet for refusing to admit a UN Human Rights Commission in July and this decision would indeed appear, in its context, to have been a major diplomatic error. But are the editorial writers of the Washington Post or the New York Times demanding that the UN should send similar commissions to Cambodia, South Vietnam, and India, and, if not, why not? The sad fact is that it is neither the quantity of the repression in Chile nor the junta's treatment of its foreign Mr. Moss iv ihe editor of The (London) Economist's For- eign Report and the author of Chile's Marxist Experiment nod The War of the Cities. I 106 NATIONAL REVIEW critics that is the real source of the selective outrage tha (kids it focus in Pinuellet. It is that the'junta. being. right wing and open to some forms of Western influence, i preeminently get-at-able. If a country goes Communist, tin consensus among 9Lif press � crusaders and "concerned' academics appears to be� ..the- caso is closed. Their logic rims as The new lords of "1-to Chi Minh City' won't- let se, visit their 're- education"- centers. But esen it is true that dire things go on there, you can't make ar omelette without breaking eggs--and who are we, from the guilt-ridden �Vest, to question the morality of an Asiar revolution? T YY ELL, WE KNOW by now how these double standard.: work. If I were to write, by way of apology for some of tisc mistakes or excesses that have been committed in the new Chik, that you can't makt3 an omel'At.:: eggs, many pL:ople- would be: delighted f'.; nyCM a pike. Remember that it is far harder�and }:tks fat longer�to rebuild than to destroy. Remember the appalling legacy of the Alle.nde regime which, by systelmatically vio. kiting the laws, had destroyed faith in the constitution and the party system and made political violence a way of life in Chile. You can't wish away an historical experience as shattering as that, and revert to some milder age of demo- cratic politics predating the holocaust. Even if you could, it would probably be impossible to produce a democratic government in Chile at this stage with the guts, and the popular backing, to sustain the current program) of eco- nomic reconstruction which is at last beginning to bring inflation under control---but at the cosi of a bitter recces- .sion, bringing in train considerable social suffering. A military junta is not, and can never be, a permanent form of government, in a country as sophisticated and politically-minded as Chile. But .it is my contention that military rule is, inescapably, a necessary transitional phase in Chile, and that its harshness and duration are likely to be increased, rather than diminished, by American con- gressrn6n and others who wave big sticks from afar instead of offering constructive advice based on the realities- of the situation. Phrases like "invisible blockage" or "destabiliza- tion" that were used by liberals to describe. past American policy toward Allende might equally well be applied to current American policy toward Pinochet. An old friend, a senior man in the Chilean navy, .astonished me during a recent visit when he exclaimed, apropos of the Turkish decision to take over most of the American bases, that "I wish- that we-had so-me American bases. If we could do. what the Turks have done, Congress might begin to under- stand that if you kick your friends around for long enough, you won't have any left!" His outburst was provoked, of course, by the congr-. sional decision last year to block arms sales to Chile that were not negotiated before July 1, 1974 and to limit eco- nomic aid for Chile to an annual $25 million. The U.S. arms embargo means that the Chileans cannot even get ammuni- tion and spare parts for their American-made weapons, although a dozen F-5 fighter planes are still in the pipeline, with delivery expected to commence next March. The embargo hurts more than it would .have anyway since Congress, in its wisdom, did not decide to stop arms sales to Peru simultaneously. Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C03303946 Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C03303946 - .1440 vrare Corisider, for a morve!it, !ht. inor,-.1ity of the Chilean arms embargo. It seem: N c 1 st there arc only ty.aa irreproachable reasons for reftedigi weapons to someone. The fIrst is that he may one day attack you. This unlikely Cu be the case with Chile, unless you think that the Chilean navy�stung beyond forbentance�might one day send a flotilla steaming north to ;hell Teddy Kennecty' summer retreat. Second, you may not want to sell � arms to your friend's -enemy---although there will be C3SeS (as with Greece and-Turlrey, or N,,:typt and Israel) where both parties to a regional courhzt may be regarded as "friends." Now who is Chile likely to attack that could be regarded as a friend of the United States? Since Pi- nochers recent: hoot of shrewd diplomacy with President Banzer of Bolivia, there is only one country in Latin America v/P1-1 wi-lich Chile is li'Kely to tu to In any fu :Lire, and that is Pei-H. Peru inay not b as wholly committed to the Russians as is commonly sup- posed, but it has received more than 300 Soviet tank's, together with Communist instructors and other assorted. 'Communist weaponry (see below). If there is to be an- other "War of the Pacific," it is likely to he Peru that strikes first. We may wake up a few months from now to find that Congress' arms policy toward Chile has left it partly dis- armed in the face of an attack by possibly the most important Soviet prot� on the Latin American mainland. This is all the niore likely to happen if the Soviet bloc succeeds in its plot to have Chile suspended by the cre- dentials committee of the UN General Assembly in its current session, thus adding to Chile's international isolation. 'What really concerns the Peruvians is a secret accord between Chile and Bolivia whose eventual effect will be to supply the Bolivians_with tlr:ir long-desired corridor to the sea�through territory in northern Chile that is still claimed by Peru. As a first step, Bolivian soldiers are being allowed to supervise the transport of Bolivian imports via the Atacama-La Paz railroad. As a later step, General Pinochet is said to have agreed to build a new port north of Iquique for exclusive Bolivian use. A very minor, but revealing, We,ttion of the new Chilean-Bolivian. ententc was the sion from the recent se.:ortit edition of General Pi- noehet's hook Geopolfficx {written when he was a staff in- structor) of certain unflatteriug references to Bolivia's past territorial claims on Chile. These developments� hardly delight the Peruvians, who arc clinging to their own Century-old claim to Chile!. nitrate-rich 'northern prir:inces. The Peruvians are- also bound to think hard about the fact that they have been presented with an opportunity that is unlikely to be .re- peated. In -a year or so, Chile is- likely to have recovered from the worst of its current economic troubles and to have taken delivery of those F-5s, badly needed to match Peru's Mirage fighters. But, for the moment, the- 'Peruvians enjoy a 6 to 1 superiority in ground weaponry and a more than 2 to I stip-e..rierity in airc.raft. reAy t_o Id are just for decoration? The Russians have been Peru's biggest benefactors. Ac- cording to an authoritative secret list to which I have had access, the Peruvian army has taken delivery of 350 Soviet-made T-54 and T-55 tanks, seven Ciech-built. 122mrn field guns, 200 Yugoslav-made 105rnm mortars, 50,000 Kalachnikov rides, iwo batteries of SAM-3 and SAM-,6 missiles, and an unknown quantity of SAM-2 and SAM-7 missiles, The Russians have also begun delivery of a .con- signment of thirty Mi-a. helicopters. NLIKE the Chileans, the Peruvians have -no difficulty U shopping around. Uncle Sans appears to be less scrupulous about selling hardware to a proto-Communist dictatorship. than to an anti-Communist one. The Peruvians have taken delivery of eight of a consignment of 36 A-37-B planes, two four) "Guppy" class submarines, 84 (of 150) APC-113 armored cars, three (of nine) Grumman Tracker planes. They have also been negotiating the purchase of up to 16 F-5 fighter planes and one hundred tank transport vehicles capable of operating in the �kind of mountain country characteristic of eastern Chile. It is hardly stir- prising that the Chilean military are somewhat -embittered by this sales list. I have gone into some detail, because I' think that a full explanation of why American arms policy has been "business as usual" in relation to Peru, but not, in relation to Chile, is the least that the Administration-- and the U.S. Congress�owes to the government in San- . tiago. I used that dubious phrase "invisible blockade." Well, it is a pretty visible blockade in the case of the arms sales�. not to mention the fact that Chilean officers are no longer permitted to attend training courses in American defense institutions.. That is another minor stroke of genius. Some congressional staffers think that the Chilean military are "gorillas," and that they should be cut off from the educa- tional influences of the outside world. The Ford Foundation and some American universities seem 'to reason the same way. The Ford Foundation has decided to end grants to any- one working inside Chile (much to the chagrin of left-wing Christian Democrats as well as conservative academics) and confine its support to Chilean exiles. The University of California has severed its !inks with the University of Chile. Isn't it funny how the left liberals who promote "con- vergence" theories in relation to the Communist world:� i.e., Let's see more of then] and they'll become more like Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C03303946 OcTonsia 10, 1975 1107 Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C03303946 .Npio 1440 opposite when it comes to dealing vth a eou'utty7 'I :e or coarse, been no economic blockuile of the but American aid and credits have.hardly been mug- nanimous7-certiiinly not by comparison with what the so, Yiet bloc did for Allende. All in all, U.S. aid and credits to the juntu. during it two years prohahly total sonic S300 million, less than haif what the Warsaw Pact coun- tries doled out to Allende over his three years in office, And there have be..t.'n a few snags along the way. Robert McNamara at the Workl Li.tiik (a very busy man who is said to find time to meet we,Aly with a group of Chilean exiles) has been particularly reluctant to sanction credits for the junta. - rNrk: 1..S1 WORD abOLIt iN American ale in Chile. It SCe111;; to he a long-staading convention with the State Depart� nv_ult that Our Mao in. Santiago shoilid be temperamentally incompatible with the government to which he is accred- ited. Allfinde had to reckon with the shrewd conservative Nathaniel Davis; the junta has to contend with the liberal David Popper, whose past contretemps with Senator Joe McCarthy�and the fuss that was made about it at the time of his appointment�did not exactly help him to find his feet on the rather Manichean terrain of present-day Chile. His relations with the junta are notoriously frigid, and are not improved by the fact that the close liaison between. his political staff and left-wing Christian Democrats is an open secret. The mlitary seem to believe, rightly or wrongly, that the project of the U.S. Embassy�or at least an ele- ment within it�is to engineer the return to power of the Christian Democrats, "the American party," at the earliest possible opportunity. Many of the blunders committed in Chile might have been averted if the Americans�and some of. the West Europeans�had made a more sustained at- tempt-to offer practical guidance rather than try to resusci- tate a long-lost past. This much by way of introduction. The present condition of Chile, a country which I have grown to love and to which I feel a strong personal commitment, depresses me in many respects, and I am not going to pull any punches in describing where things have gone wrong, and where they -need to be changed. But the attempt to isolate Chile from outside aid and support, which will be pushed further at the UN this fall, can only�if successful�make condi- tions in Chile worse. To the extent that the United States is seen to be floating along with such a policy, it risks driving Chile into that ever-growing, stridently nationalistic lobby of nations for which terms like "right-wing" or "left- wing" become irrelevant. Pinochet is called a "fascist" not because he puts people in jail without trial, but because his government is anti- Communist and supports private enterprise. Velasco was trot called a "fascist," because he made anti-American and anti-capitalist speeches and was on good terms with the Russians. There is an easy, if unpalatable, option for the Chilean generals if, in the long run, the West fails them, and that is to catapult over to a Peruvian-style "national socialism" that would not greatly respect human rights and democratic principles but could count on Third World ap- proval. I shall return to this scenario in discussing the long- range political alternatives for Chile; it is one that d;!,1