CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/07/06

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03448309
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: September 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Publication Date: July 6, 1955

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6 July 1955
Copy No. 99
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. /2
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
LI DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE. 2Q./.__
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 11/2,Le REVIEWER
-
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
77/4
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Voroshilov invites Shah to visit USSR (page 3).
FAR EAST
2. Chinese Nationalists outline Chinese Communist military strategy
in Formosa Straits (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Viet Minh procuring military supplies in Moscow (page 4).
4. USSR may raise Vietnam election question at Big Four talks
(page 5).
5. Failure of Viet Minh spring harvest intensifies famine (page 6).
6. Indonesian army reported threatening action against defense min-
ister and chief of staff (page 6).
SOUTH ASIA
7. Indian military officers visit USSR (page 7).
LATIN AMERICA
Peron speech indicates continuing political stalemate in Argentina
(page 8).
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GENERAL
1. Voroshilov invites Shah to visit USSR:
Marshal Voroshilov, chairman of the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, has
written the Shah of Iran that the situa-
tion now seemed "most appropriate" for
the Shah to visit Moscow, according to Prime Minister Ala. Voro-
shilov stated that he and the Shah should seize on the opportunity
created by the "good effects" of the recent financial and border
agreement between the two countries to discuss subjects of mu-
tual interest, including economic matters.
The Shah told American charg�oun-
tree on 1 July that he felt compelled to accept the Soviet invita-
tion, and is seeking American and British advice on the best time
for the visit and the attitude he should take on questions that might
arise. He said he thought the sole purpose of the invitation was to
prevent Iran's adherence to a collective security pact.
Comment: Moscow may believe that
with major points of tension between the USSR and Iran now elim-
inated, conditions have improved for weakening Iran's Western
ties. Moscow commentators said during Nehru's visit to the USSR
that Soviet-Indian relations should serve as an example of the pat-
tern for friendly relations with Iran. Moscow can be expected to
stage a lavish display for the Shah and make offers of economic and
technical aid.
Moscow's gestures of good will will be
welcomed in Iran but are not likely to alter its pro-Western ori-
entation.
FAR EAST
2. Chinese Nationalists outline Chinese Communist military strategy
In. Formosa Straits:
Air and sea domination of the Formosa
Straits will be the next aim of the Chi-
nese Communists after the early comple-
tion of their five new east coast airfields,
6 July 5 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
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The Nationalists calculate that Peiping will attempt to isolate the
offshore islands by this means, while avoiding either an amphib-
ious attack or any possible conflict with American forces.
Activation of the coastal airfields will
also make possible Communist air attacks on Formosan naval
air bases crowded into a relatively small area in the western
part of the island,
Comment: The Communists will prob-
ably lose no time in occupying the coastal airfields and striving
to narrow Chinese Nationalist operations along the coast. The
Chinese Communists are expected_ to continue to defer major mil-
itary action in the Formosa Straits, however, pending their as-
sessment of the prospects for direct talks with the United States
and for an international conference on Far Eastern issues.
Peiping's propaganda has expressed
increasing impatience with American statements about both types
of possible talks, and the regime may decide that by increasing
tension in the area it can bring negotiations nearer.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3, Viet Minh procuring military supplies in Moscow:
i
the Viet Minh economi
delegation n Moscow
7
discussed the acquisition of sighting
mechanisms for ordnance, miscellaneous
'neering supplies, and military medi-
1 equipment.
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Comment:
Last fall Moscow sent a large military
staff to accompany its new ambassador to the Viet Minh, pre-
sumably to assist in long-range plans to develop Viet Minh mili-
tary capabilities. Maintenance of military strength remains a
salient feature of Viet Minh policy, despite severe economic prob-
lems that face the regime. (Prepared by ORR)
4. USSR may raise Vietnam election question at Big Four talks:
Geneva,
The feeling is growing among French
and British officials in Saigon that the
USSR will try to put the issue of all-
Vietnam elections on the agenda at
according to the American embassy in Saigon.
The embassy also notes an intensifica-
tion in the Communist war of nerves on the question of pre-election
consultations. According to a French official in Saigon, the Soviet
ambassador in Hanoi and the chief of the Viet Minh general staff,
as well as Vice Premier Pham Van Dong, have recently hinted at.
"violent action" in the south if pre-election consultations are not
begun by 20 July as specified in the Geneva declaration.
Comment: The final declaration at Geneva
stated that consultations on all-Vietnam elections will take place
between the competent authorities of the two zones "from 20 July
1955 onwards." Both the Communists and the French interpret this
wording to mean that talks must begin on 20 July.
Ho Chi Minh will arrive in Moscow about a
week before the conference at Geneva opens. The Viet Minh leader
and Chou En-lai, in public statements in Peiping on 26 June, called
for prompt pre-election negotiations.
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5. Failure of Viet Minh spring harvest intensifies famine:
The American consulate in Hanoi re-
ports extensive evidence that the famine
In North Vietnam is worsening. Viet
Minh government officials have engaged
In a rash of public self-criticism for collecting only 65 percent of
government rice quotas because of stiff opposition by the land-
owner class, which is "sabotaging agricultural reforms."
The emphasis on an expansion of acreage
under cultivation and restoration of the irrigation system has not
resulted in an adequate spring harvest. In addition, consumption
of not-fully-ripened crops by the starving population has accentuated
the continuing rice shortage.
The official Viet Minh paper said in an edi-
torial on 1 July that the people must solve their own agricultural
problems without foreign aid.
Comment: Collection of rice by the gov-
ernment regardless of peasant requirements is causing widespread
antagonism. A flood control central committee has been established
and measures have been instituted to revitalize rice collection and
the land reform program.
These emergency measures are not ex-
pected to remedy the famine, which is believed comparable to that
of 1945, when about 1,000,000 reportedly died of starvation. The
token aid being sent by the Sino-Soviet bloc, amounting to 30,000
metric tons of rice, does not compensate for the loss of rice sup-
plies from South Vietnam, which before Geneva amounted to about
200,000 metric tons of the north's supplies. (prepared by ORR)
6. Indonesian army reported threatening action against defense minis-
ter and chief of staff;
The Indonesian army has issued an ultima-
tuna to President Sukarno and Prime Minis-
ter Ali to dismiss Defense Minister Iwa and
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Chief of Staff Utovo by 6 July_
Comment: In view of the communiqu�
issued by senior army officers on 3 July proposing a conference
with the government to settle the crisis, there is some doubt that
such an ultimatum has been delivered. It is possible, however,
that army officers decided later that the conference proposal would
either be rejected by the government or would lead to protracted
negotiations which would fail to improve the situation.
They may also desire to force the issue
before President Sukarno leaves the country on 12 July for a month's
travel, which will include several state visits and a pilgrimage to
Mecca. Meanwhile, debates on the no-confidence motion in the pro-
Communist defense minister began on 4 July and are scheduled to
continue through 22 July.
SOUTH ASIA
7. Indian military officers visit USSR:
three Indian
army officers will soon visit the Soviet
Union to examine tanks and artillery items.
This visit follows offers made by the
USSR as early as December 1954 to sell tanks and jet aircraft to
India. The offers have not yet been accepted by New Delhi,
Comment: Air Marshal Mukerjee and
eight senior Indian air force officers were present at the air show
in Moscow on 3 July.
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Considering the present international
political climate, both the air force and the army are probably
quite willing to examine Soviet materiel and to investigate the
quantities and types of equipment the USSR would be willing to
provide.
It seems unlikely, however, that any
branch of the Indian armed services would seriously consider
buying considerable quantities of Soviet equipment because of un-
certainty regarding supply lines and the availability of this ma-
teriel in case of war.
LATIN AMERICA
8. Peron speech indicates continuing political stalemate in Argentina:
Peron's emphasis in his nationwide broad-
cast on 5 July on the need for an end to
"political strife" suggests he may fear
a ona o ence, especially as a result of action by labor to de-
fend his personal position� A similar motive may have been be-
hind his statements dissociating organized political opposition
parties from any blame for the revolt of 16 June.
The governmenth continuing delay in
announcing a new cabinet has probably contributed to general un-
rest and indicates that the behind-the-scenes struggle is still
unresolved. The military appears still dominant. The four new
cabinet ministers announced thus far are Peronista Party mem-
bers, but none is a labor leader, as was the formerly powerful
Interior Minister Borlenghi.
The status of other cabinet ministers
whose resignations were announced on 23 June is still not clear.
There are indications that demands of the naval forces at Puerto
Belgrano may be one of the factors delaying agreement between
the government and the military on unresolved political questions.
6 July 55 CURRENT INTELLAGENCE BULLETIN Page 8
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