CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/07/29

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
03448337
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
8
Document Creation Date: 
September 20, 2019
Document Release Date: 
September 26, 2019
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 29, 1955
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PDF icon CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15721993].pdf249.07 KB
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;eefj,/r,"-deied f=as;:1910;1; C034W17/3 4/r/ /3.5(c) 29 July 1955 Copy No. 99 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. evz NO CHANGE IN CLASS. Li DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C NEXT REVIEW DATE: __e0/ AUTH: HR 70-2 DATE: /LAW__ REVIEWER: _ Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TOP SECRET 'Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 CO3448337 Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448337 AIIlk Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448337 Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448337 ....11-4,4--.111.1-4 -NOV SUMMARY SOVIET UNION NEAR EAST - AFRICA 2. Egypt requests Saudis to open liaison office in Sudan to support its position (page 3). 3. Grandval expects solution to Moroccan dynastic issue within three weeks (page 4). EASTERN EUROPE 4. Comment on Tito 's 27 July speech (page 5). * * * * Newlaidanesian cabinet may be formed before Sukarno b return (page 7). 29 July 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448337 Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448337 Oh Ur SLCUta -411. SOVIET UNION 1. NEAR EAST - AFRICA 2. Egypt requests Saudis to open liaison office in Sudan to support its position: 29 July 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 �T-14P-cFeRFT Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448337 Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448337 "LA,11.E.. 1 Comment: Authorization for Saudi Arabia to open an office in the Sudan requires concurrence from Britain as well as Egypt. Establishment of a Saudi office in Khartoum would provide Egypt with an ally in its efforts to in- fluence Sudanese opinion during the coming session of the Suda- nese parliament, which will consider methods by which the Sudan will exercise self-determination. Cairo has recently doubled its broadcasts to the Sudan and is engaged in an intensive campaign to undermine Prime Minister Azhari's government because of its stand in fa- vor of full independence for the Sudan. 3. Grandval expects solution to Moroccan dynastic issue within three weeks: Resident General Grandval told American diplomatic agent Holmes on 27 July in Ra,bat that he expected to produce a solu- tion to the Moroccan dynastic issue with- in 4 ree wee . Grandval envisages the departure of Sultan Ben Arafa and his replacement with a regency council. These steps would be publicly approved by former sultan Ben Youssef and would be immediately followed by negotiations for the formation of a Moroccan government and the drafting of a constitution for a limited monarchy. Grandval admitted that pressure against his liberal program was growing in Paris and Morocco and named Marshal Juin as one of the opponents. He pointed out, however, that the real stumbling block was El Glaoui, who, though not strong with- out French support, could not be easily dropped and was capable of causing real trouble. 29 July 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448337 Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448337 " TOP SECRET Comment: Juin, backed by French industrialists in Morocco, is influencing El Glaoui to keep Arafa on the throne. Juin resigned early this month from the Faure government's top-level co-ordinating committee on North Africa, apparently because he could get no assurance that Arafa would be retained. The Moroccans are unlikely to accept a regency council without a guarantee of autonomy. EASTERN EUROPE 4. Comment on Tito's 27 July speech: Yugoslav president Tito in a speech at Karlovac on 27 July restated Yugo- slavia's policy of aloofness from power blocs and pointed up Belgrade's determination to pursue an in- dependent course, in co-operation with countries like India, Burma, and Egypt. His tone toward the West was sharper than that taken by any Yugoslav leader in recent months, while he demonstrated increasing confidence in his country's relations with the USSR. He made the strongest disclaimer to date of any fear of attack from the Soviet Union, citing this as the reason for his disinclination to emphasize the military aspects of the Balkan pact. Although he characterized President Eisenhower's 'blueprint" proposal as "unrealistic" and only an "ideal" at this stage, Tito made enthusiastic references to the President. Relations with the USSR and the West In his discussion of every subject, whether internal or international, Tito revealed a preoccupation with economic problems, particularly the worsening Yugoslav balance of payments position. He expressed more interest in 29 July 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 �P-iatk--Cr-=w Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448337 Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448337 1� la: -311� continuance of economic than of military aid from the West, but said that either kind must be given without strings, emphasizing that Yugoslavia will not alter its stand in the controversy over American inspection and supervision of the utilization of aid. Tito spoke with considerable gratitude of the Soviet cancellation of Yugoslavia's prewar debt of $90,000,000. All past claims, even Yugoslav ones for a far higher total for damages accruing from the post-1948 Soviet blockade, have apparently been wiped out. He contrasted Soviet generosity with West German unwillingness to reach an agree- ment on wartime debts and with Western insistence on large in- terest payments on past loans. Tito appeared to be trying to use what was in fact a rather academic concession by Moscow to show the West that he can bargain with both sides success- fully. Relations with the Satellites Tito charged that "certain men in the neighboring Satellites, . especially in Hungary" are not pleased with the improvement in Soviet-Yugoslav relations and are "in- triguing under cover" against Yugoslavia. He said they are tell- ing their followers that the Soviet gestures toward Yugoslavia are only a maneuver, and are still arresting men who favor friend- ship and co-operation with Yugoslavia. Tito charged that "these men," who ar- ranged false trials in the past and sentenced innocent men such as Lazio Rajk in Hungary to death, are afraid to admit their mis- takes and to follow a new path. "These men," Tito concluded, "will inevitably fall into their own political traps" and will not succeed in causing relations between the Soviet bloc countries and Yugoslavia to deteriorate again. Titob charges seem designed to test the intentions of Soviet leaders, in view of the promises they re- portedly made in Belgrade to bring about changes in the Satellites. This portion of the speech may have been prompted by his dis- satisfaction with the Satellites' caution in endorsing the Solviet- Yugoslav rapprochement, and particularly with the indications of renewed campaigns in Poland, Hungary, and Albania against "nationalist" deviationists within the parties. 29 July 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448337 Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448337 A TOP SECRET TA Tito appears to be aiming particularly at Hungarian party boss Rakosi, who played a leading role in the Corn- inform 's ouster of Tito in 1948. The Hungarian regime, in an ap- parent effort to cover Rakosi's position, after the visit of the Soviet leaders to Belgrade publicly blamed the imprisoned former security chief Gabor Peter for the deterioration in Hungarian-Yugoslav rela- tions. * * * * . New Indonesian cabinet may be formed before Sukarno's return: Indonesia's Vice President Hatta is try- ing to select a cabinet formateur and get a new cabinet accepted before President Sukarno returns from Mecca, Hatta has not indicated his reaction to a reported proposal by the army that it have a seat in the new govern- ment, but it is clear that no cabinet would succeed without army approval. (NOFORN) Comment: The possibility of a "business" or caretaker cabinet rather than the usual parliamentary cabinet has been frequently advanced by the former opposition parties. It would have a limited program--presumably holding elections on schedule and trying to settle the army crisis, and would have the additional advantage of not requiring Sukarno's personal participa- tion. 29 July 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 -MP crrRFT Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448337