CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/07/21

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03448344
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: September 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Publication Date: July 21, 1955

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21 July 1955
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE CHANGE IN CLASS.
LT1 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: IS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 20 /
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 11,4/60_ REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
99
/11A
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Soviet leaders reportedly promised Tito change in policy toward
Satellites (page 3).
2. Two high-ranking Soviet newsmen to visit Egypt (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Comment on Saigon riots (page 4).
4. USSR not to press for Vietnam-Viet Minh election talks now
(page 5).
5. Indonesian president temporarily strengthens personal position
(page 6).
THE FORMOSA STRAITS
(page 8,)
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GENERAL
1. Soviet leaders reportedly promised Tito change in policy toward
Satellites:
The Soviet leaders told Yugoslav presi-
dent Tito at Brioni that there would be a
change in their policy toward the Satellites,
but that time would be needed for this.
These Soviet statements were in answer to Tito's
stand that the further development of Yugoslav-Soviet relationships
depends on the Soviet attitude toward the Satellites,which would
serve as proof of the Soviet Union's real intention.
Comment: Since the Soviet visit, Yugo-
slav official statements have claimed that the Satellite-Soviet re-
lationships would inevitably change, but this is the first report of
any specific promise by the Soviet leaders.
While there has been no significant change
in the Soviet-Satellite relationships, the USSR has been reducing
the obvious aspects of some of its controls and attempting to make
the Satellites appear independent. The fundamental reliance of
the Satellite regimes on Moscow will allow the USSR to continue
to increase the use of more sophisticated controls, as has already
been evidenced by the dissolution of most of the joint stock com-
panies and the increased use of "co-operative" organizations to
co-ordinate planning.
2. Two high-ranking Soviet newsmen to visit Egypt:
D. T. Shepilov, member of the Soviet
-Communist Party secretariat and pre-
sumably still chief editor of Pravda,
recently told the Italian ambassador in
Moscow that he was leaving on 19 July
to attend the Egyptian liberation day
celebration on 23 July, according to the
American embassy in Moscow.
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A usually reliable source in Cairo re-
ports that N. G. Palgtmov, chief of the Soviet news agency TASS,
will also attend the Egyptian celebration. (NOFORN)
Comment: Prime Minister Nasr's invi-
tation to two of the highest-ranking newsmen in the USSR may be
the result of increased friendly Soviet-Egyptian contacts during
the past several months, especially in connection with reported
Soviet offers of economic, technical and military assistance.
Soviet propaganda media can be expected
to exploit the visit fully. A man of Shepilov's rank would be in a
position to invite Nasr for an official visit to the USSR. Similar
invitations have been issued to other heads of governments.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Comment on Saigon riots:
The rioting which broke out in Saigon on
10 July is an outgrowth of government-
sponsored demonstrations in connection
with an "anti-Communist week," which
was climaxed by the observance of 20 July--
the first anniversary of the Geneva agree-
ment--as a national "day of mourning."
During the riots, the most violent of a series
of government-sponsored anti-Communist actions, two hotels quar-
tering personnel of the International Control Commission were
sacked and the Indian chairman of the ICC reportedly was man-
handled. The commission has since claimed that the attitude of
the South Vietnam government is preventing it from functioning
and has decided to request instructions from Britain and the USSR,
the co-chairmen of the 1954 Geneva conference.
In promoting anti-Communist demonstra-
tions and condoning abuse of the ICC, the Diem regime appears to
be interested in enhancing its own popular support and in causing
a withdrawal of the ICC from Saigon.
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The rioting has placed the French in a
difficult position. Bound by the Geneva agreement to protect ICC
personnel, the French are faced with the dilemma of risking clashes
with the anti-Communist Vietnamese, or of being accused. by the
�CoMmunists of further violating the Geneva agreement.
Indian prime minister Nehru may hold
the Diem government responsible for the riots. This might re-
sult in a hardening of the attitude of Indian personnel operating
in Laos and Cambodia as well as in South Vietnam. India is not
likely, however, to jeopardize the Geneva agreement by with-
drawing from the WC.
There have been indications that Viet
Minh agents have been active among the demonstrators. The
Viet Minh will presumably contrast the situation in Saigon with
its own "co-operative" attitude toward the ICC and "faithful ad-
herence" to the Geneva agreement.
4. USSR not to press for Vietnam-Viet Minh election talks now:
Regarding the Indian proposal of 14 June
that the two co-chairmen of last year's
Geneva conference promote consultations
between the two Vietnamese governments
on the subject of elections, the USSR has informed Britain that
steps to carry out this proposal "might be postponed for the time
being" to allow the Diem and Ho Chi Minh regimes "an ampler op-
portunity for reaching an agreement on conducting negotiations in
accordance with the Geneva agreements." Britain is informing
the Soviet Union that it shares this view.
London had previously informed New Delhi
that it did not think a formal step such as suggested by India was
necessary.
Comment: The decision of the Interna-
tional Control Commission in Saigon to seek instructicos from the
USSR and Britain following the riots on 20 July will provide the
USSR an excellent opportunity to raise at Geneva the subject of
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Indochina in connection with a request for a conference on Far
Eastern questions later in the year. Soviet leaders apparently
are being very careful not to damage their negotiating position
before Far Eastern questions are discussed at Geneva.
Moscow's response to the Indian pro-
posal is in line with the mild tone of the Soviet-Viet Minh com-
muniqu�ssued in Moscow on 18 July. The Soviet attitude is in
contrast, however, with the earlier virulent Chinese-Viet Minh
communiqu�nd subsequent propaganda from Peiping and Hanoi.
The Soviet statement suggests that the USSR will not encourage
the use of force by the Viet Minh because of South Vietnam's re-
fusal to meet for pre-election talks on 20 July.
5. Indonesian president temporarily strengthens personal position:
Comment: There are strong indications
that the army is still dissatisfied with the All government and has
refused to accept its proposals for a settlement of the chief-of-
staff problem.
Promises by both the army and Vice
President Hatta not to seek a change in government during Sukarno's
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three weeks' absence probably influenced the president's decision
to leave the country and to state publicly that the army-cabinet
problem would soon be settled.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY
(14-20 July 1955)
THE FORMOSA STRAITS
Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group
for the Formosa Straits Problem
1. The military situation has remained quiet.
2. Peiping's propaganda has hinted that a continuation of
calm in the Formosa Straits will depend on whether progress is
made toward settling outstanding issues. Peiping radio has de-
nounced American statements which allegedly implied satisfac-
tion with a "de facto cease-fire."
3. While Soviet spokesmen have been calling in general
terms for a settlement of Asian problems, Peiping radio has
twice this week called explicitly for an international conference
on Far Eastern issues. Peiping has identified the main Issues
as those of Formosa, Korea and Indochina, arguing as usual that
all three can be solved if foreign troops are withdrawn and for-
eign military bases abolished.
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FORMOSA STRAITS SITUATION
Primary roads
Secondary roads
NAUTICAL MILES
5p lop 150
510 100 150
STATUT MILES
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COMMUNIST AIRFIELD LEGEND
USABILITY
DESIGNATIONS
PRIMARY: CONSIDERED MOST IMPORTANT IN AREA. WITH PREPARED
MIG.I5. IL.28 RUNWAY GENERALLY 5000 FEET OR LONGER.
SECONDARY: AUXILIARY OR EMERGENCY BASES. OR FIELDS OF LESSER
71_1.2, IL-10, LA-9/11, LI-2, ETC. IMPORTANCE. RUNWAYS GENERALLY LESS THAN 5000 FEET.
UNKNOWN CPERATICNAL ACTIVE BASE FOR MILITARY & CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT.
SOME BASES USED BY PISTON TYPES MAY BE 4SABLE A? JETS.
FIELDS NOT CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF
SUPPORTING SUSTAINED OPERATIONS SERVICEABLE. INACTIVE BASES CAPABLE OF USE BY AIRCRAFT
AT PRESENT
lir NATIONALIST AIRFIELD
UNKNOWN: CURRENT STATUS UNDETERMINED,
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