CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/08/14

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03448348
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: September 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Publication Date: August 14, 1955

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14 August 1955
Copy No. 99
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. 46
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
[I DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 20/0
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: REVIEWER
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
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CONTENTS
1. BASIS OF POWER IN SOVIET UNION MAY BE SHIFTING
(page 3).
2. COMMENT ON USSRS PLANNED REDUCTION OF ITS
ARMED FORCES (page 4).
3. CHINESE NATIONALIST ARMY LEADERS UNDER
SUSPICION BY REGIME (page 5).
4. COMMUNISTS MAINTAINING MILITARY PRESSURE IN
LAOS (page 6).
6. FRANCE'S REPORTED NEW MOROCCAN POLICY FACES
WIDESPREAD OPPOSITION (page 8).
7. OSLO AGREES TO AMERICAN INDOCTRINATION FLIGHTS
TO NORWEGIAN BASES (page 9).
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1. BASIS OF POWER IN SOVIET UNION MAY BE SHIFTING
The Communist Party's central com-
mittee, a moribund institution until
Stalin's death, has gradually increased
its power in the past two years until it
may now be a deciding factor in some high-level policy de-
cisions. The 125-man body comprises the top and second-
level leaders in all areas of Soviet life and in its new role
will facilitate the maintenance of stable leadership in the
Soviet Union.
Molotov was censured by a July central committee
plenum for the anti-Yugoslav stand he had vehemently ex-
pressed at an earlier plenum held just before Khrushchev
and Bulganin departed for Belgrade. Molotov used this
earlier plenum as a forum for presenting his disagreement
with other party presidium members, which suggests that
in this instance, at least, the central committee was called
upon to witness a disagreement within the presidium and
to choose between the alternatives posed.
the central committee's
actions lends credibility to an earlier story by Ralph Parker,
Moscow correspondent of the London Daily Worker, that
the January plenum held just before Malenkov's demotion
debated and decided the key economic controversy over
priorities to be given heavy as opposed to light industry.
Prior to this, disputes apparently were resolved in the
party presidium and an agreed position presented to the
central committee for formal approval.
Extension of some decision-making power
to the central committee, which represents a more inclu-
sive balance of forces than the party presidium, will tap
points of view and talents hitherto slighted in the Soviet Un-
ion and if continued and expanded will militate against a
return to one-man rule as a method of leadership.
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2. COMMENT ON USSR 'S PLANNED REDUCTION OF ITS
ARMED FORCES
The USSR's announcement that it plans
to reduce its armed forces by 640,000--
about 16 percent of estimated present
strength�will enhance the Soviet po-
sition at the forthcoming UN Disarmament Subcommittee
discussion. The reduction goes about half way toward
meeting the USSR's proposal of 10 May that armed forces
of all powers be reduced within one year by 50 percent of
the difference between the armed force level of 1954 and
an ultimate level of 1,500,000 for the United States, Soviet
Union and Communist China.
Other factors which may have contrib-
uted to the Soviet decision include (1) the trend toward
more powerful weapons in reducing the effectiveness of
mass armies; (2) the easing of international tension, re-,
ducing the requirement for large strategic reserves, and
(3) the labor shortage in the USSR, which would be eased
temporarily by the addition of this number of men to the
labor force.
The Soviet army is estimated to have
2,500,000 men; the navy 691,000; and the air force 800,000;
making a total, exclusive of security forceps, of an esti-
mated 3,991,000. It would seem unlikely that a signifi-
cant portion of the cut will be within the Soviet air force
or navy, since both of these have sizable requirements for
specialized personnel.
Some reductions may already have been
made under the retrenchment program of the Malenkov re-
gime.
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411
3. CHINESE NATIONALIST ARMY LEADERS UNDER
SUSPICION BY REGIME
The deputy commander of the Chinese
Nationalist army, Lt. General Chia
Yu-hui, has been under suspicion for
"several weeks" because he is known
s an associate of General Sun Liden,
arrest. According to a report from
the American military attach�n Taipei, no charges have
been brought against Chia, but he has been bypassed in
all official matters which are normally his responsibility.
Nationalist military personnel have
been ordered not to discuss the Sun case, but General
Chia and other friends of Sun have surreptitiously told
Americans they believe strict noninterference in the af-
fair is the best policy.
Comment General Chia is the second high-
ranking Nationalist officer reported
touched by the Sun case. The Matsu garrison commander,
Major General Hua Hsin-chuan, who served under Sun in
Burma during World War II, reportedly is under surveil-
lance.
These reports suggest a quiet purge
of General Sun's former associates and subordinates is
now in progress. Such a policy could be expected to dis-
hearten high-ranking Nationalist officers and through
them depress the morale of the entire military estab-
lishment.
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4101111
4. COMMUNISTS MAINTAINING MILITARY PRESSURE
IN LAOS
The American army attache in
Vientiane reports that there have
been several Pathet Lao attacks on
government forces in northern Laos
in the past two weeks. Efforts by
the International Control Commission to intervene and
prevent further fighting have been ineffective.
Comment
Political negotiations between the
Pathet Lao and the government regard-
ing electoral procedures and the administration of the two
northern provinces are deadlocked and may well break
down completely in the near future.
The Pathet Lao has frequently resorted
to violence to give emphasis to its position at the confer-
ence table, and the current attacks could be a prelude to
more intensive action in the event political negotiations
are broken off.
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6. FRANCE'S REPORTED NEW MOROCCAN POLICY
FACES WIDESPREAD OPPOSITION
The French cabinet's decision of
12 August on a Moroccan policy, as
reported by the press, does not ap-
pear to be the basis on which progress
toward a Moroccan settlement can be
made. Its instructions to Resident
General Gra.ndva1 that a preliminary
a emp �e ma e to have Sultan Mohamed ben Arafa form
a representative government which would negotiate with
Paris will not be accepted by the nationalists. If this
attempt fails, the cabinet reportedly ordered the forma-
tion of a regency council with Ben Arafa remaining on the
throne.
The French program appears to be
unrealistic in view of the widespread sentiment in Morocco
that Ben Arafa must be removed.
In addition to strong nationalist objec-
tions to Ben Arafa, the American consul general in Rabat
reports that the chiefs of four important Berber tribes and
the Rabat committee of the French Radical Socialist Party
urged on 12 August that the French government act on the
throne issue. The tribal chiefs also asked that Paris dis-
pel the "Glaoui myth," to the effect that the Berber tribes
are loyal to the sultan and El Glaoui, the pasha of Marra-
kech.
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7. OSLO AGREES TO AMERICAN INDOCTRINATION
FLIGHTS TO NORWEGIAN BASES
The Norwegian Foreign Ministry has
approved indoctrination flights of
American aircraft to the North Nor-
way air bases of Bodo, Bardufoss
and later Andoya, subject to advance flight clearances
by the US naval attach�ith the Royal Norwegian Air
Force.
Comment This is the first change in Oslo's con-
sistent opposition to the permanent
stationing or rotation of foreign troops in Norway during
peacetime. The proposed schedule would allow two
flights every three weeks by American planes based at
Keflavik, Iceland. Although the aircraft stationed in
Iceland are not under NATO command during peacetime,
they would be included in the event of war, and thus these
flights constitute NATO training.
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