THE ELECTION OUTLOOK IN EL SALVADOR

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05126553
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2016
• Case Number: F-2015-01950
• Publication Date: March 12, 1982

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
The Election Outlook
in El Salvador
Special National Intelligence Estimate
SNIE 83.1-82
12 March 1982
Copy 349
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SNIE 83.1-82
THE ELECTION OUTLOOK
EL SALVADOR
Information available as of 10 March 1982 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and
the Treasury.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
t-ft.EJ,
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KEY JUDGMENTS
We believe that the 28 March elections in El Salvador will take
place on schedule. Although a sudden shift in the balance of power
between the military and guerrilla forces, or a military coup, could
result in cancellation or postponement of the vote, neither appears
likely.
The vote is for a 60-member constitutent assembly that, on paper
at least, will have the power to reconstitute the political system
completely. The assembly will be empowered to draft a new constitu-
tion, appoint a new provisional government to replace the present junta,
and set dates for subsequent elections.
The -quality- of the voting on 28 March will be highly significant.
An election process perceived by most Salvadorans and foreign observ-
ers as legitimate could provide a turning point for El Salvador. The
legitimacy of the electoral process, of the assembly, and of the political
reforms it could set in motion will depend, however, on such factors as
voter turnout, the impact of violence, the manner in which the election
results are tabulated and announced, and international perceptions of
the process.
The guerrillas will try to disrupt the election with an escalating
series of military assaults and assassinations. They will probably try to
knock out electrical power and take over towns. They will attack
military outposts and interdict highways. We believe, nonetheless, that
the guerrillas are incapable of seizing and holding simultaneously a
large number of small towns or even a major city. Nonetheless, they
have the capability to launch widespread disruptive and violent actions
during the election period.
The violence will inevitably cause some voters to stay home, but it
is possible that the guerrilla campaign will prove counterproductive.
The extreme left and its international supporters will undoubtedly
denounce the election no matter what the outcome.
If the turnout is large and the electoral result is widely accepted as
legitimate, a blow could be dealt to the extreme left, isolating it and un-
dermining its internal support. The chances for success may be
enhanced by indications of increasing popular interest in the elections,
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by the presence of a large and diverse group of foreign observers, and
by the government's promise to hold fraud-free elections. Other factors,
in particular the threat of extreme leftist violence, will make such a
positive outcome uncertain, however.
It appears unlikely that any of the three major parties will emerge
with an outright majority in the assembly. While the Christian Demo-
crats are likely to win the largest number of seats, anything less than a
majority would leave them vulnerable to the conservative parties.
A Christian Democratic victory would be a strong affirmation of
the balanced political strategy the government has followed over the
last two years. It would also validate the Salvadoran military's efforts to
work with progressive civilians. A Christian Democratic landslide,
however, could exacerbate strains between the party and military
leaders.
There is a chance that a coalition between Roberto D'Aubuisson's
ultrarightwing National Republican Alliance (ARENA) and the conser-
vative National Conciliation Party (PCN) could emerge. A government
dominated by D'Aubuisson would be highly destabilizing; it would
remove moderate leaders from the political scene, isolate El Salvador
internationally, and probably boost the strength and credibility of the
guerrillas.
The most stable outcomes would be a narrow Christian Democratic
victory or a Christian Democratic coalition with the PCN. If the
Christian Democrats miss by only a seat or two, they could probably
strike a deal with individual PCN or other representatives. If Duarte
needs more than a few additional votes to form a majority, however, his
only likely remaining alternative would be to form a coalition with the
PCN.
The Salvadoran military will probably continue to support demo-
cratic processes as long as its critical interests are not threatened. It
would, however, move swiftly to prevent any civilian challenge to its
corporate identity and prerogatives. It would also seek to exercise a veto
over any negotiations between a civilian government and the guerrillas.
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DISCUSSION
The Electoral Process
1. With only about two weeks remaining before the
28 March elections in El Salvador, campaigning is
accelerating and violence is at high levels, as groups
across the political spectrum become more preoccu-
pied with the promise and perils of the vote. The
stakes are high for the political parties that have
fielded candidates and for the insurgent groups that
are trying to disrupt or abort the voting through
sabotage, intimidation, and guerrilla actions. The
stakes are high, too, for the military, which has stood
at the apex of political power in El Salvador for the
last 50 years, but which has promised to hold and
honor the elections and open the political system to
broader participation. Leaders of all these groups
probably recognize that the electoral process has al-
ready begun to alter the country's political landscape,
and that developments over the next few weeks could
result in decisive changes in the balance of political
forces.
2. Salvadorans are scheduled to vote for a constitu-
ent assembly that, on paper at least, will have the
power completely to reconstitute the national political
system. The 60-member assembly, with representa-
tives to be elected from each of the country's 14
departments (see map), will be empowered to draft a
new constitution, to appoint a new provisional govern-
ment to succeed the present four-man junta, and to set
dates for presidential and other elections. Its formal
authority will be so sweeping that it could confirm or
enlarge the junta, replace it with another, appoint an
interim president, or convert itself into a parliament.
Thus, if the elections are conducted without major
scandal or disruptions, the assembly will become the
official governing power in El Salvador soon after the
votes are counted, and the country will come under
the rule of popularly elected officials.
3. The -quality- of the voting on 28 March�
measured by the presence or lack of fraud, the size of
the vote, the impact of violence, the manner in which
the results are tabulated and announced, and other
intangibles�will be highly significant. An election
process perceived by most Salvadorans and foreign
3
observers present as legitimate could provide a turning
point for a nation that long has been wracked by
political fragmentation and polarization, and since
1980 by savage civil war. It could also deal a major
blow to the extreme left, isolating it and undermining
its sources of internal support. Legitimizing elections
would strengthen US interests and bolster democratic
forces in Central America and elsewhere in the region,
while reducing the appeal of violent methods and
groups. If, however, the elections are seriously marred
by violence, fraud, or low turnout, the legitimacy of
the process would be undermined.
4. The credibility of the elections will depend
significantly on their fairness and absence of major
fraud. They have been planned and will be supervised
by a three-man elections council, one member of
which was appointed by the governing junta, and the
others chosen by the junta from lists submitted by the
Supreme Court and the political parties. The election
law provides for poll oversight committees composed
of party representatives who may observe the voting
and the counting of ballots. The government has also
indicated that international observers may do the
same. Elections council chairman Bustamante claims
that 300 polling places with 4,500 voting tables will be
open. The government intends to set up voting stations
in 230 of the country's 261 municipalities and to
provide protection.'
'The election council has taken pains to prevent fraudulent
voting and irregularities in voting tabulations. Each ballot is num-
bered for purposes of ballot inventory control, and only those
properly validated are counted. The voter tears off the number
before voting, marks the party of his choice on the ballot, and drops
it into the ballot box. As the balloting proceeds, officials at each
voting table fill out report forms. Upon closing of the polls, the ballot
boxes are broken open, votes counted, and the results entered on
report forms. The ballots and the form�which is signed by elections
council representatives and witnessed by poll watchers�are sealed
in a pouch, which is then carried to the departmental elections
council. From there pouches are sent to council headquarters in San
Salvador. Furthermore, at the time the form is signed, the voting
table officials send a telegram with the results to the central council.
The telegram, however, will not be official; only the form represents
the official count. The council will use the telegrams on election
night to announce preliminary results. We expect that the extreme
left will try to disrupt these processes. The extreme right may also
attempt to do so.
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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