A SOVIET DIPLOMAT`S COMMENT ON THE LACK OF A SOVIET POLICY ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05140027
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2018
• Case Number: F-2016-02009
• Publication Date: July 28, 1971

DIRECTORATE OF
FLANS,
N sC -3 /
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� /1X-Ce�4 /
Intelligence Information Cable
STATONR DIA NMCC/MC
EV DO!
(SECOEF JCS ARMY NAVY MR) CIA/NMCC NIC
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the
transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, N
COUNTRY: JORDAN/ARAB STATES/USSR
DOI
SUBJECT; 1. A SOVIET DIPLOMAT'S COMMENT ON THE LACK OF A
SOVIET POLICY ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION
NSA
ROUTINE
IN 388849
PAGE 1 OF 5
SDO ONE CRS
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Espionage taws, Title 10, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, ths
onour
tftlafihd hem witomeik
'BACKGROUND USE ONLY
T FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
CITE
01ST 28 JULY 1971
ACQ
SOURCE :
2.
ON THE RESULT OF
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
COMMENTS TO THE SOVIET DIPLOMAT (b)(1)
(b)(3)
(A) THE FIGHTING IN JORDAN AND (B)
THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETINGS
(b)(1)
a-WM
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
A SOVIET DIPLOMAT (b)(1)
VEX INFORMATION ABOUT ((bb))((31))
(b)(3)
THE RESULTS OF THE FIGHTING IN JORDAN BETWEEN THE PALESTINIAN
NO FOREIGN DISS01,
SECRET
BACKGROUND USE ONLY
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IN
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(b)(3)
tBACKROUND USE ONLY(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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THE SOVIET COMMENTED TO A FRIEND
THAT THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT REALLY HAVE A SET POLICY ON THE
CONTINUE TO HARM THE GENERAL POLICY OF THE SOVIETS IN THE MIDDLE
PALESTTNIAN QUESTION, AND THIS DEFICIENCY HAS HARMED AND WILL
EAST. HE SAID THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION IS REALLY THE PRINCIPAL
QUESTION OF THE WHOLE ARAB LIBERATION MOVEMENT; WITHOUT A SOLUTION
TO IT THE MOVEMENT REMAINS PRECARIOUS AND UNSTABLE.
2, THE SOVIET (W(1)
(b)(3)
DIPLOMAT ASKED FOR INFORMATION SPECIFICALLY ABOUT THE FOLLOWING:
CA) THE RESULTS OF THE FIGHTING IN JORDAN AND WHICH
FORCES WERE USED;
CB) THE NUM ER OF PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE FORCES REMAINING
IN JORDAN;
(C) THE RESULTS OF THE PLO/EC DISCUSSIONS AND THE
RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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IN 38881+9
PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES
(b)(3)
BACKGROUND USE ONLY (1D)(1N
(1D)(3Y:
A. FOil TWO MONTHS, THE jAA HAD BEEN PREPARING FOR
BATTLE BY SURROUNDING THE FEDAYEEN AND HOLDING MANEUVERS IN ORDER
TO FORCE THE FEDAYEEN TO REPLY AND WASTE THEIR AMMUNITION. THE
ATTACK WAS BEGUN BY THE SECOND DIVISION, SUPPORTED BY TWO BRIGADES
OF ARMORED CARS, EIGHTEEN BATTERIES OF ARTILLERY, AND
TWO COMPANIES OF THE ROYAL GUARD PLUS A NUMBER OF PARACHUTISTS,
LED BY A PAKISTANI OFFICER.
B. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE FIGHTING, THERE WERE 3,500
FEDAYEEN AS FOLLOWS: 470 SA'IQA; 200 POPULAR FRONT FOR THE
LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP); 100 PFLP/GENERAL COMMAND; SO
POPULAR DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PDFLP);
300 PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY (FLA); THE REMAINDER (2,350) FROM
FATAH. THE JAA WAS UNABLE TO BREAK THROUGH THE FEDAYEEN LINES
UNTIL THE SECOND DAY OF FIGHTING, AFTER SUFFERING LOSSES OF
500 SOLDIERS KILLED AND WOUNDED AND 30 TANKS DESTROYED. THE
FEDAYEEN SUFFERED LOSSES OF ONE THOUSAND KILLED AND WOUNDED,
PRIMARILY AS A RESULT OF THE CONCENTRATED ARTILLERY FIRE, WHICH
CAME AT A RATE OF ONE SHELL PER SQUARE METER. IN ADDITION, 2,300
FEDAYEEN WERE TAKEN4PRISONER, AND 200 ARE MISSING.
C. AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE FEDAYEEN HAVE BUT ONE BASE,
AT GHOR
WITH 200 FEDAYEEN WHO HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO LAY. DOWN - THEIR.
NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
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(b)(3)
'BACKGROUND USE ONL(b)(1)
ougaelleattoo idioms ,ettitrela) (b)(3)
WEAPONS. THEY HAVE REFUSED, DEMANDING TO GO TO SYRIA WITH THEIR WEAPONS, TO REMAIN
WHERE THEY ARE, OR TO SURRENDER TO ISRAEL, RATHER THAN SURRENDER TO THE JAA. A FEW
MEN CONTINUE TO HIDE IN THE MOUNTAINS, AND SECRET CELLS EXIST IN AMMAN, AWAITING ORDERS
TO GO INTO ACTION.
3. CONCERNING THE PLO/EC MEETINGS, TWO POINTS OF VIEW EMERGED,
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
A. THE FIRST, PVT FORTH BY THE PFLP REPRESENTATIVE ON THE PLO/EC, WAS THAT THE
PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE SHOULD PROCLAIM THE OVERTHROW OF KING HUSAYN'S REGIME BY DECLARING
WAR ON HIM AND ENGAGING IN A SCORCHED�EARTH POLICY; MILITARILY, POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALL1
AND BY URGING ALL THE ARAB COUNTRIES TO BREAK WITH HIM, IN SUCH A WAY AS TO MAKE HIM
SUBMIT OR MAKE A PACT WITH ISRAEL.
B. THE OTHER PUT FORTH BY FATAH AND THE PDFLP, WAS THAT KING HUSAYN HAS
NO AUTHORITY OVER THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. THUS A PALESTINIAN GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE MUST
BE FORMED AS A PRELUDE TO A CLAIM FOR A PALESTINIAN STATE ON WEST BANK TERRITORY NOW
OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL. THIS PLAN IS SUPPOSED TO BE FAVORED BY UAR PRESIDENT ANWAR
SADATAND KINGFAYSA L.
.......THE FATAH REPRESENTATIVES, ESPECIALLY KHALIDHASAN'S WING, WERE
ANALy ENTHUSIASTIC.ABOUT THE IDEA THAT THE PLO/EC SHOULD OPT FOR A PALESTINIAN
STATE AND A GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE. HOWEVER, AFTER PLO/EC CHAIRMAN AND FATAH LEADER
5YASIRARAFATMET WITH SYRIAN PRESIDENT HAFIZASAD, THE SYRIAN POSITION WAS CLEAR5
4 4
5AND PRECISE AND DID NOT ENCOURAGE FATAH TO CONTINUE ALONG THOSE LINES. ASAD ARGUED 3
2
1THAT SUCH A STATE, BETWEEN ISRAEL AND A SOLD-OUT HASHEMITE REGIME, COULD NOT 2
SlullelkiiiLESS IT PLACED ITSELF AT THE DISPOSITION OF ISRAEL AND THE JORDANIAN 1
� OIC NO FOREIGN DISSEMi 1CKGROUND USE ONLY (b)(1)
(clattoktation) ccusiem controls)
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(elairittitagion) (afters cofttral)
(b)(3)
ACKGROUND USE ONLY (b)(1)
(b)(3)
REGIME. BECAUSE OF SYRIA*S POSITION, THE ISSUE OF A PALESTINIAN
STATE WAS LEFT UNRESOLVED, AND THE PLO/EC DECIDED TO UTILIZE
OTHER POLITICAL MEASURES IN ORDER TO EXERT PRESSURE ON JORDAN
AND THE VARIOUS ARAB COUNTRIES. AMONG THESE WERE:
� A. THE PLO/EC DECIDED TO HOLDAN INTERNATIONAL MEETING
IN BEIRUT, LEBANON, OF ALL THE NATIONAL AND PROGRESSIVE PARTIES,
INCLUDING FRIENDLY EUROPEAN AND ASIATIC SOCIALIST PARTIES,
IN AN EFFORT TO HELP THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE FIND A VIABLE
AND RADICAL SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN AND PALESTINIAN/
ISRAELI PROBLEMS
B. IN ADDITION, THE UNION OF PALESTINIAN WORKERS, IN
AGREEMENT WITH THE SYRIAN WORKERS FEDERATION, WILL HOLD A CONGRESS
IN DAMASCUS IN WHICH REPRESENTATIVES OF WORLD TRADE UNIONS WILL
BE INVITED TO PARTICIPATE., WITH THE SAME AIM OF MAKING THE
PALESTINIAN QUESTION BETTER KNOWN TO THE WORLD.
C. MOREOVER, IT WAS DECIDED THAT DELEGATIONS FROM
THE PLO/EC WOULD CONTACT ARAB COUNTRIES DIRECTLY IN ORDER
Ta EXPLAIN TO THEM THE PALESTINIAN VIEWPOINT, WHICH MUST DOMINATE
ANY SOLUTION TO THE MIDDLE EAST QUESTION.
5. DIS'SEM: CINCMEAFSA
REPORT CLASS: SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM,
BACKGROUND UyeatifT
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