MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT - USSR-EE

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05241477
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2016
• Case Number: F-2015-02129
• Publication Date: June 24, 1983

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #4613-83
24 June 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director qf Central Intelligence
FROM : Stanley M. Moskowitz
National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE
SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment - USSR-EE
1. Soviet Domestic Political Scene.
A. Discussion.
Andropov emerged from the Central Committee and Supreme
Soviet meetings with his authority enhanced, but he did not
make the major moves needed to fully consolidate his power.
This outcome lends itself to two interpretations. Most analysts
believe that Andropov is still operating under important political
constraints, may be handicapped by health problems, and lacks
strength in the all-important party apparatus. A minority
suscribe to the view that Ahdropov, satisfied with his gradual
consolidation of power and growing ability to dictate the
policy agenda, deliberately chose not to force the pace by
making top-level leadership changes.
B. Implications for Collection.
reporting prior to the plenum
indicated that Andropov was first among equals and that there
were factional disputes in the Politburo.\
Continued reporting on this subject is needed.
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Pre-plenum speculation about top-level military changes
did not pan out, but continued attention should be paid to
possible changes in the high command.
2. Soviet Perspective on the Kohl Visit to Moscow (4-8 July).
The pre-visit atmospherics have not been the best and
have probably dampened any Soviet hopes of breakthroughs with
the new FRG chancellor:
The Soviets wanted to label the visit an "official
friendship visit": but the Germans successfully
insisted that it be called simply a "working visit";
-- The Germans rejected the Soviet request for a joint
communique.
The Soviets probably still see merit in the visit, however,
since it will give them an opportunity to pressure Kohl as well
as to appeal to the West German public over Kohl's head. They
will portray themselves as aggrieved that the Soviet-German
relationship is not as good as they would like and express
fear that it will get even worse if NATO goes forward with INF
deployments. They will stress the advantages to Germany of good
ties by alluding to the possibility of economic deals, improved
intra-German relations, and possibly increased ethnic German
emigration from the USSR. Their main agenda item, of course,
will be INF. Although unlikely to make any major initiatives,
they may dangle a few teasers -- such as the possibility of
some limits on Far Eastern deployments, the physical destruction
of SS-20s, a low calculation of UK and British warheads which
would entail important Soviet reductions, and some compromise
moves on SRINF collateral restraints in which the FRG Foreign
Office has been particularly interested. At the same time,
the Soviets will probably profess a convergence of Soviet and
German interests in convening a Conference on Disarmament in
Europe (CDE) and making progress in MBFR (where the Soviets
are currently creating at least the impression of greater
flexibility on verification measures.) They will also
threaten to make life worse for the West Germans on all the fore-
going issues, if INF deployment is not stopped or, at least,
postponed.
Overall, though, neither side seems to expect much from
the visit. The Soviets will probably be satisfied if they can
make it a little harder for Kohl to carry through with deployment.
3. Afghanistan.
A. Discussion.
A brief update of the military situation led to the view
that the ephemeral impact of Soviet sweep operations may lead
to a reevaluation of Soviet strategy and tactics. On the
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diplomatic front, the Soviets are showing fewer signs of
flexibility than they did six months ago. There is little
reason to believe that the Soviets want out of Afghanistan
on anything significantly short of their own terms. But
the group engaged in a speculative discussion of what actions
we would expect to see if the Soviets decided to withdraw from
Afghanistan.
In the unlikely event that the Soviets were interested in
a negotiated withdrawal, analysts expected that the kind of
things Moscow might do iinclude:
-- Trying to ensure that the government remaining behind
in Kabul be as strong and as pro-Soviet as possible.
Broadening the political base of the Kabul regime.
Stepping up the UN negotiations by going into continuous
sessions.
Expanding the scope of the negotiations by drawing in
more parties (e.g., resistance elements, Iran, India).
Increasing their contacts with Afghan exiles in
Western Europe.
Suggesting to the Pakistanis that they would loosen
their ties with India if Pakistan decreased its support
to the Afghan resistance.
-- Begin shrinking the Soviet defense perimeter and
possibly move to partition the country.
-- Proclaiming victory in their domestic press so that
they could later claim their troops were no longer
needed.
After discussing the evidence, the group agreed that the
Soviets were currently making only one of the postulated
withdrawal moves -- attempting to strengthen the Afghan regime.
But since that action is also consistent with a staying-the-course
strategy, in isolation it cannot be considered an indicator of
withdrawal preparations. The group therefore concluded that,
press speculation to the contrary, the Soviets are not currently
preparing to leave Afghanistan.
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4. Poland.
A. Discussion.
Analysts were divided on the impact of the Pope's visit.
Most thought that it would revitalize resistance to the regime
while not leading to the lifting of Western sanctions that
Jaruzelski had hoped for. This would lead to renewed debate and
in-fighting inside the regime about the wisdom of allowing the
visit and how hard or lenient a policy to follow in the coming
months. But a few analysts argued that there would be no immediate
aftereffect of the visit: the government would not change policy,
the people would realize that the visit had been only a temporary
escape from the grim reality of Poland today, and that things
would go on much as they had before the visit. All analysts
agreed, however, that the visit demonstrated the government's
miniscule base of support and showed that a renewed popular
explosion was all but certain within this decade, the only
unanswerable questions being when it will occur and what the
catalyst will be.
Stanley M. Moskowit
ET
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