MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT - USSR-EE

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05241545
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2016
• Case Number: F-2015-02129
• Publication Date: October 21, 1983

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, k.205m
National Intelligence Council
NIC #7580-83
21 October 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE
SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment - USSR-EE
1. INF Watch
A. Discussion.
The Soviets seem perplexed about the tactics to follow as
their efforts to block US deployments seem increasingly futile but
they remain admantly unwilling to countenance even a limited US
deployment through an agreement. A month ago most analysts felt it
probable that the Soviets would soon attempt some major diplomatic
ploy, most likely combining some interruption of the talks with a
new reduction offer. Instead, the Soviets have now signalled that
negotiations can continue at least until US deployments begin and
passed up two major opportunities to make a new offer (the Warsaw
Pact Foreign Ministers meeting and the Gensher-Gromyko talks).
Consequently analysts are now split about evenly between those who
feel the USSR will not make any new offer and those who believe
there is still a better than ever chance that the Soviets will
unveil some new proposal between now and the FRG Bundestag debate
on 21 November. Those who posit Soviet passivity also tend to
believe that Soviet military countermeasures to NATO deployments
will consist mainly of publicizing long-planned force modernization
programs. The Soviets, however, are continuing to make threatening
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statements, with Soviet military leaders now chiming in but not
adding much precision to earlier Soviet admonitions. The most
explicit statement to date was made by General Chervov in an
interview with a West German magazine when he identified
short-range tactical missile modernization as one Soviet response
(read the Frog modernization program which started some time ago),
reiterated the threat to the US by saying the Soviets would deploy
missiles with a ten-minute flight time to the US, but ruled out
Cuba as a deployment site.
2. Romania:
A. Prospects for the Winter
The general calm throughout the country may be deceptive as
the regime has not been able to come up with a viable energy
strategy, is apparently implementing a differentiated wage policy
whose net effect may be decreases in take-home pay for most
Romanians, and has apparently reaped a crop diminished by drought.
These three negative developments will probably combine to decrease
creature comforts and increase dissatisfaction, whose form and
extent will be influenced by the severity of the winter. Overall,
Romania is likely to see more isolated demonstrations and strikes
of the sort which plagued the country last year. Although security
forces should be able to contain them, their occurence will cast
further doubt on the leadership qualities of Ceaucescu and may lead
to renewed, and possibly more pronounced, expressions of
anti-Ceaucescu sentiment within the politico-military-security
apparatus.
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3. Soviet Naval Diplomacy in the Indian Ocean
A. Discussion.
Since early this year the Soviets have moved to improve their
access to facilities in the PDRY, Ethiopia, and the Seychelles:
In the PDRY, according to one report they have sought to
acquire an air and naval base for sole Soviet usage; even if
that report is overdrawn, they have at the very least tried to
improve their access to PDRY facilities.
In Ethiopia, they either have or are in the process of adding
some 70 technicians to their permanent contingent in the
Dahlaks and may be seeking to obtain Ethiopian acquiescence to
a further build-up.
In the Seychelles, they are consolidating their ties with
President Rene. The most significant military development is
the initial Soviet usage of the island for refueling stops by
military transport aircraft, a privilege which they may seek
to expand into the right to stage reconnaissance flights, most
likely by IL-38s.
The short-term military significance of all these moves is limited,
particularly since Soviet naval operations in the Indian Ocean are
continuing to decline from the peak they reach in 1980. Over the longer
term, however, they reflect the Soviet determination to strengthen their
regional military posture.
The most significant issue to watch over the next six months or so
is the evolution of the Soviet relationship with Rene. Analysts were
unanimous in the judgment that the Soviets are striving to make Rene
increasingly dependent on them; but opinions were divided on how
successful they have been, with some analysts arguing that Rene was
manipulating them and thereby improving his leverage with the West.
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