SNIE 91-83 ARGENTINA: A TROUBLED TRANSITION[SANITIZED] - 1983/06/03

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05258663
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: June 3, 1983

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3.5(c)
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SNIE 91-83
ARGENTINA:
A TROUBLED TRANSITION
Information available as of 20 May 1983 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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CONTENTS
3.5(c)
Page
PREFACE 1
KEY JUDGMENTS 3
DISCUSSION 7
The Impetus for Elections 7
Weakness of the Current Regime 7
Support for Coup Lacking 7
Key Transition Issues 8
The -Disappeared- 8
Corruption and the Falklands War 9
Economic Mismanagement 9
Prospects 12
Party Politics 13
Likely Strategies and Outcomes 13
Stability of an Elected Government 14
Implications for the United States 17
ANNEX: MAJOR PARTICIPANTS IN THE TRANSITION PROCESS 19
The Peronists 19
The Radicals 21
Other Contestants 22
Organized Labor 24
The Private Sector 25
The Catholic Church 25
III
.00.4trOTT
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,setlicr
PREFACE
3.5(c)
Politically exhausted and discredited, Argentina's armed forces
have promised restoration of civilian rule. The transition, however, is a
troubled one. Seemingly intractable economic problems and civilian-
military disagreement over sensitive political issues aggravate an inher-
ently unstable situation. Moreover, there is some fear that a civilian
government may not be able to survive.
The Peronists, traditionally the country's dominant civilian politi-
cal force, are expected to win the elections scheduled for October. The
Radical Party, however, has a reasonable chance to obtain its first-ever
election victory over the followers of the late Juan Peron. In the
unlikely event that the transition process is aborted, there could be
severe consequences for US interests and bilateral relations with
Argentina.
This paper explores the dynamics of the transition to civilian rule,
as well as the implications for the United States of a Radical or Peronist
victory�or an aborted process.
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aserT
KEY JUDGMENTS
3.5(c)
The military in Argentina has initiated a transition process that in
all likelihood will produce a civilian, constitutional government by 30
January 1984, as promised. The armed forces recognize that they are
too discredited to retain power after seven years of rule that have
included human rights abuses, economic mismanagement, and loss of
the Falklands war. Even if President Bignone were ousted in a palace
coup, the transition is not likely to be derailed.
A minority of military officers might like to halt or extend the
transition period, but we believe they lack the necessary support in the
military and civilian sectors to do so. Any coup attempt would almost
certainly be short lived. A coup attempt that is not quickly aborted,
however, could trigger intramilitary violence with highly unpredictable
results.
Renewed military adventurism with respect to the Falklands
would not disrupt the transition. Another full-scale Argentine assault is
highly unlikely, and a more limited incident (such as a minor Argentine
raid or an accidental sea or air encounter) might rekindle Argentine
public passions but probably would not prompt civilian leaders to
accept halting or delaying the transition. The armed forces would also
be unlikely to use it as a pretext for doing so.
Military-civilian harmony during the transition and after a new
civilian government is installed will depend in large part on how several
key issues�including corruption, thousands of disappearances during
the antiterrorist campaign, and the political conduct of ,the Falklands
war�are handled. Armed forces leaders want to protect themselves
against personal or institutional retribution before turning over power.
Civilian leaders recognize the sensitivity of these issues but are wary of
the political consequences of being perceived as having struck a deal
with the military.
The elections on 30 October 1983 will be dominated by two center-
left parties�the Peronists and the Radicals. The Peronists are expected
to win, but they suffer from serious internal splits because of the lack of
a recognized successor to the late strongman Juan Peron. Radical hopes
for winning the election lie in a united effort behind Raul Alfonsin�a
lawyer who is appealing to the labor sector in an effort to supplement
his party's traditional middle class constituency. New voters will
rRET
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3.5(c)
account for as much as 30 percent of the electorate�a huge electoral
imponderable. These new voters form a pool from which Alfonsin must
draw support if he is to build his populist coalition.
Most other political parties tend to be small, provincial, and highly
personalistic organizations. None threaten the Peronists or Radicals
nationally, although some might provide marginal support to the major
parties in coalition efforts. Conservative political and economic interests
in Argentina lack an effective national party to articulate their views
and attract broad support. This critical weakness accounts in part for
the historical tendency of conservatives to rely on the military to protect
their interests.
Economic problems will almost surely dwarf all other issues facing
the new government. In 1982, inflation was about 200 percent, with the
trend accelerating; unemployment hovered around 10 to 12 percent,
and the foreign debt verged on $40 billion. As the election date
approaches, economic policy makers are likely to become increasingly
susceptible to pressures for expansionary policies rather than austerity.
The government probably will fall short of its IMF targets later this
year, but the IMF is unlikely to cut off aid�preferring to work out re-
vised terms with a newly elected government.
A new administration most likely would attempt to broaden its
support for economic recovery by incorporating key sectors�organized
labor, industry, finance, agriculture�into the policymaking process.
Nevertheless, if the victor wins less than a majority, as is likely, it will
have great difficulty abandoning the kind of populist, protectionist, and
redistributive policies that both parties traditionally have favored. A
civilian government also will be somewhat circumscribed by a continu-
ing heavy foreign debt service burden and the policy conditions
attached to new lending by the IMF and private foreign banks.
In foreign affairs, either party will continue to press for negotia-
tions with the United Kingdom over the Falklands issue, and to seek
better relations with Argentina's neighbors and Nonaligned states. The
Argentine-Soviet relationship�which has strengthened considerably
since 1980�will remain essentially the same under a civilian govern-
ment of either party. Buenos Aires will endeavor to maintain and
perhaps expand commercial relations with Cuba, the USSR, and Soviet
Bloc countries while attempting to minimize the risks of political
contamination. Leaders of both parties are anti-Communist, and la-
bor�which is sure to play an important role in the next government�
has historically opposed Communism and Soviet expansionism. Military
leaders probably will continue to reject Soviet offers to sell major
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oef CI 5
3.5(c)
weapon systems as long as Argentina retains access to Western arms on
acceptable terms.
Bilateral contacts with the United States probably will resume their
historical pattern of correct relations, marred by intermittent periods of
tension. Under the Peronists, and even more so if Alfonsin becomes
president, Argentina is likely to become less supportive of US policies in
Central America and more critical of US economic policy in the
hemisphere.
The continued preeminence of the Falklands issue for Buenos Aires
probably will cause problems with the United States. Argentina's
current test of faith is the willingness and ability of the United States to
pressure the United Kingdom into negotiations. With this a highly
unlikely development in the near future, bilateral tension is nearly
assured. In its attempts to drum up Falklands support in international
forums, Argentina is likely to trade votes on issues insignificant to
Buenos Aires but important to the United States, giving rise to a series of
bilateral irritants.
Given a successful transition, US interests are not likely to be
threatened directly, although US investment in the petroleum and
financial sectors might be exposed to some increased risk. In interna-
tional affairs, neither a Peronist nor a Radical administration is likely to
create threats to US security interests by aligning Argentina with the So-
viet Bloc and providing the Soviets with access to its port and base
facilities, or by pressing for the development of nuclear weapons.
Moreover, a civilian government will be less likely to pursue adventurist
military policies that would complicate US relations with the United
Kingdom or Chile.
In the unlikely event that the transition were aborted by rightwing
forces, US interests would be adversely affected. US condemnation,
mandated by US support of democracy in the region and the Argentine
transition in particular, would severely strain relations. The repressive
tactics such a regime would probably employ would create serious
problems over human rights issues. An extremely hostile environment
would be created for foreign investment, given the likely termination of
the IMF program, mounting economic difficulties, and a stridently
nationalist bent in ruling circles. Finally, regional peace might be
threatened if a nationalistic regime indulged in saber rattling over the
Falklands or the Beagle Channel in an effort to rally domestic support.
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Argentina
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3.5(c)
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ET 3.5(c)
DISCUSSION
The Impetus for Elections
1. Defeat in the Falklands war sealed the political
fate of Argentina's military government. The seeds of
that demise, however, were sown long before, particu-
larly in the form of economic mismanagement. The
Falklands debacle accelerated the move toward restor-
ing civilian rule by undermining the military's prestige
and its willingness to retain power in the face of
seemingly intractable economic problems and rising
political discontent. The postwar declaration by the
armed forces that they would cede power to an elected
civilian government in early 1984 merely constituted
public recognition that they were too discredited to
retain power.
Weakness of the Current Regime
2. The fundamental dilemma of the armed forces
and the Bignone administration is one of managing a
transition from a position of pronounced weakness.
With their legitimacy exhausted and their credibility
at a post-1976 nadir, the ability of the armed forces to
structure a retreat that satisfies their political prefer-
ences and protects their institutional interests is ques-
tionable. Moreover, President Bignone lacks a personal
power base, and this makes him vulnerable and
dispensable. Both military and civilian supporters of
the transition, however, are willing to retain him
because he has identified himself unambiguously with
the transition.
3. Military efforts to run the government are com-
plicated by both intraservice and interservice rivalries.
The intraservice problem remains but is less critical
than it was in the immediate aftermath of the war
when discontent in the ranks�especially in the
Army�prompted frequent rumors about command
shakeups. The selection of new commanders, the
retirement of many senior officers in the Navy and the
Air Force, and the concentration of efforts on institu-
tional recovery have produced a more settled, al-
though far from quiescent, atmosphere within the
individual services.
4. Traditional interservice rivalries and animosities
also were exacerbated by the Falklands war. Interserv-
ice coordination is slow and inefficient, and unseemly
battles between the services almost inevitably surface
in the press, further undermining the military's image
and credibility. The Army, however, remains the
dominant service. It is particularly important, there-
fore, that Army Commander Nicolaides now appear to
be in control of his troops, supportive of Bignone, and
committed to a successful transition.
Support for Coup Lacking
5. A large majority of general officers in all three
armed services support the transition�or at least are
resigned to it�and we have no evidence that the
widespread dissatisfaction that led to pressure from
the lower ranks for command changes after the Falk-
lands war has been redirected in favor of blocking the
transition.
6. Nonetheless, support for prolonged military rule
can be found among a minority of officers at all levels.
Their varied reasons include:
� Fear that military institutions and individuals
will be vulnerable to retribution under a civilian
regime.
� Philosophical opposition to a democratic.
government.
� Expectation on the part of rabid anti-Peronists
that the followers of the late Juan Peron will win
again.
� Desire to retain the lucrative sinecures in state
companies.
7. A coup attempt by a small coterie of disgruntled
officers would be unlikely to succeed. Not only would
their numbers be insufficient, but other critical ele-
ments would be missing, such as a high degree of
interservice coordination and a receptive or passive
civilian environment. The situation would probably be
7
S EfoliT
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ET 3.5(c)
reminiscent of the aborted effort by the Air Force to
oust Peron's widow from the presidency in December
1975. Such an incident would have little impact on the
military's commitment to the restoration of civilian
rule.
8. Rumors about more broadly based coup attempts
persist and usually revolve around:
� Alleged negotiations between union elements
headed by labor chieftain Lorenzo Miguel and
Army colonels loyal to General Nicolaides direct-
ed at the kind of labor-military alliance that
Peron rode to power in the period 1945-46.
� A -1,000 days- plan that allegedly involves low-
and middle-ranking Army officers plotting with
unspecified civilians to extend the transition
process through two 500-day phases.
Civilian and military support for such plots is lacking,
however, and they probably would have little chance
of success.
9. Similarly, we do not expect that renewed adven-
turism with respect to the Falklands would derail the
transition. The lack of interservice cooperation and
coordination, along with other clear military deficien-
cies, makes another full-scale assault on the islands
highly unlikely. Also unlikely, but more probable,
would be a limited incident that might result from an
accidental encounter with UK ships or aircraft; a
junta-approved action designed to nettle the UK de-
fense forces; or a unilateral action undertaken by a
single Argentine service�most likely the Navy. A
minor incident of limited military consequence might
rekindle Argentine public passions over the Falklands
but would not be perceived in civilian circles as
sufficient reason to terminate or postpone the transi-
tion process. Any hint that the government might use
such an incident as a pretext to do so would probably
provoke widespread civilian protests.
Key Transition Issues
10. Military reticence about the transition in part
reflects anxiety over unresolved issues in which signifi-
cant military interests�institutional and individual�
are at stake. Chief among them is responsibility of the
armed forces for abuses committed during the anti-
terrorist campaign, especially disappearances. Other
sensitive matters include the political conduct of the
Falklands war, the Beagle Channel dispute, corrup-
tion, and economic mismanagement, including the
staggering growth of the foreign debt.
11. Armed forces leaders feel vulnerable on these
issues and want them dealt with before the turnover of
power creates an environment in which public pres-
sure for investigations and punishment would be hard
for a civilian government to resist. Potential civilian
heirs to the presidency also have an interest in early
resolution. Such sensitive issues would threaten to
destabilize any new government by provoking almost
immediate problems with the armed forces.
The "Disappeared"
12. It is on the -disappeared- issue that the armed
forces feel most exposed and least able to compromise.
The dimensions of the problem remain unclear. While
estimates vary as to the number of persons missing as a
result of 1975-79 counterterrorist operations, the fate
of perhaps 7,000 to 10,000 people is probably in-
volved. Most of them probably died at the hands of
security forces personnel.
13. The prospect of massive, Nuremberg-style retri-
bution triggers military anxieties. Armed forces leaders
refuse to apologize for their counterterrorist methods
and are committed to protecting their personnel from
any sort of judicial processing for alleged abuses. To do
otherwise would not only risk internal rebellion but
seriously blemish the only outstanding success of post-
1976 military goverment�the triumph over terrorism.
14. The junta document on the counterterrorist war
released on 28 April was primarily an attempt to calm
fears within military ranks about possible future pun-
ishment. It was issued amidst an ever-increasing
stream of media revelations about abuses and accom-
panied by an -Institutional Act" apparently intended
to assign military courts exclusive jurisdiction over
military personnel accused of "dirty war- crimes.
Although the junta stated that no further information
would be published, the document contained no de-
tailed data on disappearances and little new informa-
tion on any facet of the war.
15. Predictably, the report was strongly condemned
by representatives of all nonmilitary sectors. Moral
indignation inspired much of the criticism, but a large
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measure of political opportunism was also present as
campaigning politicians benefited from another
chance to blast the military for its sins. There remains
a strong possibility that the junta will issue an amnesty
law before the elections, It will probably be necessitat-
ed by a belief within the armed services that the
"final- report and "Institutional Act- do not provide
adequate protection for personnel who were involved
in the counterterrorist effort.
16. Until the last year or so, most civilian political
leaders treated the "disappeared- issue with extreme
caution, when not avoiding it entirely. It was left to
human rights organizations to demand from the armed
forces an accounting for those allegedly missing. As the
transition process began to unfold, demands for such
an accounting became common coinage among critics
of the military from political parties, labor unions, the
Church, and human rights groups. Most political party
spokesmen are still somewhat cautious, however. A
position that is appropriately outraged�although
vague on solutions�is an essential weapon in the
arsenal of any presidential aspirant. A candidate who
adopts an inflexible stance, however, could quickly
become trapped after he is elected. If he compromises
he will lose some measure of civilian support, but if he
demands action and alienates the armed forces he
might provoke a coup attempt.
17. The cautious civilian stance probably reflects a
fairly accurate assessment of public attitudes. Counter-
terrorist excesses are not widely condoned. They are
perceived, however, as the unavoidable byproduct of a
struggle forced on the country by subversives. Most
Argentines probably believe that moral imperatives
dictate some form of accounting for abuses but not one
that would involve a detailed public exposure of
events or retribution against numerous military and
security officials.
Corruption and the Falklands War
18. Pressure on Bignone and armed forces leaders
on the issues of corruption and political conduct
during the Falklands war�the decision for invasion
and the conduct of mediation efforts�comes from
military as well as civilian sources. While the "disap-
peared- issue serves to unify the military, these two
issues are divisive. Among senior officers, the prevail-
3.5(c)
ing disposition is to close ranks, promise investigations,
and protect members from individual penalties. On
the other hand, many midlevel officers and apparently
a substantial number of colonels would like to purge
the armed services of the corrupt and incompetent.
Such sentiments generate periodic coup rumors, par-
ticularly from within the Army. The sense of griev-
ance may be fairly widespread, but the discontent
lacks the focus and leadership necessary to force
dramatic corrective action by the military leadership.
19. From the civilian politician's perspective, criti-
cism on these issues is a cheap, effective, and indis-
pensable component of any politician's antimilitarY
rhetoric. Nothing need be proven. The bad political
judgment displayed in the Falklands invasion and in
the subsequent failure to negotiate a settlement before
humiliating military defeat is obvious. Corruption is
taken for granted by a cynical Argentine public.
Media revelations involving the alleged misdeeds of
prominent military officers are all the more satisfying
because of repeated military pretensions to moral
superiority.
20. Nevertheless, civilians will be cautious about
attacking specific military figures or promising specif-
ic and dramatic reprisals that could only serve to sour
relations with the armed forces. Criticism of the
military has escalated sharply from all quarters during
the transition, but military tolerance is finite. The
closing of several periodicals and an early February
display of junta pique accompanied by threats of legal
action reminded the civilians that some restraint was
still necessary.
Economic Mismanagement
21. Long before the Falklands defeat sealed the
military's political fate, armed forces rule was being
undermined by obvious economic failures. Passive
acceptance of military rule was turning into active
opposition as groups largely quiescent since 1976
began displaying opposition to official economic poli-
cy. So intractable did the problems appear that, even
before the war, many officers preferred abandoning
power to continuing an apparently fruitless struggle to
manage difficult economic problems.
22. The early years of military rule had brought
domestic economic improvements under the guidance
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of Economy Minister Jose Martinez de Hoz. Policy
reforms restored growth and halved inflation. Good
world markets boosted earnings from agricultural ex-
ports, thereby helping to overcome payments prob-
lems. After 1979, however, excessive dependence on
the exchange rate mechanism to dampen inflation
produced a seriously overvalued peso, led to internal
market distortions, and laid the foundation for future
balance-of-payments problems.
23. Since late 1979, Martinez de Hoz and his
successors have been guilty of the kind of sharp policy
turns and reverses that have exaggerated Argentina's
economic difficulties over the years. In 1982 alone,
policy shifted from a somewhat promising stabilization
effort before the war, to a more populist, expansionary
thrust in the wake of defeat, to the moderate austerity
efforts now being implemented under Economy Min-
ister Jorge Wehbe. With these policy gyrations, the
economic disruption occasioned by the war, and the
impact of global recession, 1982 marked a second
straight annual drop in gross domestic product
(GDP)-5.5 percent�coupled with accelerating infla-
tion (about 200 percent for the calendar year). Foreign
debt, which expanded rapidly after 1979, stood at
about $38.7 billion at year's end. (See charts of
economic indicators.)
24. Wehbe, who took over in August 1982, gradual-
ly tightened monetary policy and introduced reforms
designed to slow inflation without provoking an un-
manageable political backlash. In simplest form, his
approach involves subsidizing domestic industrial re-
covery through export taxes on agricultural production
and a combination of rebates for industrial exports and
controls on industrial imports. This scheme is support-
ed by daily minidevaluations of the exchange rate
pegged to the difference between rates of internal and
external inflation.
25. Wehbe's chief successes to date have been
refinancing and restructuring Argentina's foreign
debt, tasks not yet completed. The refinancing pack-
age is composed of a $1.1 billion syndicated bridge
loan, about $2.2 billion in IMF facilities ($1.65 billion
standby agreement and $570 million in compensatory
financing), a $500 million BIS bridge loan, and a $1.5
billion midterm private bank loan still being negotiat-
1 0
3.5(c)
ed.' The Central Bank is also renegotiating payments
schedules on $6 billion of 1982 public-sector principal
arrears and $8.7 billion in 1983 maturities. If all the
pieces fall into place, the debt profile will be altered to
one in which a large part of the debt that would fall
due in 1983 would not be due until 1987 or later.
26. Wehbe's task will not get easier during the
remaining months of the transition. Political uncer-
tainty and the government's weakness will inhibit
consistency in policy implementation and discourage
foreign and domestic private investment. His room for
maneuver will also depend upon the aggressiveness
with which a renascent labor movement forces its
wage demands. Should the unions threaten social
peace through massive strike activity, political consid-
erations will take increasing priority over economic
ones in the decisionmaking process. Finally, Wehbe
has no solid political base even within the armed
forces, where Air Force critics of his efforts have been
vocal at times. His most solid leverage consists of
continued Army support and general acceptance of
the need to maintain IMF financing by making an
earnest effort to comply with agreed guidelines.
27. Wehbe's susceptibility to pressures from various
quarters was evident in early 1983 when labor and
military sectors forced acceptance of Argentina's first
unemployment insurance program. Subsequently, in
March, dissatisfaction within the military and else-
where over surprisingly high inflation figures for
January (16 percent) and February (13 percent) forced
Wehbe to accept a price controls scheme that features
subsidized interest rates for participating businesses.
28. Oscillation between such ad hoc expansionary
measures and maintenance of Wehbe's established
program to meet IMF requirements will probably
persist throughout the transition. In the last quarter of
the year, as the military's tenure winds down, the
government will probably be less resistant to expan-
sionary measures. Given the economic consequences
of political uncertainty, it is reasonable to expect about
a 2-percent recovery in production during 1983, with
inflation ranging between 200 and 300 percent. Rec-
ord grain exports and continued import restraints
' Completion of negotiations on the $1.5 billion loan is being
delayed by an Argentine prohibition on the remittance of profits by
UK banks�a measure passed during the Falklands war.
e tri
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...0SECZET
should permit a reduction in the current account
deficit to about $1 billion, a shortfall that can be
covered if the projected debt refinancing package is
completed.
29. Argentina complied with agreed guidelines for
the first quarter of its IMF agreement (see inset) and
may do the same for the second-quarter review in
June but will probably fall short of some internal
targets as the election approaches. If for any reason the
government should feel forced to cancel the accord, it
could trigger a highly negative series of events. A
likely withdrawal of new foreign lending would force
a sharp drop in imports and economic activity, further
stimulating inflation. Eventually Argentina would
probably be forced to declare at least a temporary
moratorium on all debt servicing, including interest.
Argentina's IMF Agreement
Buenos Aires concluded a 15-month stand-
by agreement with the IMF in February. In
return for $1.65 billion in IMF assistance and
commercial bank lending support, the Ar-
gentines promised to implement the reforms
to improve the country's economic perfor-
mance. Under the terms of the agreement,
Buenos Aires promised to reduce the public-
sector deficit from 14 percent of GDP in
1982 to 8 percent this year and limit credit
expansion to 170 percent. The government
also agreed to raise interest rates, public-
sector tariffs, and wages and to devalue in
line with the rate of inflation. The stabiliza-
tion program hoped to achieve 5-percent
real growth this year, while reducing infla-
tion to 160 percent and halving the current
account deficit to $1 billion, but they are
incompatible targets.
Prospects
30. The chances that Argentina will reach elections
on 30 October and a restoration of civilian rule on 30
January 1984 are perhaps 85 percent at this point.
With the election timetable established, momentum in
favor of the transition will continue to build through
12
3.5(c)
out the year. Elements opposed to elections may
become increasingly anxious and desperate as the date
approaches, but they will find it increasingly difficult
to generate widespread support for stopping a process
so near completion. (See inset.)
),IrefET
Implications of a Coup Attempt
While we judge the possibility of a success-
ful coup to be low, a coup attempt that is not
swiftly put down could produce several high-
ly undesirable situations. Among them:
� An all-out struggle for control in the
armed forces, including violent con-
frontations, during which the civilians
would remain on the sidelines.
An apparent victory by antielection
military sectors that would provoke ac-
tive and eventually violent civilian
resistance.
� In the highly unlikely and worst case
event, a violent intramilitary clash in
which civilian sectors would choose
sides, leading to a complete breakdown
of law and order.
In all these cases the outcome would be
highly unpredictable. Particularly in the
worst case, opportunities might be created
for the emergence of a new military strong-
man, for decisive action by well-prepared
extremists of the right or left, and for med-
dling by foreign interests.
Opportunities for Soviet interference
would increase given the collapse of law and
order, but Moscow's in-country resources
would be limited. The Argentine Communist
Party (about 50,000 members) has no work-
ing-class base and is not violence prone. It
repudiated those involved in the subversive
violence of the 1970s and, as far as we know,
has no clandestine cache of weapons. It is
viewed as nonthreatening by the military,
which excluded the Communists from a
1976 ban on parties advocating the violent
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overthrow of the government. Few of the
violence-prone revolutionaries who fled the
country in the 1970s have returned to Argen-
tina, and the labor movement's staunch anti-
Communism makes it an unlikely Soviet
proxy. Perhaps the best Soviet hope, there-
fore, would lie in the possible emergence of a
leftist or reformist military clique from
among young officers, something akin to the
group that led Peru in the early 1970s. To
our knowledge, however, such a group cur-
rently does not exist.
31. Argentina's civilians are returning to power by
default. The popular mood is clearly antimilitary, but
the array of civilian alternatives provokes only limited
public enthusiasm. Despite the deaths of the nation's
dominating civilian caudillos, Juan Peron and Ricardo
BaIbin, political parties are offering little that is new in
terms of personalities or rhetoric. Thus, there is little to
allay the cynicism of an Argentine electorate inured to
repeated civilian as well as military failures in govern-
ment. In 1973, at the close of the previous military
government (1966-73), many Argentines entertained
hopes that an older and wiser Peron might somehow
mold a consensus that would permit political stability
and economic growth. The Peronist debacle of 1973-
76 smashed those illusions. Today Argentines prefer
civilian to military rule, but they view the transition
without exaggerated expectation.
Party Politics
32. The contest among political parties for the
presidency and control of lesser seats of power will
soon begin in earnest, once internal party reorganiza-
tions and the process of selecting candidates for the 30
October elections are completed. To date, the political
game has been played on two levels. On one level, the
contest pits all civilians against the military as all
aspirants to office seek to validate their antimilitary
credentials. The second level of politicking involves
intraparty contests.
33. The antimilitary campaign has been coordinat-
ed in part through the Multipartidaria, a five-party
coalition that includes the country's two major parties,
the Peronists and the Radical Civic Union, along
3.5(c)
with three small parties. The coalition serves the
interests of its members by emphasizing their common
opposition to military rule and providing a vehicle for
authoritative expressions of dissent. However, the im-
portance of the Multipartidaria has faded in recent
months and will continue to do so as the electoral
campaign sets the coalition members against one
another.
34. At stake in the intraparty battles is control over
the reorganized parties and nominations for offices
from the presidency down to provincial and local
posts. These battles are particularly intense within the
Peronist and Radical camps, in part because of the
deaths of Peron and Balbin. Personality conflicts and
ideological tensions long held in check by their domi-
nating paternalism have been unleashed in the inter-
nal struggles in both parties.
Likely Strategies and Outcomes 2
35. The elections will be a Peronist-Radical affair
with the Peronists the favorite if they patch up their
internal differences. A united Peronist effort should
elicit strong support in traditional Peronist constituen-
cies such as urban labor, small and middle-size busi-
ness, the bureaucracy, and proponents of strongly
nationalist economic and international policies. For
good measure, the Peronists will probably work out
deals with small parties such as the Movement for
Integration and Development, the Popular Conserva-
tive Party, and the Christian Democrats. None are
important enough to be labeled swing groups, but each
could provide marginal support for the Peronist presi-
dential ticket.
36. Radical hopes for defeating the Peronists lie in a
united effort behind Raul Alfonsin. He alone among
Radical aspirants has the potential to appeal beyond
historical Radical constituencies and make a dent in
Peronist domination of the labor vote. Alfonsin pro-
jects a populist image domestically. His outlook on
international affairs is skewed by a pronounced anti-
US bias. He views -imperialism- as responsible for
many of the hemisphere's economic, social, and politi-
cal problems and firmly believes Argentina has been
victimized by domestic speculators and foreign
bankers.
See the annex for a detailed discussion of the political parties
and other major participants in the transition process, such as
organized labor, the private sector, and the Catholic Church.
ArRET
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37. To have a chance, an Alfonsin campaign will
have to be extremely well organized and financed. He
must court the labor vote in the industrial suburbs of
the Federal Capital that fall into the Buenos Aires
Province voting area, even though he will surely lose
to the Peronists there by a wide margin. He will have
to make up the difference in the other three key
voting areas, the Federal Capital itself, Cordoba Prov-
ince, and Santa Fe Province (see map on page 6). It is
more important to Alfonsin than to the Peronists to
seek extraparty alliances. Dozens of small parties will
eventually crowd the ballot, and many will seek a
deal, offering to support the Radical or Peronist
presidential ticket in exchange for major party support
for their provincial slates.
38. Parties on the right and left of the political
spectrum cannot mount a serious national challenge to
the Peronists and Radicals (see table). Although a
conservative coalition was able to capture 15 percent
of the vote in the 1973 elections, the absence of a
national conservative party to give institutionalized
expression to conservative political and economic
views remains a critical weakness in Argentina's party
system. In the October contests, center-right aspirants
will be further handicapped by the support lent to
post-1976 military governments by prominent civilian
conservatives. The nonviolent left is equally divided
and doomed by its inability to shake Peronism's grasp
on labor's vote. Revolutionary groups have no constitu-
ency, and parties advocating violence are outlawed.
39. If there is a true swing group in the elections, it
may be those who have come of age since 1973 and
will be voting for the first time. New voters may make
up as much as 30 percent of an electorate roughly 18
million strong. It is difficult to gauge the impact of the
1973-76 Peronist period or the ensuing years of mili-
tary rule and repression on the political perceptions
and preferences of new voters. If to this group are
added those who have had only one opportunity (1973)
to vote in a presidential contest since 1964, the sector
of the electorate for which we have no reliable voting
history jumps to well over half. The new voter pool
may open avenues for Alfonsin and the Radicals in
traditional Peronist constituencies, and it should at
least increase the -undecided- vote from which Alfon-
sin must draw to build his new coalition.
3.5(c)
40. The presidential contest will be governed by
procedures established in the 1853 Constitution�that
is, a single vote with an electoral college system. This
would appear to favor the party most likely to gain a
plurality, the Peronists. At present, an electoral law
governing the apportionment of congressional seats has
yet to be decreed. Both the Peronists and Radicals
favor granting the victorious party an automatic ma-
jority in the Congress. The smaller parties, of course,
are insisting upon proportional representation
formulas.
Stability of an Elected Government
41. The stability of a civilian regime is already a
matter of discussion in civilian and military circles.
Implicit in the concern being voiced is the fear that
any civilian government's chances will be undermined
by the absence of fundamental change in the country's
political structure, behavior, and attitudes. This con-
cern is well placed, particularly given the difficult, if
not crippling, economic situation a civilian administra-
tion is likely to inherit.
42. Relations With the Military. The armed
forces will not abandon their self-arrogated mission as
the nation's ultimate political arbiter. Under the best
of circumstances, they would reconcile themselves to
constitutional subordination to civilian authority, and
the civilians would avoid gratuitous and demagogic
antimilitary rhetoric that would inhibit cooperation
with the armed forces after the elections. Neither of
these conditions will be fulfilled entirely. However,
the stability of the new civilian government will be
improved to the degree that they are met.
43. Civilian-military tension will persist, with po-
tential flashpoints in the form of issues that might still
be pending such as the -disappeared,- corruption, and
mismanagement of the Falklands war. Barring an
immediate and egregious challenge to military inter-
ests, however, the new civilian authorities should enjoy
at least a temporary respite from coup pressure.
Conspirators will find it difficult to muster support
until the civilians have had a chance to succeed.
Likewise, given the current level of military disrepute,
potential COUP plotters will probably see the wisdom of
a low military profile for a time while military leaders
attend to professional tasks and the resurrection of the
military's public image.
SE ET
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Argentina: The Political Spectrum
3.5(c)
Parties (1983)
Performance in March 1973 Election
Organized Support Groups L.
Grouping
Vote (%)
Right of center
Popular Federalist Forces (FUFEPO)
Conservative coalition headed
14.9
Argentine Industrial
Confederation of the Republican
by Federal Party leader Man-
Union (UIA): particular
Center (including Alsogaray's
none.
representatives of businesses
Center Democratic Union).
Three other conservative
5.75
with international
Federal Party
candidates
connections and markets
Democratic Party
Argentine Rural Society
Conservative Party
Progressive Democrats (PDP)-
Democratic Socialists (PSD)
alliance
Center to center left
Peronists
Peronist coalition (FREJULI)
49.59
Peronists: vast majority of
Christian Democratic Federation b
including MID, PCP, and
unionized labor, including
Popular Conservatives (PCP)
Movement for Integration
and Development (MID)
part of Christian Democrats
CGT-A, CGT-RA, "62 Or-
ganizations"; small and medi-
um-size businessmen once
represented by defunct Gen-
eral Economic Confederation
(CGE)
Radicals (UCR)
UCR
21.3
UCR: small minority of
organized labor; university
students
Left
Intransigent Party (PI)
Coalition headed by PI leader
7.43
Communist Party (PCA)
Socialists (several splinters)
Alende and unofficially
including proscribed PCA
Popular Leftist Front (Fir)
FIP
0.9
Radical left
Socialist Workers Party (banned)
Coalition headed by
0.6
No organized in-country
Montonero Peronist Movement
Socialist Workers
support groups..
(banned)
Party
Revolutionary Communist
Party (banned)
a The elections are too far off to have prompted declarations of support for candidates or parties from most existing organizations or from
those that will be founded to assist campaigns.
b An uneasy alliance, some factions of which belong closer to the center or center right of the political spectrum.
c Although we have few details on their numbers and intentions, some Montonero exiles have returned to Argentina in recent months.
Some of these have been captured or killed.
44. Economic Policy. Economic problems will al-
most surely dwarf all other issues facing the new
government as the civilians inherit the military's lega-
cy. Pressure for Quick results will be great, perhaps
reflecting expectations generated by imprudent cam-
paign promises.
95. Party platforms have yet to be drafted, but
there is scant evidence of innovative thinking among
the Radical or Peronist economists. In most cases, their
analysis is based on the assumption Argentina is an
extraordinarily wealthy country whose potential re-
mains unrealized because of either the unwitting
mismanagement of incompetents or, more often, the
conspiratorial actions of international interests (Rocke-
feller, et al.) and their domestic accomplices (Martinez
de Hoz, et al.). With free market policies again
discredited, they argue, the state must intervene to
ensure both economic justice and economic independ-
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RET
ence. There are variations on this theme, reflecting the
sophistication, experience, and general political out-
look of various proponents. The basic assumptions
remain unchanged, however, and will manifest them-
selves in the policies of a Peronist or Radical
administration.
46. The options available to a new administration
will depend in part upon the dimensions of the
winner's victory margin. A Peronist or Radical govern-
ment inaugurated after winning less than a majority of
the popular vote, as is likely to be the case, will have
great difficulty abandoning the kind of populist, pro-
tectionist policies which, despite specific variations,
both parties favor. There is a small chance that the
Peronists might win a majority of the popular vote.
The strength of the resulting mandate would open
more policy options, and in the past Peronist adminis-
trations have implemented austerity programs when
forced by economic realities to do so.
47. A civilian government's options will also be
somewhat circumscribed by the continuing heavy debt
service burden and the policy conditions attached to
new lending by the IMF and private foreign banks.
These constraints could be circumvented by an indefi-
nite moratorium on all debt principal and interest
payments. Such a course, however, would risk default
actions by creditors and would cut off Argentina from
any foreign credits for some time. We do not believe
that economic conditions will be so bad in January
1984 as to make such a dramatic initiative appealing
except to an extraordinarily weak civilian government
denied access to foreign financial support.
48. The more likely scenario envisions a Radical or
Peronist administration entering office on the basis of
an electoral plurality and attempting to broaden sup-
port for economic recovery by incorporating key
sectors�organized labor, industry, finance, agricul-
ture�into the policymaking process. Policy directions
are likely to reflect the populist, statist, distributionist
tendencies these parties have demonstrated in the past.
The current IMF agreement will expire soon after the
new government takes office. We would expect that
the civilians' effort to negotiate a new agreement
might curb somewhat their temptation to rely heavily
upon import restrictions, export subsidies, exchange
controls, and generally protectionist policies.
16
3.5(c)
49. Neither the Peronists nor the Radicals question
the positive role of the domestic private sector or
foreign investment -properly" controlled. Neverthe-
less, foreign financial and petroleum interests will
probably take a rhetorical beating in the election
campaign and would be the most likely targets for
punitive action if a civilian government felt the need
to validate its nationalist credentials. Otherwise, the
most probable development is a new foreign invest-
ment law that would be a compromise between the
unrealistic restraints contained in the 1973 Peronist
legislation and the very relaxed conditions established
by the military since 1976.
50. Foreign Affairs. In international affairs, the
Peronists and Radicals would probably pursue very
similar paths:
� Concentration on the Falklands issue with a
stance little changed from that of the current
government.
An emphasis upon connections with Nonaligned
Movement countries and relations with Latin
American neighbors.
� Correct relations with the United States, but with
a tendency to adopt the role of critical Latin
American spokesmen on matters such as US
policy in Central America and US international
economic policy.
� The maintenance of commercial relations with
Cuba, the Soviet Union, and Soviet Bloc coun-
tries. The tendency with the Soyiets will be to
protect Argentina's trade interests by expanding
bilateral relations in peripheral areas (for in-
stance, civil aviation, technical assistance) where
the Argentines believe they can minimize the
risks of political contamination.
51. Leaders of both major parties are anti-Commu-
nist and will be wary of Soviet intentions toward
Argentina. Peronists are always quick to point to their
historical domination of the labor movement as the
key to preventing Communist inroads in Argentina.
Elected civilians, along with armed forces leaders, will
remain resistant to Soviet offers to sell arms. Only if
Argentina is denied access to desired Western arms is
the military liable to purchase major Soviet weapon
>alb
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3.3(b)(1)
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systems. The Argentines will, however, continue to
-play the Soviet card--that is, hint at the availability
of Soviet weapons in order to broaden their access to
Western materiel on acceptable terms.'
Implications for the United States
52. US interests in Argentina are not likely to be
significantly affected by the installation of a new
civilian government whether it be Peronist or Radical.
However, private US investment in the petroleum and
financial sectors might be exposed to some increased
risk, and troublesome differences are likely to arise on
some issues.
53. In international affairs and forums, a civilian
government's likely policy direction will produce dis-
agreements with the United States, but neither Peron-
ists nor Radicals are liable to create direct threats to
US security interests by aligning Argentina with the
Soviet Bloc and providing the Soviet military with
access to its port and base facilities.
59. The Falklands war added new and important
elements of uncertainty regarding Argentina's long-
range nuclear plans. Suspicions about its ongoing
research notwithstanding, the existence of a dedicated
nuclear weapons program has not been confirmed.
Any civilian government will probably continue Ar-
gentina's efforts to develop a complete nuclear fuel
cycle independent of safeguards and to exploit the
country's nuclear achievements for international and
domestic political gain.'
55. Bilateral affairs will probably resume their his-
torical pattern of correct relations, marred by inter-
mittent periods of tension. Policymakers will profess
allegiance to Argentina's Western, Christian traditions
and acknowledge the need for good relations with the
United States. However, Argentine actions will often
reflect more immediate concern for gaining support
3.5(c)
on the Falklands, winning or maintaining commercial
advantages, and being perceived as independent from
the United States.
56. Immediate disagreement with the United
States, especially if Alfonsin becomes president, is
likely to arise over:
� Central America, with Argentina probably as-
suming a stance similar to that of the Socialist
International.
� Hemispheric economic affairs, on which Argenti-
na will probably become a more outspoken critic
of alleged US misdeeds.
57. From the US perspective, bilateral relations will
be complicated by the lack of leverage with which to
influence Argentine policies and policymakers. None
of the likely civilian successors will feel particularly
obligated toward the United States, and US influence
with the Argentine military is likely to remain mini-
mal because of the Falklands war and the prolonged
prohibition on US military assistance and sales.
58. The Falklands will remain the crucial issue for
Argentina, and there would appear to be little the
United States can do to satisfy Argentine desires. US
support for resolutions in the UN and OAS in late 1982
improved the acrimonious postwar atmosphere. How-
ever, Argentina's new test of faith is the willingness
and ability of the United States to pressure the United
Kingdom into negotiations. With this a highly unlikely
development in the near future, the Falklands issue
will continue to be a source of bilateral tension. In the
meantime, it will cause peripheral problems as Argen-
tina drums up Falklands support in international
forums by trading votes on issues insignificant to
Argentina but perhaps important to the United States.
Votes running counter to US interests could produce a
series of bilateral irritants.
59. The US ability to influence the lending prac-
tices of international financial institutions and US
commercial banks provides some leverage over Argen-
tine policymakers. Recognition of this fact tempers
anti-US sentiments in some civilian circles, although it
is not likely to be a policy determinant on internation-
al matters considered important by the Argentines.
Perceived US influence in this area can also become a
liability should it become necessary to urge compli-
c
S T
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ance with international obligations on a besieged
Argentine Government. Anti-US sentiment could be
aroused easily if the United States were portrayed or
perceived as the lobbyist of the international bankers,
encouraging austerity measures at the expense of the
Argentine working class.
60. In the unlikely event that the transition process
were aborted by a rightwing military coup, the effect
on US interests would be adverse and substantial:
� Bilateral relations would be severely strained by
a strongly negative US reaction to termination of
the electoral process that would be dictated by
RET
3.5(c)
US support for democracy in the region and the
Argentine transition in particular.
� Repressive tactics likely to be employed by such
a regime would probably bring renewed prob-
lems over human rights.
� Peace could be threatened because a nationalist
government might turn to saber rattling against
Chile or the United Kingdom to rally popular
support.
� Opportunities for meddling by the Soviets would
increase if there were a severe breakdown of law
and order.
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vatic
ANNEX
3.5(c)
MAJOR PARTICIPANTS IN THE TRANSITION PROCESS
The Peronists
1. On the basis of past performance, the Peronists
enter the campaign favored over their only real rivals,
the Radicals. Juan Peron's heirs, however, are bur-
dened both by the legacy of the 1973-76 Peronist
failure and the absence of a recognized successor to
the late strongman. Under Peron's domination, Peron-
ism was a -movement" rather than a traditionally
styled party. It was a collection of heterogeneous
elements that paid obeisance to Peron and a vaguely
defined ideology that emphasized working-class wel-
fare and political and economic nationalism. In fact,
Peronism was what Peron proclaimed it to be at any
given time. Through a rigid hierarchical or verticalista
structure, Peron maintained a secure grip on the
movement and consciously prevented the emergence
of potential competitors to leadership.
2. Ideology plays little role in the battle among the
pretenders to Peron's mantle. Small groups at the right
and left extremes of the movement are unimportant.
They have little influence in the leadership contest
and may or may not choose to remain under the
Peronist umbrella during the elections.
3. The real contest is a power struggle among
aspirants who generally represent the mainstream of
the movement but are divided into two general tend-
encies over issues that have historically plagued
Peronism:
� Democracy versus autocracy in internal party
procedures.
� Confrontation versus cooperation with a sitting
military government.
4. The verticalista or orthodox wing is composed
of those who stuck most closely with Peron's widow,
Isabel Peron, during her abbreviated presidency (July
1974-March 1976). They continue to profess loyalty to
her as Juan Peron's legitimate heir and probably
control most of what still exists of the traditional party
machinery. Since 1976 the verticalistas have consist-
ently opposed accommodation with the military gov-
ernment and sometimes opted for confrontation. In
the labor sector, verticalistas control the so-called
Argentine Republic faction of the General Confedera-
tion of Workers (CGT-RA) and the -62 Organiza-
tions," a political caucus of orthodox union bosses.
5. The antiverticalistas or self-styled moderates
are the political if not linear descendants of the so-
called Neo-Peronists of the 1960s, While Peron was
still alive, they were attempting to structure a move-
ment that would advocate traditional Peronist policies
but without the suffocating domination of Peron, who
was then in exile. Currently, moderates emphasize the
need to institutionalize and democratize Peronism, to
respond to the will of the rank and file. Since 1976, the
moderates have been less strident than their orthodox
counterparts in criticizing the military. In particular,
their labor wing, the Azopardo faction of the CGT-A,
has regularly collaborated with armed forces leaders.
6. There is no clear favorite among contenders for
the Peronist presidential nomination. Nor is there
much in terms of ideology or programs that distin-
guishes one from the other. Antonio Cafiero is the best
19
.S.3.pftleT
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Antonio Cafiero
Peronist Verticolista
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-.sear
positioned of the verticalistas. A veteran Peronist
campaigner, a former Economy Minister (1974-75),
and a moderate on both domestic and international
issues, Cafiero is able and experienced but lacks the
public presence and charisma that could set him apart
from the field.
7. In the moderate camp, the situation is muddled
by the fact that the most logical and perhaps most able
candidate, Angel Federico Robledo, is a victim of
Parkinson's disease. His fellow moderate Raul Matera,
a 67-year-old neurosurgeon, has also been unofficially
proclaimed a candidate by one of Peronism's many
factions. Matera enjoys a good public image, but he is
not considered presidential timber in Peronist leader-
ship circles.
Raul Matera
Peronist Moderate
8. If continuing indecision leads to the selection of a
compromise candidate, halo Luder may be the best
bet. A former President of the Senate and Acting
President of Argentina (1975), Luder has been closer to
the orthodox wing of Peronism in the past. He has,
however, avoided acerbic confrontation with the mod-
erates and might be acceptable to them if the nomina-
tion process were deadlocked. Luder is impressive in
Halo Luder
Peronist, possible
compromise candidate
for presidency
3.5(c)
Within the
pparty,ubli
he suffers from an aversion to the folkloric and
demagogic aspects of Peronist campaigning (that is,
mass rallies with the traditional Peronist drums, songs,
and rhetoric). Luder's fortunes will have received a
substantial boost if there is truth in reports concerning
support for his campaign from military sectors that are
convinced the Peronists will win and prefer Luder
among Peronist contenders.
9. Uncertainty about the role of Peron's widow and
successor confuses the Peronist scene. Isabel Peron has
maintained a studied political silence during recent
years of exile in Spain, but speculation continues in
Buenos Aires about her return and possible candidacy.
10. Despite Peronist demands that her political
rights be restored, it is highly doubtful that any of the
party's presidential contenders want Isabel Peron to
resume an active political role, at least until the
candidate selection process is completed. She has few
political talents, bears a grave responsibility for the
1973-76 disaster, and would probably exacerbate dif-
ferences rather than unite Peronists. If and when
agreement is reached on a Peronist ticket, she could
exert a positive influence by endorsing the candidates
and campaigning on their behalf.
11. The Peronist electoral program will probably
offer traditional party positions. On domestic issues,
the emphasis will be upon a central role for the state in
resolving social and economic policies. In the econom-
ic area, the Peronist candidate will make a whipping
boy of former Economy Minister Jose Martinez de
Hoz (1976-81) and his alleged efforts to enrich domes-
tic speculators and international financiers. To the
degree that specific remedies are advocated, emphasis
will probably be placed upon protection for domestic
industry and income redistribution favoring the work-
ing class. There is no significant support in Peronist
ranks for either debt repudiation or an assault on
multinationals, although foreign investors in highly
visible and symbolic areas, such as financial entities
and petroleum development, may take at least a
rhetorical beating.
The political proscription levied against Isabel Peron in 1976 by
the governing junta has been lifted, but she is still legally barred
from holding office as a result of a conviction in a civilian court
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Streit
12. The Peronists foreign pidicy plaiiks will proba-
bly include:
� Emphasis upon nonalignment. reflecting Juan
Peron 's vaunted third position between capital-
ism and (fommunism.
� Special emphasis upon closer relations with Ar-
gentina's Latin American neighbors.
� Onitinuation of the drive for favorable diplomat-
ic solutions to the Falkland Islands and Beagle
Channel disputes.
� Need for restructuring the international econom-
ic system.
� Maintenance of the strategy of exploiting Soviet
Bloc commercial opportunities while avoiding
pilitical contamination.
� Good relations with the United States.
The Radicals
13 The Radical Civic b nion (UCH) provides the
only serious national competition for Peronism. As the
self-sty led option to Peronist populism and conserva-
(ix e-military fraud and repression. Radicalism is going
through a process of redefinition as internal sectors
compete to inherit the controlling influence formerly
exerted by Ricardo Balbin. Pitted against one another
are the parties' two main factions�the Movement for
Renovation and Change and the National Line�
and the two men ho have emerged as their respec-
tive standard bearers. Raul Alfonsin and Fernando De
Im Rua. Smaller party factions must look for opportu-
nities to parlay their limited support into influence on
one side Or the other.
Raul Alfonsin
Standard bearer of
Radical faction the
Movement for Renoration
and Change
3.5(c)
Fernando De La Rua
Standard bearer of
Radical faction the
National Line
14. The most charismatic of a lackluster crow d if
presidential hopefuls. Alfonsin is a middle class law yer
who tried to move the Radicals to a more populist
stance while Balbin was alive. Fle began early w ith a
well-organized and financed campaign that his Na-
tional Line competitors have not been able to match or
blunt. January and February polls commissioned by a
Buenos Aires news magazine attested to Alfonsin's fast
start at least in greater Buenos Aires Not only was he
the favorite candidate among those polled. but the
results also showed the Radical Party leading the
Peronist Party
15. The traditional party machinery is largely in
the hands of the National Line bosses. who clearly
view :Alfonsin as something of an interloper Alfonsin,
therefore, is reaching beyond the traditional b (Li
constituency, attempting to mold a nelN
populist coali-
tion through an appeal to center-left elements in all
parties. young people, intellectuals, those looking for
anyone who might beat the Peronists. and. 11101
crucially, the Peronist bailiwick of industrial labor. Ad
hoc alliances with small provincial parties also 1(4111
part of the strategy. Vbithin (:R ranks. Alfonsin has
increased his chances by accepting Victor Vlartinez as
his running mate and thereby securing support from
the Cordoba line. the party 's third-largest wing
16. Alfonsin's antimilitary credentials are impecca-
ble. His illectiage On domestic issues is populist and
short On specifics, although he fits w ell yi ithin the
mainstream of Latin American social democracy. Ilis
outlook on international economic and political affair'
is skewed by a pronounced anti-US [Has and a tenden-
cy' to see conspiracies. Ile views -imperialism- as
responsible for many of the hemisphere's economic.
social and political problems and firmly believes
Argentina has been victimized by domestic speculators
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and foreign bankers who have drained the nation's
wealth with the connivance of the military-conserva-
tive governing alliance. Thus, while Alfonsin professes
to welcome multinational activity in what he terms
productive sectors, he would almost surely place se-
vere restrictions on financial firms. On the debt
question, Alfonsin's perceptions have resulted in a
pledge to pay public-sector foreign debt and private-
sector obligations which debtors can prove were con-
tracted legitimately.
17. The National Line is the Balbin wing of the
UCR, but his death left his lieutenants in disarray and
Alfonsin free to seize the initiative. Only in the
January-February period did De La Rua emerge as
the National Line's alternative. A former national
senator and vice presidential candidate, De La Rua
was the UCR's rising young star during the 1973
elections. The beneficiary of youth (46) and a carefully
cultivated Kennedy-like image, De La Rua represents
the traditional UCR moderate, middle class interests.
Although he is an attractive public figure and will
enjoy whatever grassroots support the traditional party
machinery can engender, it is doubtful that he can
overcome Alfonsin's lead. De La Rua's challenge,
however, has slowed Alfonsin's momentum and kept
him embroiled in intraparty struggle when his energies
might be more profitably spent on building his new
coalition.
18. An Alfonsin�De La Rua ticket would seem the
most promising route for the UCR, but Alfonsin insists
that he is not interested. Given the intramural struggle,
the UCR's history of schismatic behavior again clouds
its electoral chances. Alfonsin believes he deserves the
nomination. If the party machinery is somehow ma-
nipulated to deny his bid, he might bolt, despite
repeated denials that he would do so. With Alfonsin as
the candidate of a united party, the UCR could make
the elections a contest. With Alfonsin outside the fold,
both he and the UCR would lose badly to the
Peronists.
19. There is little to choose between the UCR and
the Peronists in programmatic terms. Both are center-
left on the domestic political spectrum, although the
UCR is generally less disposed toward statist economic
policies or attempts at income redistribution. With
respect to foreign policy, the UCR will probably
assume a stance not markedly different from that
3.5(c)
expected of the Peronists. Alfonsin's nomination
would, however, probably mean a rhetorically more
aggressive and perhaps more anti-US tone than that of
any of the likely Peronist candidates.
Other Contestants
20. The remainder of the political landscape is
dotted with small parties whose numbers attest to the
schismatic, personalistic, and parochial nature of Ar-
gentine politics.
21. The Movement for Integration and Develop-
ment (MID) is among the more significant small
parties because of the Quality of its people and the
leadership of ex-President (1958-62) Arturo Frondizi.
Its support stems from domestic business and profes-
sional groups attracted by the MID's emphasis on
development of an infrastructure of heavy industry.
The MID ran with the Peronist coalition in 1973 and
may do so again. If it offers its own ticket, Rogelio
Friegerio, Frondizi's chief lieutenant and MID theo-
rist, will head it. If Cafiero wins the Peronist nomina-
tion, an alliance is less likely because of longstanding
differences between Cafiero and the MID.
22. The outlook of the political right is as bleak as
ever. The absence of an effective national Conserva-
tive Party has always been a critical weakness in the
political system. It has deprived conservative political
and economic interests of an institutionalized mecha-
nism for influencing national policy formulation and
thereby encouraged conservatives to depend upon the
military's willingness to disrupt the constitutional sys-
tem. Conservative parties tend to be small, provincial,
highly personalistic organizations given to forming ad
hoc electoral alliances in a feeble attempt to present a
third alternative to the historical domination of the
Peronists and Radicals. Such an alliance, under the
leadership of venerable Federal Party chief Francisco
Manrique, won a respectable 15 percent of the March
1973 presidential vote. This time, however, the right is
seriously handicapped by its identification in the
public mind with the post-1976 military regime; sever-
al of its prominent figures have held official posts
under the military.
23. Under ideal circumstances, parties on the right
would coalesce behind an attractive public figure and
win 15 percent of the vote or a bit more. It would help
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5firetrET 3.5(c)
if the UCR would run Alfonsin and move to the left in
its efforts to cut into Peronist working-class support.
By default, the conservatives would pick up disaffect-
ed UCR voters and independents from the middle of
the political spectrum who often vote Radical because
of distaste for Peronism. The next step would be
translation of the electoral alliance into a stable parlia-
mentary opposition group that would be the basis for
development of a truly national conservative alterna-
tive in future elections.
24. This scenario seems highly unlikely, however.
The lack of a promising coalition candidate is evident
in the efforts of some to push forward Nicanor Costa
Mendez, the Argentine Foreign Minister during the
Falklands war. An ad hoc coalition is still likely, but
the squabbling that has surrounded efforts to mold the
Popular Federalist Forces into an effective vehicle for
electoral participation suggests a repeat of past
conservative disappointments. Dissatisfied groups most
likely would run independently or fashion deals with
the UCR. Names likely to emerge as presidential
candidates from the right along with Manrioue in-
clude Rafael Martinez Raymonda, of the Progressive
Democratic Party in Santa Fe Province, and Alvaro
Alsogaray, respected and contentious free market
economist, who has formed a small party to promote
his fortunes.
25. The prospects of the left are at least as dismal as
those of the right. Revolutionary groups have no
constituency. Parties that advocate violence are out-
lawed, and vivid memories of the terrorism of the
1970s will deny anything but a negligible vote to
parties suspected of radical intentions. The nonviolent
left is fatally handicapped by its continuing inability
to shake Peronism 's grasp on the working-class vote.
26. The left also suffers from the lack of a single-
party mechanism that could aggregate and magnify its
voice and influence. Segments of the left exist in both
Peronism and the Radical Party. In the former, Vicen-
te Saadi's Intransigents are few and isolated but still
better off politically than they would be as an inde-
pendent party or part of any foreseeable coalition.
Alfonsin is reportedly doing well attracting unat-
tached, left-leaning voters to his Radical bandwagon.
27. Outside the Argentine Communist Party, the
left is represented by one faction of the small Christian
Democratic Party; a half dozen proponents of social-
ism, all small and ineffectual; and Oscar Alende's
Intransigent Party. Alende unofficially represents the
left in the multiparty group and drew 7 percent of the
March 1973 vote as the presidential standard bearer
for a left coalition. His politics over the years have
blended welfare statism with often shrill anti-US, anti-
UK rhetoric. In recent years, he has cultivated contacts
with the Socialist International. An experienced practi-
tioner at molding left-of-center coalitions, Alende has
in the past worked with the Communist Party, the
Peronist left (including the Montoneros), and a number
of smaller parties. He has denied rumors about Intran-
sigent Party contacts with the Communist Party con-
cerning coalition possibilities, but they are probably
correct
Alende probably cannot match his
1973 vote total if he runs on an Intransigent Party
ticket. If, however, he could demonstrate even half his
1973 drawing power (that is, 3 to 4 percent), he might
prove a useful ally in a close Peronist-Radical contest.
28. The Communist Party, with perhaps 50,000
members, poses no electoral threat. While reputedly
well financed and organized, it is totally subservient to
Moscow's line and without prospects for challenging
the Peronist grip on its self-arrogated natural constitu-
ency�the working class. The Communist Party does
not advocate violent revolution. In 1976 it was not
among the radical parties banned by the military,
partially because it consistently opposed terrorism and
probably also because of the importance of Argentine
trade with the Soviet Union. The Communist Party
has dutifully complemented Soviet efforts to court the
Argentine military in recent years by proposing a
civilian-military convergence and criticizing the gov-
ernment in language no more severe than that of other
parties.
29. The Communist Party has undertaken an ag-
gressive campaign to sign up 200,000 members, and its
presidential ticket has been proclaimed. Nevertheless,
spokesmen have made clear the Communist party's
eagerness to participate in an electoral coalition, as it
did unofficially in 1973. Thus far, the Peronists and
Radicals are not responding.
30. Moscow and Havana undoubtedly would be
delighted by anything approaching a respectable na-
tional Communist Party showing at the polls. Very
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3.3(b)(1)
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little is known of party financing, but it is reasonable
to assume that Moscow will find a way to subsidize its
campaign. Additional efforts�especially covert activi-
ty�by the Cubans and Soviets on the party's behalf
seem unlikely. Both have important bilateral commer-
cial links with Buenos Aires that they have been
fostering through attempts to develop closer state-to-
state ties. It is unlikely that Havana and Moscow
would risk these interests by clandestine support for a
Communist Party that has little chance for significant
electoral gains. There is no evidence that Moscow or
Havana would view incitement of violence or termi-
nation of the transition process as in their interests.
Organized Labor
31. Organized labor is the most significant nonparty
political force. Since the mid-1940s when Juan Peron
mobilized and politicized the country's work force,
unionized labor has remained predominantly Peronist
and played a crucial role in the formulation of
national economic and social policies under both
civilian and military governments, The country's
roughly 4 million union members could be the decisive
electoral factor if they vote as a bloc.
32. Sharing with many civilians the perception that
organized labor exerted an excessive and unhealthy
political influence, the armed forces government set
out in 1976 to depoliticize the unions. The General
Confederation of Workers (CGT) was banned. Most
large unions were placed under military overseers, and
all unions were strictly limited to nonpolitical activi-
ties. Many union leaders were arrested, some disap-
peared, and labor laws were rewritten to deprive
union leaders of the funds and organizational base to
become major political actors. These tactics, backed by
the ever-present threat of repression, succeeded to the
point of creating considerable disarray within the
labor movement. They did not, however, depoliticize
labor or apparently undermine its overwhelmingly
Peronist complexion.
33. As with the Peronist political wing, union ef-
forts to reorganize and influence political develop-
ments have been complicated by Juan Peron's ab-
sence. Divisions among self-proclaimed national
leaders that Peron would have manipulated to his
advantage now present less tractable threats to the
movement's unity and potential political effectiveness.
3.5(c)
The verticalista-antiverticalista dichotomy and, per-
haps more importantly, personal rivalries and power
struggles have divided the labor movement along lines
that roughly approximate the divisions among Peronist
political leaders. The Cafiero-Bittell-Luder troika
(Deofind� Bittel, as vice president of the Peronist
Party, is its acting chief during the exile of Isabel
Peron), draws its labor support from CGT-RA, while
the Robledo-Matera group is associated with the CGT-
Azopardo.
34. Neither CGT faction has any legal standing
because the military's labor legislation does not recog-
nize such national federations. Their very existence,
however, and the fact that the government deals with
them provide testimony to the government's weakness
and acknowledgment of labor's potential political and
economic clout.
35. The CGT-RA is the smaller of the two groups,
despite having absorbed a group of nonaligned unions
in early 1983.6 In recent years, it has maintained a
consistently hardline, confrontational posture toward
the military government. It supports traditional Peron-
ist economic and social policies and has frequently
indulged in demagogic demands for immediate work-
er benefits as a means to build support.
36. Among the key assets of the CGT-RA is the
leadership of Lorenzo Miguel, labor's kingpin from the
pre-1976 period. Although currently proscribed from
office holding, Miguel is extremely active. He controls
the -62 Organizations,- a remnant of the pre-1976
days that acts as something of a political caucus for
affiliated unions. Miguel, as much as anyone, is aware
of the political power of a unified labor front, but he
wants unification on his terms and under his control.
He epitomizes the kind of tough, conspiratorial, pow-
er-conscious bosses that survive Argentina's interne-
cine labor battles. It is typical that rumors have
surfaced concerning secret talks between Miguel and
military sectors on a military-labor alliance and that
Cafiero, the supposed beneficiary of CGT-RA support,
remains unsure about Miguel's intentions.
37. The CGT-Azopardo, led by Jorge Triacca, has
been critical of the government, but it has negotiated
both publicly and privately with the military in hopes
of obtaining worker benefits and gaining control of
� Prior to the amalgamation, the CGT-RA was known as the CGT-
Brazil.
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...sEewEr
unions once military overseers are withdrawn. Because
of its negotiating tactics, the Azopardo sector is under
more public pressure to obtain results from the gov-
ernment. The seriousness of the RA-Azopardo split
was emphasized in January when it was further
institutionalized by the Azopardo group's creation of
its own version of Miguel's -62 Organizations.-
38. Military manipulation looms ever larger as a
potential determinant in the intralabor struggle. Act-
ing on the assumptions that the Peronists will win in
October and labor will remain a powerful institutional
factor, military representatives have been holding
discreet discussions with union leaders from both
factions. The government retains the power to deter-
mine which labor faction will inherit control of major
unions still under military intervention. Armed forces
spokesmen are probably using this leverage in search
of acceptable Peronist treatment of key issues in the
postelectoral period. Alfonsin touched off a minor
political storm in May with public accusations con-
cerning a labor-military deal. Few Argentine advo-
cates of democracy are encouraged by the prospect of
an agreement between the two groups that are not
only the most powerful but also the most autocratic
and hierarchical political groups in the country.
39. Restoration of at least superficial labor unity is
important not only for the Peronists' electoral pros-
pects but for labor's institutional interests. A unified
movement could well have sufficient leverage to gain
for labor the second slot on the Peronist presidential
ticket as well as a significant number of candidacies to
national congressional seats. Labor bosses are also
aware that failure to solidify their internal ranks might
leave the Peronists' key constituency vulnerable to the
appeals from a Radical party headed by Alfonsin.
The Private Sector
40. Major economic interest groups that have peri-
odically suffered at the hands of Peronist statist-
distributionist economic policies since 1946 face a
familiar political dilemma. They are the wealthiest
groups in the society, controlling economic activities
vital to its growth and stability. Yet, there is no party
mechanism that articulates their economic views and
integrates them into a broader social and political
message that has any popular appeal. In short, the
25
3.5(c)
civilian restoration will again leave these interest
groups without institutionalized channels for influenc-
ing national decisionmaking. As in the past, they will
have to rely upon personal relationships, their capacity
to undermine government policies through passive or
active resistance, and ultimately on their links to
military sectors that share their views. Groups that
find themselves in this position include major financial
and commercial interests, large industrial concerns
that produce primarily for export and/or have links to
multinational firms, and large agricultural producers.
41. A candidate with the free-market orientation of
Alvaro Alsogaray would be appealing to such groups,
but no amount of financial backing will enable such a
candidate to challenge the Peronists and the UCR.
Funding might be provided to either of the two major
parties in the hope of garnering postelectoral influ-
ence. While such an investment might produce some
favors from the new government, it would not lead to
basic policy changes.
42. Small and medium-size domestic industrialists
will find a comfortable political niche with either the
Peronists or the UCR. Both parties are likely to
support nationalist, Protectionist policies appealing to
this group which in the past had an institutionalized
voice in the Peronist-controlled General Economic
Confederation (CGE). Something similar to the CGE
could well emerge as part of the Peronist campaign
organization.
The Catholic Church
43. The Argentine Catholic Church is bedeviled by
the same theological disputes that have characterized
the Church's activities throughout Latin America. The
conservative hierarchy protested only cautiously and
quietly the post-1976 military abuses, and carefully
avoiding the advocacy role assumed at the time by the
Church in Chile.
44. With the postwar political liberalization, the
Church has emerged as a more strident human rights
advocate and a potential mediator between civilian
and military sectors on sensitive issues, especially
disappearances. In late 1982, when both civilian and
military leaders toyed with the notion of a preelection
agreement, the initiative was stymied by their seem-
ingly rigid and irreconcilable positions. The Church's
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sweep 3.5(c)
moral authority equipped it for the role of mediator,
but Church officials were wary about becoming deep-
ly enmeshed in politics. Painfully contrived public
statements distinguished between the political task of
mediator, which the Church rejected, and the act of
offering the Church's -services- in search of national
moral reconciliation. If efforts to reach a civilian-
military accord are renewed, the Church may again
be thrust somewhat unwillingly into the role of
pseudomediator. In any event, it will remain an
outspoken advocate of reconciliation through the dis-
closure of information on disappearances and other
human rights abuses.
95. Despite historical differences between the
Church and the Peronists and Radicals, neither party
now represents a threat to Church interests. Thus, the
institutional Church will obey papal proscriptions on
political activity and not actively campaign for or
against parties or candidates.
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