Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
April 3, 2019
Document Release Date: 
April 12, 2019
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 3, 1976
Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 [Declassified copy attached] IEO 13526 , 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs i; E013526 ,3.5(c) I Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudernan) to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, August 3, 1976 Shlaudeman reported to Kissinger that the military regimes of the Southern Cone had coordinated intelligence activities, including finding and killing subversives located in their countries and Europe. Sources: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P760138-0562. Secret; Noforn. Drafted by Proper and Luers on August 2. 3.3(b)(1) \In telegram 178852 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, July 20, the Department transmitted an INR report on the possibility of an intergovernmental assassination plot involving Southern Cone security forces; the report concluded that "the evidence supporting such speculation is scanty." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files) (S) Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 0) 4 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, 0,C. 20520 1;;v1 The Secretary FROM: ARA - Harry W. Shlaudeman AA Monthly jjJul) The "Third World War" and South America The military regimes of the southern cone of South America see themselves as embattled; on one side-by international Marxism and its terrorist exponents,. and on the other by the hostility of the uncomprehending industrial democracies misled by Marxist propaganda. In response they are banding together in what may %ell become a political bloc-of some cohesiveness. But, more .0 isignificantly, they are joining forces to eradicate "subversion", word which increasingly translates into non-violent dissent from the left and center left. The security forces of the southern cone 4 now coordinate intelligence activities closely; operate in the territory of one another's countrie.s_r: in pursuit of "subversives"; have established Operation Condor to find and kill ' terrorists of the "Revolutionary Coordinating Committee" in their own countries and in Europe. Brazil is coopera- ting short of murder operations. This siege mentality shading into paranoia is perhaps he natural result of the convulsions of recent years in which the societies of Chile, Uruguay and Argentina have been badly Shaken by assault from the extreme left. But the military -leaders, despite near decimation of the Marxist left in Chile and Uruguay, along with accelerating progress toward that goal in Argentina, insist that the threat remains and the war must go on. Some talk of the "Third World War", with the countries of the southern cone as the last bastion of Christian civiliza- tion, /KGDS-2 WARNING NOTICE: SENSIT 'INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS -- INVOLVED. DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. � ------ e4 ccx 14-rol CLASSIFIED Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 Somewhat more rationally, -- they consider their counter-terrorism every bit as justified as Israeli actions against Palestinian - -- terrorists; and -- they believe that the criticism from democracies of their war on terrorism reflects a double standard. result of this mi-1 �u4_interna1lyr is to magnify the isolation of the military institutions from the civilian sector, thus narrowing the range of political and economic options. he broader imslicati ns und for .fitr trend in the hemisp_ere are disturbing. The use or bloody counter- terrorism by these regimes-UTEatens their increasing :isolation from the West and the opening of deep ideologicai divisions among the coUntries of the hemisphere. An outbreak of PLO-type terrorism on a worldwide scale 1n responseis 4tso. a p6:1;sibilitv. The.industrial-democracies would be the battlefield. This month's trends paper attempts for the first time to focus on long-term &wgers of a right-wing bloc.,; Our initial policy reco-4vendations are: -- To emphasize the differences between the six countries at every opportunity, -- To depoliticize human rights. -,- To oppose rhetorical exaggerations of the ' ''Third-World-War' type. � 7- To bring the potential bloc-members back�dnto our cognitive uniye'rse-through systematic ' exchanges. RED Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 Security Cooperation is a Fact There is extensive cooperation between the security/ intelligence operations of six governments: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Their intelligence services hold formal meetings to plan "Operation Condor." It will include extensive FBI-type exchanges of information on shady characters. There are plans for a special communications network. These details are still secret, but broad security cooperation is not. Officials in Paraguay and Argentina have told us that they find it necessary to cooperate with each other and their neighbor.s against internationally-funded terrorists and "subversives." The problem'begins'with the definition of'"subverSion" -- never the most precise of terms. One reporter writes that subversion "has grown to include nearlranyons who opposes government policy." . In countries where everyone knows that subversives can wind up dead or tortured, educated people have an understandable concern about the boundaries of dissent. The concern doubles when' there is a chance of-yersecution by foreign police. 0 acting on �indirect, unknown information. Numerous Uruguayan refugees have been murdered in Argentina, and there are widespread accusations that Argentine police are doing their Uraguayan colleagues a favor. These accusations are at -least credible,whether or not they are exact. The Nature of the. Left-Extreme Threat: "Third'Horld War"? !Uruguayan Foreign Oinister Blanco -- one of the brighter and normally steadier members of the. group was the first to describe the campaign against terrorists as a "Third World War." The description is interesting for - two reasons: It justifies harsh and sweeping "wartime" measures. -- It emphasizes' the international and institutional aspect, thereby justifying the cz:creine of power beyond national borders. Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 3 -4-- if The threat is not imaginary. It may be exaggdrated. This is hard to suggest to a man like Blanco/ who believes -- probably correctly -- that he and his family are targeted. One must admire his personal courage. Even by objective standards, the terrorists have had substantial_ accomplishments over the years: _ At one time or other, urban and rural guerrillas have created severe problems for almost every South American government, including those where democracy is. still surviving'. 717eyhave provoked -repressive reactions, including torture and quasi-governmental death squads. (The guerrillas typically claimed to welcome repression, but Wonder if they really like what they got.) They still pose a serious threat in Argentina and -- arguably -- a lesser problem in two � or three other countries. There is a terror-oriented "Revolutionary Coordinating Junta", possibly headquartered _ in Paris, which is both. a counterpart of and an incentive folF.Cooperation between governMents Nevertheless, it is also 'true that, broadly speaking; both terrorists and the Peaceful left have This is true even in 'ale minds of studious' revolutionaries. .Che Guevara's romantic fiasco crushed hopes for rural revolution. Allende's fall is taken (perhaps pessimistically) as proving that the electoral route cannot work. Urban guerrillas collapsed-in- Prazil with Carlos Marighela and in Uruguay with the TupaMaros. The latter represented a high-water mark. Their solid, efficient structure posed a reel wartime threat. Probably the military believe that torture was indispensable to crack this structure. ..,.,,..,,...,,,,,,..�....,,.. ,�,,,,,..� ,,,,=.,....,,�.."_,,,,,:,, ,....,._,_...,.......,,,,_�7,.7�,r,,,...,4_, ...�____�--",....Lt..2........,,,, ,,,,,,,,,,,, .z.,=�,' ;,,,,.......� ,...,..._,..�:�...�....,...,.,,,,_,..,......,.....,..:.., , �. . � . , .� .._.......... ._._ Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 v Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 UNIAititti There is is still a major campaign in Argentina. We expect the military to pull up their socks and win. They have precedents to guide them, and the terrorists ' have no handy refuge in neighboring countries. What will a chain of governments, started by Brazil in 1964, whose origin was in battle against the extreme left. It is important to their ego, their salaries, and their equipment-budgets to believe in a Third World War. At best, when Argentina stabilizes, we can hope to convince them that they have already won. s, The warriors will not like this, They already snicker at us for being worried about kid stuff like drug- smuggling when there is a real military campaign going on. They accuse,, us of 'applauding the defeatp.f terrorism In Entebbe but not in; Montevideo. Our differing perceptions of the threat are raising suspicions about our "reliability." � What the Right-Wing Regimes Have in Common These governments are reactive: they derived their Initial legitimacy ergm'a reaction against terrorism, left-eNtremism, instability( and (as they see it) Marxism, Thus, "anti-Marxism'is a moral and political ;force. There is also an-ideology that is malLs_positive in origin: that of national develo-sanent. The vision of nation has been as effective in South America as it was in Eux:ope (It may yet turn out to be as destructive; this paper looks only briefly at the potential for conflicts between Latin nations and blocs.) Military establishments, traditional protector's of boundaries and national integrity, are in- a position to profit from the new nationalism. Economic development is'a pressing need and a public demand. Disciplined military estab- lishments can work with technocrats to produce economic development. In the countries we are considering, the military is always the strongest national institution -- sometimes Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 -6- 1E1 almost the only one. It has, typically, saved the nations from civilian chao.s. National developmentalism is therefore real medicinec closer to most citizens then. trendy left or rightl-t-ing causes. To this extent, military eocr can find a popular base. National developmentalism has obvious and bothersome parallels to National Socialism. Opponents of the military regimes call them fascist It is an effective pejorative, the more so because it can be said to be technically accurate. But it is a pejorative. These days, to call a man fascist is not primarily to describe his economic views. In.practice,.the military regimes tend ,�tto be full .of the same inconsistencies, that characterize. non-military,.. pragmatic, non-ideological regimes Local political institutions are (reasonably).. considered to have. been a failure, and it is.. _- suggested thdt..democracy doesn't work for us."_ Leaders want to build more efficient institutionS; to organize their �societies entirely -differently: Yet there is, at some level of consciousness, - an acceptance that democracy is the ideal ' eventually to be sought. No other institution is allowed to challenge military power, vet political parties and courts,often exist and perform some valid functions. Brazil's toothless parliament, for example, does cautiously articUlate 'public opinion and provide a dormant alter- native to military rule. Insecure, repressive governments nevertheless allow substantial "democratic" .freedoms, including varying degrees of freedom of expression. The ambiente is more like Washington than MOSCOW�, You can buy -a good newspaper, a pair of dec:atilently-flowered blue jeans, a girlie magazine, or a modern painting. UNCLASSIFIED Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 TrLe s e mlitar regimes do not epect to lat forever. There ia no thought of .a Thousand. Year Reich, no pretense of having arrived at ultimate Marxist-style truth. From the stahdooint of our policy, the most ortantiongterm characteristic of these regimes may be precisely that they are reversible, in both theory and practice. They know it. But they do not know what to do about it. -Political and social development lag. Long after left-wing threats are squashed, the regimes are still terrified of them. Fighting the absent piffkos remains a central goal of national security. Threats and plots are discovered. Some "mistakes" are made by the torturers, who have difficulty finding logical victims. Murder Squads kill harMless people and petty thieves. When elections are held, the perverse electoratehows -a desire to put the military out of cower. Officers see the trend ending.with their:own bodies on the rack. - No more electials..s for a while. We do- not suggest that there is a hopelessly vicious circle. Since some of these regimes are producing really solid economic successes The officers may eventually-txust Civilians to succeed them and provide an honorable. e:.cit. So far, the military has found it easier to ride the tiger than to dismount, When an alternative government eventually has to be found, it mightbe that the only one available will be at thb. far left. But .There Are Also Leading Differences. In discussing the general characteristios of.. the southern military regimes, we have made some indefensibly broad generalizations. The following is an attempt to correCt the worst distortions, country-by-country. It is important to be clear about the differences because, for reasons we shall. develop later, our *olioy should he t-o emphasize what the countries do not have in common rather than what they do. * � The front-burner cases are Argentina, Chile,and Uruguay. - Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 � -8- Argentina. is the mot.interestingr-both-beaause. it is important and because the directions of the new regime are not clear, The Argentines are politically sophisticated like the Brazilians, but unlike the Brazilians, the Argentines lack social and even military unity. To recover economically, they must break the power of traditional structures, and especial- ly of the labor movement. There is also a genuine challenge from. left-wing terrorists and right-wing counter-terror. The problem approaches civil-war dimensions. We believe that the Brazilian model will prevail. In the long run, thus, we think the military will win, Videla -- or his successor .--- will have more trouble with hard-line military officers and right-wing terror than with the left.. Forces probably Connected to the regihave already been killing' exiles and priests, among others-. Chile has been the subject of so much acticn lately-that you probably. do not need to hear any more. The Chileans have smashed the Left almost as thoroughly as the,�prazilianf.,;( but the repressive apparatus is much more.unrestrinEd. There is no one at the to like Geisel who_even seems to wish � � � to moderate human-rights abuses� The Santiago regime provides the archetype of the reasoning that criticism of torture can come only from international Marxist plotters. The military seem particularly insecure and isolated, even with respect to the Chilean public. , Uruquay is'tht third pressihg case (with Argentina and Chile). Foreign Minister Blanco was the first to talk about the "Third World War," and- he stilXinsists that the threat continues high in his country. Given this picture, Uruguay is, of course, eager to cooperate with its neighbors in defensive measures. Nevertheless, unlike the Chileans, the Uruguayans have maintained some sense of proportion about human rights and inter- national public opinion0 Civilians are up front in the government, give the military substantial Support, and interact relatively well. Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 ICIASSIFIED Brazil: We can and should relate to Brazil as an emerging world power rather than as a trouble-spot. Yet I its 1964 "revolution" is the basic =de1 for its - neighbors. The biggest problem is that, despite re- markable successes, the Brazilian -armed services still cannot find a way to relax their hold on power. On.% . the other hand, they are not much worried about it. . They have been able to tap civilian talent for economic purposes. The Left is smashed, but it iS not clear. . whether the President can control the zeal of his security forces. Attempts at political distensID have largely flopped. (The word carries both the English sense of "distending", or enlarging authority from a narrow miliEary base, and the French sense of "relaxing". Better than detente?) Brazil, like the other large countries, does see itself as a world actor, and this inhibies extremism. Bolivia is an interesting case but nota hot problem. This is the scene of one of the tfiree genuine social revolutions in Latin America -- which makes it all the more puzzling that Che Guevara thought -he had a contribution to make. Despite his failure, he left lasting worries. The. Bolivians still consider that Che's daath makes them a target of revenge for international terrorists. We cannot quite perceive the same menace. In Bolivian terms, the government is notably stable and economically successful. It has been moderate on human rights. ; Paraguay is marching to the same tune as its neighbors but is a mile behind. This is the kind of nineteenth-coutury military regime that looks good on the cartoon page. Paraguay, however, has eminently sound reasons for being backward 'and is not in the - least apologetic. The Paraguayans remember that, in the Chaco War, they fought off the massively - superior armed forces of three neighbors for a ridiculously long time. ,Pride was saved, if nothing else. There is no democratic tradition whatever. The government has reacted to fear of the left rather than the kind of specific challoage posed in the other countries. � XCIASSIFIEll Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 _a Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 � LASSIFIED A Political Bloc In Formation? -----rf-boTrEe-type cdoperation evolves into -formatf6E of a political bloc, our interests will be involved in wars that are new for South America. such a bloc is not here vet. The conditions for its formation are largely present: -- The conviction that an international leftist. threat ,amounts to a:rWorld War" and hence requires an alliance. -- Highly compatib],e philosophies and political � objectives in other respects. Improved.transpOrtand communication between neighboring countries,-which previously had .better links with the US. and Europa than with each other. A suspicion that even the U.S. has "lost its will" to stand firm against communism because of Viet-Nam, detente, and social decay, Resentment of human-rights criticism, which is often taken as just one more sign of the' commie encirclement, -- Exclusion by the military of the Civilian, democratic. interplay Which helps to maintain a sense of proportion. ' There are a few inhibitions on formation of . a bloc. Nationalistic thinking is the obvious one Traditional feuds have largely shaped the sense of nation. With the exception of the Peru/Chile:tension, however, border disputes -are no longer an overriding factor in the southern cone; To predict a political bloc would still be speculative. Commonsense could assert itself There is plenty of it available in these countries and even some in their armies cqe do, think that tne trend toward bloc thinking is present, clear, and trouble- some. xvforireedeo, CASSIA Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 -11- ASSIFIED If a Bloc. Does Form. . In the early stages, we will be a "casual bene- ficiary" (as one reporter puts it) for reasons that are too obvious to need elaboration here. On the main East-Nest stage, .right-wing regimes can hardly tilt toward the Soviets and Cubans. The fact that we are :an apparent beneficiary can easily lull us into trouble, as has historically been the case in this hemisphere. But we would expect a range of growing problems, Some are already with LIG. Internationally, the Latin generals look like our guys. Fe are especially iden- tified with Chile. It ,cannot do Us any good__ Europeans, certainly, hate Pinochet 4 Co: with a passion that rubs off on us. More P-roblems are on the schedule: -- Human rights abuses, as you know, are creating more. and more problems of conscience, laT:;, and- - v diplomacy.. Chile's black-sheep status, has already made- troUble for its economic recovery. The farther to the right, the drift goes in other-countries the more difficultias. we can expect in our economic links with them. We would like to share, with, say, the Brazilians, a perception that we are. natural allies. . Brazilian participation in a right-wing bloc would make this unlikely. -- Eventually, we could even see serious' strains with the democracies farther north. Orfila has told us that he thinks a confrontation is possible. Uruguay and Venezuela have just broken relations over el. incident involving political asylum. A precedent? tlittESIFIED Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 _ ) Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 SSIFIED Over the horizon/ there is a chance of serious world-Scale trouble. This is speculative:put .n.9-11.0.Ager-'_... ridiculous. The Revolutionary ..Coordinating Junta now seems to have its headquarters in Paris, plus consicler- able activity in other European capitals. With terrorist& being forced out of Argentina, their concentration in Europa (and-possiblv the U.S.) will increase. The South American regimes know about this. are planning their own counter -terror oneratIons in Europe. Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay are in the lead; Brazil is wary but is providing some technical support. They The next step might be for the terrorists to under- take a worldwide-attack' on embassie.,;.and interests of the six hated regimes. The PLO has shown the.way. Ue can picture South American activities on a eenparable scale, again Using the industrial democracies as a battlefield. The impossibility of peaceful change will, radicalize exile's who might, in earlier days, .have looked forward to returning home peacefully. Our Response; How to end- Third World Uar Till now, though we have tried to exercise a moderating influencs, we have not taken a longterm strateaic view of the problems that a right-wing bloc ' would create. This paper has 'tried for a sharper focus. � Fe shall have more recommendations in mouths to come, but the following are a fair start: 4. 1) Distinguish between counries with special card If we treat them as a whole, we will be encouraging. them to view themselves as an embattled bloc. In our dealings with each country and in Congressional testimony, we should, for example, reflect recognition tat: Argentina, with its virtual civil war, face a problem much different from its neighbors. Uruguay, with its substantial remnants of military/civilian interplay, is not comparable to cniie. Brazil has the weight, sot!histication, and world- perspective to share many of our concerns. UNCLASSIFIED Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 -13- ESIFIEll Our military sales programs may also:provide an opportunity for distinction. Aid no longer provides - significant.leverage. Thereis vast interest in overall economic relations -- but not much freedom of movement. 2) Try to get the politics and ideologY out Of human rights. This objective will be hard to reconcile with the equally pressing need to multilateralize our concern To. avoid charges of "intervention," we must increasingly work through the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. The countries that support us there, however, will tend to be democracies (and perhaps one or two radical Caribbean governments). .Right-wing regimes will feel besieged. Ideally, we should keen one or more of them with Qs. If that is impossible Cas now seems likely), We should take special -care to make clear that authoritariE.a regimes of the right have no monooly on ebuses. (Your Santiagoeech had the rght balance). 3) Oppose Rhetorical exaggerations --J:here and her. -- Make clear in...,our South Americzn dealings that the "Third World War" idea is overdrawn .and leads to dangerous.consences, -- In Congressional testimony here, stress that the threat is real for, a country like-Argentina. 4) Bring them back to our cognitive universe, Bui- how? Our 3r,rabassv in La Paz hasrscomMended that we exchange intelligence briefings with the Bolivians, This might provide a way to reach suspicious military officers and work on their "Third world ar" syndrdte. But there are hazards. We would fail to produce infor- mation sustaining their theais, and they might-conclude that we were badly informed or uncooperative. Instead, we think we should work on systematic mid-level exchanges �.something more than exchanges of infonnation on terrorists. We need to achieve a perception that neither detente nor distensgo is 'a threat to the legitimacy of friendly regjrn.e5; DUCUSSIFIEU Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650 14- MED In time, perhaps we-can convince them that a Third World War is undesirable. e'S ARA/PLC: DeProper/WHLuers, 8/2/76 x-99192 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C05355650