MEMO TO NEIL GALLAGHER FROM <SANITIZED> RE THE ATTACHED MEMORANDUM IS BEING DISSEMINATED TO PUT ON THE RECORD AT THE SECRET LEVEL THE EVIDENCE REGARDING IRAQI CULPABILITY FOR THE ASSASSINATION PLOT AGAINST PRESIDENT BUSH IN APRIL 1993

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05458139
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 29, 2018
• Case Number: F-2018-01052
• Publication Date: June 12, 1993

Approved for Release: 2018/07/25 C05458139
�grefiCT,
(b)(3)
12 June 1993
Neil Gallagher, FBI
The attached memorandum is being
disseminated to put on the .record
at the Secret level the evidence
regarding Iraqi culpability for the
assassination plot against President
Bush in April 1993. The memorandum
is consistent with the DCI's report
to the President on the matter.
-�rcfterEz_
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(3)
CRM-30382
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"-Stec&
Directorate
of Intelligence
Intelligence Memorandum
Counterterrorist Center
12 July 1993
Iraq: Baghdad Attempts to
Assassinate Former President
Bush
Summary
The evidence currently available allows us to draw a
confident analytic conclusion that Iraqi President Saddam
Husayn directed his intelligence service to assassinate former
President Bush during Mr. Bush's visit to Kuwait on 14-16
April. This memorandum briefly outlines the evidence on
which this conclusion rests and explains why we believe that
the alternative scenarios against which the evidence was
tested are implausible.
This memorandum was prepared by
Counterterrorist Center, and has been coordinated within the CIA.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to C/CTC
on secure. (U)
"S"-eer-eL
CTC MN 01-1(v1, r
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Sources of Evidence
The evidence on which our conclusion is based comes from three sources:
Forensic examinations by U.S. Government technical experts of equipment and explosive
devices
FBI interviews of the 16 suspects
Intelligence reporting from human sources.
Forensics
The forensic evidence in this case is based primarily on the FBI's examination of the explosive
devices acquired in Kuwait: a car bomb and several smaller "cube bombs." The FBI
conducted a detailed forensic comparison of these devices with two Iraqi devices that had been
recovered elsewhere in the Middle East in early 1991 during the Persian Gulf conflict. The
FBI has reported the following results:
The same person, or persons of close association, constructed the remote-control fusing
systems in the Kuwait car bomb and in the two other known Iraqi devices.
The person, or persons of close association, responsible for the additional wiring and
components associated with another known Iraqi radio-controlled car bomb was also
responsible for the additional wiring and components associated with the radio-controlled
car bomb recovered in Kuwait.
� The results of chemical and physical analyses of the explosive main charge from the car
bomb recovered in Kuwait indicate an explosive known as PE-4A. According to the FBI
Laboratory Explosive Unit, PE-4A plastic explosive was contained in terrorist improvised
explosive devices used by Iraqi operatives in early 1991 in Bangkok, Jakarta, and Manila.
� The results of the chemical and physical analyses of samples from two of the 10 cube-
shaped explosive devices recovered in Kuwait are consistent with exolo ive material taken
from an Iraqi car bomb recovered in the Middle Fast in 1991.
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-Seege..t_
Interviews
The FBI's interviews of the suspects arrested by Kuwaiti authorities produced the following
information:
The two main suspects--Iraqi nationals named al-Asadi and al-Ghazali�said they received
orders in early April from individuals they believed to be associated with the IIS to carry
out a bombing operation in Kuwait and were given explosive material and instructions on
its use. The Iraqi recruiters provided the plan, training, and material for the operation.
The suspect al-Ghazali told the FBI on 13 May that a person who identified himself as
Abu Rafid recruited him on 9 April to assassinate former President Bush.
The suspect al-Asadi said a person known to him as Muhammed Jawad recruited him on
10 April and later instructed him to transport explosives to Kuwait and guide al-Ghazali to
Kuwait University. He told the FBI that al-Ghazali told him of the plot against Mr. Bush
after the operation began. (Al-Asadi's recruiter was described by al-Ghazali as the
individual who assisted Abu Rafid to prepare him for the mission to assassinate President
Bush.)
Intelligence Reporting
Testing Other Scenarios
In conducting our inquiry, we tested the foregoing evidence against three other scenarios and
concluded that none of these alternatives is plausible.
1.
3
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3. An Iraqi Rogue Operation. This scenario is also unlikely:
4
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