CHASING BITTERFELD CALCIUM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05461036
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: September 6, 2016
• Case Number: F-2016-02218

for Release: 2016/08/24 C05461036
CRET
No Foreign Diss
Tracing an ingredient for
the Soviet atomic bomb
CHASING BITTERFELD CALCIUM
Henry S. Lowenhnupt
In-December 1946 a chemical eri-gjneer from the former 1. G. Farben plant
at Bitterfeld in East Germany voluntt,ered in Berlin that this plant "had started
in the past few weeks producing 500 kilograms per day of metallic calcium.
Boxes of the chemical are sent by truck4very afternoon to Berlin, labelled to
Zaporozhe on the Dnieper. Calcium is believed to be used as a slowing age,nt4,in
processes connected with the production of atomic explosive."
This was the lead we in the Foreign Intelligence Section of the Manhattan
District Headquarters had been waiting for. We had read the technical investiga-
tion reports from FIAT (Field Information A.gency(Technical) on the production
of uranium at the Auergesellschaft Plant in BerliMOranienburg. We also knew
that Dr. Nikolaus Riehl�with his whole research team from Auergesellschaft�
had met the Russians, volunteering to help them make uranium for their atomic
bomb project. We knew from intercepted letters that the group was still to-
gether, writing from the cover address PO Box 107P, Moscow,* We knew
Auergesellschaft during World War II had made the uranium metal for the
German Uranverein**�the unsuccessful German atomic bomb project�by
using metallic calcium to reduce uranium oxide to uranium metal (not as
"slowing agent"). We had analyzed the two-inch cubes .of uranium metal from
the incomplete German nuclear reactor which the Alsos Mission*** had found
in the minuscule village of Stadtilm in Thuringia. We knew German uranium
was terrible�full of oxides and voids, though it was fairly pure otherwise by
non-atomic standards. The files also disgorged that in 1945 the Russians had
started to dismantle and take to Russia the small calcium plant tit the enormous
Bitterfeld Combine, in addition to the big magnesium facility. �
Cables went out immediately to the European Command in Germany via
G-2 and directly to Col. Edgar P. Dean, Manhattan District representative in
London, to locate and interrogate all engineers who had fled �Bitterfeld to the
West or were currently willing to sell information on their unloved masters. We
wanted to know how much calcium was to be produced, what its specifications
were, and where it was to be shipped. We wanted to know what non-atomic
normal German industries used calcium, and in what quantities. We wished Col.
Dean to keep our British colleagues in the Division of Atomic Energy, Ministry
of Supply, informed.
At home, the Scientific Division of the Office of Special Operations in the
newly-formed antral Intelligence Group was also app:iseci of our needs. Col,
Frank A. Valente of our section was asked to take time out from his task of
organizing an atomic detection systemt to talk to the U.S. Atomic Energy
"*See "On the Soviet Nuclear Scent," &tales x114,
.168 David Irving's The Virus House. William Kimber. London, 1967.
***Code name for teams interrogating Italian., French And German scientists in
of World War II.
tSee "The Detection of Joe-1," Studies X;1.
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Bitterfeld Calcium
Commission in depth about the use in the U.S. program of calcium to reduce
uranium salts to uranium metal. Major Randolph Archer, also of our office, was
asked to talk to U.S. firms making calcium metal, :141 find out what it. was used
for and in what quantities.
As so often happens, the people involved and their experience were crucial
ingredients. On the American side was the Foreign Intelligence Section of the
Washington Liaison Office of the Manhattan District, then in the process of
transferring as a unit to the newly formed Central Intelligence Group. It was
headed by Col. L. E. Seeman, a career Corps of Engineers officer who had run
the American engineering forces of 'the CBI theater during World War II and
would go on to become major.general. The section was staffed with a few career
Corps of Engineers personnel, several officers and civilian trained in science, and
the remainder trained in investigative procedures in the Counter Intelligence
Corps.
The orientation toward engineering on the part of our management led
directly to a pragmatic approach�do what works, and get on with the job. The
engineering orientation also led materially toward the estimative method ,of
technical evaluation. Engineering officers are accustomed to laying out engineer-
ing tasks to find out how long they will take at a minimum�and then to evaluate
likely slippage. They think in quantitative terms�man days, truckloads, cubic.
yards. The scientific side of the section, Col. Valente, Mr. Charles Campbell,
Mr. � Donald Quigley, and I learned gradually to ferret out the crucial technical
facts, the bottlenecks as it were, that could be used in these engineering-type
evaluations.
A remnant of the wartime cooperation in the atomic field was the direct
;liaison at that time with the Intelligence Section of the British Division of
Atomic Energy of the Ministry of Supply,. Col. Dean. Assistant Military Attach�
was out representative in London, .fipis cooperation was normalized gradually
into more regular country-to-couni4 liaison channels after our section was
deployed to the newly formed, CIG:eari;v in 1947. The Atomic -Energy Act of
1946, which restricted much atomic data,ao "cleared" U.S. personnel, also tended
to perpetuate differences between the U.S. and UK intelligence efforts already
in being in 1946 because of the "nationalistic" Policies on the parts ef blith --------.--.t; �
General Leslie R. Groves, Manhattan District Commander, and Sir John
Anderson, head of the UK atomic effort.
The British office was staffed with technical personnel, much as our own was.
Mr. David Gattiker, their liaison to our section, had been a chemical engineer
with Imperial Chemicals Incorporated before World War II. Mr. Kenneth Town-
ley, one of the London members, was a geologist by profession with some experi-
ence in uranium prospecting. Its leader, Commander Eric Welsh, however, was
also a career member of MI-6. Commander Welsh htt.d masterminded the sabotage
of Norsk Hydro in Norway in 1943 to prevent theGermans from getting heavy
water and completing an operating reactor at Stadtilm. In 1940 he had been
instrumental in smuggling the great, nuclear physicist Niels Bohr out of occupied
Denmark. A: d in the thirties he had been a chemist at Bitterfeld.
Returning to the calcium problem, by mid-January 1947 the Bitterfeld
activity was definitely confirmed, and indeed amplified: Russian requirements
were for 30 tons of metallic calcium per month, and distillation' was needed to
achieve adequate purity. A number of former Bitterfeld engineers were soon
interviewed, especially by Major Paul 0. Langguth working for Col. Dean in
London. As we learned more, some were even re-intervieWecl. I remember. for
instance, flying to Wright Patterson Airbase in late 1947 to talk once again to a
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Bitterfeld Calcium
Bitterfeld metallurgist whom Langguth had previously interrogated, and who
had in the interim come to the U.S. as a member of the Air Force's Operation
PAPERCLIP.
'These interviews also soon established the non-atomic usage of calcium:
during the-s war Bitterfeld had producedt about 5 tons per month of 95% pure
calcium metal for use by the Osram andiPhilips Companies to eliminate the rem-
nants of oxygen and nitrogen from radid4ubes. Some 20 tons per month of
calcium aluminum and calcium-zinc alloysikwere produced for bearings for the
German railroads, and the German Navy and Air Force bought calcium hydride.
for use in inflating balloons. The concept of 30 tons per month of calcium so purg
it had to be distilled was clearly foreign to German industrial practice.
At home, Col. Valente selected Dr. Frank H. Spedding at the Institute of
Atomic Research, Ames Laboratory, Ames, Iowa, as the man who would know
most about uranium metallurgy�having been concerned with that aspect of
atomic energy since the early forties. Spedding was quite firm, to make uranium
metal for reactor use, the U.S. normally reduced uranium fluoride with magne-
sium metal�because it was cheaper. The magnesium had to be made by the
Pidgeon process, in which dolomite is reduced with ilerro silicon at very high
temperatures; normal magnesium produced from sea water by electrolysis was
not pure enough.
Reduction of uranium oxide with calcium, Spedding continued, always gave
a poor product. However, reduction of uranium fluoride with calcium gave
properly liquid melts, and an excellent product on cooling. The calcium had to be
distilled for adequate purity. Elements like boron, vanadium, manganese, should
they become incorporated into the uranium metal even in minute amounts, would
tend to absorb neutrons and stop the nuclear reaction. Thus these elements also
had to be kept to exceedingly low amounts � in the calcium used to make the
uranium metal. He gave Col. Valente;a list of maximum allowable impurities in
U.S. uranium metal used for our Hanford reactors, and in U.S. atomic-grade cal-
cium. Of these, the worst actor was boron.
Major Archer reported that in the United States, only Union Carbide and
Carbon and New England Lime made calcium metal, and only three to five tons
per year at that for non-atomic uses.
Informed of the Russian calcium project at Bitterfeld, our British colleagues
became quite active. Several Bitterfeld chemical engineers chose to resettle at
I. G. Farben plants in British-occupied Germany, thoughtfully taking with them
copies of reports on calcium production written for the Russian' management.
The British also followed our lead in making a thorough survey of non-atomic uses
Of calcium both on the continent and in Britain, to make absolutely sure this
was no red herring.
Meanwhile, the general intelligence net was far from idle. The U.S. Army
Interviewed a border-crosser, Dr. Adolf Krebs, and learned that he had been
taken. to Moscow by the Russians for an ,interview with several MVD colonels
and one MVD General "Kravehenko.7hIn the course of these interviews he went
to Elektrostal, r. town some 40 mi es.; ast of Moscow. where the best crucible
steel plant in all of Russia is located. Here he was interviewed by Dr. Riehl of
Auergesellschaft fame, who was "segregatink uranium on a production scale using
a new process which utilized electric furnaces." On return to East GermanIr
(after declining the position offered) Krebs fled to the West, fearing repriSS.A.
Confirming this story was the word from the British that Frau Blohel. Riehl's
former secretary at BerliniOranienburg, had mentioned to an agent that Riehl's
last letter to her had been postmarked 7 October 1946 from Elektrostal in the
USSR, rather than the usual 1037P Moscow. A search of the files on Elektrostal
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quickly disgorged a British report of the preceding autumn indicating three car-
loads of uranium ore had been sent from the famous Jachymov (Joachimstal)
Mines in. Czechoslovakia to Electrostahl (sic) in the USSR. The circumstantial
evidence that Elektrostal was the site of the Russian uranium metal plant was
becoming impressive.
Our "Summary Report. of the Status of the Russian Nuclear Energy Pro-
gram" on 1 June 1947 reflected this, stating that he "indication from metallic
calcium production . . . appears to be the construction of two plutonium pro-
ducing reactors . . . with 500. megawatts (MW)" of total power.* '"It is par-
ticularly significant that a project of this size cannot be supported by the
estimated reserves of uranium ore available to the Russians . . . 514 tons
uranium oxide already available and 2200 tons of uranium in reserves. . . The
best information indicates that this program is not proceeding well, and in fact
uranium metal appears to have been produced in insufficient quantity to operate
more than a very small pilot reactor, such as that first operated in this country in
December 1942. Thus, if it is assumed in the worst case that Russian progress
from this date will proceed at a rate comparable to that of the American
project . . . then to produce a single bomb, January 1950 represents the
absolute lower limit."
Not a single thought that�just possibly�the Russians were planning in the
light of full engineering 'information, and that our estimates of their expected
available uranium were low. The Greeks called it "hubris"�unreasonable pride.
. In mid-1947 our earlier discussions with. 0-2 and OSO began to pay off.
First, engineer one of the sources on Bitterfeld and by
then a resident at Leverkusen in the British Zone of Germany, decided to cash in
on a good thing by selling his research papers on calcium distillation to the
American 5-2 in Berlin as well as to the British. Aside from the delicate problems
with the British raised by this particular sale information indicated that
the Bitterfeld people had developed a new copper-calcium alloy process for
making calcium electrolytically which was much more efficient than the old
electrolytic "carrot" process. It was this alloy that was partially distilled at high
teinpeatures to give the very pure calcium metal needed, the reject alloy going
back into the electrolytic baths. sn}:i'' ther, bottlenecks had been developing in
obtaining the high-temperature sictomal or similar type steel needed for con-
tainers, and the firm Pfeiffer in Weizlit6in the American Zone of Germany was
tardy in manufacturing needed vacuum pumps. � �
Headquarters, European Command forthwith stopped all further shipments.
of vacuum pumps and sicrornal to the East Zone. We in the U.S. had already
put vacuum pumps on the "COCOM" export control list in April 1946, thereby
stopping a tidy order recently placed by A MTORG, the Russian trading organi-
zation in New York. Thus export control pressure against the Russian atomic
program was being applied as rapidly and as forcefully as we could arrange it.
How much, if at all, it slowed the Russian atomic program'clowii is problematical,
but it certainly forced Russian and Bloc industries to widen' the scope of their
manufactures rapidly.
Of more importance from an intelligence vie4e'nt were the samples of raw
and distilled calcium which Miehe gave to 5-2, Berlin. These found their way to
Col. Valente of our office, who passed them to the AEC for shipment to Dr.
Spedding at Ames. By late 1947 we had his detailed analysis of the calcium the
Russians were using, along with a comparison to U.S. atomic-grade calcium and
*Presumably based on our graphite plutonium producing reactors at Hanford, which were then
rated and operated about 250MW apiece.
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Bitterfeld Calcium
U.S. specifications: the Bitterfeld distilled calcium was quite adequate by our
atomic standards.
Simultaneously, OSO produced a winner�a reporting source at Bitterfeld
itself who had access to the firm's records. He brought in documentary evidence
that on 26 July 1947 three rail cars carrying metallic calcium--consignment
No. 179-4363�left Bitterfeld for "Elektrostahl Moskau," Post Box 3, Kursk
Railroad. The shipment of carload lots of both calcium and uranium ore to
Elektrostal confirmed it as the site of a production-sized uranium metal produc-
tion facility, and not just the locatiotliff a research effort under Nikolaus Riehl.
Digressing a moment, we turne8 out to be lucky�or wise�in accepting
Elektrostal as the destination. We eventyally had enough destinations to keep
the most eager analyst busy. The initia report mentioned Zaporozhe on the
Dnieper�which turned out to be where the magnesium plant cells were vbeg
sent. Later, air shipments to Leningrad were mentioned. It was said the Russian
calcium electrolysis plant would probably be erected at Magnitogorsk, the dis-
tillation plant at Kiev, Dzerzhinsk or "Samarov." Knowing mention was made
of two German technicians, Drs. Springmann and Kroesel, said to be capable of
supervising the erection of a calcium plant, and who reportedly wrote letters
from Dzerzhinsk in the USSR.
An early January 1948 report from the UK, for example, indicated that
"those German scientists who were deported from Bitterfeld and who had
knowledge of the production of pure metallic calciu4'm ore are at Sverdlov near
Gorki." Welsh, according to a handwritten note, later "reviled this report," for
there is no town of Sverdlov, near Gorki. Just to prove that old analysts fade
gradually, I took this report the other day to the appropriate section of CIA's
Central Reference Service, and out popped the famous explosive manufacturing
and shell loading plant "Sverdlov" in the town of Dzerzhinsk, just west of
Gorki. Next to Sverdlov is the Chemical Plant "Kalinin," which makes the
sulfuric and nitric acids used at Sverdlov for the production of explosives, and the
chlorine which would be needed for calcium chloride production for feed for a
calcium plant. I would not be surprised to find that the special calCium chloride
plant designed at Bitterfeld for erection in the USSR was actually built at either
the Kalinin or Sverdlov plant in Dzerzhinsk.
In addition .to the "hot tips" on destinations mentioned above, Russian
bureaucracy coupled with security produced another bizarre batch for us to
unscramble. First, I. G. Farben Bitterfeld became Elektrochemisches Kombinat,
Bitterfeld, of the Aktiengesellschaft fiir Mineraldiinger. Later the overall
administration was changed to Abteilung der Staatlichen S.A.G. "Kaustik."
Initially, the official consignee was do Raznoimport, Moscow. By 1948 both
"Verwaltung der Aktiengesellschaft fill- Elektrochemische Industrie `Kaustik,'
Moscow" and "Verwaltung GUSIMZ, Moscow Chkalov St. 36," were used as
addresses on two shipments in a single freight car. Possibly there really were
two different destinations for raw and distilled calcium metal, but it seems doubt-
ful. By 1950 the address became simply APN 27301, Frankfurt/Oder, although
the same type of Ministry of Foreign Trade order and transshipment numbers
that had been attached from the rery beginning continued in use. Again OSO
helped immensely when it tapped banking and trade circles in East Germany
who uhiferstood in exhaustive detaipAat Soviet property abroad (GUSIMZ)
was subordinate to the Ministry of Folreign Trade, just like the older subordinate
trade sections such as Raznoimport. Fufti,k:er, they made it clear that the Trade
Representation in Berlin and Amtorg in New York were vehicles or umbrellas in
each foreign country under which all these trading or property organizationsovkre
"housed." A misassigned German POW (yes�the Russians also make security
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mistakes) returned to West Germany and told us about APN 27301: it was just
the Russian equivalent of a military post office number, in this case simpl; the
address of a labor battalion at the transshipment yards in Frankfurt/Oder which
handled the transshipment* of all special atomic goods going east or west.
Another facet of the problem investigated thoroughly was the possibility
that the Russians would eventually turn from calcium to magnesium, much as the
U.S. had done. Unfortunately, the Germans had been developing a Pidgeon-type
process for making magnesium during the war, and there was evidence from
Bitterfeld that experimentation on making calcium by this process was under
way. There were, indeed, reports that one of these furnaces had been sent to the
atomic people. Then we learned that Soviet technicians had been intensely
interested in the similar Hansgirg process furnaces at .the Hungnam Chemical
Complex in North Korea when that country came under Soviet control in 1945.
In the end, all too much effort was spent on this red herring of our own devising.
. Returning to the calcium problem itself, Commander Welsh in the UK
decided in mid-1947 that clandestine penetration of the Bitterfeld calcium pro-
gram was Me way of getting at the Soviet atomic program from East Germany,
He felt he had the assets and the official backing from the MI-6 hierarchy.
He also attempted to force U.S. agreement to lay off Bitterfeld, allowing
the British a free hand and reducing the possibility that too many (American)
cooks would alert the Russians. When full agreement was not forthcoming, he
tried to use an (unwitting) attempt by an American Army officer as a for-
instance case to back up his plea. Col. Seeman and Charles Campbell on the
Averican side spent hours discussing the matter with both OSO and.G-2 repre-
sentatives, but in the end legitim40 self-interest forced the decision that the
Americans would try not to use the eine sources as the British. Actually Welsh's
fear of American "clumsiness" was mitplaced. His sources at Bitterfeld were
never in jeopardy from American acti*s; indeed we may have helped. What
saved him�and us�was his penchant for operating directly for "C."**/
\ His real danger lay in the Soviet penetration of
MI-6 and the British Foreign Office: Donald McLean, secretary to the Combined
U.S.-UK (atomic) Policy .Committee, and "Kim" Philby, MI-6 representative
to CIA at the time, were later both shown to be active members of the Russian
Intelligence Service.
Welsh's confidence in his Bitterfeld penetration, however, was not mis-
placed at all. From its inception it produced lo4sheets of monthly shipment
statistics on a box-by-box basis. Selected product analyses were received periodi-
cally, and Russian specifications and requirements as they occurred. These data
were interpreted in the light of the design reports which the British (and to a lesser
extent we ourselves) had already received. In addition, the agent usually added
comments as needed for understanding. Indeed it is fair to say that as far as the
technical side of the Bitterfeld calcium operation was concerned, by 1948 the Brit-
ish (and in turn we ourselves) knew as much about it as the Russians did.
Information on what was going on in Russia, however, came hard. Through
mid-1950, the only additional informant on Elektrostal was Dr. Hans Kersch-
baum, who had been arrested and interned in the USSR, gone to Elektrostal for
an interview with Riehl, instead worked on electronics at Shchelkovo near
*From Russian standard gauge (five. British feet inside-to-inside on the rails) to European
standard gauge (five Roman feet center-to-center on the rails). The British, of course, designed both.
s" M" to James Bond fans.
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Moscow, returned in early 1949 to East Germany, and then fled to the West. He
merely confirmed that Riehl was reducing uranium with calcium, though he did
add that he thought it was from uranium fluoride, rather than uranium oxide.
The Russian defector "Icarus" in July 1950 confirmed many of our conclusions
about Elektrostal, Bitterfeld, transshipment offices, etc., but his information
was primarily non-technical.
At Bitterfeld, Russian security about atomics in the USSR was almost
absolute. There were, however, rumors in March 1948 that the Soviets had a
calcium distillation plant in operation in the USSR at that time. In 1949 a high-
'level Soviet official at Bitterfeld was reported as saying "that the USSR was
enieaged, in the production of calciuTi by electrolysis and distillation." In 1950
a "very accurate" source stated "Wfi.vilive been informed that crude calcium is
not being used and the quantities delivered by us would be distilled in Russia."
Finally, there was a rumor in East Gerretby in December 1948 to the effect that
Riehl had received a 100,000-ruble Stalin Prize. Useful, but hardly earthshak" g
Our only recourse was to infer what was going on in Russia from requirelxe'lfts
and specifications given to Bitterfeld, a straightforward, though far from simple
technical intelligence problem. To this end, Major P. 0. Langguth, temporarily
back in the United States, early in 1948 visited both the main offices of the
Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation in New York City, and their laboratories
and .calcium production plant at Niagara Falls, N.Y. He took with him such
detailed specifications as were by then available on the Bitterfeld calcium
'operation. As had happened on previous occasions, Union Carbide was most
cooperative. They produced full technical data on Oheir own process, requiring
only that it be kept within CIA "and not given to the USAEC," to whom
Carbide was selling the majority of its calcium and all its high-purity product.
They studied the Bitterfeld data and either judged technical factors (such as
efficiencies) in the light of their own experience, or estimated these factors if
they were missing from the Bitterfeld data. The analysis extended to the technical
factors and material efficiencies involved in producing uranium by calcium
reduction of the fluoride. As a result, Major Langguth returned with a compre-
hensive technical understanding of the Bitterfeld operation and of the expected
performance of both calcium and uranium metal facilities designed for Russians
for erection in their country. Finally, Carbide's files produced, of all things, a
translation of a 1938 paper in Russian entitled "Regarding certain questions on
the founding of the calcium industry." Because of the almost certain interruption
by the war of any 1938 plans for new facilities, this report settled negatively the
question whether the USSR had had any sizable native calcium industry.
, Incidentally, I have often been asked "Does technical intelligence help
American industry?" Usually I have had to hedge the reply because customarily
we have had all too little technical data. For metallic calcium, however, we had
detailed design data on a new, definitely more efficient process, copper-calcium
electrolysis followed by distillation. Carbide did not want it in 1948, nor has the
AEC been interested subsequently. The reason given has always been the same:
the (then) cumnt operation was a small one with no expectation of significant
expansion. Any major change would have been economically disadvantageous
over any reasonable amortization period. Thumbs down.
We, however, gleefully accepted all the data, drawings, plans, evaluations,
an&specifications we could assemble on the Bitterfeld operation, attempting to
collate itNin every way we could thing. in the hope of squeezing out one more
drop of information on the Russian 4omic program. We turned to surprisingly
complete photointerpretation reports written in 1943 on the Bitterfeld complex to
locate the calcium facilities and get exacii) building dimensions�something the
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sources never seemed to have available. In the precess we discovered just how
enormous an operation the Bitterfeld Combine really was. No wonder bombing
had never completely halted operations.
Events pertinent to calcium were placed in chronological order. The process
was properly described and quantified. The names of Russian and German per-
sonnel were arranged alphabetically with intelligence data attached. Process
yields were evaluated and recorded. Shipment data' were tabulated and quanti-
fied. The results were eventually all pulled together and published by Donald
M. Brasted as a Scientific Intelligence Report early in 1952 after the Bitterfeld
operation had been mothballed.
In 1948 and 1949, however, these collations were being used in estimates as
fast as they were being made. We lined up a sequence of events dominated by
(a) the orders of April 1946 to expand production severalfold, to 30 tons per
month of calcium with essentially normal specifications, (b) the coincidence in
October of air shipments of raw calcium to Moscow with the Russian decision to
build a large calcium distillation plant at Bitterfeld, (c) the arrival in November
of production specifications based simply on the theoretical neutron absorption
rates of impurities, followed in February 1947 by (d) much more realistic (and
adequate) specifications, and in March by (e) orders to draw- up engineering
plans for Russian calcium facilities. This sequence was interpreted much as
follows:
�
�-� � � "... In August 1945 there was no coordinated plan of action for the development
of nuclear energy. About January .10p,the USSR decided it was necessary and desir-
able to use for atomic purposes thefproduction capacity of the occupied countries.
... By June 1947 uranium metal small to have been produced in sufficient quantity
to operate no more:than a very small pil4 reactor..,."
Actually, we could have pointed up our ,conclusions: as we later leitned,
Russia's first "Fursov" research reactor went critical at the Moscow InStifarte of
Atomic Energy at 6 p.m. on Christmas Day 1946.* That was why the realistic
specifications were sent to Bitterfeld in February 1947. At the time we thought
this change in specifications came from Russian measurements on how the chain
reaction fell off in an exponential pile (a portion of a reactor mockup about 'both
size) after the neutron source was removed. Our guesses were running six months
too late.
On the designs for Russian calcium facilities drawn up at Bitterfeld between
October 1946 and March 1947, we knew that tlie calcium chloride feed plant
had a capacity of 15 tons per day, "with the possibility of being doubled"�
enough for a calcium electrolysis plant producing 30 tons per month. The raw
(carrot) calcium electrolysis plant, was supposed to be similar (or identical) to the
30-ton-per-month plant at Bitterfeld, and the distillation plant would have had
to match at 25 tons a month, to give 50 to 60 tons per month uranium metal
capacity. Brasted in his 1952 paper arrived at better founded, but not materially
different estimates, through a more sophisticated analysis which melded actual
Bitterfeld production data with the extreme design possibilities for the Russian
plants. These were used in the mid-fifties as basic data.
- In the estimates of 1948 and 1949 (by then these were interagency estimates
by the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee under CIA chairmanship)
the prime conclusion was that the Russians were headed at least for a plutonium
bomb. Even as late as the mid-1949 estimate, it was recognized that if the uranium
fuel were irradiated at reasonable values to yield between 200. and 400 grams of
plutonium per tan of uranium, then one could assume by analogy a Russian
*Soviet Atomic Science and Engineering, p 48 (Atomic Energy Publishing House, Moscow, 1967).
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Bitterfeld Calcium SE
lag-range target of perhaps two 251:!-MW graphite-moderated Hanford reactors
using about 500 tons of uranium PerArear, with an additional 200 tons for initial
loading. These numbers always conflicted with the uranium ore estimates, which
tended to be lower. In mid-1049, for intiktance, the distilled calcium stockpile of
680 tons easily .could have produced 1500 tons of uranium metal, compared to
the 850 tons probable and 1320 tons possible of uranium as judged from,thkre..
estimate. So in the mid-1949 .estimate, one 250-MW Hanford-type graphite-
moderated reactor was assumed as one alternative, a heavy-water-moderated
reactor being assumed as the other one. Any additional later reactors were sub-
sumed in the stated errors. These estimates consistently placed mid-1950 as the
earliest possible date for the first Russian nuclear test, with mid-1953 being more
likely. The general feeling that the first Russian pilot reactor went operational
in mid- to late-1947 was, of course, crucial to the minimum estimate.
Actually, from the quantitative point of view 4e estimates weren't too bad:
we learned in 1956 that the first reactor had been algraphite-moderated 100-MW
reactim This one was soon followed by additional reactors reaching perhaps a
total of 700 to 800 MW by the mid-fifties. None of us even guessed in 1949 that
that "possibility of doubling the calcium chloride plant" was the clue we really
should have followed in long-term thinking.'
Inasmuch as the final Russian calcium specifications and the American
�analysis of the Bitterfeld calcium, product both were adequate for graphite-
moderated reactors, it is odd that no conclusion was ever drawn that. the initial
reactor must be of that type, especially as it was known that heavy water reactors
could tolerate many more impurities. The reason, suppose, was that having
learned how to make really pure uranium, we would and did use that purity for
our heavy-water-moderated research reactor in Chicago as well as the graphite-
moderated production ones at Hanford. We assumed the Russians might well
act the same way. But the reverse would not have been true. Had the Russians
established "reasonable" specifications for heavy water reactors, the resultant
uranium would have stopped a graphite reactor in its tracks. In actual fact, the
Russians did not even get a heavy-water-moderated research reactor operating
until 1951.
I believe we were correct�with regard to the estimates�in assigning the
cessation of calcium distillation at Bitterfeld between 1 July 1948 and August
1949 to the start-up of the Russian distillation plant, and simply putting the
equivalent uranium into stocks during the rather high distillation rate in the
August .1949�November 1950 period. I'm sure that widely varying needs for
stocking reactors or letting them "\cook" for an initial period of four to six months
without, any additional uranium plaiyed`its*part in the actual course of events.
However, without additional specifieclata, or at least hints, it is pretty hard to
take these vagaries into account. t
� V
Operation Spanner is perhaps of miVre interest: in the spring of 1948 Eric
Welsh was musing along with Charlie- Campbell�presumably, as usual, attiSut
which way thc cat would jump�when he broached he idea of sabotagiiket)he
Russian plutonium effort. Both were aware� of the Russian specifications on
distilled calcium which called for less than one part per million of either boron or
cadmium. These substances simply soak up neutrons, thereby tending to stop
nuclear reactions. Welsh was all for dropping in a pinch of bone acid and
"buggering the works." But he had been a chemist and was afraid his man at
Bitterfeld would be caught through routine batch analysis. Then Charlie Camp-
bell remembered that in 1944 the Manhattan District had 'a really secret plant
for making boron enriched in the neutron-catchingtoron-10 isotope. In nature,
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Bitterfeld Calcium
boron contains 20% boron-10. The Manhattan District product was nearly 9C%
pure. It should work fine.
Col. Seeman liked the idea and arranged for diPereet inquiry to be made at
the appropriate levels of the AEC. The answer came back they'd be glad to loan
us some excellent material, but if we lost any of it, not to admit it!
Then came the usual period of agonizing detail. British analysis of 1947
Bitterfeld calcium disagreed with U.S. analyses in the boron content. Who really
knew how to analyze accurately for boron, and could the other laboratory learn
to reproduce the method? What really was the accuracy of the Bitterfeld
analyses? How much boron would they really let pass? Could anyone obtain
reliable isotopic analyses of millionths of a gram of boron?
Professor A. J. Demster- of the University of Chicago indicated he had just
received a mass spectrograph which could handle these small amounts of boron.
He knew a microchemist who could prepare the samples for his analysis. It was
agreed on 11 June 1948 to exchange old Bitterfeld calcium samples with the UK,
and analyses as well.
All went well at first. The analytic problems were worked out. The amounts
of enriched boron per batch of distilled calcium were worked out. Calculations
indicated there was some risk, but the Russians would be hard put to conclude
anything except some extra boron contamination in the billets�there was no
indication they had mass spectrographs of the sophistication of Prof. Demster's.
If, however, a simple neutron absorption test�a routine test in the U.S.�were
performed, it would reveal that a whole batch of uranium (that made from the
contaminated calcium) was bad. It was decided to go ahead. The sabotage chemi-
cal was transferred without records to us, and then on to the British.
. Then calcium distillation at Bitterfeld stopped for a year. Welsh's agent
started to worry. On grounds that he ,would be caught, he refused to add to the
raw calcium the amount of enriched. iisron needed to make sure that enough
contamination would pass through the distillation process into the uranium.
Finally, in August 1949, the Russfanaldetonated their first plutonium bomb
secretly. The Air Force Technical Applications Center intercepted the radioactir
debris almost by happenstance. The July issue of Nosy Mir carried a symbofil
poem:
"You shuddered. The distant hollow rumble of your carriage sounded like a wind.
Sleep my baby. ...
At the pre-arranged hour, the explosion occurred.
The granite was blown asunder to dust,
The Taiga around the mountain was illuminated
By golden radiance. ...
Sleep, my baby"
Admiral Hillenkoetter, Director of Central Intel1ige4ce, established a Nuclear
Intelligence Panel to determine why'r we had estimated mid-June 1950 as the
earliest possible date, when in fact it occurred in August 1949.
There was no longer any sense to Operation Spanner. The prepared material
came back from Bitterfeld to London to Washington, flnally being reinserted
onto a shelf somewhere in the AEC, again without any paper work. All was as
if it had never been. The Russians put the Bitterfeld calcium plant in mothballs
in December 1950. In September of .1961 I threw the last pieces of Bitterfeld
calcium into the Potomac River, watching the water boil with the reaction.
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Practice .to deceive
DECEPTION
In April 1972, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sponsored a week-long �ttegie
Planning Seminar concentrating on the question of deception. Seminar pre-
sentations by participating U.S. Government departments and agencies, and by
the Syracuse University Research Corporation (SURC) under contract to the
Advanced Research Projects Agency, have been summarized in JCS's Strategic
Planning Seminar. 17-21 April 1972, Vol. 1 (SECRET I NO FOREIGN
DISSEM). They appear in full in a 525-page Volume II which is TOP SECRET/
NO FOREIGN DISSEM. Studies in intelligence reproduces the presentation
made by Euan G. Davis, Director of the National Indications Center, and
prepared in collaboration with Cynthia M. Grabu of the NIC staff, because it
relates the question of deception and the entire scope of the seminar to the
intelligence warning function.
As an introduction, we also summarize a preceding paper by Prof. Barton S.
Whaley, of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, on
Deception and Surprise�the Lessons from History. -
Dr. Whaley has analyzed the element of surprise in 168 battles in 17 wars
from 1914 through 1968.* He comes up with some impressive statistics on the
efficacy of surprise:
Out of 50 battles in which intense surprise was achieved, 17 far exceeded
the objectives of the initiators, and only one ended in defeat..
Conversely, out of 50 battles fought without the advantage of initial
surprise, 30 ended in defeat for the initiators, and only one substantially
exceeded the attacking commander's expectations.
The average mean casualty ratio in favor of the attacking force was
1-to-15 when surprise was achieved, but only 14o-1.7 without surprise.
How, then, to achieve the desired surprise? The ,classic security pre-
cautions? Dr. Whaley finds that in 61 battles which achieved 'strategic
surprise, this could be attributed to passive security measures by the attack-
ing force in only four instances. Of 54 cases of tactical surprise, seven at
most could be attributed to effective security.
Deception, however, was either the main cause or a significant factor
in 82% of all cases of strategic surprise, and 57% of the tactical surprises.
"The greater the effort put into the deception plan," Dr. Whaley notes,
"the greater the degree of surprise gained."
� Thus, Whaley summarizes, "Ybur chances of obtaining or exceeding
yo4 goals are almost four tin41.better if you can achieve at least some
degree of surprise. Your chances 'hf gaining surprise are eight times better if
deception planning is used. And 'unify, you can greatly improve on even
these most favorable odds, the more comprehensive and sophisticated
your deception." .6 �%1
Another participant in the same seminar cited a statement by Princeton
football coach Jake McCandless, worthy of the late Herman Hickman: "An
*Whitley's Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War was issued as a manuscript by Massachusetts
Institute of Technology in 1969 It will soon be published in book form.
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Deception
ounce of deception is worth a 240-pound tackle." The language of the
gridiron may be unfathomable to potential enemies of the United States, but
there is nothing to prevent such enemies from performing the same calculations
- Dr. Whaley has made, and arriving at the same attractive odds. Indications
intelligence officers, accordingly, expect any opposition undertakings to seek
ma.ximxim deception and surprise.11,....
The Editor
STRATEGIC WARNING AND DECEPTION
Euan G. Davis
and
Cynthia M. Grabo
I welcome this opportunity�a rare opportunip, I might add�for some of
us in the intelligence field to meet with the operational planners on a subject
of mutual interest and great importance to us all: deception.
The subject is a two-faced problem. It may be important for the security
and success of our own operations in many cases that we have an effective decep-
tion plan. But it may be equally important, and.sometimes more important, that.
we understand what the enemy's deception capabilities may be and what decep-
tion he may be practicing at the moment. The latter is peculiarly the function of
the intelligence community�and particularly of those elements of intelligence
which are concerned with warning: For the perception of the enemy's deception
plan, and even the recognition that he may be practicing deception at all, clearly
is a most important element in the warning process. In some cases, it could be the
most important element in warning, and particularly of strategic warning, of
the recognition of the enemy's intention to attack.*
� In his manuscript, Mr. Whaley identifies five *general types of deception,
noting that there is more than one *approach to this problem. The military
planner, seeking surprise, may attempt to conceal or mislead as to his:
Intention, that is, that he is preparing to attack at all..
Time of attack.
Place of attack.
Strength of the attacking forces.
Style of the attack, that is, the form the military operation will take, or the
weapons that may be employed.
Now, we in the strategic warning business today are not unconcerned with
matters of the time, place and stiength,of enemy attacks. We do deal from week
to weak with questions such as a,. 1 erth Vietnamese attack on Long Tieng, or
Israel's response to new attacks by e fedayeen. We deal with these because this
is the type of problem which comes. uptirom day to dry.
lil .
But this is not our primary functi . Our primary function is to assess the
intentions of. our enemies to attack us at all, anywhere, at any time in the , re- _____..
fly
seeable future. We are concerned above all with whether the USSR, the Pee ' le's' -- -- -- _ ----14
*On the general subject of warning, see Davis, "A Watchman for AU Seasons," Audits XIII/2;
on the timing factor in strategic warning, see Grabo, "Strategic Warning: The Problem of Timing,"
Studies XVI/2.
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