POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF POST-EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTION

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05756584
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: December 23, 2016
• Case Number: F-2015-01589
• Publication Date: May 13, 2011

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LN.1,
13 May 2011
DISPOSITION MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: (UHAIU0) Possible Violation of Post-Employment Restriction
CASE: 2010-09556-IG
INTRODUCTION:
1Th%.) On 20 January 2010,
Clandestine Service (NCS) advised the Office of Ins
National
ector General (OIG) that
(b)(3)
Agency retir-
(b)(3)
is running
a
business,
business that has a number of Chinese clients.
sai�
(b)(6)
is based in the Was mgton D.C. area
and
travels to China,
stated he has no knowledge of whether
sought
counsel from the
Office of
General Counsel (OGC) concerning his
post-
retirement e�'lyment.
(b
)(3)
2.
retired
from the Agency in February 2006. At the time of
his retirement
was
an Agency Senior Intel1i2ence Service (SIS) officer.
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
In January 2010,
reported
that was
(b)(3)
running a business "that had a lot of forei n clients." At question is whether
between the time he retired in and the time that his final
restrictions would have expired in iolated any of his post
employment restrictions, specifically(biarictions forbidden by Title 18 U.S.C.
� 207 (a)(2), Title 18 U.S.C. � 207 (f), Section 402 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act of 1997 and or Agency Regulation i.e., did he:
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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� Make any communication or appearance before CIA seeking official
action on behalf of a third party within two years of his separation?
(Title 18 U.S.C. � 207 (a)(2)) (Exhibit A.)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
� Sign a "Section 402 agreement" IAW the Intelligence Authorization
Act of 1997? Section 402 of the Intelligence Authorization Act of
1997) (Exhibits B and C.)
� Represent or advise a foreign government or foreign political party
within three years of his separation (Section 402 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act of 1997) (Exhibits B and C.)
PROCEDURES AND RESOURCES
3. OIG interviewed
Counsel, Administrative Law Division (ALD);
the OGC Ethics
and the Subject of this
investigation. OIG reviewed and OGC records regarding
Subject and reviewed internet information and corporate information supplied
by Subject regarding his company, (b)(6)
FINDINGS
(b)(3)
4. tated he did not know if client list�
included foreign persons, foreign governments, or foreign corporations. He
opined that clients w((b)(3)imarily large US-based
--names. As an example of the type of client was working with,
-(b)(3)
advised that the current head of the
(b)(6) is one of (b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
that that
5.
activities s
(b)(3)
(b)(6) told him
clients.
(b)(3) (b)(3)�
said he believed that began his consulting
-)
ort y ter he retired. He said( b )( 3
and he retired from the Agency shortly thereafter. According to
(b)(6)
shortly aftei (b)(3) He said
was a former chief of the
2005P3)(3) opined the hiring of
to (b)(3) a former Agency
etirecl and went to work with
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
and another former(b1(61
also hired on with6)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
in
was connected
who
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3) ,
S T
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opined tha
their connection with(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
gained employment with by way of
and they eventually took over control of
(b)(6)
6. tS) said.thou h he did not know wh has as its
clients, he be ieve that[ relationship relationship with the Chinese might better be
described as an employer to em 1---; relationship than a company to client
b)(6)
relationship. He explained tha consults for large US companies
regarding risk assessments, in country dangers, and other matters. He opined
that to provide that type of due diligences consulting, i.e., to assess threats,
obtain telenhone records, conduct surveillance, and to do other things of that
nature -(b)(6) needed personnel who were indigenous to the environment.
As an example, he stated that(b)(6) hires Chinese employees
with
7
(b)(3)
3r
(b)(6)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(6)
(b)(3)
direct interface
and
However,
(b)(3)
advised that
(b)(3)�is
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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(b)(3)
9. tE3 Ethics Counsel, ALD/OGC, advised that
becaus� (b)(3) was an SIS Officer
he would have been a "designated employee" under Section 402 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act of 1997; and as such, he should have executed a
Post Employment Agreement and a Section 402 Agreement with OGC. She
said these documents should be stored in OGC holdings. (b)(3) explained
that the list of designated ns is revised yearly, but stated she was certain
(b)(3)
that is an appropriately graded position (an SIS
position) that holds a perennial spot on the required Section 402 designation
list.
(b)(3)
)
10
tenure (b)(3) an. w o was-(b)(3) arti (b)(3)onlar OGC Ethics Officer at the
.
his retirement, had also retired retired on (b)(6)
I
offered to conduct a due diligence search for any information
concerning (b)(3) and said she would forward her findings to OIG.
(b)(3)
dvisetd that the OGC Ethics Officer during (b)(3)
(b)(3)
11. sC,c) On 16 April 2010, advised OIG that OGC had "very
little to report" re arding information concerning any post employment
(b)()
agreement3 . had, or had not, signed with the Agency. She advised, "No
'[OGC] attorney has fol(b)i3)ny advice given to, or about, this gentleman." A
package sent to OIG by office indicated that OGC had no -post
employment letter, no 402 agreement, and no form 879s on file for (b)(3)
12.*)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
4
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13. Nt
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
/said that (b)(3)
runs a
consulting business that consults with major US firms, such as Dow Jones and
other Fortune 500 companies. He advised that many major US companies
hnve neo le [foreign national employees] who come to the US to work, and
(b)(3)
company uses indigenous contacts and contract employees to conduct
due diligence research for their clients regarding these foreign employees.
14. X)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
15
16.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
17. On 8 November 2010,
advised he is a minority part owner of�(b)(6)_
former (b)(6)
was interviewed by OIG.
(b)(3)
_He said that (b)(6)
with the FBI; (b)(6)
a person with a background in tuiciriess and with the US Department of State;
(b)(3)
and (b)(6) a person who(b)(6)has a background in business, are the other
--owners of ("6) According-to was-established on 1 March
6 b)()
2006, when he and his partners purchased ( from
(b)(3) both former Agency
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(b)(3)
(b)(6)
employees, said that basic mis-:� (6)was to be a "response
(b)
renter" to take care of travel. He said that
( b)(6)
firct ^nened as an adjunct to (b)(6) and then evolved into a consulting
company. (b)(3)
said he started consulting almost immediately upon his
retirement from the Agency.
(b)(3)
18. Z`G.4 advised that -(b)(6)
is a consulting company that
responds directly to its client's requests. He said that earlier in his company's
history, it did due diligence and background investigations for US companies,
but now (b)(6) helps corporations with their business strategies concerning
countries like China. (b)(6)
(b)(3)
corporations, such as
(b)(3)
advised his customers are major US
(b)(6)
(b)(3)
one (b)(6) employee, and one (b)(6)
employee. (
(b)(6)
19. ai has no direct contact with the Chinese
government r anyone with a Chinese political party affiliation. He said he h as
never hired anyone with those affiliations and never will. According to ("3)
(b)(6)
hires a separate intermediary company who, in-turn, hires a Chinese
investigative agency (that is not part of the Chinese government hnt may have
employees who work for the Chinese government). He said
works
through this company using "team leaders" who handle the liaison between his
company and the contracted Chinese investigative agen)(6ccording to
(b)(3)
the tenrn leaders are also contract hires and no --nloyees.
(b)(6)
said provides provides its contract team leader with
requirements and they, in-turn, supply the requirements to the Chinese
(b)(6)
investigative agency. He said the make-up of tf contractor team
leaders is on (b)(6) employee, one (b)(6) emplgyee_
b)(3)
said the Chinese investigative agency, in-turn, delivers 1ts(b)(6) 3) aid --its over to the.
(" contractors, who then provide the information to
(b)(6)
practice of using coordinators to orchestrate the use of a legal
Chinese agency to do background work is athy(-6-)- standard practice in their
business, many companies do it. He said strength is in its ability to
analyze the information and provide a report to its client.
6
"SEGREZ____
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(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(6)
20.
said that
"bashes" the Chinese by giving its US
(b)(3)
clients irc;erbt
(b)(3)
robbing them blind.
into how the Chinese are
He
(b)(6)
said,
ID)(6) _s accused
of being Sinophoebes
and goal
iQ 1-^ ;dentify
Chin em-
penetrations
and to stop their threat
to US interests."
(b)(3)
claims
thatr(b)(6)
has
hurt th-
' _(b)(6)nese and neither
the Agency nor
the FBI
has
certain abilities,
which
does have,
to accomplishing that task.
21. c�
Employment
"Section aril
of 1997. (b)(3)
(b)(3)
said he does not remember whether he executed a Post
greement with the Agency's OGC or whether he signed a
reement" in accordance with the Intelligence Authorization Act
aid he read some materials pertaining to post employment
restrictions and he was familiar with -nost employment restrictions, but he did
not recall signing any documents. (b)(3)
said he did not ask for or receive any
written "waivers," signed by the Executive Director regarding his business and
or contact with a foreign government.
(b)(3)
22. (I) said that since his retirement, he has neither made any
communication or appearance before CIA seeking official action on behalf of a
third party nor has he represented, aided, or advised a foreign government or
foreign political party with the intent to influence the US government. He said
he has been very strict about any post employment restrictions. (b)(3) aid he
is diligent regarding his post employment restrictions but he is even more
concerned, and watches even more closely, the Foreign Companies Practices
Act. He explained that the Foreign Companies Practices Act specifies that US
companies cannot pay a foreign officers or country for favors.
CONCLUSIONS:
23. (U11,41-146P) No available documents or testimony indicates,
demonstrates, or validates that (b)(3)
� Made any communication or appearance before CIA seeking official
action on behalf of a third party within two years of his separation.
� Aided or advised a foreign government or foreign political party with
the intent to influence the US government within a year of his
separation.
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� Signed a "Section 402 agreement" JAW the Intelligence
� Authorization Act of 1997.
� Represented or advised a foreign government or foreign political
party within three years of his separation.
This case is closed.
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
8
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