LETTER TO JAMES A. WILDEROTTER FROM S. WARNER

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: MHCHAOS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05840160
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 68
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2024
• Document Release Date: December 24, 2024
• Publication Date: June 27, 1975

0 UNCLASSIFIED
I AL
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ri INTERNAL
USE 0 LY 0 CONFIDENTIAL
1:] SECRET
-
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (optional)
Director's Report of 24 December to the President
FROM:
John S. Warner
General Counsel 7D-07 Hqs.
EXTENSION
6111
NO.
DATE
27 June 1975
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
COMMENTS (Number isoch comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a in. across column after each comment.)
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
1 .
Assistant to the Director
7E-19 Hqs.
�
Attached is a copy of the
Director's Report of 24 December
to the President prepared by
the addressees in declassified
and unclassified form for release
by the White House.
This is being forwarded to
the White House today and, I
assume, will be released by the
White House in the next few days.

e
JOHN S. WARNER
General Counsel
,.-
- '
4
..k
�
2.
I 3.
Assistant to the Director
1F-04 Hqs.
, -
4.
5. Associate Deputy Director
for Operations
7E 26 Hqs.
6.
7.
Associate Deputy Director
for Intelligence
8. YE-44 Hqs.
9. Associate Deputy Director
for Administration
' 7D-26 H s.
10.
11. Associate Deputy Director
for Science & Technology
6E-56 Hqs.
12.
,.
13. Inspector General :
Attn: Ed Ryan
2E-24 Figs.
14.
Legislative Counsel
7D-49 Hqs.
15. Deputy Chief, Operations
2D-48 Hqs.
FORM A1 0 uslocrZUS INTERN)y.
3-62 1.0 11 SECRET ri CONFIDENTIAL El
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
27 June 1975
The Honorable James A. Wilderotter
Associate Counsel to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Jim:
I enclose three copies of the Colby Report of 24 December to the
President. These copies have been prepared by CIA, in slightly different
form from the original, for release by the White House in line with my
discussions with you several days ago. As indicated, the changes are
minor and were made in order to declassify or prepare unclassified versions.
For your information and convenience, the differences between the
original report (and attachments) and the modified versions are as follows:
a. There are no changes in the six-page Colby letter of
24 December or in Annex F (the Schlesinger memorandum of 9 May 1973).
b. Annexes C and E have been declassified and thus are modified
only by the deletion of the words "Secret-Eyes Only" from each page
of Annex C and the word "Secret" from each page of Annex E.
c. Annex G has been declassified and thus is modified only by
the deletion of the words "Secret-Eyes Only" from both pages of that
Annex. The two-page undated and unsigned memorandum attached
to Annex G has been produced in an unclassified version as a result -
of one minor change--a two-letter prefix to the word "CHAOS" has
been deleted.
d. Annex I has been declassified and thus is gypdified only by
the deletion of the words "Secret-Eyes Only" from toth pages of that
Annex. Of the memoranda attached to Annex I the following have
been declassified and thus are modified only by deletion of the
words "Secret-Eyes Only" from each page of those attachments:
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t.�Yditit14;
Care in Relation to Significant Domestic Events
Restrictions on Files of American Citizens
Restrictions on Operational Lists on Americans
U.S. Citizens Involved in Narcotics Abroad
Foreign Connections with Organized Crime in the U.S.
DCS Assessment of U.S. Citizens
DCS Interest in Foreign Students and Foreign National Physicians
The Intelligence Evaluation Committee
Reporting on Dissident Groups
Testing of Equipment in U.S.
Influencing Human Behavior
Postal Service
OEL Speech-Processing Assistance
Unclassified versions of tile remaining attachments to Annex I have
been produced by making minor deletions from each. For your informa-
tion and convenience, I am enclosing at TAB I of this letter a copy of
these memoranda in the classified form forwarded by Mr. Colby on
24 December. The deletions made to permit production of the unclassi-
fied versions are indicated in brackets.
e. Annex A herewith is an unclassified version of the original.
A bracketed notation on the top of page one indicates that the unclassi-
fied version differs from the original classified version only by the
deletion of the names of two CIA officers.
f. Annex B herewith is an unclassified version of the classified
original, which is a 1967 cable from CIA Headquarters to CIA
2
Q17171.7
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addressees abroad. Names of the addressees, certain internal control
and dissemination markings, and the names of CIA personnel partici-
pating in the preparation and approval of the cable have been removed,
and minor deletions in the text have been made. A copy of the classified
cable as forwarded with the 24 December letter, but with deletions
bracketed, is enclosed at TAB B of this letter for your information and
convenience.
g. The title page of Annex D "Briefing Papers Special Operations
Group, Counter Intelligence Staff," 1 June 1972, and the first and
fourth of the four briefing papers, namely, "Program Objectives" and
"Program Manpower Resource Requirements" have been declassified
and thus are unchanged except for the deletion of the words "Secret-
Eyes Only" from each page. An unclassified version of the other two
briefing papers, namely, "Program Interagency Relationships" and
"Operational Program" has been prepared and a notation at the top of
the first page of each of those two papers indicates that deletions have
been made. For your convenience and information, enclosed is a copy
of all of Annex D as forwarded with the 24 December letter, with the
deletions made for the unclassified version indicated by brackets.
This is identified as TAB D to this letter.
h. Annex H herewith is an unclassified version of the classified
original, which is a 1974 cable from CIA Headquarters to CIA addressees
abroad. Names of the addressees, certain internal control and dissemi-
nation markings, and the names of CIA personnel participating in the
preparation and approval of the cable have been removed, and minor
deletions in the text have been made. A copy of the classified cable as
forwarded with the 24 December letter, but with deletions bracketed,
is enclosed at TAB H of this letter for your information and convenience.
An explanatory note indicating the changes as above is attached
to the enclosed report intended for release. As I had mentioned to you earlier,
the Director had thought it would be helpful if a caveat note were attached
pointing out that this report was prepared almost overnight and was
supplemented by an oral report to the President on 3 January. Also, addi-
tional items were brought forward to the Rockefeller commission by the
Agency during the course of their investigation. In other words, it is
hoped that such an explanation would make clear that the original report
was in the nature of a preliminary report and was never considered to be an
exhaustive and complete report. Release of the note should aid the press
and others in understanding the changes in the report.
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In paragraph two of Mr. Colby's unclassified letter of 24 December
to the President, reference is made to a National Security Council Directive
and there is indication of the substance of that Directive. The NSCID is a
classified document, and it has been the practice of the National Security
Council and the intelligence community not to indicate the substance of
NSCID's in unclassified doauments. It may be that our report of 24 December
should have been classified, and the White House or the National Security
Council may want to consider classifying or modifying the Colby letter now.
I have gone into great detail as to exactly what we have done to each
of the documents so as to make your task easier if you wish to review this.
Perhaps you would want to word such a caveat in conjunction with the
explanatory note we have attached so that it would be one cohesive covering
explanation. Please let me know if you need additional information or
assistance.
Enclosures
Sincerely,
7
S. Warner
eneral Counsel
4
A r-ral
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Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - A/DCI (Knoche)
1 - A/DCI (Theurmer)
1 - ADDO
1 - ADDI
1 - ADDA
1 - ADDS&T
1 - IG (Attn: Ed Ryan)
1 - OLC
1 - DC/Ops
1 - OGC
OGC: RHL/dmh
Ltr to Wilderotter from OGC dtd 27 Jun 75 re Colby Report of 24 December to
the President
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This is the report from the Director of Central Intelligence of
24 December 1974 to the President, together with the annexes, covering
matters related to the New York Times article of 22 December. No changes
have been made in the report itself (Mr. Colby's letter of 24 December),
which was not classified. Some of the annexes have been declassified.
Unclassified versions of several others have been prepared, and
substituted for the originals, by making deletions from the original
classified versions. Each such unclassified version is so identified by
an appropriate notation. In certain documents internal distribution and
control markings have been omitted.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
December 24, 1974
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
This report is in response to your request for my comments
on The New York Times article of December 22nd alleging CIA
involvement in a "massive" domestiC intelligence effort. While
CIA has made certain errors, it is not accurate to characterize
it as having engaged in "massive domestic intelligence activity."
The National Security Act of 1947 states that CIA shall
have no "police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal
security functions." The Agency's functions thus relate solely
to foreign intelligence. Included in this responsibility is
foreign counterintelligence, as stated in National Security
Council Intelligence Directive No. 5. This provides that CIA
shall, inter alia, conduct clandestine counterintelligence
outside the United States and its possessions. Under this
charge, CIA for many years has maintained liaison with the
intelligence and security services of other nations and has
conducted independent counterintelligence activities abroad.
Whenever such matters relate to the internal security of the
United States, information derived from such operations is
passed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other
Departments or Agencies of the Government when appropriate.
In addition, CIA has responded to requests from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and on occasion other Departments,
for counterintelligence work abroad.
.In 1967, wh,71 .1ncern grew in the United States Government
over domestic di.si_ence, questions were 'taised as to whether
there might be stimulation or support of such activity from
outside the United States. As a result, the Director of
Central Intelligence on 15 August established within the CIA
counterintelligence office a program to identify possible
foreign links with American dissident elements (Annex A).
Later that same year, this became a part of an interagency
program (Annex B). In November 1967, the Agency produced a
study, International Connections of US Peace Groups, in response
to a request by the President. In late 1967 or early 1968
the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
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reques.-ted an assessment of possible foreign links with
Ameri:;an dissident student groups (SDS). In mid-1968 the
Agency produced an assessment of youth movements throughout
the world, including a section analyzing the American scene
to complete the picture. This study concluded that: "There
is no convincing evidence of control, manipulation, sponsorship,
or significant financial support of student dissidents by
any international Communist authority."
In September 1969 the Director reviewed the counter-
intelligence program and stated that he believed it to be
proper, "while strictly observing the statutory and de facto
proscriptions on Agency domestic involvements" (Annex C).
In 1970, in the so-called Huston Plan, the Directors of
the FBI, DIA, NSA, and CIA signed a report to the President
recommending an integrated approach to the coverage of domestic
unrest. While not explicit in the Plan, CIA's role would have
been to contribute foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.
The Huston Plan itself was not implemented but was followed
by the establishment on 3 December 1970 of the Interagency
Evaluation Committee which was coordinated by the Counsel to
the President, Mr. John Dean. This committee was chaired by
a Department of Justice officer, Mr. Robert Mardian, and in-
cluded representatives from CIA, FBI, DOD, State, Treasury,
and NSA. Pursuant to this Government-wide effort, CIA con-
tinued its counterintelligence interest in possible foreign -
links with American dissidents. A full description of the
CIA project, prepared on 1 June 1972, is attached (Annex D).
Because of CIA's effort during these years, some CIA
employees, not directly involved in the program, misinterpreted
it as being more focused on American dissidents than on their
possible connections with foreign governments. In addition,
however, there were individual cases in which actions were
taken which overstepped proper bounds. For example, the
Agency recruited or inserted individuals into American dissi-
dent circles to establish their credentials for operations
abroad against those foreign elements which might be supporting,
encouraging, or directing dissidence in the United States.
In the course of their preparatory work or on completion of
a phase of their mission abroad, these individuals reported on
the activities of the American dissidents with whom they came
in contact. Significant information thereby derived was
reported to the FBI, but in the process CIA files were
established on the individuals named.
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In 1972, with the approval of the Director, the Executive
Director issued an internal memorandum to senior CIJ. officials
describing the program in order to clarify its scope and to
invite reports of any departures from its policy:
"To carry out its responsibilities for counter-
intelligence, CIA is interested in the activities
of foreign nations or intelligence services aimed
at the U.S. To the extent that these activities lie
outside the U.S., including activities aimed at the
U.S. utilizing U.S. citizens or others, they fall
within CIA's responsibilities. Responsibility for
coverage of the activities within the U.S. lies with
the FBI, as an internal security function. CIA's
responsibility and authority 4re limited to the
foreign intelligence aspect of the problem, and
any action of a law enforcement or internal security
nature lies with the FBI or local police forces."
(Annex E)
On 9 May 1973, the Director issued a bulletin to all
employees requesting them to report any indication of any
activity they believed might be outside CIA's charter (Annex F).
Responses from some employees referred to the counterintelli-
gence program. As a result, on 29 August 1973 the Director
issued specific direction to the managers of the program re-
emphasizing that the focus of the program was to be clearly
on the foreign organizations and individuals involved in links
with American dissidents and only incidentally on the American
contacts involved (Annex G).
In March 1974 the Director terminated the Program and
issued specific guidance that any collection of counter-
intelligence information on Americans would only take place
abroad and would be initiated only in response to requests
from the FBI or in coordination with it; furthermore, any such
information obtained as a by-product of foreign intelligence
activities would be reported to the FBI (Annex H).
In the course of this program, files were developed on
American citizens. The total index of these Americans amounts
to 9,944 counterintelligence files. Approximately two-thirds of
these consisted of the by-product coverage of the activities
outlined above or stemmed from specific requests from the FBI
for information on the activities of Americans abroad. One-
third consisted of FBI reports on American Communists. We
have for the past several months been in the process of
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eliminating material not justified by CIA's counterintelligence
responsibilities, and about 1,000 such files have bean removed
from the active index but not destroyed.
Aside from our Congressional liaison working records,
we hold files on foutteen past and present Members of Congress.
These were opened prior to their election to office and were
caused either by the process ,of clearing them for work with
the Agency or because we were interested in them for foreign
intelligence purposes. There is no, and to my knowledge never
has been any, surveillance--technical or otherwise--of any
Members of Congress.
The New York Times articles makes a number of specific
allegations of improper activity domestically by CIA and
relates these to the above program. In the 1973 compilation
by the Agency of all activities which might be questionable,
a number of items were raised which were not related to that
program. The Agency's action in most of these cases was
founded upon the section of the National Security Act of 1947
which provides that the Director of Central Intelligence is
responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure. Over the many years in which
CIA has been operating, some actions have been taken which
were improper extensions of the charge contained in this
language. Apparently The New York Times reporter learned of
some of these items, and erroneously associated them with the
above program. Examples include:
a. Unauthorized entry of the premises of three
individuals, a defector and two former employees, to
determine whether they had-classified documents, and
in one case to recover them (in 1966, 1970 and 1971).
Two of these incidents involved breaking and entering.
b. Electronic surveillance (telephone tap) of
two newspaper reporters (1963) and physical surveillance
of five reporters (in 1971 and 1972) to determine the
sources of classified information published by them.
Similar physical surveillance of three ex-employees of
the CIA who ware suspected of unauthorized possession
of classified documents (1969, 1971, and 1972).
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c. Development of paid informants among construction
workers at the time of construction of the Agency building
(1960-1961) to protect against the placement of electronic
raps therein.
d. During the period 1967-1971, agents were also developed
to monitor dissident groups in the Washington area considered
to be potential threats to Agency personnel and installations,
and Agency security field officers in the US also collected
information on similar dissident groups, to advise the Agency
of potential threats to its personnel and installations.
e. A list of individuals suspected of particular offenses
considered to pose a security vulnerability was collected over
a number of years prior to 1973. This practice was terminated
and the file destroyed in 1973.
f. From May-September 1971 along-time CIA source was under
surveillance in the US in connection with a reported plot to as-
sassinate or kidnap Vice President Agnew and the DCI. The in-
dividual covered was a Latin American revolutionary, but the
surveillance expanded to cover several American citizen contacts
in New York and Detroit.
A final category of questionable activity identified during the
1973 survey was related to the Agency's mission to collect foreign
intelligence. In some cases the Agency exceeded proper bounds or its
activities were subject to misconstruction as being aimed at.purposes
outside its charter. The following examples, for instance, may be
related to the charges made in The New York Times article, although
they have no connection with the program first discussed above:
a. Records were made of the identities and addresses of
individuals exchanging correspondence between the United States
and certain communist countries, as an aid to determining pos-
sible leads to potential operations. This program included .
the surreptitious opening of certain first-class mail to ex-
tract positive intelligence or data valuable for the develop-
ment of foreign intelligence operations against the communist
country. This program was initiated in 1953, and from Its
Inception was fully coordinated with the FBI, which received
much of its product. The operation was.-,approved by three
Postmasters General and one Attorney General. The program
was terminated in 1973.
b. We Obtained names and addresses of persons telephoning
a communist country so that we could follow up for possible opera- ,
tional leads.
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c. Individuals were recruited or inserted into dissident
groups in the US to establish their credentials to collect
foreign intelligence overseas. By-product information reflect-
ing planned violence or similar activity was passed to the FBI.
The items listed above..are those questionable activities relating
:o matters covered in The New York Times article. Obviously, I am
,repared to brief you fully on such matters, as I did the Chairmen of
:he Congressional Armed Services Committees.
Following our identification of all these matters in 1973, I
.ssued detailed and specific instructions dealing with each activity.
;ome were terminated; others were continued but only as fully author-
.zed by our statute and in accordance with law (Annex I).
The New York Times article also statges that I am considering
he possibility of asking the Attorney General to institute legal
,ction against some of those who had been involved in these activi-
Aes. I have conferred with the Acting Attorney General, Mr. Silber-
an, as to my responsibilities with respect to evidence relating to
,:)ssible illegal activities by Agency personnel. On December 21st
agreed with him that I would review the questionable activities
oted in this letter and others to determine whether these should be
rought to his attention for legal review. I will certainly keep
,)u advised of any such action.
As I stated to you on the telephone, Mr. President, you have my
'1,11 assurance that the Agency is not conducting activities comparable
, those alleged in The New York Times article. Even in the past, I
olieve the Agency essentially conformed to its mission of foreign in-
,Illigence. There were occasions over the years in which improper
tions were taken as noted above, but *I believe these were few, were
ite exceptional to the thrust of the Agency's activities, and have
en fully terminated. Agency personnel are instructed each year to
vise me of any activity they consider questionable, and I am re-
k lved to follow your directive that no improper activity be conducted
- this Agency.
Respectfully,
W. E. Colby
Director.
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ANNEX A
[This is an unclassified version of the original memorandum. The only
difference between this and the classified original is that the names of two
CIA officers are omitted from this version.]
15 August 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI Staff
SUBJECT : Overseas Coverage of Subversive Student
and Related Activities
1. Further to our discussion with the Director this morning, please
take the steps necessary to accomplish the following:
a. Designation of the officers in the CI Staff who will be the
responsible focal points and coordinators of operational activity
in this matter. (Harry Rositzke and Dick Ober appear to be
excellent candidates, as you suggested.)
b. The exclusive briefing of specific division chiefs and
certain selected officers in each division, on the aims and
objectives of this intelligence collection program with definite
domestic counterintelligence aspects.
c. The establishment of some sort of system by one of the
CI Staff officers (or whatever officer you select) for the orderly
coordination of the operations to be conducted, with the
responsibility for the actual conduct of the operations vested
in the specific area divisions.
d. The identification of a limited dissemination procedure
which will afford these activities high operational security
while at the same time getting the information to the appropriate
departments and agencies which have the responsibility
domestically.
e. The establishment of a periodic reporting 4-stem,
preferably monthly, to gauge progress in the enterprise.
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2. The officer you select for the operational end of this will have a few
leads to start with. He should confer with Mr. for a couple of
leads and with Mr. for a follow-up on some ideas that he has. Your
suggestion of this mornin, that some of our liaison may be helpful in this,
certainly should be pursued energetically but carefully. One of the CI Staff
officers, or whoever you select, should feel free to seek the assistance of
the Fl Staff as he requires this to run down leads or otherwise to do his job.
It may be well to assign a cryptonym to the effort, so that cable traffic can
be suitably handled on a limited basis.
3. I should appreciate some sort of interim report by 31 August on the
steps we have taken to get into position to move on this program.
Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans
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ANNEX B
[This is a cable of 3 November 1967 from CIA Headquarters, to CIA addressees
abroad. Certain deletions were necessary to permit production of this
unclassified version.]
1. HDQ IS PARTICIPATING IN HIGH LEVEL INTERDEPARTMENTAL SURVEY
OF INTERNATIONAL CONNECTIONS OF ANTI-VIETNAM WAR MOVEMENT IN U.S.
FOR PURPOSES OF THIS STUDY WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO ESTABLISH NATURE
AND EXTENT OF ILLEGAL AND SUBVERSIVE CONNECTIONS THAT MAY EXIST
BETWEEN U.S S. ORGANIZATIONS OR ACTIVISTS INVOLVED AND COMMUNIST,
COMMUNIST FRONT OR OTHER ANTI-AMERICAN AND FOREIGN ELEMENTS ABROAD.
SUCH CONNECTIONS MIGHT RANGE FROM CASUAL CONTACTS BASED MERELY
ON MUTUAL INTEREST TO CLOSELY CONTROLLED CHANNELS FOR PARTY
DIRECTIVES.
2. INFORMATION COLLECTED BY OTHER AGENCIES IS BEING TAPPED
HERE IN ADDITION TO OUR OWN FILES TO SUPPLEMENT THIS DATA, PARTICU-
LARLY ON RECENT ACTIVITY RELATED TO 15-21 OCT. DEMONSTRATIONS.
WE NEED CURRENT CHECK ON STATION HOLDINGS. ADDRESSEES ARE REQUESTED
TO CANVASS INFO ON FILE OR OTHERWISE READILY AVAILABLE, AND CABLE
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS PLUS ANY COMMENTS STATIONS BELIEVE RELEVANT.
COVERAGE SHOULD BE INVITED TO EVIDENCE OF CONTACTS BETWEEN ELEMENTS
OF U.S S. PEACE MOVEMENT AND FOREIGN GROUPS OR INDIVIDUALS. VIETNAM
PROTEST ACTIVITY IN YOUR AREAS SHOULD BE REPORTED ONLY INSOFAR AS
DIRECT CONNECTION WITH U.S S. ORGANIZATIONS OR CITIZENS IS INVOLVED. WHERE
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CONNECTION IS EVIDENT, ADDRESSEES SHOULD TRY TO SHOW OR ESTIMATE
WHETHER ACTIVITY IS LOCALLY INSPIRED OR IS EXTERNALLY DIRECTED.
3. VIEW SENSITIVITY THIS MATTER, PLEASE DO NOT DISCUSS WITH
NON-U.S. GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL. THESE REPLIES SHOULD BE SLUGGED
[CRYPTONYM] ONLY. SHOULD NOT BE DISSIMINATED LOCALLY OR LATERALLY.
APPRECIATE THIS IS SHORT NOTICE, BUT NEED REPLY BY 7 NOV
END OF MESSAGE
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ANNEX C
6 September 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Support
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
1. I recently have reviewed the Agency's efforts to monitor those
international activities of radicals and black militants which may affect
the national security. I believe that we have the proper approach in
discharging this sensitive responsibility, while strictly oberving (sic)
the statutory and de facto proscriptions on Agency domestic involvements.
2. My understanding is that OCI carries this responsibility in the
Intelligence Directorate, and that arrangements have been made in each
geographic division to ensure continuing coverage of pertinent activities
and systematic compilation of useful information. Mr. Corscadden's
reassignment removes from the scene an experienced and knowledgeable
analyst of these matters, and it is my hope that a suitable replacement
will be found and developed.
3. I appreciate that there are several components in the Clandestine
Service with a legitimate operational interest in the radical milieux.
At the same time, it should be understood that Mr. Ober's Special
Operations Group of CI Staff has the principal operational responsibility
for coordinating and developing operations to collect information on
aspects of activities abroad which have a direct bearing on U.S. radical
and black militant movements. I expect that area divisions and senior
staffs will be fully cooperative in this effort, both in exploiting existing
sources and in developing new ones, and that Mr. Ober will have the
necessary access to such sources and operational assets.
4. It is most important to ensure that Mr. Ober's -proup has a small
coterie of knowledgeable, effective officers. He needs-two kinds of
people: skilled analysts who can produce written material coherently
and quickly, and experienced operations officers, ideally with a
demonstrated ability to work in this sensitive area. If the right people
are scarce and already ensconced in other activities, a select few
nonetheless ought to be broken away for assignment to CI Staff.
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5. A formidable obstacle to Mr. Ober at present is the backlog of
undigested raw information at his disposal. In addition to assigning skilled
analysts to deal with the flow of information, there is an obvious need for
introducing expanded sophisticated computer support. I understand that
the Office of Computer -Service possesses on-line capabilities and other
facilities which not only would provide vastly improved information
storage and retrieval but also affords the possibility of a data link with
certain other elements of the security community. I would urge the earliest
utilization of this capability. A rational combination of able officers and
computers ought also to foster the twin virtues of holding Mr. Ober to an
acceptable level and minimizing the number of individuals with access to
sensitive intelligence and operational information.
6. It is also important to ensure that a cooperative and supportive
relationship exists between the Office of Security and Mr. Ober's Group.
I expect that information collected by the Office of Security as part of its
normal security mission; but which has a bearing on the targets of the
Group, will be provided to the Group. Office of Security checks with
other domestic repositories of information, involving targets of interest to
the Group, should be closely coordinated with it.
Richard Helms
Director
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ANNEX D
1 June 1972
BRIEFING PAPERS
SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP, COUNTER INTELLIGENCE STAFF
I. Program Objectives
II. Program Interagency Relationships
III. Operational Program
IV. Program Manpower Resource Requirements
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1 June 1972
Program Objectives
Special Operations Group, Counter Intelligence Staff
The Special Oper4tions Group is responsible for
managing and implementing the Agency program for collection
and dissemination of information on the countersubversive
aspect of counterintelligence. This responsibility includes:
A. Collection: Clandestine collection abroad
of information on foreign (Soviet, Chinese Communist,
Cuban, North Korean, North Vietnamese, the Communist
Front of South Vietnam, and the various Arab Fedayeen
groups) efforts to support/encourage/exploit domestic
extremism and dissidence in the United States. These
efforts include funding, training, propaganda,
provision of safe haven, provision of alias documenta-
tion, etc. The collection emphasis is on foreign
involvement, whether directly or by indirect third
national leftist groups or individuals. Principal
concern is for coverage of foreign involvement in
the extremist anitwar movement, extremist student/
youth/faculty groups, black extremism, Chicano
extremism, Puerto Rican extremism, deserter/evader
support and inducement, and international aspects of
domestic underground media. Examples of organizations
of interest with respect to possible foreign involvement
therein include the Peoples Coalition for Peace and
Justice, the National Peace Action Coalition, the
Student Mobilization Committee, the Black Panther
Party, the Puerto Rican Socialist Party, the Students
for a Democratic Society, Dispatch News Service, -
Newsreel, Liberation News Service, Ramparts, etc.
B. Dissemination: Information on the above
subject, collected by all elements of this Agency,
including the Clandestine Service, the Office of
Communications, the Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, and the Domestic Contact Service, is
disseminated as obtained via special reports series.
The bulk of the disseminations are to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation but disseminations are also
made to other agencies, including the White House
as appropriate.
I ;
I
�
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C. Data Base Maintenance: Since all cable
and dispatch correspondence in relation to the
program is compartmented for reasons of operational
security and sensitivity, and is not processed -by
either the Cable Secretariat or the Information
Services Division (ISD) of the Clandestine Service,
a complex, highly sophisticated system is utilized
for the control and retrieval of this information.
(An additonal reason for the need for such a system
is the receipt of a large volume of-reporting from
the Federal Bureau of Investigation which requires
detailed retrieval capability for pertinent names
cited, and which would not otherwise be retrievable
under existing ISD procedures.) The control and
retrieval system has an on-line remote query and
remote input capability and is linked to an IBM
360/67 computer of the Office of Computer Services.
Hardware involved includes nine IBM 2260 Cathode
Ray Tube Terminals, five IBM 2741 Typewriter
Terminals, one Data 100 Offline Printer, and one
Data 100 Card Reader.
D. Production: In addition to disseminating
pertinent information as collected, the Agency is
responsible for preparation and provision of
special reports, studies, and estimates on the
sub-paragraph A above subject, in response to
requirements levied upon it by other elements of
the Government. To maximize compartmentation,
such special studies, reports, or estimates are
prepared by the Special Operations Group, rather
than the DDI, utilizing either all information
available to the Agency or all information
available to the Government, depending upon the
nature and scope of the particular requirement.
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[This is an unclassified version of the original memorandum. Two minor
deletions were necessary to permit the production of the unclassified version.]
1 June 1972
Progi,am Interagency Relationships
Special Operations Group, Counter Intelligence Staff
Implementation of the Agency's program for collection and dissemination
of information on foreign exploitation of domestic dissidence and extremism
involves a complex series of interagency relationships. These fall into the
following categories: operational; dissemination of information; and pro-
vision of special studies, reports, and estimates.
A. Operational: Despite the disruption of liaison between
the Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the Spring
of 1970, the FBI has cooperated operationally with the Special
Operations Group along three lines:
1. Exploitation of FBI Sources Abroad: Most common
(about 18 cases since January 1971) has been participation by
the Special Operations Group in the briefing and debriefing of
FBI New Left and racial extremist sources who travel abroad
as part of their undercover activities. Some such travel (five
cases, not included in the preceding figure) has even been
arranged to meet Special Operations Group needs.
2. Provision of Sources by the FBI: In a few cases, either
in response to a specific request for a specific type of source for
long-term use abroad by the Agency, or because an FBI informant
who has done a good job for the FBI and who wants to work abroad
has asked for it, the FBI had made available FBI sources in this
country for turnover to the Agency and use abroad. There are
three such sources now active abroad under Agency control
and direction.
3. Provision of Informant Leads to the FBI: As a converse
of sub-paragraph 2 above, the Agency on occasion has provided
the FBI with leads on possible informants in the United States on
extremist and dissident activity. Such leads arise from efforts
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to spot and recruit assets suitable for dispatch abroad against
targets of this program.
B. Dissemination of Information: Pertinent information is
disseminated as collected in response to general standing requirements
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service, and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service. Most of this information goes
only to the FBI. Roughly 20 to 25 percent of that is responsive to
specific FBI requirements. The Special Operations Group evaluates
its disseminated product by regularly checking with the FBI on its
adequacy and relevance. Counterintelligence of exceptional importance
is disseminated over the signature of the Director of CIA and is sent,
as appropriate, to the White House, the Secretary of State, the Attorney
General and the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation. The
principal White House addressee is the Counsel to the President who
has special cognizance over domestic affairs; when appropriate, the
information is also sent to the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs.
C. Provision of Special Studies, Reports, and Estimates:
In the earlier phase of the program, special studies and estimates were
requested by and prepared for the President, his Counsel, and/or
the Attorney General. Since mid-1970 such special reports and
estimates have been prepared for a highly sensitive interagency com-
mittee physically located within the Department of Justice and working
on behalf of the White House. This is the Intelligence Evaluation
Committee, composed of representatives of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Department of Justice, the Secret Service (on behalf
of the Treasury Department), the Department of Defense, the National
Security Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency. The primary
function of the Committee is the evaluation of domestice intelligence
for agreed-on national estimates, and the levying of collection require-
ments related thereto. The CIA contributions are limited to the foreign
aspects. The Chief of the Special Operations Group serves as the
representative for the Agency on the Intelligence Evaluation Committee
Staff, and as the alternate to the Agency representative in the Committee
(who is the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff).
Note: Special Problem: There is no writteii, agreement governing the
activities of Legal Attaches abroad in dealing with foreign liaison services on
collection of information on foreign exploitation of domestic U.S. dissidence
and extremism. The DCI has enunciated a policy that the Agency is the action
instrumentality of the U.S. Government in this field with foreign liaison
services. In actual practice, the FBI levies pertinent requirements directly
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upon its own Legal Attaches and may or may not come to the
Agency for assistance. An informal, usually followed, agreement
has been reached, under which the Agency handles FBI requirements
in this field (a) in countries where there is no Legal Attache, and
(b) in situations in which several-countries are involved (including
countries in which there is a Legal Attache) . Unilateral collection
effort is requested of the Agency, however, whether or not there
is a Legal Attache
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[This is an unclassified version of the original memorandum. Certain
deletions were necessary to permit the production of this unclassified version.]
1 June 1972
Operational Program
Special Operations Group, Counter Intelligence Staff
To accomplish its objectives, the Special Operations Group seeks to
achieve the maximum feasible utilization of existing resources of the Clandestine
Services. Few assets have been recruited and are being run exclusively for
this program. Instead, emphasis has been placed on the exploitation of new
and old Agency assets who have a by-product capability or a concurrent capa-
bility for provision of information responsive to the program's requirements.
This involves close continuing liaison with briefed officers in all area divisions
and the Soviet Bloc Division; and provision of custom-tailored collection require-
ments and operational guidance. Where special targets exist, a few agents asset
have been specially recruited and deployed against them.
Because of the emphasis on exploitation of existing assets to the extent
feasible and of liaison service capabilities where appropriate, this has been
and continues to be a low-cost collection program, particularly in relation to
the total number of assets involved and the production therefrom, At present,
operational expenses directly chargeable to the program are limited to eight
approved operational projects. The major costs of the program are the salaries
of the Special Operations Group personnel and the computer-associated data
base maintenance costs. These Headquarters resource requirements are
covered in a separate memorandum.
The following statistics are a rough index of the extent of effort involved
in the collection and related dissemination program. They show how much is
being done with a relatively small resource input. The statistics apply to
cables and dispatches sent or received through special handling channels for
the exclusive action of the Special Operations Group; to the dissemination
prepared and distributed by the Group; and to the number of FBI reports
received by the Group for operational support and data base maintenance
purposes.
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�
1970
- 1971
Jan---:31 Hay :72
Cables In
. 2593
2190
.1
1071
Cables Out
2114
2217
. 1076
Dispatches In
1016
1033
355 -
Dispatches Out
347
315
99
Disseminations
�
.(Regular)
746
.711 .
307
-DiSseminations
(Special memos,
studies, estimates)
�
14
37
.24
Incoming FBI Reports
1�,486
10,110
3,043
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1 June 1972
Program Manpower Resource Requirements
Special Operations Group, Counter Intelligence Staff
The program of the Special Operations Group originated in instructions
of the Deputy Director for Plans on 15 August 1967, based on instructions
to him by the Director, Central Intelligence Agency. These instructions
were to establish a program for collection and dissemination of information
on foreign involvement in domestic extremism and dissidence; and to maintain
an adequate supporting data base, including full control of pertinent related
information received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The program
started with one officer and one IA, building strength gradually as personnel
could be obtained.
The first formal strength authorization was provided in mid-1969 when
a total of 36 positions was authorized with the understanding that, if this
should prove insufficient, additional personnel would be authorized. (The
Chief of the Special Operations Group estimated that a.force of about 60
would be required as a minimum to fully implement the required program.)
To facilitate a rapid qualitative buildup of the program, a memorandum
was sent in September 1969 by the DCI to each of the Agency Directorates
requesting full support to the program; i.e., especially by the Office of
Security and Office of Communications in the Support Directorate; by the
Foreign Broadcast Information Service and the Domestic Contact Service in
the Intelligence Directorate; by the Office of Computer Services in the
Scientific and Technical Directorate; and by all pertinent elements in the
Plans Directorate. As part of the buildup of the Special Operations
Group, several key personnel assignments were made in mid and late 1969;
i.e., three branch chiefs and a.deputy chief.
' By mid-1970 the authorized strength of 35 had been achieved and was
inadequate for the workload, despite the use of a very large amount of
overtime.
As a result, the question of overall strength was reviewed and a
decision made in late Spring of 1971 that an additional 18 positions would
be authorized for the Special Operations Group for fiscal year 1972. Due to
the lack of an effective directed assignment system, the Group has been
unable to date to build up to its authorized strength (and still is short of the
space needed to accommodate that strength).
As of 2 June 1972, the Group has an on-board strength of 42, with two
additional officers scheduled to report by early July. Four Group officers,
however, are scheduled for transfer out by mid-July. The group thus needs
not only to complete its buildup to authorized strength by filling
existing vacancies, but also to obtain replacements for officers still in
the Group whose tours with the Group either are already over or are close
to their end. The early satisfaction of these personnel requirements
is essential to bring a halt to the physical drain on the health of the
Group's officers trying to keep up with the enormous continuing volume of
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work. The Group has been staffed to date primarily by junior officers
who are bright and hard-working but who require relatively close super-
vision because of lack of prior experience. The management span of the
senior officers is thus larger than desirable; additional middle grade,
experienced officers are required. Replacement of officers at or near
the end of their tour of duty is also required to maintain a concept of
rotation-tour-staffing which has proven the only effective means of
attracting qualified, experienced personnel or bright, ambitious,
young personnel.
In fulfillment of a requirement set forth when a 54 strength Group
was authorized, a formal Table of Organization has been recently approved.
The Group is organized around two worldwide operational branches, each
of which is concerned with the collection and dissemination of information
on foreign involvement in certain specific aspects of the domestic U.S.
scene. These branches are supported by a special operational unit and by
sections concerned with the control of correspondence and the maintenance of
a retreivable data base. In addition, the Office of Computer Services pro-
vides five full man years and two partial man years of programming and
system design support for the computer systems under development for and
utilized by the Group. Without such computer support, it would be impossible
to run this program with the relatively small number of people authorized
and with the short time deadlines required to provide effective require-
ments and guidance for field operations, and to respond effectively to
special studies and estimates requirements levied upon the Agency.
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ANNEX E
21 April 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Plans
Deputy Director for Support
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Heads of Independent Offices
(For Distribution to Office/Division Chief
Level Only)
SUBJECT: CIA Activities in the United States
1. From time to time some of our employees express concern over
various allegations or rumors of CIA activities in the United States. The
attached memorandum is designed to clarify this subject so that super-
visors can authoritatively reply to any employees indicating such concern.
It is a statement of the facts of the situation. If incidents or activities are
reported which appear to conflict with this statement, they should be re-
ported to appropriate senior authority for resolution (or correction if un-
authorized activities might have occurred) .
2. Because of the possible sensitivity of this description of the
Agency's methodology, this memorandum is not being given the usual broad
circulation of the "FYI -- Allegations and Answers" series. Office and
Division Chiefs are urged, however, to use it to inform Branch Chiefs so
that its points can be readily available to supervisors to react to expres-
sions of employee concern.
(signed)
W. E. Colby
Executive Director-Comptroller
Attachment
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ALLEGATION:
In a variety of ways it has been alleged that CIA is working within
the United States, with particular attention to extremist groups.
FACTS:
1. Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, subparagraph
D3, states, "The Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement
powers, or internal security functions."
In his speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors on
14 April 1971, the Director states:
"I can assure you that except for the normal responsibilities
for protecting the physical security of our own personnel, our
facilities, and our classified information, we do not have any
such powers and functions; we have never sought any; we do not
exercise any. In short, we do not target on American citizens."
In the Director's "State of the Agency" speech to employees on
17 September 1971, he said:
"I gave a talk to the American Society of Newspaper Editors
last winter, as you know, and I did it for only one purpose. That
was to try and put in the record a few of these denials that we've
all wanted to see put in the public record for some time. And
you can rely on those denials. They're true, and you can use
that as any text that you may need to demonstrate that we're not
in the drug traffic, and that weire not trying to do espionage on
American citizens in the United States, and we're not tapping
telephone lines, and that we're not doing a lot of other things
which we're accused of doing. One of the things that tends to
perpetuate some of these silly ideas are jokes that are made
about them, particularly about domestic espionage. Although
the jokes have no basis in fact they nevertheless give us a name
which we don't deserve. I don't say that that makes all that much
difference, but it does make some difference, and this tends to
spill over, so I would like to suggest that if you have it in your
hearts to do so that you speak up when the occasion arises and
try and set the facts straight."
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2. From time to time some employees have been concerned that Agency
activities might conflict with these statements. They can be assured that
Agency activities do not. For clarification, some activities which may have
been subject to misunderstanding are listed as follows:
a. Domestic contacts. The Domestic Contact Service
establishes discreet but overt relationships with American pri-
vate citizens, commercial, academic and other organizations
and resident aliens for the purposes of collecting on a voluntary
basis foreign intelligence information or soliciting their coopera-
tion in assisting the Agency to perform its mission overseas.
Records of the individuals and organizations cooperating with the
Agency are maintained as a necessary practical element of this
process.
b. Security Investigations. Security investigations are
conducted on prospective employees, contractors, and consultants,
and on security problems which arise. These investigations
involve a wide range of investigative procedures, including neighbor-
hood inquiries, checks with other Government agencies, review of
credit reports, and interviews with former employers and business
associates. This is essential to assure that our personnel possess
a high degree of personal integrity, sense of responsibility, and
competence and to protect classified information and sensitive
intelligence sources and methods. The resulting files are held
separately by the Office of Security and are not merged with other
Agency files.
c. Foreign Resources. On some occasions, foreign citizens
of interest to CIA are contacted and recruited in America for work
abroad. The purpose of this activity is entirely restricted to the
Agency's foreign operations.
d. Recruitment. CIA recruiters maintain a wide variety of
contacts within the United States, assisting individuals interested
in employment with CIA to learn more about it and to join its
employee force.
�
e. Contracting. In the course of CIA business and operations,
a number of contracts for procurement, research, or analysis are
made with a variety of U.S. companies and individuals. This in no
way constitutes operations in the U.S. but rather secures the assist-
ance of these groups in carrying out the CIA mission against foreign
targets.
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f. Operations. The 1967 Katzenbach Committee report was
approved by the Director in March 1967 and is binding on any of
our relations with American organizations today. It specifically
prohibits covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect,
to any U.S. educational or private voluntary organization. Any
relationship or operation the Agency has with an American organi-
zation must be and is %within these guidelines.
g. Details or loans. On rare occasions, details of technically
qualified CIA personnel, technical advice, or loans of CIA equip-
ment have been made available to other U.S. agencies at their
request to assist them to carry out their responsibilities. An
example is the skymarshal program, in which some CIA personnel
were temporarily detailed to the FAA in order to assist in a rapid
initiation of that program. Such personnel and equipment are under
the operational control of the receiving agency. Assistance of this
nature in no way constitutes an assumption of responsibility or
authority by CIA for the program.
h. Counterintelligence and Drugs. To carry out its responsi-
bilities for counterintelligence, CIA is interested in the activities
of foreign nations or intelligence services aimed at the U.S. To
the extent that these activities lie outside the U.S. , including activi-
ties aimed at the U.S. utilizing U.S. citizens or others, they fall
within CIA's responsibilities. Responsibility for coverage of the
activities within the U.S. lies with the FBI ,as an internal security
function. CIA's responsibility and authority are limited to the foreign
intelligence aspect of the problem, and any action of a law enforce-
ment or internal security nature lies with the FBI or local police
forces. (CIA's assistance to the U.S. Government program against
narcotics and drugs is handled in the, same fashion.)
i. Operational Support. To support CIA operations, arrange-
ments are made with various U.S. business or other entities to
provide cover or other support for CIA personnel or activities
abroad. This can include proprietaries formed or controlled by
CIA. While these may exist within the U.S., their purpose is to
conduct or support operations abroad.
j. Defectors. As provided by law, CIA occasionally resettles
in the U.S. defectors and other foreign individuals of operational
interest. This resettlement may involve a new identity, relocation,
employment, etc. Although this activity takes place in this country,
its purpose is the support of operations abroad.
-3-
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ANNEX F
9 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR ALL CIA EMPLOYEES
1. Recent press reports outline in detail certain alleged CIA
activities with respect to Mr. Howard Hunt and other parties. The pre-
sently known facts behind these stories are those stated in the attached
draft of a statement I will be making to the Senate Committee on Appropria-
tions on 9 May. As can be seen, the Agency provided limited assistance
in response to a request by senior officials. The Agency has cooperated
with and made available to the appropriate law enforcement bodies informa-
tion about these activities and will continue to do so.
2. All CIA employees should understand my attitude on this type of
issue. I shall do everything in my power to confine CIA activities to those
which fall within a strict interpretation of its legislative charter. I take this
position because I am determined that the law shall be respected and because
this is the best way to foster the legitimate and necessary contributions we in
CIA can make to the national security of the United States.
3. I am taking several actions to implement this objective:
I have ordered all senior operating officials of this Agency
to report to me immediately on any activities now going on,
or that have gone on in the past, which might be construed
to be outside the legislative charter of this Agency.
I hereby direct every person presently employed by CIA to
report to me on any such activities of which he has knowledge.
I invite all ex-employees to do the same. Anyone who has
such information should call my secretary (extension 6363)
and say that he wishes to talk to me about "activities outside
CIA's charter. ."
4. To ensure that Agency activities are proper in the future, I hereby
promulgate the following standing order for all CIA employees:
Any CIA employee who believes that he has received instructions
which in any way appear inconsistent with the CIA legislative
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charter shall inform the Director of Central Intelligence
immediately.
James R. Schlesinger
Director
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ANNEX G
29 August 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Management and Services
Deputy Director for Operations
INFO: Inspector General
SUBJECT: Questionable Activities
1. As an aspect of the allegations of improper CIA activity in connection
with the Watergate and associated matters, the Inspector General was directed
to assemble all information available in the Agency on any such activities.
Certain specific matters were provided to him, and the Director by memorandum
of 9 May 1973 directed all employees to report any activities, current or past,
"which might be construed to be outside the legislative charter of this Agency."
This information was assembled and consolidated by the Inspector General in
a memorandum of 21 May 1973 and certain individual memoranda thereafter
supplementing it. This material was used in a detailed, page-by-page review
of all such information with Senator Symington and Congressman Nedzi, as
Chairman of the Senate and the House Armed Services Intelligence Subcommittees,
respectively. In addition, I undertook very specific commitments in my con-
firmation hearings to ensure that the Agency will remain within its legislative
charter. I am arranging for the published transcripts of those hearings to be
circulated throughout the Agency for compliance, and at that time will reaffirm
the specific direction made by Dr. Schlesinger in his memorandum of 9 May
1973. This will also be incorporated into appropriate regulations.
2. With respect to the specific questionable activities which were
reported as a result of the search made throughout the Agency, however,
I believe it essential to take specific action in order that these not seem to be
condoned or overlooked. I have therefore developed specific instructions on
each reported activity. These are included in the attachments to this memo-
randum, and have the force of specific direction to you to pass on to appropriate
subordinates the instructions outlined. Separate packages of such instructions
are being developed for each Directorate in order to respect the sensitivity
of some of the activities discussed, including those which are deemed quite
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appropriate within CIA's charter. Similarly, each activity is placed on a
separate page so that the Deputy Director concerned may most easily forward
it to the office or offices directly concerned without distributing it more
broadly.
3. In the event that these instructions raise substantial difficulties
of implementation or compliance, I would appreciate your raising such cases
with me directly, with whatever recommendations you may have for modifica-
tion to carry out the spirit of the action undertaken here but to avoid undue
disruption of legitimate activities. In the absence of such notice, I will
expect full compliance with the instructions outlined herein.
4. Each addressee Deputy Director is instructed to recommend to the
DDM&S modification or addition to Agency regulations of appropriate language
to reflect the direction included in this memorandum and attachments addressed
to him. DDM&S will be responsible for consolidating such recommendations
and making an overall report to the Director through the IG, coordinating
with General Counsel.
/signed/
W. E. Colby
Attachments
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[This is an unclassified version of the original memorandum. A minor
deletion was necessary to permit the production of this unclassified version.]
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: CHAOS
CHAOS is restricted to the collection abroad of information on foreign
activities related to domestic matters. CIA will focus clearly on the foreign
organizations and individuals involved and only incidentally on their American
contacts. As a consequence, CIA will not take on the primary responsibility
for following Americans abroad, although CIA can accept a request by the FBI
to be passed to an appropriate liaison service in a foreign country for the
surveillance of such an American and the transmission of the results back to
the FBI. It must be plainly demonstrated in each such transmission that the CIA
is merely a channel of communication between the FBI and the appropriate foreign
service and is not to be directly engaged in the surveillance or other action
against the American involved.
With respect to Americans abroad who become suspect for security or
counterintelligence reasons, any official U.S.personnel will be reported to
their parent agency's security authorities, CIA will merely serve as a trans-
mission belt for the information concerned. Specific CIA operations will not
be mounted against such individuals, but they will be reported when their
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identities come as an incidental result of other CIA foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence operations. With respect to private American citizens
abroad, any such information arising will be reported to the FBI. CIA involve-
ment thereafter will be restricted to following intelligence or counterintelligence
aspects of the case and transmitting any FBI requests for assistance from foreign
security or intelligence services on the matter, in the fashion outlined above.
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ANNEX H
[This is a cable of 5 March 1974 from CIA Headquarters to CIA addressees
abroad. Certain deletions were necessary to permit the production of this
unclassified version.]
CHAOS
FROM COLBY
SUBJECT: TERMINATION OF CHAOS PROGRAM
1. THIS MESSAGE IS TO NOTIFY YOU OF THE TERMINATION OF THE
CHAOS PROGRAM AND TO PROVIDE GUIDELINES UNDER WHICH HQS HAS BEEN
OPERATING FOR SOME TIME ON CERTAIN ACTIVITIES FORMERLY INCLUDED
IN CHAOS.
2. GUIDELINES
ALL COLLECTION TAKES PLACE ABROAD. COLLECTION IS RESTRICTED
TO INFORMATION ON FOREIGN ACTIVITIES RELATED TO DOMESTIC MATTERS.
CIA WILL FOCUS CLEARLY ON THE FOREIGN ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS
INVOLVED AND ONLY INCIDENTALLY ON THEIR AMERICAN CONTACTS. IN
DOING THIS, FOLLOWING WILL APPLY:
A. WHENEVER INFORMATION IS UNCOVERED AS A BYPRODUCT
RESULT OF CIA FOREIGN-TARGETED INTELLIGENCE OR COUNTER-
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS ABROAD WHICH MAKES AMERICANS
ABROAD SUSPECT FOR SECURITY OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
REASONS, THE INFORMATION WILL BE REPORTED BY CIA IN
THE FOLLOWING MANNER.
(I) WITH RESPECT TO PRIVATE AMERICAN CITIZENS
ABROAD, SUCH INFORMATION WILL BE REPORTED TO THE
FBI.
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(2) WITH RESPECT TO OFFICIAL U .S. PERSONNEL
ABROAD, SUCH INFORMATION WILL BE REPORTED TO
THEIR PARENT AGENCY'S SECURITY AUTHORITIES, AND
TO THE FBI IF APPROPRIATE. IN BOTH SUCH CASES, UNDER
THIS SUB-PARAGRAPH, SPECIFIC CIA OPERATIONS WILL NOT
BE MOUNTED AGAINST SUCH INDIVIDUALS: CIA RESPONSI-
BILITIES THEREAFTER WILL BE RESTRICTED TO REPORTING
ANY FURTHER INTELLIGENCE OR COUNTERINTELLIGNECE
ASPECTS OF THE SPECIFIC CASE WHICH COME TO CIA
ATTENTION AS A BY-PRODUCT OF ITS CONTINUING FOREIGN-
TARGETED OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY. IF THE FBI, ON THE
BASIS OF THE RECEIPT OF THE CIA INFORMATION, HOWEVER,
SPECIFICALLY REQUESTS FURTHER INFORMATION ON TERRORIST
OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS RELATING TO THE
PRIVATE AMERICAN CITIZENS INVOLVED IN THE SPECIFIC
CASE, CIA WILL RESPOND ACCORDING TO THE GUIDANCE
IN SUB-PARAGRAPH B BELOW. IN PERFORMING THESE FUNCTIONS
CIA WILL BE DISCHARGING ITS RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PRIMARY
FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ABROAD,
PARTICULARLY AS ASSIGNED IT UNDER PARAGRAPHS 1B
AND 3B OF NSCID 5.
B. CIA MAY RESPOND TO WRITTEN REQUESTS BY THE FBI FOR
CLANDESTINE COLLECTION ABROAD BY CIA OF INFORMATION ON
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FOREIGN TERRORIST OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS INVOLVING
PRIVATE AMERICAN CITIZENS. SUCH COLLECTION ACTIVITY MAY
INVOLVE BOTH LIAISON SERVICES AND UNILATERAL OPERATIONS.
IN THE CASE OF LIAISON SERVICES, WHENEVER FEASIBLE IT SHOULD
BE PLAINLY DEMONSTRATED IN THE TRANSMISSION OF THE REQUEST
TO SUCH LIAISON SERVICES THAT CIA IS ACTING AS A CHANNEL OF
COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE FBI AND THE APPROPRIATE FOREIGN
SERVICE. ANY UNILATERAL OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY WILL REQUIRE
SPECIFIC PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE DDO, AND THE DCI WILL BE
ADVISED THEREOF. PERTINENT INFORMATION OBTAINED WILL BE
PROVIDED BY CIA TO THE FBI.
3. THE ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE WILL BEAR THE
CRYPTONYM [
. TRAFFIC WILL BE IN [CRYPTONYMJ STAFF CHANNELS
SLUGGED [CRYPTONYM, CRYPTONYM] . DISPATCH TRAFFIC SHOULD BE
ADDRESSED TO CHIEF, OPS/ITG (2 COPIES) WITH ONE INFO COPY FOR THE
CHIEF OF THE AREA DIVISION (EYES ONLY) .
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ANNEX I
NOTE: A selected group of attachments to this
memorandum is attached. The selection
includes all those which might be related to
the allegations in The New York Times article
of December 22nd.
W. E. Colby
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29 August 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Management and Services
Deputy Director for Operations
INFO: Inspector General
SUBJECT: Questionable Activities
1. As an aspect of the allegations of improper CIA activity in connection
with the Watergate and associated matters, the Inspector General was directed
to assemble all information available in the Agency on any such activities.
Certain specific matters were provided to him, and the Director by memorandum
of 9 May 1973 directed all employees to report any activities, current or past,
"which might be construed to be outside the legislative charter of this Agency_"
This information was assembled and consolidated by the Inspector General in
a memorandum of 21 May 1973 and certain individual memoranda thereafter
supplementing it. This material was used in a detailed, page-by-page review
of all such information with Senator Symington and Congressman Nedzi, as
Chairman of the Senate and the House Armed Services Intelligence Subcommittees,
respectively. In addition, I undertook very specific commitments in my con-
firmation hearings to ensure that the Agency will remain within its legislative
charter. I am arranging for the published transcripts of those hearings to be
circulated throughout the Agency for compliance, and at that time will reaffirm
the specific direction made by Dr. Schlesinger in his memorandum of 9 May
1973. This will also be incorporated into, appropriate regulations.
2. With respect to the specific questionable activities which were
reported as a result of the search made throughout the Agency, however,
I believe it essential to take specific action in order that these not seem to be
condoned or overlooked. I have therefore developed specific instructions on
each reported activity. These are included in the attachments to this memo-
�4 �
randum and have the force of specific direction to ytt-dto pass on to appropriate
subordinates the instructions outlined. Separate packages of such instructions
�are being developed for each Directorate in order to respect the sensitivity
of some of the activities discussed, including those which are deemed quite
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Similarly, each activity is placed on a separate page so that the
Deputy Director concerned may most easily forward it to the office
or offices directly concerned without distributing it more broadly.
3. In the event that these instructions raise substantial
difficulties of implementation or compliance, I would appreciate
your raising such cases with me directly, with whatever recommenda-
tions you may have for modification to carry out the spirit of the
action undertaken here but to avoid undue disruption of legitimate
activities. In the absence of such notice, I will expect full
compliance with the instructions outlined herein.
4. Each addressee Deputy Director is instructed to recommend
to the DDM&S modification or addition to Agency regulations of
appropriate language to reflect the direction included in this
memorandum and attachments addressed to him. DDM&S will be
responsible for consolidating such recommendations and making an
overall report to the Director through the IG, coordinating with
General Counsel.
signed/
W. E. Colby
Attachments
-2-
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MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Care in Relation to Significant Domestic Events
� All Deputy Directors will exhibit particular sensitivity to
the possible coincidence of CIA training, testing, or support
activities and significant domestic, political or other events
to which they could be wrongly related by the unwitting observer.
This refers particularly to political conventions, the activities
of dissident groups, etc., in which cases CIA activities should
be deactivated, moved away, or suspended temporarily.
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[This is an unclassified version of the original memorandum. A minor
deletion was necessary to permit the production of this unclassified version.]
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Audio Surveillance
CIA will not operate audio equipment or otherwise actively assist
other agencies in such operations against domestic targets. Equipment
may be made available in such cases if:
1. There is full disclosure of the operation and there is
no legal inhibition against it when carried out by the other
agency.
2. No CIA participation is involved.
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[This is an unclassified version of the original memorandum. Two minor
deletions were necessary to permit the production of this unclassified version.]
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: [cryptonymi
Project [cryptonym] is approved as a necessary support to foreign
intelligence operations. Care will be taken that, during the training and
development period of such agents in the United States, they will not be
operated by CIA against domestic targets. To the extent that incidental
knowledge is gained of such matters, it may be passed to the FBI on the
approval of the Deputy Director for Operations.
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[This is an unclassified version of the original memorandum. A minor
deletion was necessary to permit the production of this unclassified version.]
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: CHAOS
CHAOS is restricted to the collection abroad of information
on foreign activities related to domestic matters. CIA will focus
clearly on the foreign organizations and individuals involved and
I
only inicdentally on their American contacts. As a consequence,
CIA will not take on the primary responsibility for following
:Americans abroad, although CIA can accept a request by the FBI to
be passed to an appropriate liaison service in a foreign country
for the surveillance of such an American and the transmission of
the results back to the FBI. It must be plainly demonstrated in
each such transmission that the CIA is merely a channel of communi-
cation between the FBI and the appropriate foreign service and is
not to be directly engaged in the surveillance .or other action
-against the American involved.
With respect to Americans abroad who become suspect for
security or counterintelligence reasons, any official U.S. per-
sonnel will be reported to their parent agency's security authori-
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ties,. CIA will merely serve as a transmission belt for the
information concerned. Specific CIA operations will not be
mounted against such individuals, but they will be reported
when their identities come as an incidental result of other
CIA foreign intelligence or counterintelligence operations.
With respect to private American citizens abroad, any such
information arising will be reported to the FBI. CIA involvement
thereafter will be restricted to following intelligence or counter-
intelligence aspects of the case and transmitting any FBI
requests for assistance from foreign security or intelligence
:services on the matter, in the fashion outlined above.
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MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Restrictions on Files of American Citizens
� The Office of Security or the Chief, CI Operations will not
maintain files of American citizens other than those developed as
an incidental aspect of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
matters or as employee, applicant, contact, etc. The arrest records
formerly received from the Washington, D.C., and certain other areas
have been destroyed and will not be reconstituted.
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MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Restrictions on Operational Lists on Americans
The accumulation of operational leads to Americans with access
to significant foreign targets must be conducted in a fashion which
clearly avoids the charge that black lists of any sort are being
accumulated by CIA. If such listings cannot be made by CIA in a
non-misunderstandable manner, arrangements should be made for the
service to be performed by the FBI or other service which can
legitimately do this function. This particularly refers to matters
such as mail watches, overseas telephone call watch lists, doctors
who studied abroad, etc.
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MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: U.S. Citizens Involved in Narcotics Abroad
NARCOG is directed to review its passage of information with respect
to U.S. citizens involved in narcotics trafficking abroad. To the extent
these reports reflect intelligence incidentally acquired on U.S. citizens
in the course of operations against foreign intelligence targets in the
narcotics field, these reports may be continued, but no operations are
authorized to be launched aimed at individual U.S. citizens as a target
in themselves. Assistance can be provided for DEA operations abroad
in the narcotics field, even in provision of intelligence-related equipment,
so long as it is clear that the operation belongs to the DEA and is not a
joint activity by CIA and DEA against U.S. citizens.
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MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Foreign Connections with Organized Crime in the U.S.
The SEC request for assistance with respect to information
on any foreign connection with organized crime in the U.S. should
focus on foreign targets and not on U.S. citizens. To the extent
that information on the latter appears to be acquired incidentally
to the foreign coverage, it may be passed to the appropriate agency.
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�
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: DCS Assessment of U.S. Citizens
DCS assessment of the suitability and willingness of U.S.
citizens to cooperate with CIA in its foreign intelligence mission
is an appropriate action.
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MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: DCS Interesi in Foreign Students and Foreign National
Physicians
DCS collection of information on foreign students studying in
the U.S and on foreign national physicians trained abroad but
practicing in the U.S. may continue. DCS may also continue to
accept information on possible foreign involvement in U.S. dissident
groups and narcotic trade, when sources refuse to deal directly
with the FBI or DEA.
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a
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: The Intelligence Evaluation Committee
The Intelligence Evaluation Committee has been disbanded.
In the future, CIA participation in interagency domestic
intelligence discussions will be restricted to the provision
of foreign intelligence which might bear upon the matters
being considered. CIA will not participate in recommendations
or actions with respect to domestic affairs.
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MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Reporting on Dissident Groups
Reference to U.S. dissident groups can appear only in the
most incidental form in CIA publications, and no study in depth
will be developed of such groups, such as occurred in OCI publi-
cations in 1967 and 1968. However, it is appropriate to focus on
significant foreign intelligence such as black radicalism, even
when such subjects have substantial impact on domestic situations.
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[This is an unclassified version of the original memorandum. A minor
deletion was necessary to permit the production of this unclassified version.]
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Project [cryptonym)
In the course of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence operations,
it may on occasion be appropriate to conduct surveillance of foreign
individuals temporarily within the United States. Any such surveillance
will be conducted in coordination with the FBI. Such surveillance by CIA
will also be limited to the foreign personnel and will not be extended to
include surveillance of American contacts or associates.
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[This is an unclassified version of the original memorandum. A minor
deletion was necessary to permit the production of this unclassified version.]
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Projects [cryptonym, cryptonym, cryptonym]
No surveillance, telephone tap, or surreptitious entry will be conducted
against employees or ex-employees of the Agency outside Agency property.
In the event that threats to intelligence sources and methods appear from
Agency employees or ex-employees, the appropriate authorities will be
advised, and the Agency will cooperate with the appropriate authorities
in the investigation of possible violation of law.
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[This is an unclassified version of the original memorandum. A minor
deletion was necessary to permit the production of this unclassified version.]
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Projects [cryptonym, cryptonym, cryptonym]
No surveillance, telephone tap, surreptitious entry or other action
will be taken by Agency personnel in the United States against United
States citizens not connected with CIA, under the claimed authority of
"protection of intelligence sources and methods." This provision of
the law lays a charge and duty on the Director and the Agency to act so
as to protect intelligence sources and methods. It does not give it
authority to take action with respect to other American citizens. If
a threat or exposure of intelligence sources and methods occurs, the
Agency can appropriately assemble its information on the topic and
conduct such steps within its organization as may be appropriate.
With respect to outsiders, the appropriate lawful authorities must be
approached for assistance on the matter, e.g., the FBI or local
police.
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[This is an unclassified version of the original memorandum. A minor
deletion was necessary to permit the production of this unclassified version.]
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Project [cryptonym] and Project [cryptonym]
Projects [cryptonym] and [cryptonym] are terminated. It is
appropriate under certain circumstances to record the mail addresses
of senders and receivers, but no such lists should be developed as a
watch list on American citizens, such as, for example, the list of
doctors who studied abroad.
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MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Testing of Equipment in U.S.
Testing of intelligence and espionage-peculiar equipment may
be undertaken in the United States, but care will be taken that no
recordings are made of U.S. citizens or otherwise conducted on un-
witting subjects in the United States. If it is essential to test
equipment on an American communications system or other establish-
:ment, this may be done provided that no recordings of the material
are retained or examined by any element other than the original
test engineers.
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[This is an unclassified version of the original memorandum. A minor
deletion was necessary to permit the production of this unclassified version.]
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Project [cryptonym]
Per our discussion with the retiring Director of BNDD, Project
[cryptonym] will be phased out. CIA will not develop operations to
penetrate another Government agency, even with the approval of its
leadership.
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[This is an unclassified version of the original memorandum. A minor
deletion was necessary to permit the production of this unclassified version.]
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Project [cryptonym]
It is appropriate for the Office of Security to develop private sources
among CIA employees. It is not appropriate for CIA to penetrate domestic
groups external to CIA, even for the purpose of locating threats to the
Agency. Notice of such threats should be reported to the appropriate
law enforcement bodies and CIA will cooperate with them in any action
required which does not involve direct CIA participation in covert
clandestine operations against U.S. citizens in the United States.
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MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Influencing Human Behavior ,
Any experiment or use of drugs or other techniques for in-
fluencing human behavior will be undertaken only with the Director's
specific approval and in no case on unwitting American citizens.
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MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Postal Service
The assistance provided the Office of the Chief Postal
Inspector by OTS seems appropriate, provided it is essentially
defensive in orientation and would not assist penetration of the
mail.
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MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: OEL Speech-P:eocessing Assistance
Speech-processing assistance by OEL should be limited to
assistance in the technique developed for speech processing and
should not involve the processing of the tapes themselves by CIA'
or with CIA participation.
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