DRAFT ESTIMATE FOR IRAN TASK FORCE PAPER

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05850278
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2021
• Case Number: F-2014-00454
• Publication Date: May 11, 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
11 May 1961
ONE MEMORANDUM
0.4
SUBJECT: ,Draft Estimate for Iran Task Force Paper
lo We have serious problems with this paper in its present
forme A number of these concern specific substantive judgments.
These can be dealt with readily enough by revisions in the present
texto More basically, however, we tend to disagree fairly sharply
with the "way of thinking'? (N. B. not the style of writing) on
which the estimate as a whole is based. The paper is unduly
focussed on Prime Minister Amini and ignores -- or refers to
only in connection with Amini -- fundamental trends and forces in Iran,.
,These trends and forces,
/we believe, are going to be more important in determining future
developments in Iran than the various facets of Aminits position.
20 We suggest that it is essential that present developments
be set in a context o2 basic trends. Part of the material on
pages 1 and 2 of the present paper is useful in this regard but
it should be melded with the ideas expressed in Paraso 7, 17 and
SE8RET
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18 of NIE 34-610 The section of the paper dealing Idth "Prospects
for the Amini Government" has some useful material in it.
However, as it now reads it has undertones of a lawyers brief
for Amini. We feel it necessary to separate our consideration
of the Shah's position, that of the Nationalists, and that of
the military (including General Bakhtiar). Having done this,
it becomes possible to make an objective and balanced estimate
of probable developments in Iran which can be centered on the
expected tug of war between Amini and the Shah. At this point,
the affect of US support for Amid_ could be assessed. The
section on "Iran and the USSR" doesn't seem to go anywhere.
We suggest that Aminits coming to power has caused no significant
change in the situationiand recommend that the material in
Paras. 36-38 of NIE 34-61 be used instead,'
-BEertET
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ANNEX
Para. 7 of NIE 34-61:
At the same time, important forces inimical to the status
quo have become stronger. The growing political unrest of the
urban middle class was manifested more openly than in previous
years. The first set of elections for the 20th Majlis held in
August 1960 were cancelled by the Shah in response to widespread
dissatisfaction over the blatant rigging. Despite strong
professions of his good intentions in regard to permitting a
relatively free second round of elections, the January-February
1961 elections have been as thoroughly controlled by him as
those in August. This has resulted in popular demonstrations in
some provincial centers and in Tehran and the arrest of a
considerable number of students and some nationalist leaders.
Parao 17 of NIE 34-61:
We do not believe; however, that the question of stability
in Iran should be dismissed with such a narrow estimate. Iran
is still largely traditionalist in its social and political
structure, with authority concentrated almost exclusively in
the hands of the Shah, who relies for support on the army, the
security forces, the large landowners, tribal chieftain; the
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old line leaders of commerce and finance, and the senior
bureaucracy. The "establishment" and many of its policies are
unpopular with most intellectuals and with much of the growing
middle class. is out-of-step with the dynamic political
ideas and movements which are afoot in other parts of Asia and
Africa. The nationalist forces remain unwilling to cooperate
to any significant degree with the present "establishment" but
as yet lack the power to sup] lant it and probably even the
ability to run the country in its stead.
Para. 18 of NIE 34-61:
Under these circumstancus, profound political and social
change in one form or another is virtually inevitable; this, we
believe, is the most important estimate to stress in regard to
Iran. It is possible that the change will be evolutionary with
the Shah making concessions to the urban groups and bringing
some of thomore moderate nationalists into the governmental and
administrative apparatus. The nature of Iranian politics and
the personal characteristics of the Shah, however, appear to
make gradual evolution unlikely.
-2 -
SEGRET
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ANN'a
Paras. 36-38 of NIE 34-61:
360 A stalemate in Soviet-Iranian relations has persisted
during the two years since the Shah broke off negotiations for
a nonaggression pact with the USSR. This stalemate grows out of
the essentially contradictory objectives and attitudes of the
two parties. The Shah's concept of improved relations is limited
to the cessation of hostile Soviet propaganda, modest expansion
of trade, and the settlement of a kew minor commercial and border
matters. The Soviet objective, on the ether hand, is to force
Iran out of its alliance with the West. We believe the odds are
against a break in this stalemate for SCAM time to come.
There
may be ups and downs in the degree of active tension between
the Soviets and Iran, but basic incompatibilitils will probably
prevent any real rapprochement in the short run.
37. It is possible that over the longer run, the Shah
and the USSR may achieve some kind of modus vivendi. The Shah
is deeply worried about the pressure which is being brought against
him by the Soviet Union, and no amount of rational argument or
moral support from the West is likely to be completely successful
in reassuring him. A general reduction in tension with the USSR
would probably be popular with most of the nationalist elements
-3,.
SECRET
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ANNE
in Iran and would receive support from many conservatives who
remain devoted to the traditional Iranian policy of neutrality.
Thus, we believe that the Shah will continue to seek to relieve
Soviet pressure by such measures as his often-repeated offers
to ban foreign missile bases from Iran and the sending of a good
Will mission to Moscow now scheduled for this spring.
38. Should the Shah become convinced that the US was with-
drawing or significantly reducing its support for him, the chances
of his working out an accommodation with the USSR would be much
greater. Such an accommodation could lead to a broadening of
Iranian relations with the Soviet Union to include substantial
economic aid, and conceivably even military aid,
-4-
CEORET
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