CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1952/07/27

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05973574
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: June 6, 2019
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2019
• Publication Date: July 27, 1952

CApproved for Release: 2019/05d8 C05973574--\
TOP SECRET
SECURI INFORMATION
27 July 1952
Copy No. 5 3
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
3.5(c)
DOCUMENT NO. 7
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. VV.
0 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE.
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE/
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
REVIEWER:
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
TOPS
ET
SECURI FORMATION
Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 005973574
S.
Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 005973574
CRET
SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1. Guerrillas in West China located near Kantzu (page 3).
2. Indian mission in Tibet to become Consulate General (page 3).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
3. Comment on Mossadeq's new cabinet (page 4).
4. Comment on King Farouk's abdication (page 4).
5. French opinion tending not to oppose inclusion of Tunisian question
on UN agenda (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
6. France insists only additional financial aid can stave off disaster
(page 6).
7. Denmark fears increasing Soviet pressure on NATO policy (page 6).
8. Portugal threatens to abandon NATO unless basic defense needs
are met (page 7).
* * * *
2
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 005973574
p,Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 005973574
TGPSERET
3.5(c)
FAR EAST
I. Guerrillas in West China located near Kantzu:
Comment: Since Kantzu is on the princi-
pal route to Tibet from Chengtu, a "bandit" uprising there would
alarm the Communists more than at most places in the border area.
2. Indian mission in Tibet to become Consulate General:
An agreement has been reached with Peiping 3.3(h)(2)
whereby the Indian mission at Lhasa will be
established as a Consulate General, 3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
Indian trade agent,--4,,
will remain in the Tibetan towns of Yatung and Gyantse, on the trade
route route between India and Tibet, and that Indian troops are still posted
along the route.
Comment: This agreement reflects both
India's recognition of Chinese Communist authority in Tibet and China's
interest in retaining Indian cooperation in supplying that country.
3
TOP SCRET
'Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 005973574
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 C05973574
ET
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
3. Comment on Mossadeq's new cabinet:
Mossadeq's new cabinet list,presented to the
Shah for approval on 26 July, gives every indication of being merely
a rubber stamp for the Prime Minister, Since Iranian cabinet mini-
sters must resign their parliamentary seats, the absence of National
Front deputies from the cabinet list suggests that Mossadeq expects
some opposition from Parliament and wishes to maintain as many
supporters as possible.
Prime Minister Mossadeq's previous insist-
ence on being appointed Minister of War precipitated his resignation
on 16 July. He has now appropriated that post. The other key Mini-
stries of Finance, Justice, Foreign Affairs, and Interior are also held
by the National Front,the most significant appointments being that of
former Foreign Minister Bagher Kazemi as Minister of Finance and
that of Hossein Navab, former Minister to The Hague and ardent sup-
porter of oil nationalization, as the new Foreign Minister.
The distribution of posts suggests that there
will be no compromise on the oil issue and that Mossadeq may now at-
tempt to carry out his governmental and economic "reforms!' As
Minister of War, he is in a favorable position to further his well-
known desire to limit the influence of the Shah and the army.. A lessen-
ing of American influence in Iran may also be expected, for Mossadeq,
who is in principle opposed to foreign military aid, favors the with-
drawal of the American military and gendarmerie missions.
4. Comment on King Farouk's abdication:
The enforced abdication of King Farouk in
favor of his seven-month old son and a Regency Council, considerably
strengthens the position of the dissident army group which successfully
revoltedagainst the military high command on 23 July. General Nagib
has thus destroyed the influence of the Crown, the real threat to the new
army leadership.
=4
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 005973574
Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 005973574
RET
The insurgent opposition to the King was
based on Farouk's long-term support of corrupt army leaders and
his repeated efforts to promote Palace interests at the expense of
those of the younger officers. Drastic action against the King may
have been dictated by the evident insurgent suspicion that Farouk
was angling for British military intervention in order to save his
throne.
Farouk's enforced departure from Egypt,
removes a man who, despite a much-criticized personal histbry,
has exerted considerable moderating influence on Egypt's internal
and external affairs. For the moment, Western diplomatic repre-
sentatives have lost substantial influence with Egypt's top leadership.
While the military regime has shown no
initial hostility toward foreign interests, there are indications that
the insurgents may form an alliance with the Moslem Brotherhood
and the Wafd Party. Further repercussions are possible not only
within Egypt but also in the neighboring Arab countries.
5, French opinion tending not to oppose inclusion of Tunisian question
on UN agenda:
French govern-
mental and public opinion tend not to oppose
inclusion of the Tunisian question on the
agenda of the forthcoming regular session of the UN GeneralAssembly.
5
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 005973574
Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 C0597357
TGPSE6RET
3.5(c)
Comment: The United States delegation in
New York has reported that similar opinions have been voiced by a
high official in the French delegation.
According to the American Ambassador in
Paris, however, at least five ministers in the Pinay cabinet support
Marshal Juin's position that France should withdraw frOm the United
Nations if the North African issue is forced.
WESTERN EUROPE
6. France insists only additional financial aid can stave off disaster:
French Premier Pinay has informed Am-
bassador Dunn that American refusal to
finance military production on the scale
requested by France is a disastrous blow
to the entire French economy, and that France will now have to
make drastic revisions in its military expenditures.
Comment: Without considerable external
assistance, Pinay's stop-gap economic measures will be unable to
prevent large-scale retrenchment in the French standard of living,
in investments, in social services, in rearmament, or in the Indo-
china war.
7. Denmark fears increasing Soviet pressure on NATO policy:
A Foreign Office official reports that the 3.3(h)(2)
USSR is bringing pressure to bear on Den-
mark because of its NATO policy, parti-
cularly with regard to airfields. He cited
among other things the recent Pravda article which attacked the
Danish plans for NATO naval bases. The official expects Soviet
pressure to increase.
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/05/
8 C05973574
�
Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 C05973574
T P RET
3.5(c)
Comment: Since early May,Danish cabinet
members have been preparing the public for the ultimate admission of
Allied troops to man NATO airfields. Many Danish officials fear,
however, that Soviet protests might force the government to state
categorically that foreign troops will not be stationed in Denmark.
8. Portugal threatens to abandon NATO unless basic defense needs are met:
40"
The US Ambassador reports that Portugal 3.3(h)(2)
informed MAAG officials on 3 Iuly that It
would be left defenseless unless it had five
jet fighter squadrons, and that it wOuld prefer
to gbindOn NATO rather than submit to a reduction of this figure to
three, as now planned by the United States.
The Ambassador adds that in order to satisfy
minimum Portuguese demands the five-squadron program may have to
be restored and two additional squadrons provided for the Azores, since
Lisbon does not wish to assign the defense of these islands to a foreign
country., 3.3(h)(2)
Comment: This is the first official confir-
mation of previous reports that the Portuguese have contemplated the
possibility of withdrawing from NATO unless the Western powers meet
what they feel are the security needs of the Iberian Peninsula.
7
_ 3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 C0597357