CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1952/08/19
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
05973594
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
6
Document Creation Date:
June 6, 2019
Document Release Date:
June 27, 2019
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
August 19, 1952
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15653015].pdf | 175.67 KB |
Body:
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SEC INFORMATION
19 August 1952
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Office of Current Intelligence
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Nye.;
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SEC INFORMATION
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
I. Comment on Chinese Communist mission to Moscow (page 3).,
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
2. Turkish officer may be appointed to command Libyan Army
(page 4).
EASTERN EUROPE
3. Tito presses for offensive weapons (page 4).
4. Comment on the current drought in Yugoslavia (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
5. Russians seen restraining pace of East German remilitarization
(page 6).
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GENERAL
1. Comment on Chinese Communist mission to Moscow:
The composition of the Chinese Communist
mission to Moscow and the speech of Chou En-lai on his arrival
strongly suggest that the Peiping regime is seeking increased Soviet
assistance for long-range economic and military development.
The posts held by the Chinese delegates
indicate that they may ask for additional allotments of petroleum
products, heavy industrial goods, communications equipment, arms
and possibly further credits. Chou En-lai's speech emphasized that
the talks will aim at furthering "the cause of peaceful building."
These presumed Chinese overtures again
force Moscow either to contribute substantially to Peiping's power
position, which might eventually be used for independent action, or
to risk weakening the Sino-Soviet alliance by refusal. In view of
Peiping's importance to the world Communist cause, Moscow is ex-
pected to comply in some measure, as in 1950, with the Chinese
requests. This would tend to strengthen the Soviet voice in Chinese
economic and military affairs, and would encourage Peiping to per-
sist in its Korean commitment and to pursue a common policy toward
Japan and other Asian countries.
The parties may also discuss the provisions
of the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1950 which call for return of the Changchun
Railway tO Chinese control, and for the withdrawal of soviet fOrces
from the Port Arthur Naval Base Area before the end of 1952.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
2. Turkish officer may be appointed to command Libyan Army:
Libyan Defense Minister Jerbi intends to
recommend that Lieutenant Colonel Yetisal,
a Turkish officer of Libyan origin) be ap-
pointed Commander in Chief of the Libyan
Army.
Turkish President Bayar told Ambassador
McGhee that his country wants to help Libya in every way possible,
and that it is up to the latter to say what it needs.
Comment: jerbi has just returned from a
month-long inspection of the Turkish military establishment. The
appointment of a Turk to command the Libyan Army would increase
Turkish prestige and influence in the Middle East, and would also
end repeated rumors that the British commander of the Jordanian
Legion, Glubb Pasha, was to receive the position.
EASTERN EUROPE
3.� Tito presses for offensive weapons:
Marshal Tito has told Secretary of the Army
Pace that Yugoslavia needs tanks to repel
any invaders. In reply to Pace's suggestion
that Yugoslavia should place more emphasis
on ess expensive an ank weapons like bazookas, Tito said it would
not be in his nature to think defensively if Yugoslavia were attacked.
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Comment: Yugoslav military leaders have
been concerned by the lack of heavy weapons in the military aid pro-
gram. They have been irritated at statements to the effect that heavy
weapons would be wasted on Yugoslavia because of unsuitable terrain
and the lack of mechanical and technical training, and of experience
in the tactical use of such weapons.
Faced with increasing numbers of modern
Satellite tanks and self-propelled guns, the Yugoslays may be ex-
pected to maintain their pressure on the United States for heavy offen-
sive weapons.
4. Comment on the current drought in Yugoslavia:
The extended Yugoslav drought, which has
produced crop conditions similar to those of the disastrous summer
of 1950, threatens not only seriously to weaken the country's economic
program and balance of payments position, but also to widen the breach
between the Tito regime and the general populace.
The government's warning that the burden of
this year's drought must be borne by all and not by urban residents
alone may foreshadow the reimposition of forced crop deliveries which
were abolished earlier this year. A return to such direct action against
the independent peasant would adversely affect agricultural and, indi-
rectly, non-agricultural production, resulting in increased popular
disaffection.
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WESTERN EUROPE
5. Russians seen restraining Pace of East German remilitarization:
American officials in Berlin believe that
the new recruiting drive for the People's
Police and the "Service for Germany"
organization primarily is an effort to rally
youth through mass movements and only secondarily is designed to
prepare lists for eventual con8criptiOn.
These officials believe that, despite the
vigor of East German recruiting efforts, the USSR still feels that
open remilitarization in East Germany can only follow the inauguration
of military service in West Germany, and that overly ambitious East
German moves in this direction must therefore be "braked!'
Comment: The East Germans are less
concerned than the Russians by the implications of their remilitari-
zation program for relations between the USSR and the West. They
have recently moved with unusual speed in "sovietizing" their
country, and can be expected to be intransigent in dealings with the
West in ratio to their increasing "authority."
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