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Document Creation Date: 
June 6, 2019
Document Release Date: 
June 27, 2019
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Publication Date: 
August 19, 1952
PDF icon CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15653015].pdf175.67 KB
Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 C05973594 TOP ET 0 SEC INFORMATION 19 August 1952 3.5(c) 3.5(c) CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 3.5(c) Office of Current Intelligence A bgpr,�-;::: tivDEAss DIA s-7; ED Aurii,vwDATET. rs 6 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Nye.; 3.5(c) 3.5(c) TOP SECRET SEC INFORMATION Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 C05973594 Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 C05973594 CRET SUMMARY GENERAL I. Comment on Chinese Communist mission to Moscow (page 3)., NEAR EAST - AFRICA 2. Turkish officer may be appointed to command Libyan Army (page 4). EASTERN EUROPE 3. Tito presses for offensive weapons (page 4). 4. Comment on the current drought in Yugoslavia (page 5). WESTERN EUROPE 5. Russians seen restraining pace of East German remilitarization (page 6). * * * * -2 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 C05973594 Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 C05973594 ET GENERAL 1. Comment on Chinese Communist mission to Moscow: The composition of the Chinese Communist mission to Moscow and the speech of Chou En-lai on his arrival strongly suggest that the Peiping regime is seeking increased Soviet assistance for long-range economic and military development. The posts held by the Chinese delegates indicate that they may ask for additional allotments of petroleum products, heavy industrial goods, communications equipment, arms and possibly further credits. Chou En-lai's speech emphasized that the talks will aim at furthering "the cause of peaceful building." These presumed Chinese overtures again force Moscow either to contribute substantially to Peiping's power position, which might eventually be used for independent action, or to risk weakening the Sino-Soviet alliance by refusal. In view of Peiping's importance to the world Communist cause, Moscow is ex- pected to comply in some measure, as in 1950, with the Chinese requests. This would tend to strengthen the Soviet voice in Chinese economic and military affairs, and would encourage Peiping to per- sist in its Korean commitment and to pursue a common policy toward Japan and other Asian countries. The parties may also discuss the provisions of the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1950 which call for return of the Changchun Railway tO Chinese control, and for the withdrawal of soviet fOrces from the Port Arthur Naval Base Area before the end of 1952. 3 3.5(c) TOPS Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 C05973594 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 005973594 , 10' TUP SECET 3.5(c) NEAR EAST - AFRICA 2. Turkish officer may be appointed to command Libyan Army: Libyan Defense Minister Jerbi intends to recommend that Lieutenant Colonel Yetisal, a Turkish officer of Libyan origin) be ap- pointed Commander in Chief of the Libyan Army. Turkish President Bayar told Ambassador McGhee that his country wants to help Libya in every way possible, and that it is up to the latter to say what it needs. Comment: jerbi has just returned from a month-long inspection of the Turkish military establishment. The appointment of a Turk to command the Libyan Army would increase Turkish prestige and influence in the Middle East, and would also end repeated rumors that the British commander of the Jordanian Legion, Glubb Pasha, was to receive the position. EASTERN EUROPE 3.� Tito presses for offensive weapons: Marshal Tito has told Secretary of the Army Pace that Yugoslavia needs tanks to repel any invaders. In reply to Pace's suggestion that Yugoslavia should place more emphasis on ess expensive an ank weapons like bazookas, Tito said it would not be in his nature to think defensively if Yugoslavia were attacked. -4 TO 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 005973594 Approved for Release: 2-019/05/28 005973594 TCPSERET 3.5(c) Comment: Yugoslav military leaders have been concerned by the lack of heavy weapons in the military aid pro- gram. They have been irritated at statements to the effect that heavy weapons would be wasted on Yugoslavia because of unsuitable terrain and the lack of mechanical and technical training, and of experience in the tactical use of such weapons. Faced with increasing numbers of modern Satellite tanks and self-propelled guns, the Yugoslays may be ex- pected to maintain their pressure on the United States for heavy offen- sive weapons. 4. Comment on the current drought in Yugoslavia: The extended Yugoslav drought, which has produced crop conditions similar to those of the disastrous summer of 1950, threatens not only seriously to weaken the country's economic program and balance of payments position, but also to widen the breach between the Tito regime and the general populace. The government's warning that the burden of this year's drought must be borne by all and not by urban residents alone may foreshadow the reimposition of forced crop deliveries which were abolished earlier this year. A return to such direct action against the independent peasant would adversely affect agricultural and, indi- rectly, non-agricultural production, resulting in increased popular disaffection. 5 TOP RET Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 005973594 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 005973594 CRET WESTERN EUROPE 5. Russians seen restraining Pace of East German remilitarization: American officials in Berlin believe that the new recruiting drive for the People's Police and the "Service for Germany" organization primarily is an effort to rally youth through mass movements and only secondarily is designed to prepare lists for eventual con8criptiOn. These officials believe that, despite the vigor of East German recruiting efforts, the USSR still feels that open remilitarization in East Germany can only follow the inauguration of military service in West Germany, and that overly ambitious East German moves in this direction must therefore be "braked!' Comment: The East Germans are less concerned than the Russians by the implications of their remilitari- zation program for relations between the USSR and the West. They have recently moved with unusual speed in "sovietizing" their country, and can be expected to be intransigent in dealings with the West in ratio to their increasing "authority." -6 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 005973594