CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1952/09/19

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05973620
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: June 6, 2019
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2019
• Publication Date: September 19, 1952

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SECUR INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
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19 September 1952
Copy NO., 57
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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DOCUMENT NO
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ikr
0 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE
AUTIt HA 70.2
DATE11 Re WEWER:.
Office of Current Intelligence
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Comment on Chinese reaction to Moscow talks (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. All-out fall offensive by Viet Minh seen less likely (page 3).
3. French Union troops and Vietnamese show good teamwork in Tonkin
(page 4).
SOUTH ASIA
4. New government and increased unrest foreseen in Nepal (page 4).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5.
6.
7.
8.
(page 5). 3.3(h)(2)
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Comment on new Lebanese government (page 6).
Egypt protests British failure to deliver jets (page 7).
EASTERN EUROPE
9. Establishment of new Hungarian region creates unrest in Rumania
(page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
10. Comment on the East German electoral delegation to Bonn (page 8).
11. Crisis in French Communist Party seen as serious (page 9).
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GENERAL
1. Comment on Chinese reaction to Moscow talks:
Chinese Communist comment to date
on the announced results of the Sino-Soviet talks reveals sensitivity
to possible charges that Peiping was outmaneuvered by its ally.
Official Chinese Communist releases
argue that the two agreements are to the "practical interest" of
China. From Peiping's point of view, the reasons cited for
extending the Port Arthur agreement--the threat posed by Sapan
and the possible expansion of the Korean war--are valid.
Peiping's assertion that the USSR "is
prepared to shoulder all responsibilities beneficial to peace" in the
Far East hints at the possibility that a larger Soviet military
guarantee resulted from the talks.
Peiping's position in Chinese eyes would
be greatly improved by announcement of agreements on further
Soviet economic and military aid. Moscow and Peiping may still
be working out the details of such agreements.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. All-out fall offensive by Viet Minh seen less likely:
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an all-out Viet Minh fall or
winter offensive is "less likely now"
because of continued low morale and lack
of supplies and recruits.
3.3(h)(2)
He anticipates intensified guerrilla acitvity and
infiltration of the delta, however, and considers as still probable
an offensive limited to the northwest corner of the delta by the two
best Viet Minh divisions, with diversionary action elsewhere.
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,Comment: Previous reports have
suggested that the usual fall offensive was expected. However,
there have also been indications of fatigue, and to some degree low
morale, -among Viet Minh units. A principal logistic bottleneck
for the Viet Minh is the inadequate transportation network within
Indochina. French bombing of roads and bridges used by the Viet
Minh has recently been Lmprecedentedly heavy.
3. French Union troops and Vietnamese show good teamwork in
Tonkin:
The recent liberation of 20 southern 3.3(h)(2)
Tonkin villages without casualties to French
Union troops was made possible by the
cooperation of the local population, accord-
ing to the governor of North Vietnam. The Vietnamese Catholic
bishop who in effect administers the area wrote a letter of congratula-
tions to the French commander in Tonkin on the good behavior of
the French Union troops.
Comment: The French military anti Viet-
namese civil authorities have achieved a good working relationship
in Tonkin. Praise for the behavior of the French Union troops is in
marked contrast to the bitter complaints of less than a year ago.
French-Vietnamese cooperation in Tonkin, however, has progressed
further than in Vietnam as a whole.
SOUTH ASIA
4. New government and increased unrest foreseen in Nepal:
An American official in Katmandu has
heard unconfirmed reports that the King
of Nepal intends to end his interim rule
by appointing a prime minister and cabinet
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with no political affiliations. The majority of cabinet members
will belong to the Rana family, whose hereditary control of Nepal
was ended by the "popular" revolution of 1950. Former Prime
Minister M. P. Koirala will be included as an indpendent.
The American official remarks that Nepal
Congress Party President B. P. Koirala will not participate in the
cabinet, and that in his present bitter mood he might seek aid from
local Communists and from China to seize control of the government.
In this event, even the Indian Army could not restore order without
a major effort.
Comment: The Indian Government dominates
the King of Nepal and is presumably aware of such plans. If these
plans are accurately reported, the Indian Government, which tacitly
supported the revolution of 1950, has apparently lost some of its
faith in "democratic" government in Nepal. It now seems to be
attempting to increase stability by returning the Ranas to power,
whether or not the move is locally popular. The likelihood of an
armed revolt led by B. P. Koirala exists as long as he is not in power.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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6.
7. Comment on new Lebanese government:
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Political tension in Beirut, climaxed by
a three-day strike throughout Lebanon, has been eased by the 18
September resignation of President el-Khouri and his appointment of
General Chehab, Commander in Chief of the Army, as temporary
Chief of State and Prime Minister. Chehab is believed to have most
of the army behind him. He also has substantial political support,
including that of two former premiers.
The new Chief of State, who is a Christian,
is faced with the problem of easing the Moslem-Christian tension
built up over the past weeks. He must also deal with Lebanese political
leaders who are opposed to military direction of civil affairs. More-
over, Chehab's past friendship with Khouri can be exploited by any
military and civilian opponents. Chehab, or a succeeding government
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leader, must still cope with basic economic problems as well
as with widespread corruption, which caused Khouri's fall.
8. Egypt protests British failure to deliver jets:
The Egyptian Government has handed
the British Ambassador in Cairo a
sharp note concerning the British
failure to deliver the 65 jets now on
order, The note charged that nonfulfillment of the contract is
due to a British-imposed arms embargo.
Ambassador Caffery states that the
Foreign Minister and the chief of the Egyptian Air Force are not
interested in explanations. He 'understands that Egypt wants 36
jets immediately.
Comment: As a gesture of goodwill
to the Nagib government, Great Britain has recently made available
trainers and spare parts.
In September 1950, the British Govern-
ment postponed delivery of all high-priority items, including jets,
to other than NATO and Commonwealth nations because of critical
shortages. Great Britain has now indicated, however, that it
would offer jets to Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Israel.
EASTERN EUROPE
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9. Establishment of new Hungarian region creates unrest in Rumania:
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Comment: There is evidence that the fears
of the Rumanian population and the hopes of the Hungarian minority
for the return of Transylvania to Hungary persist, despite the claims
by the Communist regimes of Hungary and Rumania that they have
solved this long-standing irredentist problem.
Although the draft constitution which
provides for establishment of the new Autonomous Hungarian Region
has not been officially adopted, recent militia messages indicate
that the region was in fact set up on 1 August.
WESTERN EUROPE
10. Comment on the East German electoral delegation to Bonn:
West German agreement to accept an East
German delegation bearing proposals for the unification of the country
has handed an unexpected propaganda victory to the Orbit. The
Communists have established a "record of interest" in unity, muddied
the question of nonrecognition of the East Zone government, fomented
dispute among West German leaders, and exposed them to a barrage
of exceptionally sharp criticism.
It remains in doubt whether the delegation
will be able to exploit its varied opportunities when it arrives in Bonn
on 19 September. Since there are indications that the East Germans did
not expect to be received at all, they evidently expect favorable propa-
ganda even from a rejection of their overtures.
The East Germans may have been persuaded
by their apparent success in circumventing Adenauer's government
to try to influence German legislators and to establish some basis for
further negotiations. Since even those West Germans who favored
receiving the delegation recognized the propagandistic motives
involved, the reception in Bonn is likely to be cool.
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11. Crisis in French Communist Party seen as serious:
The demotion of two top-level members of 3.3(h)(2)
the French Communist Party, Andre Marty
and Charles Tillon, is expected by
the French Ministry of
the Interior to have "deep repercussions" in Communist ranks. 3.3(h)(2)
The purge is interpreted as evidence of
Duclos' victory over the hard militant faction of the French Communist
Party which tried to assume control during Duclos' imprisonment in
June.
Comment: There is no indication that
Marty and Tillon are considering a break with their party. Since they
controlled its central military committee, a general shake-up of the
Communists' paramilitary appartus may be in process.
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