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August 14, 2020
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August 27, 2020
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June 21, 1961
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-(z2=�!�o 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 21 June 1961 Copy No..4:74" CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN -TOP-SECRET- #####Z1Z Apsroved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO5973644, A/ AI A �. Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973644 N, TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973644 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C05973644 TOP SECRET ::) 1. 2. 21 June 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS Laos. (Page t) USSR: Analysis of recent Soviet ICBM test firings sug- gests new propulsion system may be undergoing tests. (Page it) 3. Congo: Katangan refusal to attend parliament meeting may jeopardize Kasavubu's prospects of controlling ses- sion. (Page it) 4. Bolivia: President threatens to resign if miners don't end strike. (Page tit) . Albania: Albania requests French, Italian economic aid. (Page tit) 6. Turkey: New shake-up of armed forces leadership re- flects continuing dissension in regime and military estab- lishment. (Page itt) 7. France: Farmers' demonstrations spreading, could be exploited to weaken De Gaulle's political position. (Page ti,) 8. Central African Federation: British constitutional pro- posals for Rhodesias encounter continuing opposition. (Page ft,) TOP SECRET Approvedlor Release:,2020/08/11,,C0597364.-f A Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973640 CHINA BURMA Nam Dr rag NAMI1THA Nam Bac Soi ���' ong Soi 1 Ban Houei LUANG! PRA,BANG Muong Hot6171uang Probang SAYABOURY Il / Sam N.,?ua \Ir.? AM NEUA 1 � XIENG 0 \(. CT) , _ K H OU Als1 G 1Muon/) Soui hay hong Sayan Phou K8un Xieng Khouang Muor Ka� \A.') onAate, 2I, `�..,..../S\ dillea Dong ....; --' rs, `Y. I: Vang Vreng -�,...,,I.ssisTha Thom 1 / amone ..,,, _ ,- j---./..', 1.-.,..ft.' *a Ban Hot Bo `.-. � ---- / e,� ' VIENTIANE riorikhanS\ / Ban�Hinkletip Pak Sone , (--.--4 . , 1 --, Vien e .s. � Nong Khai THAI LAND NORTHERN 'LAOS 411:9 GOVERNMENT Forces 41210 KONG LE - PATHET LAO KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS 0 GOVERNMENT (MEO) BASE AREAS ROAD 50 TRAIL I STATUTE MILES 0 ROUTE NUMBER 100 610617 Lak KHAMMVANE Thokhe St Seno Pha Lane 21 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973644 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C05973644 TOP SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 21 June 1961 DAILY BRIEF Laos: Virtually no progress appears to have been made , in the Zurich talks between Boun Oum, Souvanna Phouma, and Souphannouvong. The chief stumbling blocks to agree- 474 44% ment are the method of forming a coalition government and the role that General Phoumi would play in such a government. Souvanna and Souphannouvong are demanding that Souvanna's "legal government" be expanded to include rightist elements, while the Boun Oum group wants to form a new government headed by the King and approved by the national assembly. Souvanna and Souphannouvong seem willing to permit Phoumi to hold a position in the proposed coalition only if he divests himself of his rank and influence in the military. Souvanna's illness caused postponement of the scheduled 20 June meeting between the three princes; whether genuine or diplomatic, this indisposition gives the conferees some reason to extend the Zurich meeting beyond the originally stipulated three-day period running from 19-21 June. Elle mixed Pathet Lao - Kong Le - North Vietnamese force in the Pa Dong area on 20 June attacked one of the new Meo po- sitions about 3 miles southwest of Pa Dong after subjecting the position to mortar and artillery fire the night before. The enemy meanwhile is continuing guerrilla actions against gover rforeealorg Route 13 to the north and east of Vientiane: {:loc airlift operations continue to be scheduled through 21 June. (Backup, Page 1) (Map) TOP SECRET 4A/Bmoy_e_d_to_r_R_e_lta_s_s_2_0_2_010_8111_ C05973644/' A Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C05973644 ;Ed Pointe Noire BanWa. fft CONGO� Brazzaville /atone Mate I Republic of the Congo Iflfl 041414 REPUBLIC ETHIOPIA 00030 1 500 Bangassou TUNISIA OBlITU �Gemena Ise 201. 3400 net ECUATEU Coquilhatville �Or �Boende OBU1U ETHIOPIA MOB UT EOPOLDVILLE � r aim 4. Leopoldv' ysville 'T< A , � uluabour Bak Approximate area nominally controlled by: Luanda . f=1 Kasavubu�Mobutu , � Gizenga r- Ear Kalonji ' (= %bombe lia1 United Nations Forces (Service Forces �Selected road not Included) Selected railroad� -r- Selected airfield . � STATUTE MILES 400 Mbhge 8ondo ca.9 OR ENTAL GIZE GA LIBERIA leyville THIOPIA MALAYA 500 Manono FEDERATION OF R. ODES AND NYASALAND ake Albert UGANDA NIGERIA UANDA URUNDI Usunibura TANGANYIKA Lake Tanganyika IRELAND 650 SWEDEN 870 . 21 June 61 .CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C05973644 V ,Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C05973644 / TOP SECRET 0 / / USSR: Preliminary evaluation of the characteristics of five of the firings noted since 1 January 1961 on the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range leads to the tentative conclusion that the USSR may be testing a new or second generation ICBM. These firings, which occurred on 3 March, 2 and 15 April, 16 May, and 2 June, were distinguished from other ICBM test vehicle firings to date by a shorter burning time, a higher acceleration, and a lower apogee. These characteristics may be associated with a new propulsion system. On two of these firings, the vehicle is believed to have impacted close to the presumed tar- 926 get of previous ICBM tests, but the other three missed by sig- nificant distances. One impacted near Khabarovsk, about 1,100 nautical miles southwest of the usual Kamchatka impact area. Preliminary assessment of the other firings this year suggests other groups with distinctive rharactpristieg *Congo: Katanga's announcement that it will boycott the Congolese parliamentary session beginning on 25 June unless eteitzt. two virtually unacceptable conditions are met threatens to set back efforts to end the political impasse in the Congo and to jeopardize Kasavubuts prospects of controlling parliament. The Katangan statement, signed by all provincial delegates to the par- /P liament, requires that Tshombe be released before parliament meets and that the Congolese legislature accept the confederal accords reached at the March Tananarive meeting. Leopoldville politicians could not accept such terms without risking a military coup, and without Katanga's votes, the Kasavubu regime might be outvoted by the Gizengists. CGizenga's New York spokesman claimed on 19 June that parliament would either confirm Gizenga as premier or select Minister of Interior Adoula as premier. with Gizenga's agreement. The spokesman claimed Gizenga controlg 21 June 61 DAILY BRIEF ii TOP SECRET A 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C05973644 1 V5 out of the 137 parliament votes, but merican officials in Leopoldville believe Gizenga's strength is closer to 40 delegates.] The ranking UN official in the Congo had reported that the Ghanaian IL-18 flight to Stanleyville, reportedly to deliver med- icines and diplomatic personnel, has been canceled at his request. (Map) *Bolivia!' President Paz Estensoro yesterday threatened, to resign "within five days" if striking miners, who are seek- ing financial benefits and the release of Communist labor leaders ar- rested in early June, do not return to work. Paz' threat is de- signed to rally support for the government within Bolivia and dLEIZ- possibly also to remind the United States of the political risks he took in arresting the Communists. Some miners had already re- " turned to work by yesterday, and support for the mine strike ap- peared to be diminishing. Vice President Juan Lechin would be Paz' legal successor, but is probably too controversial a figure to succeed to the presidency without considerable violence among Bo,livia's regular and irregular armed forces. Albania:` Albania Ids requested economic and technical as- sistance from France and Italy. Despite promises of large amounts of Chinese Communist aid, the Albanian regime evi- dently needs still more help to offset Soviet bloc economic pres- sures which have been applied since Albania sided with Peiping in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Rome was giving assistance to Tirana in an effort to keep /(.. the West's foot in the door. Tirana had also recently approached Paris on this matter and that aid would probably be given. France and Italy are the only Western countries having diplomatic relations with Albania. Their trade with Albania has been negligible, although late in 1960 France shipped Albania 30,000 tons of wheat, at least 20,000 tons of which was paid for bvthe rhinc.Qp rnmmilni.t. Turkey:, A new shake-up in the top echelon of the Turkish armed forces reflects continuing political and personal dissension 21 June 61 DAILY BRIEF iii TOP SECRET /, ,Aooroved for Release: 2020/08/11 C05973644F 4Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C05973644id TOP SECRET within the military establishment and the Committee of Na- tional Union. Three admirals and two generals have, been retired, several senior army officers have been reassigned, and there are strong rumors of an impending purge of an =- disclosed number of officers in the grades captain through colonel.. These changes, added to the recent forced resigna- tion of General Madanoglu from the command of the Ankara Garrison and the removal of several air force colonels, indi- cate a further improvement of the power position of General Irfan Tansel, reinstated chief of the Turkish Air Force. He has the support of a majority of the younger, less conserva- tive officers on the Committee of National Union. (Backup, Page 3) France: The farmers' agitation which began two weeks ago in Brittany is spreading to central and southern France and may become subject to further exploitation by anti-Gaullist elements, particularly rightists opposed to De Gaulle's Algerian policy. The government, in view of the efficient mobilization tactics being employed by leaders of the movement, has report- edly not ruled out the hypothesis that the demonstrations may be part of a plan to weaken De Gaulle's political position and to tie down security forces in areas remote from Paris. (Backup, Page 5) Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland:U3ritain is running into growing difficulty in its efforts to obtain acceptance for the constitutional proposals it is developing for the Central � African Federation. Africans in Northern Rhodesia are threat- ening to call widespread strikes and to demand a definite date for self-government if, under pressure from Europeans, Colo- nial Secretary Macleod announces measures which would leave the whites in control of the protectorate's legislature. The British governor of Northern Rhodesia reportedly has said he will resign if Macleod insists on revisions to favor, the whites....3 (Backup, Page 7) 214JUL-1.-ci DAILY BRIEF iv !kiDiprovedlor Release:,2020/08/11,,C0597364,4y A C, Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C05973644, TOP SECRET Laotian Developments Unless Phoumi is prepared to make concessions he will probably maneuver for an early collapse of the Zurich talks. The longer the talks go on the more vulnerable members of the Boun Oum - Phoumi entourage will be to offers by Souvanna of personal deals, which would lead to Phoumrs isolation and to the collapse of the Boun Oum government. Phoumi will also feel himself under a strong compulsion to return to Vientiane to resume personal direction of governmental affairs. he sec- ond-level leaders he left in charge there are sending Phoumi highly colored reports on the trend of developments in Laos since his departure for Europe.3 [General Bounleut, responsible for military affairs in Phoumi's absence, thought it necessary for Phoumi to return to Vien- tiane as soon as possible. Bounleut indicated that he had been having some difficulty inducing Lt. Col. Siho to provide details of his plans for defending Vientiane. BounleUt also referred to "slightly disturbing rumors" of discontent among officers in Luang Prabangj {Fuller information on a previously reported enemy attack on a Meo position about 20 miles northeast of the Plaine des Jarres from 16 to 18 June indicates that the attacking force num- bered between 800 and 900 and may have been predominantly North Vietnamese. Mortars and recoilless rifles were used in the attack which forced the dispersion of the Meos into hills, where they reportedly plan to operate as guerrillas. In the Ban Hat Bo area northeast of Pak Sane, the enemy for the present appears to be consolidating its forces and not organizing any pursuit of the Laotian army elements which retreated from the area last week. {gfforts are apparently being made to improve overland sup- ply of the Communist forces in Laos. Route 7 between Muong Sen in North] TOP SECRET 21 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973644 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C05973644, TOP SECRET Vietnam and Ban Ban is being paved and widened to about 26 teet. In addition, all wooden bridges are being replaced with steel structuresD a group of Chinese Communist experts planned to "commence work on 21 June," possibly on the road connecting Phong Saly with China, which previous reports indicate the Chinese have undertaken to construct. Details of bloc airlift operations for the past several days are as follows: On 16 June there was a total of 13 sorties, of which 11 were into Laos; on 17 June, 18 sorties were flown, 12 of which were into Laos. No flights into Laos were noted on 18 June, On 19 June, 17 sorties were flown, of which 12 were into Laos. During the week 12 through 18 June, there was an esti- mated total of 102 sorties for an estimated delivered cargo of 211 tons. Through 18 June there has been an estimated total of 3,047 sorties by bloc aircraft-2,676 by Soviet transports and 371 by North Vietnamese --for an estimated delivered cargo of 5,706 tons. TOP SECRET 21 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973644 0 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C05973644 Military Shake-up Continues in Turkey The abortive attempt by a group of senior military officers to oust 52-year-old Lt. Gen, Irfan Tansel from his command in early June has resulted in significant changes in power relation- ships in Turkey. General Gursel's position as head of the gov- ernment has been undermined. General Madanoglu, who had be- come one of the leading members of the governing Committee of National Union (CNU), has resigned. General Alankus, while continuing to serve�temporarily at least as minister of defense, has been retired from the army along with Lt. Gen. Alkoc, who was commander of Ground Forces. The deputy chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Onur, is being groomed to replace Sunay as chief of the Gen- eral Staff. One of the three top-level naval officers retired was Vice Adm. Ozak, who was chief of the Turkish Navy. His retire- ment, and replacement by Adm. Uran, had been anticipated for some time, however, and does not necessarily indicate naval in- volvement in the intraservice power struggle. Most of the changes appear designed either to remove officers who represent possible sources of trouble or to re-establish seniorities in the chain of command. ET'he so-called "Forces of Solidarity," first mentioned during the present crisis, remains something of a mystery. It report- edly includes most of the younger members of the CNU, some members of the General Staff, officers located in the Ministry of Defense, and officers from army units located in the vicinity of Ankara. General Onur has also aligned himself with this group, which apparently was largely responsible for the reinstatement of General Tansel as chief of the Air Force at the height of the crisis. Because of its representation in units strategically lo- cated near Ankara, the "Forces of Solidarity" is far more impor- tant than its numbers suggest. The alleged aims of this group in- clude continued military influence on the government following elections, the execution of the top leaders of the former regime, and military intervention against all activities directed against the CNU. The aspirations of the "Forces of Solidarity" could lead to further dissension within the armed forces3 It has become increasingly apparent that a highly critical situation existed in Ankara during the period 6-9 June. One SECRET 21 June 61 CEN77 Approved forTrxel7e7se72.0.20T087 Page 3 n Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973644 SECRET (.2 leading Turkish political figure has commented that for a 48 hour period the "possibility of bloodshed hung in the balance." The government has again reaffirmed its intention to hold the referendum on the constitution and national election within the time period previously promised. The referendum is to be in early June and elections prior to the 29 October deadline. SECRET 21 June 61 CEYITID AT TAMIL, T T Trizowrrit, 1DTTT T VITTN Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C05973644 Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C05973644 SECRET (' Subversive Threat in French Farm Unrest Low farm prices and the government's failure to imple- ment the promises it made last year to improve agricultural conditions have sparked a crisis which in some respects paral- lels that of the spring of 1960. In March 1960 a demonstration at Amiens was transformed into a major riot on behalf of "French Algeria," and deputies of all major political parties except the Gaullist UNR in effect ganged up to test De Gaulle's political strength by demanding that he convene a special ses- sion of parliament. His refusal has been described as a viola- tion of the Fifth Republic constitution in subsequent political assaults on his regime. The appearance at sabotage sites of the initials "O.A.S." accompanied by a Celtic cross is intended to link the farm dem- onstrations to the Organization of the Secret Army in Algeria, which is composed of European settler extremists and some military elements. According to the American Embassy in Paris, the same individuals--"commandos"--have participated in dem- onstrations at successive trouble sites. A vice president of the national federation of agricultural syndicates has reportedly ad- mitted that troublemakers may have infiltrated the demonstra- tions to profit from disorders. The Communists have made efforts to exploit the movement but thus far have apparently been unable to penetrate it. Disgruntled political leaders may use the farm issue to voice increasing discontent over the continuation of the emergency pow- ers De Gaulle assumed when he crushed the military revolt last April. They feel these powers handicap normal political activity and are a threat to French democracy. @ocialist party Secretary General Guy Mollet reportedly views the farm demonstrations as a "bad sign" of potentially explosive social unrest which had hitherto been restrained by the fact that French-Algerian negotia- tions had finally begun:D Reported government concern over the possibility that the farm demonstrations may be part of a coordinated move to weaken --SECRET-- 21 June 61 rplamn AT TATTM" T T TrrEvATO T T T ''"Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973644LETIN Page 5 C, Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C059736, \ SECRE 44 T De Gaulle politically and pin down metropolitan security forces may be based on information uncovered by investigations of the April military mutiny. The investigations reportedly indicated that a widespread plot against the government was being pre- pared in metropolitan France as well as Algeria. Security forces in France are considered barely adequate for normal coverage, and government spokesmen have usually voiced alarm when events in Algeria have required the temporary dispatch of many such units from the metropole. Further violent demonstrations are likely on 22 June, when instigators of the seizure of the town of Morlaix earlier this month are scheduled to be tried, and 27 June, which farmers in central France have proclaimed as "Roadblock Day" to indicate their sympathy for the Brittany movement. 21 June 61 CETm1AT. TNT'F. T .T .Tar.N11-1P . Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C05973644LETIN n Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C05973644,\ SECRET ) (./ Constitutional Problems Facing Britain in Central Africa Dm its efforts to guide the political evolution of the Fed- eration of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Britain is trying to balance the demands of the Federation's two main racial groups as well as its four juridical entities--the largely self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia, the two protectorates of Northern Rho- desia and Nyasaland, and the government of the Federation as a whole. Most of these have different legal bases, and all are at different stages of evolution. The Nyasaland government is to have an African majority following elections this August. A constitutional conference for the Federation as a whole has been adjourned since mid-December 1960, pending the formulation of new constitutions for Northern and Southern Rhodesia,3 EFollowing talks on Northern Rhodesia's constitution, held in London in February and March, Britain seems to have de- cided tentatively to establish a 45-member legislature for the protectorate. Of the 45, fifteen would be elected by a group of voters�predominantly European--with high educational and fi- nancial qualifications and fifteen by another group�largely African--with lower qualifications. Fifteen "national members" would be elected by all voters, with the votes of each community given equal weight. Under pressure from right-wing Conserva- tives at home and from white leaders in the Federation, however, the details of the British plan, which may be formally announced later this week or early next week, have been arranged so as to make more likely the numerical predominance of moderate whites and of Africans amenable to their influence. These arrangements have been denounced by both African nationalist organizations in the protectorate. Although Kenneth K,aunda, the outstanding African leader in the territory, has forbidden his followers to resort to violence in opposing the proposals, some of Kaunda's lieutenants have been making references to "racial strikes" and "fanaticism'] C.The alleged concessions to the whites in Northern Rhodesia probably were made partly in order to increase the chances of approval for the Southern Rhodesian referendum next month, The referendum on constitutional proposals published a week ago will be voted on by 76,000 of the 225,000 whites but only 4,000 of the3 SECRET 21 June 61 Curs Tarrrl i A T TXTMVIT T- TrIzirkTruct DTI T -Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C05973644 Page Page 7 CApproved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973644 L2,870,000 Africans. Under these proposals, Africans for the first time would sit in the colony's legislature. Britain would also agree to end the veto it has held on racial matters, in ex- change for the promulgation of a bill of rights and the establish- ment of a constitutional council to pass on racial legislation. The present moderate leaders of the African nationalist party agreed to these proposals in conference but, apparently as a result of pressure from their extremist followers, rejected it when it was published. With the white electorate almost evenly divided on the issue, African opposition or abstention could re- sult in the defeat of the proposals. The British apparently hope that the Northern Rhodesian constitutional revisions will cause enough Europeans in Southern Rhodesia to vote for the new con- stitution to offset the loss in African votesj SECRET 21 June 61 CVATTP A T. TKIIT2T .T.TC227k1T1F_ TATTLLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973644 Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C05973644,, UOIWIULI'I1IAL ) THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Counsel to the President The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Under Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973644 Approved �-