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August 14, 2020
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August 27, 2020
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June 26, 1961
PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15815595].pdf511.77 KB
0 TOP SECRET L) 3.3(h)(2) 26 June 1961 Copy NO. /L-=--i) CENTRAL IYTELLIG-ENCE BULLETIN- -TOP-SECRET- ArAr.e.ed'.e.,,'Ar#ArArAr.e.rjr iA"pproved for Release: 2020/08/11 C05973649/ /Z Opproved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973649,_\ --Top-sEefiET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973649 AApproved for Release: 2020/08/11 C059739 SECRET 26 June 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Laos: Further talks on coalition to be held in Laos within 15 days. (Page i) 2. Thailand: Foreign minister considering grouping of neu- trals as alternative to SEATO guarantees. (Page i) 3. USSR: Soviet delegation said to plan no "disruptive and aggressive" tactics at next UN session. (Page ii) 4. Turkey: Military leaders support new Forces of Solidarity. (Page ii) 5. East Germany: "Soft" tactics fail to reduce popular dis- content. (Pageii) 6. USSR-Japan: Moscow will send Mukhitdinov to Japanese party meeting. (Page iii) 7. North Korea: Kim Il-sung to visit Moscow this month. (Page iv) 8. Argentina: Frondizi reported seeking Peron's support in congressional elections next March. (Page iv) SECRET 4Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973649F A 4Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C059736._ 449 0 SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 26 June 1961 DAILY BRIEF Laos: Souvanna and Souphannouvong, in Geneva for Mon- day's conference session, have stated that further talks on forming a coalition government will be resumed in Laos within 121 15 days. [General Phoumi plans to leave Geneva for Laos on '27 or 28 June, and apparently intends to consult with King 74 Savang before the talks are resumedj / the King has recently repeated to French Ambassador Falaize that he would not consider heading a government him- self, but would be willing to designate Souvanna prime minister. two government camps were taken on 24 June and that a third was to be attacked that evening. No major military actions have been reported. Bloc airlift operations continue to be scheduled through 26 June. ) (Backup, Page 1) [Thailand: [Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman told Am-. bassador Young on 22 June that he is considering the possibility that a neutral belt might be established in Southeast Asia to supersede the security arrangements of SEATO, in which Thai- )1-4 land sees little remaining value. Thanat apparently believes the concept originally proposed by Prince Sihanouk to include Laos, Cambodia, and possibly Burma might be expanded to cover Thailand, South Vietnam, Malaya, and even East Pakistan, pro- vided agreement could be obtained from Communist China, the USSR, and the US to guarantee the independence and integrity of the grouping3 (Backup, Page 2) --SEeRET iinkipproved for Release: 2020/08/11 C05973649f A /oat 4Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C059730/ A USSR-UN: A member of the Soviet UN delegation is re- ported to have briefed the European satellite delegations on 21 June on the tactics to be employed during the 16th General Assembly session beginning next September. He gave the general impression that the USSR was not inclined to under- take "disruptive and aggressive" tactics at the session. On the "troika" plan for revising the UN secretary general's of- fice, the Soviet delegate said that the USSR would not press for a decision because the timing was not right and there was no hope of gaining a majority in support of the plan. This line suggests that Moscow may plan to take a more conciliatory stand at the UN in order to offset anticipated tensions over Berlin and a possible breakup of the nuclear test negotiations by the time the General Assembly convenes,03 , Turkey: The military group identified as the Forces of Solidarity (F) which emerged from the recent power struggle has reportedly gained the support of practically all top military leaders. General Gursel and the other two generals on the Committee of National Union (CNU) are also believed to have joined the new group; they may be trying to exert a moderating influence on the more radical young officers in the FS. The group now includes officers from most, if not all, of the mil- itary units in the Ankara area, which are the key to the military control of Turkey3 The referendum on the new constitution will be held on 9 July. all provincial governors, members of the CNU and the Constituent Assembly will tour the country to propagandize the new constitution before the referendum. The CNU press bureau has announced that the date of national elec- tions will be decided by the Constituent Assembly within one week after the results of the referendum are known and that they, will "definitely" be held before 29 October. Erhis schedule mayj "i� 26 June 61 DAILY BRIEF ii SECRET FJ dq1;1;ZligliZZ'a7165576iTIZOgiiiZr A //Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO5973649 (c SECRET 5e altered, however, if popular disturbances result from the political trials now in their final stages. The CNU is also al- legedly considering permitting the return of 12 of the 14 for- mer CNU members who were removed last November and "exiled" abroad. Col. Turkes and Col. Erkanli, who were suspected of plotting to lead a revolt within the c NTT. annar- entiv will not be allowed to return at this timell zasv-uermany: me 'soIt- tactics aaopteavoy me uioricnt - regime last fall in an effort to reduce popular discontent and stem the flow of refugees are not succeeding; the East Germans, A, including industrial workers in several large enterprises, are openly critical of the regime's failure to improve the food sup- ply and are complaining about the sudden and drastic changes in economic organization. Ulbricht is personally concerned about the situation and recently made a trip to Halle to discuss the "mood" of industrial workers with local officials there. (Backup, Page 3) USSR-Japan: Moscow plans to send a high-level delegation headed by by presidium member N. A. Mukhitdinov to the Japanese Communist party (JCP) congress beginning 25 July. The decision to send Muldiitdinov indicates the USSR's determination to retain its influence in the Japanese party. Peiping has been increasing its efforts to impress its militant views on the leadership of the JCP. A high-level Japanese party delegation was accorded lavish attention by the Chinese Communist leaders and press during a recent visit to Peiping. The JCP leadership will probably welcome strong Soviet representation as offering support for its policy of gradual rev- olution in Japan. In 1958 at the last party congress, a sizable dissident faction favoring a more militant attack on the conserva- tive government blocked adoption of a platform incorporating this policy. However, last November party leaders won recognition of their position in the declaration of the .Moscow confere,nce of Communist parties. 26 June 61 DAILY BRIEF iii SECRET 1,939225-'12,r,&',E19;19,S9192,1129,1?1,..M1,9 A 0 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C05973C9) �SteRET North Korea - USSR: Pyongyang has announced that Kim Il-sung will lead a party and government delegation to Moscow toward the end of June. One purpose of Kim's visit may be to conclude an economic agreement. Soviet First Deputy Premier Kosygin was accompanied on his visit to Pyongyang earlier this month by top economic negotiators but no announcement of further Soviet assistance was made at that time. North Viet- nam's Premier Pham Van Dong, now on a bloc tour, is sched- uled to be in Moscow from 26 June to 5 July. The presence of both Asian leaders would afford an opportunity for discussion of Communist�reunification tactics in divided countries CArgentina: President Frondizi reportedly has renewed nego- tiations with ex-President Juan Peron in Madrid for Peronista electoral support in the March 1962 congressional elections, these negotiations are known to a group of high-ranking officers which has been planning a coup before mid-July. While retired officers have continued to plot against Frondizi, the majority of the armed forces support con- stitutional government. All of the military, however, oppose any resurgence of Peronista political power. J Backup,, Page 5) 6 26 June 61 DAILY BRIEF SECRET ,TI71=17r7ease: 2050/08/11 C05973649r iv cit A Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973649\, Laos The bloc's attempt to develop the theme of foreign involve- ment in Laos is reflected in an article in Peiping's People's Daily of 25 June. Charging that the US is "stepping up" mil- itary deployment so as to launch "new military ventures," the People's Daily Observer alleges that South Vietnamese, Thai, and Philippine troops are active in Laos. The article charac- terizes the Zurich talks as an "initial success" on the "internal aspect" of a Laotian settlement and expresses the hope that the princes' negotiations will have a beneficial effect on the outcome of the Geneva conference. [Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi have all charged that, twice during the past week, South Vietnamese artillery fired across he border into Laos in the vicinity of Route 9 in support of air- anding operations. Some South Vietnamese artillery firing upported actions on 17 June, when a small South Vietnamese orce clashed with an enemy patrol inside Laos. President iem, who is concerned over the ineffectiveness of the Laotian roops as well as over reports of southward movements by en- my forces, recently commented that it might prove necessary or South Vietnamese troops to move into Laos and protect cer- tain key positions) A Soviet AN-10 arrived at Canton on 24 June and, after five and a half hours, returned to Peiping. It apparently car- ried no passengers to Canton, but 50 passengers were aboard on the return trip�an addi- tional indication that Soviet aircrews are probably being with- drawn from North Vietnam. Only three of the six Soviet IL-14s which were to fly to Canton from Hanoi in conjunction with the arrival of the AN-10 actually made the trip. They remained at Canton for a little over three hours before returnipg to Hanoi. 26 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973649 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C05973n SECRET Growing Wai Interest in /4�utralism [Foreign Minister Thanat's remarks are all indicative of the trend toward neutralism in Thailand during the past year. Although Thanat's views as expressed may not have been cleared with Prime Minister Sarit, Sarit is strongly attracted to the idea of neutrality and that the prospect of increased American military and economic aid has not increased his enthusiasm for present commitments to the West] [Deterioration of the situation in Laos and the inability of SEATO to influence events there have given considerable im- petus to Thailand's concern over its Western alignment. The Thais believe a neutralist government in Laos would be a mere facade and that Communist control would be extended to Thailand's own borders. Several officials are said to reason that, regardless of the extent of US aid, Thailand in two or three years will be unable to defend itself against growing Communist strength in the area. They believe withdrawal from SEATO and adoption of a neutral policy would at least put an end to bloc propaganda attacks and enable the country to receive aid from both the West and the bloc2 4 Public expression of dissatisfaction with Thailand's West- ern 'lies has, increased during the past year, with complaints that Thailand's support was taken for granted by the West and the country's needs were ignored while neutral nations were granted greater assistance. In recent months the Thais have endeavored to improve relations with the Soviet Union_:_7 ahanat's thinking on a neutral belt appears to be in the pre- liminary stage, with no certain idea of the machinery for inter- national guarantees. There has been no suggestion that the Thais intend to relax their internal anti-Communist stancej -SECRET-- 26 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973649 Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 00597362) East German Regime Concerned Over Popular Disaffection In recent months, Ulbricht probably at Soviet behest-- has granted minor political concessions, promised more food and consumer goods, and a slowdown in economic develop- ment. He also has encouraged grievance petitions to the Council of State, which he heads, and has removed locally unpopular administrators as "sectarians" and "dogmatists." These measures have led to some relaxation of tension, but they have been undercut by recent bloc pressures against Berlin. The regime. is greatly concerned over the publication by a private West German intelligence service on 20 June of a petition signed by 56 workers at the important Hennigsdorf works north of Berlin, demanding an end to butter rationing, adequate food supplies, and the firing of incompetent state of- ficials. central committee functionaries believed the petition originated in "exactly the same department which started the trouble on 17 June 1953"�the East German uprising. Politburo member and agitprop chief Albert Norden was to go to Hennigsdorf in an attempt to pla- cate the workers. Ulbricht would make a secret trip to the dis- trict on 23 June to discuss with party functionaries the workers' concern over the Soviet peace treaty and Berlin proposals, pro- duction plans, and shortages of food and consumer goods. Ap- parently changing his plans to keep his presence secret, Ulbricht delivered a major speech in Halle the following day reiterating his demand for a separate treaty. Neubrandenburg party headquarters reported on 20 June that construction workers in its district, long a center of unrest, were holding "negative discussions?' Some were saying, apropos of butter rationing, "When there is no butter, then we must strike for a day." Others, while voicing "complete support" for a 26 June 61 CENTR A T TNTF. T .T .TCIF.NCF, BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973649 ApprosvEedcfoizRilfse: 2020/08/11 C05973649 separate peace treaty, asserted that food shortages would be- come even worse once a treaty is concluded and Berlin is a "free city." a near riot in Potsdam over inadequate pay and shortages of meat and butter. Others report increasing discontent, but none believes anti- regime demonstrations imminent, Acting Premier Willi Stoph admitted in Neues Deutschland on 14 June that "some difficulties exist in the supply of meat, milk, and butter" and disclosed that the newly collectivized farms have suffered heavy livestock losses. Losses have been aggravated by bad weather. Concurrently, a delegation of agri- cultural experts, headed by the party central committee secre- tary for agriculture and the minister of agriculture, left on 12 June to study Soviet agricultural techniques. SECRET 26 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973649 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C059736491 SECRET Argentine Negotiations With Peron for Electoral Support the negotiations involve a proposal that Peron publicly renounce leadership of his party and appoint a figurehead acceptable to both Peron and Frondizi. The Peronistas would then sup- port Frondizi's party in the next national elections, in which half of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies will be filled. In return for this support, Frondizi reportedly has of- fered Peron $500,000, but Peron is holding out for $1,000,000 cash. The same agents who reportedly are now negotiating with Peron allegedly paid him $500,000 before the 1958 elec- tions, in which the Peronistas supported Frondizi in his land- slide victory. Peron receives "an allowance of only $10,000 a month from Jorge Antonio," who was Peron's financial adviser prior to the 1955 revolution and has since apparently controlled the bulk of his funds. Peronista ranks have been badly divided since the party was outlawed in November 1955, and not all of Peron's instruc- tions have been obeyed. The Justicialista party, the official successor of the Peronista party, suffered from lack of lead- ership and was outlawed after the abortive Peronista attacks in several provinces on 30 November 1960. A number of neo- Peronista parties are legal, however. A leading neo-Peronista, Juan Bramuglia, departed for Spain in May to brief Peron on political realities in Argentina and to seek support for "outstanding candidates." fore departing, Bramuglia had separate interviews with for- mer Provisional President Aramburu, Cardinal Caggiano, and the papal nuncio to explain his plans. SECRET 26 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973649 c Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C05973e CCHNI-11)LIN 11AL THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Counsel to the President The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Under Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director MNPMFIVTIA I. Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973649 TOP SECRET TOP SECRET ri7/7/////171/ZZZAI;pEovecifoT lea; e72525/68/11-C 655756497