THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05974153
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: April 26, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: December 4, 1967

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The President's Daily Brief
December 1967
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DAILY BRIEF
4 DECEMBER 1967
1. Cyprus
2. South Vietnam
3. Nigeria
4. Congo
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Greece and Turkey have accepted
the terms of U Thant's plea for peace
and offer of the UN's good offices.
As of 5:00 AM EST, however, there was
no official word that Cyprus had ac-
cepted,/
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end the crisis are now expected to shift
to the UN.
Saigon officials are considering
resuming diplomatic relations with In-
donesia. The Indonesians have sug-
gested the South Vietnamese open a con-
sulate general's office in Djakarta.
Some South Vietnamese want to hold out 3.3(h)(2) -
for a full embassy, but others, in-
cluding Ky and Foreign Minister Do, ap-
pear willing to take what they can get.
The federal government now will be
able to buy military equipment in Brit-
ain. London previously had restricted
arms sales to the Nigerians-/
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The British, /; are now preparea
, to sell the Nigerians "what they want."
The federal government, wasting no time,
has sent a representative off with a
long military shopping list.
Most of the Katangese rebels who
had fled to Rwanda have been repatriated
to the Congo, where (so far) they have
been treated decently. The white mercen-
aries, however, are still in Rwanda,
where, to their immense irritation, they
are being "processed" by representatives
of the Organization of African Unity.
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5. Soviet Union
6. Communist China
7. Cambodia
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3.
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Clashes between rival Red Guard
units continue to be reported from
widely scattered parts of China. The
key railroad to west China is still
closed to through traffic because of
Red Guard activities. Many of the
Guards are again using firearms as they
did during the bloody summer months.
Fighting, however, is still on a smaller
scale than it was then.
Sihanouk has been saying that Sino-
Cambodian relations are back on the
track; now he has underlined this by
accepting a new offer of Chinese mili-
tary aid. The Chinese have been supply-
ing Cambodia with arms since 1964, but
this latest gesture is clearly a peace
offering to smooth things over after
Sihanouk's anti-Chinese outbursts ear-
lier this fall. Peking's new aid will
include ammunition and an unspecified
number of patrol boats and reconnais-
sance planes.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
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Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only
4 December 1967
I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
Traffic Moves in Hanoi: Heavy traffic was moving
on the principal rail and highway routes in the Hanoi
area as of 1 December.
/ Most of the trains
and trucks he saw appeared to be heading toward Hanoi
from the direction of China and from Haiphong.
both the
Doumer and Canal des Rapides bridges were operating
at full capacity Friday night.
train and truck movement
on both bridges had been heavy and continual during
the preceding week. At the Canal des Rapides cross-
ing, an alternate rail and
highway bridge was still out, but a pontoon bridge
to the west of the main span was carrying additional
truck traffic.
Military truck convoys were reported moving from
Haiphong to Hanoi on Route 5. .Heavy traffic was also
3.3(h)(2) observed moving south on Route lA and moderate truck
activity was evident on Highway 3. No delays were
noted, observations suggest that Hanoi
is taking advantage of the poor flying weather over
North Vietnam to replenish supplies consumed during
the past six weeks of heavy bombing in the capital
area.
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Peking Protests Ship Incident: The Chinese Com-
munist Foreign Ministry issued a statement Saturday
protesting a 25 November US air attack on a Chinese
freighter anchored at the North Vietnamese port of
Hon Gai. Peking claimed the attack wounded eight
Chinese crew members and seriously damaged the ship.
The Chinese protest went no further than Peking's
standard anti-US rhetoric and its pledges of support
for the "Vietnamese people."
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II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL
ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
More on Secretary McNamara: The Viet Cong's
Liberation Radio crowed on 30 November that "McNamara
has been dismissed," and that this happened because
the Communists have defeated "all the strategies and
tactics of the most talented collaborator of Johnson."
The commentary says that "now the war of aggression
of the US imperialists is going to collapse completely."
It reviews US progress in Vietnam since 1961 and
says that it was "McNamara himself" who devised the
strategies and tactics and guided their execution.
The commentary concludes by asserting that "any tal-
ented man who dares shoulder the heavy load (McNamara)
leaves behind, will surely face more bitter, stronger,
and more ignominious defeats."
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