THE ABU NIDAL TERROR NETWORK: ORGANIZATION, STATE SPONSORS, AND COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISE

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• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
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• Case Number: F-2016-00651
• Publication Date: July 1, 1987

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Directorate of
Intelligence
(b)(3)
The Abu Nidal Terror Network:
Organization, State Sponsors
and Commercial Enterpris
A Research Paper
'tterr
GI 87-10057
July 1987
DK
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Directorate of
Intelligence
The Abu Nidal Terror Network:
Organization, State Sponsors
and Commercial Enterprise
A Research Paper
This paper was prepared by the Counterterrorist
Center. Comments and queries are welcome and may
be directed to the Chief, Operations and Analysis
Group
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'e'L`rpeGI 87_
July 1987
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Scope Note
Reverse Blank
The Abu Nidal Terror Network:
Organization, State Sponso
and Commercial Enterprise
/We now know that the group acquires
significant revenue through the operation of its own network of commercial
enterprises, which in turn depends on strong ties to Poland and East
Germany. We have also acquired additional information concerning the
group's structure and organization, its modus operandi, and its relation-
ships with both friendly and hostile governments.
111
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July 1987
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Summary
Information available
as of 26 June 1987
was used in this report.
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The Abu Nidal Terror Network:
Organization, State Sponsors
and Commercial Enterprise
The success of the Abu Nidal international terrorist organization (ANO) is
sustained by the effective clandestine tradecraft it practices, the Middle
Eastern states that sponsor its activities, and its widespread commercial
infrastructure.
ANO founder Sabri al-Banna officially titled his organization Fatah�
Revolutionary Council and patterned its structure after Yasir 'Arafat's
Fatah. Banna left Fatah in the 1970s after a disagreement over the use of
terrorist tactics outside Israel and the occupied territories, and he seeks to
compete with 'Arafat for the loyalty of Palestinian Arabs. Banna espouses
the use of violence against Israel, Israel's Western supporters, Arab
governments willing to negotiate with Israel, and any Arab leader,
including PLO members, that he believes temporizes on the need to destroy
the Israeli state.
State sponsors of the ANO provide logistic support, training facilities,
financial backing, weapons, documents, and safehaven, without which the
organization would have difficulty operating effectively outside the Middle
East. Iraq was the major ANO patron until 1983; subsequently, Syria and
now Libya provide most of its outside support. In return for such
assistance, the ANO undertakes some operations at the behest of its
patrons, although in general the ANO pursues its own agenda.
The ANO has established a commercial network in Europe and the Middle
East that supplements income received from state sponsors and also is
available to support operations. Through companies in East Germany and
Poland, the ANO engages in gray-arms sales and illegal technology
transfer that aid both the ANO and the East European states. The ANO
has reached agreements with these states, and also with Yugoslavia, that
permit it to maintain a presence in return for a promise not to stage
terrorist attacks on the soil of these states or against their interests
elsewhere.
ANO attacks have been increasingly violent and designed to cause a
maximum number of casualties, often innocent civilians. The ANO has
threatened retaliation against states that hold its members prisoner,
including the United States. It has followed through on such threats
against the United Kingdom.
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Contents
Page
Scope Note
111
Summary
Introduction
1
The Man, the Organization, Its Operating Principles 2
The Group's Structure
6
Training and Operations
7
The Importance of Patron States 8
Financing and Facilitating Terrorist Operations 9
The Importance of Eastern Europe 13
Gray-Arms Marketeer 15
Outlook 16
Appendix
Chronology of Significant Abu Nidal Organization 21
Terrorist Activities, 1974-86
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The Abu Nidal Terror Network:
Organization, State Sponsors,
and Commercial EnterprisO�
Introduction
The Abu Nidal organization (ANO) ' is among the
most dangerous of the radical Palestinian terrorist
groups, carefully planning its operations and main-
taining tight compartmentation. The clandestine cad-
res of the ANO may number as many as 400,
organized in small cells worldwide. There is also a
support structure of several hundred more, drawn
primarily from Palestinian students around the world;
the ANO has a militia in Lebanon that is growing as
it activel recruits from other Palestinian organiza-
tions.
The ANO has conducted about 90 terrorist attacks
since its inception in 1974�almost half of them since
the beginning of 1984 (see appendix). At least 300
people have died and more than 575 have been
wounded in ANO attacks. Despite its Middle Eastern
roots, the ANO has conducted almost three-fourths of
its attacks outside the Middle East, almost two-thirds
of them in Western Europe. It has staged attacks in
over 20 countries on three continents and has cells in
cities in many countries outside the Middle East (see
foldout map in back)
The ANO claims that its enemies are Israel and
Israel's supporters, as well as moderate Arab govern-
ments and leaders, whom it considers traitors. How-
ever, the victims of the ANO's indiscriminate terror
are often innocent bystanders and are of nationalities
other than the intended target (see tables 1 and 2).
Among the most recent examples are:
� The attempted hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 in
Karachi, Pakistan, on 5 September 1986, left 21
dead-14 Indians, three Pakistanis, two Mexicans,
and two Americans.
'Because the group is most commonly referred to as the Abu Nidal
organization, teini1ial ANO will be used in this paper as a matter
of convenience
1
_ 4
Figure 1. Rome, Italy, 27 December 1985. Italian
security officials survey the scene in the after-
math of the ANO attack on the El Al ticket
counter in the terminal of Fiumicino Airport; 12
victims died.
� The simultaneous attacks on El Al ticket counters at
the Rome and Vienna airports on 27 December
1985 left more than a dozen dead�five Americans,
three Greeks, two Mexicans, two Israelis, one Alge-
rian, and one Austrian.
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ret
ANO Covernames
The Abu Nidal organization has used numerous
covernames when claiming responsibility for terrorist
attacks, including:
Black June�The group adopted this name in 1976 to
commemorate the month in which the Syrian Army
invaded Lebanon on the side of the Christian right
against the Muslim left and its Palestinian allies.
Under this name, the ANO in 1978 began assassinat-
ing mainstream Fatah targets. The ANO evidently
abandoned this covername after it moved its head-
quarters from Baghdad to Damascus in 1983.
Al-Asifa (The Storm)�The ANO has adopted much
of the nomenclature of PLO Chairman Arafat's
Fatah organization (see also Black September). The
ANO used this name�which also applies to the
military wing of Arofat's Fatah�until 1982 when
claiming responsibility for terrorist attacks.
Arab Revolutionary Brigades�The ANO began using
this name in 1982. Although it is generally used for
attacks against Persian Gulf targets, it was also used
when claiming attacks against Jordanian
targets in 1983 and in the communique that claimed
responsibility (with Egypt's Revolution) for the Egyp-
tair hijacking in November 1985.
Black September�The ANO began using this name
in 1984 in its claims for attacks against Jordanian
and Palestinian targets. The name cleverly serves a
dual role. First, it reminds Palestinians that Arafat
disbanded his group of the same name in 1974 and
has since pursued more moderate policies. (Arafat's
Black September organization was named after the
month in 1970 that marked the beginning of King
Hussein's crackdown on Palestinian organizations,
which eventually led to their expulsion from Jordan.)
Second, the name commemorates the month in 1982
when Lebanese forces massacred hundreds of Pales-
tinians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps.
Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims
(ROSM)�The ANO began using this name in 1984
as its signature for attacks against British targets.
The attacks were designed to force the British Gov-
ernment to release imprisoned ANO members, but
they did not achieve their desired objective.
� The Egyptair hijacking on 23 November 1985
ultimately cost the lives of 56 passengers, including
12 Egyptians, 12 Greeks, 11 Filipinos, eight Pales-
tinians, two Canadians, two Israelis, and one Ameri-
can
The official name of the ANO is Fatah�Revolution-
ary Council. The ANO often employs this name when
attacking Israeli targets, but it has also used a
number of covernames (see inset) when claiming
responsibility for its terrorist attacks. The covernames
are intended to confuse the enemy�namely, the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the in-
telligence services of other governments�so that the
true perpetrators of the terrorist attacks are not easily
identified.
The ANO maintains a formal organizational struc-
ture patterned after, but more secretive than, that of
Yasir 'Arafat's Fatah organization�reflecting the
fact that it considers itself the "real" Fatah. The
group's financing comes from its own commercial
network as well as from state sponsors. Some compa-
nies in its commercial network are involved in gray-
arms deals with Warsaw Pact states
The Man, the Organization, Its Operating Principles
The organization is most commonly referred to as
Abu Nidal from the nom de guerre of its leader, Sabri
al-Banna, who created it from elements that broke
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Set
Table 1
Nationalities of ANO Victims, 1985-87 a
Country/Nationality
Wounded
Dead
Algeria
1
Argentina
1
Australia
2
0
Austria
3
1
Canada
0
2
Egypt
4
12
Greece
11
15
India
0
14
Iran
2
0
Israel
3
6
Italy
21
2
Jordan
2
1
Kuwait
90
8
Mexico
0
4
Nigeria
3
Pakistan
2
3
Palestinian
3
10
Philippines
3
11
Spain
25
1
Turkey
6
20
United Kingdom
34
0
United States
50
8
West Germany
2
0
a Data are incomplete. At least 188 more were killed or wounded,
but their nationalities are unreported.
away from Yasir 'Arafat's Fatah organization in the
1970s. The ANO is committed to the destruction of
the state of Israel and the use of violence to abort any
political or diplomatic efforts that might reconcile
Israel and the Arab states. The ANO considers any
who choose negotiation to be traitors and directs
terrorist attacks against PLO officials, including
'Arafat, when they move in that direction. Banna was
sentenced to death in absentia by the Fatah command
in 1974 for planning the murder of 'Arafat and other
PLO officials, including Abu Iyad, one of 'Arafat's
3
Figure 2. Sabri al-Banna (Abu
Nidal) (b)(3)
confidants. ANO members have attacked PLO offi-
cials or offices in London, Kuwait, Paris, Islamabad,
Brussels, Rome, Lisbon, Athens, Ankara, and Bel-
grade, killing at least 11 leading Fatah members.
Banna has publicly threatened Western and moderate
Arab nations with terrorism and assassination for
what he sees as their part in preventing a Palestinian
homeland. The ANO has called for the destruction of
moderate, or, in its terms, "reactionary" Arab govern-
ments. Jordan, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates
(UAE), and Egypt have been prominent on the ANO's
target list, and each has suffered a number of attacks
on its officials, airliners, and other interests through-
out the Middle East and Europe. The ANO has also
attacked US and British targets, striking civilian
targets such as airlines and hotels, as well as diplo-
mats�including the British Deputy High Commis-
sioner in Bombay, whom it murdered in 1984. The
ANO staged a series of attacks against Jordanian
targets in 1983-85, when Jordan's King Hussein
joined PLO Chairman 'Arafat in efforts to revive
Middle Eastern peace negotiations
Banna formed his organization in 1974, largely in
response to 'Arafat's professed ban on PLO participa-
tion in terrorist attacks outside Israel and the occu-
pied territories. Banna�who was the PLO represen-
tative in Baghdad at the time�disagreed, arguing
that any operation that advances the Palestinian
cause is justifiable and any location is acceptable.
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Table 2
Nationalities of Victims of Selected
Abu Nidal Attacks, 1985-86
Locale/Date
Target
Nationalities of
Wounded
Dead
Known Victims
Rome, Ita1y-21 March 1985
Royal Jordanian Airline office
Italian
1
Jordanian
1
Athens, Greece-21 March 1985
Royal Jordanian Airline office
Greek
2
Jordanian
1
Madrid, Spain-1 July 1985
British Airways ticket office
Spanish
24
1
British
1
0
American
2
0
Kuwait City, Kuwait-11 July 1985
Two cafes
Kuwaiti
89
8
Athens, Greece-8 August 1985
London Hotel
Greek
4
0
Iranian
2
0
British
7
0
Athens, Greece-3 September 1985
Glyfada Hotel
British
19
0
Rome, Italy-16 September 1985
Cafe de Paris
Argentine
1
0
Australian
2
0
Italian
20
0
Spanish
1
0
British
3
0
American
9
0
West German
2
0
Rome, Italy-25 September 1985
British Airways office
British
3
0
Unknown
11
1
Malta-23-24 November 1985
Egyptair Flight 648 hijacking
Canadian
0
2
Egyptian
4
12
Filipino
3
11
Greek
5
12
Israeli
1
2
Palestinian
3
8
American
2
1
Unknown
5
8
Vienna, Austria-27 December 1985
El Al counter, Vienna's
Austrian
3
1
Schwechat Airport
Israeli
0
1
Nigerian
3
0
American
2
0
Unknown
31
0
Rome, Italy-27 December 1985
El Al counter, Rome's
Algerian
0
1
Fiumicino Airport
Greek
0
3
Israeli
2
1
Mexican
0
2
American
15
5
Unknown
55
0
Karachi, Pakistan-5 September 1986
Pan Am Flight 73 hijacking
Indian
0
14
Mexican
0
2
Pakistani
2
3
British
1
0
American
20
2
Unknown
77
0
Istanbul, Turkey-6 September 1986
Neve Shalom synagogue
Israeli
0
2
Turkish
6
20
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Figure 3. Valletta, Malta, 24 November 1985. Egyptian comman-
dos search among the surviving passengers of Egyptair Flight 648
for the hijackers. The incident claimed 56 victims
These radical views found favor with the Iraqi regime.
Banna's close ties to Iraqi intelligence proved benefi-
cial; Baghdad provided Banna with a base for his
operations and helped him create the Fatah�
Revolutionary Council. By choosing this name,
Banna broadcast his claim that his organization,
rather than the one led by 'Arafat, was the legitimate
Fatah. He has similarly created an organizational
structure with titles that mirror 'Arafat's Fatah
Although most noted for his international terrorist
network, Banna wants to supplant 'Arafat's organiza-
tion as the Palestinian people's main focus of alle-
giance. In recent months the ANO has renewed its
attention to intra-Palestinian politics. Although
Banna remains under death sentence by 'Arafat's
Fatah, the ANO joined preliminary sessions for the
Palestine National Council in Algiers in April 1987.
The ANO has also begun building a militia within the
5
refugee camps in Lebanon. These efforts are in
addition to�not a substitute for�Banna's basic
strategy of using violence and terrorism to bring down
Israel and punish any who support or negotiate with
its government. (b)(3)
Biographic information on Sabri al-Banna is scarce
and often conflicting, but the following elements are
common to most accounts. He was born in 1937 into a(b)(3)
large, prosperous family in Jaffa, Palestine. Accord-
ing to his brother, a prosperous West Bank merchant,
the family ensured that all the boys received a good
education at private schools. The family claims to
have lost its lands in 1948 and fled to a UN relief
camp. Banna joined 'Arafat's Fatah in 1967 where
his patron reportedly was Abu Iyad (b)(3)
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Banna described his group's goals and ideology in an
interview: "Total destruction of the Zionist entity.
Participation in Arab unity. The path of Pan-Ara-
bism. Building a democratic people's regime in which
Palestine is a homeland. In other words, our struggle
is for the liberation of Palestine, in which we wish to
establish a secular democratic state." Banna's operat-
ing philosophy is simple and constant�violence is his
preferred tool.
The Group's Structure
Banna directly controls and guides the ANO. He is
assisted by a small Politburo, of about 10 persons,
that he created in 1985 to supervise daily operations
and ensure that his policies are carried out. The
highest administrative body and theoretically the
principal decisionmaking organ is the 27-member
Central Committee that selects department leaders
and assigns them their responsibilities. Its members
include the Politburo plus additional prominent per-
sons from the organization. Ideological guidance,
indoctrination, and discipline are provided by the
Revolutionary Council of about 40 members, includ-
ing all members of the Central Committee. The ANO
has maintained offices in Libya and Syria. Banna
most often is found in Tripoli, Libya, although he
maintains a residence in Warsaw. Poland, and spends
time at other locations
The ANO's structure comprises six departments and
a military office (see foldout chart in back). The
Organization Department appears to handle relations
with foreign governments and liaison with student
movements, unions, and other mass organizations. It
coordinates with operational elements abroad through
its six regional committees. The Finance and Eco-
nomic Department manages income and investments
from the ANO's commercial activities and probably
also is responsible for general accounting and payroll
requirements for the organization. Chief financial
officer Samir Hasan Najm al-Din (a.k.a. Samir Naj-
meddin) also heads the ANO commercial network.
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The Information Department performs security and
intelligence functions and probably also serves as the
organization's locus for preparation and implementa-
tion of terrorist operations. Its three subunits are
responsible for: performing counterintelligence, in-
cluding investigations of ANO members suspected of
committing security infractions; collecting targeting
and casing information for potential operations; and
conducting terrorist operations.
The Political Department is the overt arm of the
ANO. It performs liaison and propaganda functions.
This department publishes Filastin al-Thawra, the
ANO's glossy international newsweeldy, which con-
tains items of interest to Palestinians. It is distributed
to ANO members around the world, often clandes-
tinely, because it is banned in many Arab and other
countries. The Political Department also produces
al-Tariq, an internal, typewritten document reported-
ly written by Sabri al-Banna. AI-Tariq contains policy
recommendations, future plans, ideological discus-
sions, internal criticism, and reports on personnel
matters. It is tightly held, and members who are
allowed to read it may not retain it. In recent months,
the Political Department may have achieved in-
creased prominence because the ANO has begun
emphasizing its political agenda as a part of its
maneuvers within the Palestinian movement, particu-
larly in the wake of the Palestine National Council
meeting in Algiers
The Lebanon Affairs Department is responsible for
ANO activities in Lebanon and relations with the
various organizations and movements in the country.
It oversees the five military districts into which the
ANO divides responsibility for Lebanon. It was
formed in early 1986 because of the growing impor-
tance of Lebanon, particularly the south, as a base of
operations. The department also assumed responsibil-
ity for all ANO military activities in the country from
the former Military Department, which was relegated
to an office because of an internal ANO political
squabble. The prominence of ANO armed units in the
camps' war in Lebanon has undoubtedly raised the
importance of the Lebanon Affairs De artment with-
in the overall organization.
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Se et
igto. )1A1 1
I-P;(601
142014
3.71
4111,'
t-a;1
azo 114 ;u2v?..zIaijona.atcmy ia.wal jrat jacii
Figure 4. Cover page of AI-Tariq, ANO's inter-
nal, policy magazine. The magazine is dissemi-
nated on a highly, restricted basis, and members
may not retain copies.
Training and Operations
Despite increased attention to Palestinian politics and
to military affairs in Lebanon, the ANO's primary
tool against Israel and within the Palestinian move-
ment remains its terrorist apparatus. ANO terrorist
operatives are carefully screened and trained. The
ANO does not require large military training camps,
although operatives have received paramilitary-style
training at camps in Lebanon and Syria. Some of
these camps are controlled by other organizations,
such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine�General Command (PFLP-GC), which use
the camps to train Palestinian militias for urban
guerrilla warfare. Many of the weapons and tech-
niques are equally applicable to terrorist operations.
ANO operatives at such camps have been trained in
the use of small arms, grenades, and other weaponry
for terrorist operations. Among the camps that t4
ANO has used to train its operatives are the
PFLP-GC camp at Ayn Sahab, north of Damascus;
7
Figure 5. ANO's internal publication, AI-Tariq,
carries this version of the emblem used by 'Ara-
fat's Fatah on page two of each issue. The same
emblem is also used on the letterhead of ANO
correspondenc
an installation near the village of Al Hulwah, Leba-
non, close to the Syrian border; several camps near
an installation near the village of Al Hulwah, Leba-
non, close to the Syrian border; several camps near
`Ayta al Fukhkhar in Lebanon's Al Biqa' (Bekaa
Valley); and another near Al Raudah, also in the
Bekaa Valley.
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An important component of ANO training is political
indoctrination, with heavy stress on loyalty and obedi-
ence to the organization. It is clearly understood that
"defectors" will be killed. Each ANO member report-
edly signs a statement upon entry into the organiza-
tion that he understands and accepts that he will be
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executed if he is discovered to have contacts with the
enemy. In 1986 the ANO killed a senior member in
Lebanon because he was suspected of betra ing the
organization to European authorities
The ANO leadership carefully screens all recruits.
Each prospective member reportedly first fills out an
application form. This form requests the individual's
name, date and place of birth, parents' full names,
siblings' full names, and a work history. If the
applicant or any member of his family has been
imprisoned, the form requests a full description of the
events surrounding the arrest. The applicant is also
required to provide a brief biography and to describe
his reasons for wanting to become an ANO member.
The ANO observes strict rules of compartmentation.
It drills into its operatives the need for careful
tradecraft, including the use of passwords, codes,
aliases, emergency contact instructions, and other
accoutrements of a clandestine organization. Security
and loyalty are enhanced by the extended kinship ties
that link many ANO operatives. Manipulating family
loyalties provides an entree for recruitment as well as
a potential support structure for operations beyond
the Middle East
From its inception, the ANO has demonstrated an
ability to operate beyond the Middle East; it launched
one of its earliest attacks in Pakistan in 1976. The
organization has established a clandestine infrastruc-
ture that encompasses the Western Hemisphere, Eu-
rope, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia.
It sends operatives to a city to establish cover, often as
students or small businessmen. These operatives may
or may not know other ANO members in the local
network. They gather intelligence about potential
targets, particularly those associated with Israel and
its supporters, moderate Arab governments, and rivals
in the Palestinian movement. They acquire safehouses
and surveil institutions associated with the targeted
individuals. They also scout local Palestinians as
potential recruits or supporters.
Members of ANO cells are not generally used to
carry out terrorist attacks within their host country;
they may provide only the on-the-ground support
network. In many instances the "hit team" comes
Se set
from outside solely to perform the operation. A senior
ANO operative, who usually also comes from outside,
acts as the overall controller but does not participate
in the actual operation. Individual members of the
operational team probably do not know the full details
of the attack plan. As a result, if operatives are seized
during or after the attack, they cannot provide suffi-
cient details to lead the investigators back to the local
cell or other parts of the ANO network
The Importance of Patron States
The ANO's ability to take advantage of its worldwide
clandestine infrastructure to conduct terrorist opera-
tions is greatly enhanced by support from Middle
Eastern governments, initially Iraq and, more recent-
ly, Syria and Libya. Banna's relationship with his
patrons waxes and wanes, depending on his view of
the state's utility to the ANO and the state's percep-
tion of the ANO's usefulness to its own international
political agenda. For example, at a 1983 ANO meet-
ing, Banna noted that Syria's policies are likely to be
inconsistent. A senior ANO leader said in 1985 that
the organization must put up with a certain amount of
inconsistency from Syria because a break in relations
would cause the ANO to lose its ability to operate in
Lebanon. Banna does not completely trust any one
country; as a result, the ANO never stations its entire
leadership in one place.
In return for safehaven, logistic support, and financial
assistance that enables Banna to pursue his own
agenda, the ANO will conduct certain operations on
behalf of its patrons. At its inception, the ANO
depended heavily on Iraq, and the ANO's terrorist
operations during this period served as a tool to
further Iraq's interests in the continuing intra-Arab
struggle. When Iraq subsequently needed to find
supporters in its fight against Iran, Baghdad found it
prudent to be more discreet about its relations with
terrorists. It forced Banna move his operations out
of Baghdad in 1983.
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After the ANO was forced out of Iraq, Syria became
an important supporter. Damascus has provided the
ANO with important logistic support, allowing it to
maintain offices in Damascus until June 1987 and
training facilities in Syria and Lebanon's Bekaa Val-
ley. Syria has also provided the ANO with travel
documents and permitted ANO operatives to transit
Damascus when departing on missions. According to
the lone surviving terrorist from the 1985 Rome
airport massacre, members of the four-man hit team
were trained in Syrian-occupied Lebanon and traveled
to Damascus, where they remained for four days
making final preparations for the attack.
The ANO's move to Syria coincided with a dramatic
increase in its terrorist attacks. Between 1983 and
1986, the ANO struck at US, British, pro-`Arafat
Palestinian, moderate Arab, and Israeli targets. Be-
tween late 1983 and late 1985, the ANO conducted
16 attacks against Jordanian targets�including the
murder of Jordanian diplomats in Bucharest and
Ankara�as part of a Syrian campaign to disrupt
Jordanian initiatives in the Middle Eastern peace
process. The attacks against the Jordanians ceased
following a Jordanian-Syrian rapprochement.
Syria's President Assad shut down ANO's offices in
Damascus in early June 1987. It is not known whether
this crackdown extends to the ANO-associated camps
in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley in Lebanon.
ANO members formerly based in Damascus have
relocated to Lebanon, Libya, and other areas where
the organization has an established infrastucture. The
ANO will almost certainly maintain a covert appara-
tus inside Syria.
Another major ANO supporter is Libya. The ANO's
relationship with Libya has intensified since about
1985. The Libyan press reports that Banna met with
senior officials in Libya at least three times in 1985.
Libya provides training assistance, safehaven, and
financial support to the ANO. Tripoli gives the ANO
close support for selected operations as well. In Sep-
tember 1985 an ANO operative was arrested in
London after he was seen collecting four handgren-
ades in a bag from a Libyan contact. Libya is believed
to have been involved in the bloody hijacking by ANO
of Egyptair Flight 648 in November 1985, and Tripoli
9
provided the passports to ANO members who at-
tacked the El Al counter at the Vienna airport in
December that same year. Libya also provided assis-
tance to operatives involved in the hijacking of Pan
Am Flight 73 in September 1986.
(b)(3)
The relationship with Libya is mutually beneficial
because the ANO's widespread terrorist operations
complement Qadhafi's radical anti-Western program.
Qadhafi uses terrorism as an instrument of foreign
policy and willingly supports groups that use terrorist
tactics, whether or not their targets or goals are
related to Middle Eastern issues. Tripoli operates (b)(3)
numerous training camps for foreign dissident groups.
These camps have provided instruction in explosive
devices, hijackings, assassinations, and various com-
mando and guerrilla operations. Libya is willing to
store arms and explosives in its diplomatic establish-
ments, to send weapons and other equipment through
its diplomatic pouches, and to employ its national
airline to provide logistic support and cover for terror-
ist operatives. Weapons recovered following several
Abu Nidal terrorist incidents�including the Rome
and Vienna airport attacks�were originally sold to
Libya and passed on to the terrorist group
Financing and Facilitating Terrorist Operations
The ANO operates a network of commercial busi-
nesses in several Middle Eastern and European cities,
with key branches in two Warsaw Pact countries (see
foldout map and photos in back). For a period in
1983-84, after Banna was forced to leave Iraq, these
companies were an important source of financial
support for the ANO. These companies not only
provide revenue for the group's activities but also can
be used for operational support. With such a network
in place, clandestine ANO terrorists have access to a
readymade mechanism to move and hide funds; to
buy, ship, and cache weapons; to arrange meetings;
and to serve as accommodation addresses. ANO
company personnel are thus available to perform a
wide range of terrorist support functions worldwide
under commercial cover if called on to do so.
Se et
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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Figure 6. Samir Nairn al-Din has maintained his Warsaw resi-
dence in this luxury high-rise apartment building on Ulica Bagno.
It is one block from the Bulgarian Culture and Information Center,
in the shadow of the Palace of Culture and Science, an u
Stalinesque building that dominates the Warsaw skyline.
The ANO commercial network comprises several
businesses created over the past seven years with the
long-term goal of establishing legitimate trading en-
terprises in various countries, gaining experience in
commercial trade, and making a profit for the group.
Such profits permit the organization some freedom of
operation beyond the control of its state benefactors.
Most of the companies deal in a variety of manufac-
tured goods that are sold primarily to Arab countries,
but a key segment of the network deals extensively in
the international arms market, with assistance from
gray-arms dealers and certain Warsaw Pact coun-
tries.
The general manager of the commercial network and
the principal agent in gray-arms transactions is Samir
Hasan Najm al-Din. He directs many of the ANO's
commercial activities, both licit and illicit, from his
offices in the INTRACO building in Warsaw, Po-
land. He brokered arms sales on behalf of Warsaw
Pact and Middle Eastern governments even before the
current ANO companies were established, and com-
missions from such deals are a continuing source of
income for the ANO. Najm al-Din has maintained a
permanent residence in Warsaw at 3 Ulica Bagno,
apartment 24, since at least 1983.
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The managers of the ANO's several companies report
to the Board of Directors, which includes Sabri al-
Banna; his de facto deputy for commercial matters,
Samir Najm al-Din; financial manager Shakir Far-
han; and a fourth official named Kamal Hasan
Khalil. Organizationally, the Board of Directors falls
under the purview of the ANO's Finance and Eco-
nomic Department. In reality, the commercial net-
work isrr1nhvJajm al-Din, who reports directly to
Banna.
Najm al-Din oversees all of the companies' records at
his Warsaw office. He maintains a general account at
a major West European bank from which he transfers
money to individual company accounts at local banks.
He maintains joint control of each company's bank
accounts along with the company manager and is
responsible for forwarding all major contracts to
Banna for final approval.
Members of the ANO commercial sector generally do
not interact with those involved in its political and
terrorist operations. The managers of the ANO com-
panies are primarily businessmen. This facilitates
interaction with potential clients and provides plausi-
ble denial to businessmen or governments that are
aware that the companies are controlled by ANO, but
would be embarrassed should their involvement with
these enterprises be publicized.
Although ANO businessmen are not members of the
terrorist wing of the organization, the group's leader-
ship considers them integral members of the ANO,
and they must undergo the same stringent screening
process as terrorist operatives. They regularly receive
issues of ANO publications, including the newsmaga-
zine Filastin al-Thawra and the internal policy docu-
ment al-Tariq. They attend meetings hosted by senior
ANO officials in which they are briefed on current
issues of interest and are reminded of their contribu-
tion to the ANO cause
Some of the businessmen began their ANO careers as
support operatives for terrorist operations before mov-
ing to one of the commercial enterprises. For example,
the manager of the ANO commercial enterprise in
Athens, Mufid Tawfiq Musa Hamadah, joined the
ANO in the 1970s at an early age. In late 1984, a
11
Figure 7. Must afa Murad (Abu
Nizar
senior ANO officer, Abu Fuwayris, sent him to do
clandestine work in Athens. ANO's chief of opera-
tions Mustafa Murad subsequently assigned Hama-
dah to manage the ANO company in Athens. Given
this background, it is likely that Hamadah was occa-
sionally tapped to perform terrorist support functions,
using his business as cover.
It is the ANO's policy to isolate its commercial
endeavors from its terrorist infrastructure, but ANO
businessmen are occasionally asked to provide opera-
tional support such as delivering messages or tempo-
rarily storing weapons. By virtue of their seniority,
loyalty, and access, senior officials within the ANO
commercial network, such as Najm al-Din, are likely
to be even more knowledgeable about s ecific ANO
terrorist operations and plans.
Most of the ANO companies are import-export firms
that trade in a variety of consumer goods, but one,
SAS, also trades heavily in weapons. Among the
companies in the ANO commercial network are:
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
� SAS Foreign Trade And Investment Company. SAS
was established in 1983 and is headquartered in
Warsaw. SAS stands for Samir-Adnan-Shakir, the
first names of three former or current officials in the (b)(3)
ANO economic sector�Samir Najm al-Din, Adnan
Zayit, and Shakir Farhan. It is a self-described
international organization involved in general trad-
ing, marketing, investments, and construction. Since
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TRADE rifiD IIIVESTMECIT COMPAIIV mt.
it IRS itt Of fR I RfPRISI T4711 t,
1r PT
; 4 440 4,1
'VI d
�.1
z.ar
Figure 8. The SAS Company logo appears prom-
inently on the e , � , ..r of the INTRACO
Warsaw building in
n�aM
the early 1980s, however, Najm al-Din and other
SAS Company representatives have negotiated a
number of deals to provide embargoed arms to Iran,
Iraq, and Zimbabwe. Najm al-Din is the director
and general manager of SAS, which is the most
profitable ANO company.
� Zibado Foreign Trade and Consultants Company.
The ANO originally opened the Zibado Company in
Limassol, Cyprus, in September 1983. The organi-
zation subsequently decided that it did not require
two companies operating in Cyprus, so it closed
Zibado in early 1984. The ANO established the
Zibado Company headquarters in East Berlin in
March 1984. The East Berlin office had three
employees before it closed in late 1986�the
manager, Kamal Hasan Khalil; an East German
named Hans Hoffmann; and an East German secre-
tary. It was managed by Kamal Hasan Khalil.
Zibado Company officials dealt directly with
Guenther Haussman, managing director for exports
in IMES, which is an East German Government
� foreign trade organization active in the arms trade.
�Zibado claimed to be able to deliver a wide range of
goods including entire industrial plants, building
machines and materials, research laboratories, pi-
anos, livestock, and frozen seafood. The Zibado
Company established a branch in Damascus in
1983. It is located on the fifth floor of the Nahas
Building, on Abu Sal('
Se et
Street, and is managed by Abdullah Salah (a.k.a.
Abu Hisham). The Damascus branch operates inde-
pendently from the main office in East Berlin and
has served as an office for ANO financial director
Shakir Farhan.
� Al Noor, Ltd. The company was registered in
Athens, Greece, in 1983. It has traded mainly in
foodstuffs, leather goods, shoes, arak, clothes, and
mineral water. Mufid Tawfiq Musa Hamadah man-
aged the firm, which had three employees�Hama-
dah, his wife, and a Greek secretary. Al Noor may
have closed or moved its Athens office in early 1987.
� Al Reem Trading, Ltd. (formerly Dirar, Ltd.). Al
Reem was established in Nicosia, Cyprus, in Febru-
ary 1980. It is a self-described Arab trading compa-
ny that engages in general trading, investments,
and consulting. Muhammad Salah Eddin `Abd
al-Fattah manages the company and employs his
wife and a Cypriot secretary. Al Reem may have
closed or moved its Nicosia office in early 1987.
� Al Manar Restaurant. Established in Nicosia, Cy-
prus, in 1981, the restaurant went out of business in
1986. Advertisements described it as the first Ara-
bic restaurant in Nicosia. The restaurant was man-
aged by Muhammad Salah Eddin `Abd al-Fattah,
who has and may still run the Al Reem company.
The Abu Nidal group's original plan was to open
additional Al Manar restaurants in Vienna, Athens,
and Poland. It appears that this plan was postponed
or abandoned after the closing of the restaurant in
Nicosia.
� International Marketing Corporation (IMC). The
company was established in 1983 and is directed by
Musa Rashid Ramadan in Kuwait.
� Intermador. The Intermador Company was estab-
lished by the ANO in late 1984 and is a commercial
trader of containers. Company directors include
Polish businessman Andrzej Urbaniak and ANO
member Ibrahim al-Abid.
12
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Banna prefers to keep his group's financial assets in
West European banks because political stability en-
sures a return on his investment. Most of the financial
transactions among the companies are run through a
single branch of the Luxembourg-based Bank of
Credit and Commerce International. Najm al-Din
controls the account and deals directly with the
branch manager. Each company also maintains at
least one bank account in a local bank to which
operating funds are transferred from the central
account. (s NF)
The ANO's Finance and Economic Department has
established a structured apparatus for managing day-
to-day affairs of the organization's commercial net-
work. A member of the Board of Directors visits each
of the companies monthly. Financial manager Shakir
Farhan audits the accounts of each company every
three months. The Board of Directors imposes a strict
system of fixed expenditures for travel, office ex-
penses, and monthly office budgets.
The Importance of Eastern Europe
The ANO's relations with individual East European
governments are beneficial to both sides. The ANO
obtains bases for commercial activities, propaganda,
and recruitment; access to weapons and training; and
entree into Western Europe for operations. Depending
on the nature of their arrangements with the ANO,
the East European governments obtain hard currency,
access to embargoed weapons, and/or guarantees
against ANO's terrorist activities on their soil.
A salient feature of the commercial network is its
intricate relationship with Poland and East Germany.
ANO commercial organizations in Warsaw (SAS
Foreign Trade and Investment), and in East Berlin
(Zibado), have been staffed not only by ANO com-
mercial representatives, but also by Polish and East
German nationals who act as brokers between govern-
ment export companies and foreign buyers. They have
dealt heavily but not exclusively in arms trading in
the Middle East and Africa. The SAS Company in
Warsaw forms the hub of much of this activity.
13
SAS works closely with the official Polish arms
exporter, CENZIN, to broker arms transfers for the
Polish Government. Andrzej Marchewka is the chief
Polish contact for SAS commercial activities. He
functions both as a representative of CENZIN and as
the manager of the SAS office. He has negotiated a
number of weapons deals for SAS with Middle East-
ern governments. He is believed to be a Polish
intelligence official, and the ease with which he
expedites visas and customs clearance for ANO trav-
elers to Warsaw suggests close ties to Polish security
officials. Najm al-Din pays $600 per month for
Marchewka's services. He pays $500 to Marchewka's
Polish employees who, in turn, pay Marchewka in
local currency, and he directly pays Marchewka
$100 (in US currency).
(b)(3)
The ANO has maintained a close commercial rela-
tionship with East German foreign trade organiza-
tions in three areas: manufactured goods, weapons,
and embargoed technology. Unlike SAS, which is the (b)(3)
ANO's focal point for all business deals in Poland,
Zibado was responsible only for trade in manufac-
tured goods and it dealt directly with East German
manufacturing firms. Najm al-Din personally han-
dled the weapons and technology transactions, some-
times with the assistance of the Zibado Company
manager. For these, he dealt directly with IMES, a
state-run foreign trade organization primarily respon-
sible for the sale of weapons and other military
equipment. East German officials have also turned to
the ANO commercial network for assistance in estab-
lishing contacts in several African and Middle East-
ern markets that the East Germans have not other- (b)(3)
wise been able to penetrate. (b)(3)
In Warsaw and East Berlin, the local employees and
the export firms with which the ANO deals have
extensive ties to responsible party, government, and
commercial officials. These employees and local ex-
port firms also have ties to high-level intelligence
services, which facilitate the group's travel and deal-
ings with state bureaucracies.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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Polish and East German connections help the ANO in
other areas as well. After his expulsion from Iraq in
1983, Banna went to Poland. He may have resided in
Poland from late 1983 until early 1985, and he
continues to maintain a residence in Warsaw, which
he may occasionally visit. The ANO holds general
business meetings in Warsaw; Banna presided over
two such meetings in 1983 and 1984. In December
1983 meetings were held at the Solec Hotel and at the
Novotel Hotel near Warsaw's airport. In September
1984 the meetings were held again at the Novotel
Hotel.
The ANO's ties to Poland date to at least 1979.
Banna and the Polish Government entered an agree-
ment whereby the ANO pledged not to undertake
terrorist activities on Polish soil or against Polish
interests in return for freedom to conduct ANO
propaganda activities in Poland and for scholarships
for ANO members. A senior official of the Polish
Ministry of Education met the first group of ANO
students at the Warsaw airport. The ANO continues
sending students to Poland each year and maintains a
liaison officer in Warsaw�Najah `Abd-al-`Afu Mu-
hammad `Adas, himself a former student there�to
oversee the scholarship program
The East German Government reached a similar
arrangement with Banna in early 1983. Again, the
reciprocal agreement involved a pledge by the ANO
not to undertake operations in East Germany or
against East German interests abroad in return for
government scholarships and training. The first group
of 15 ANO members arrived in January 1984 for
training in "ideology and culture"; Isam `Abd
al-Rahim Asad Maraqa, now ANO deputy secretary
general, led the group. In 1985 an ANO group
received military training in East Germany. The East
Germans have also provided "security training" that
includes courses on casing a target, detecting surveil-
lance, and assembling explosives.
The ANO liaison representative in East Berlin deals
with an official of the East German Ministry of State
Security responsible for training foreign liberation
movements if the issue is a routine training matter.
Otherwise, he talks directly with the assistant to the
Secret
State Security Minister and member of the Commu-
nist party committee responsible for the training of
foreign liberation movements
Political aspects of the ANO's relations with these
Warsaw Pact countries are apparently handled per-
sonally by Banna, or his designated representative,
who travels periodically to Warsaw and East Berlin.
Both East Germany, and Poland deny any connection
with the ANO. The Polish Government publicly
denied in late September 1986 that Banna had ever
been in Poland, asserted that he would not be allowed
to enter the country in the future, and printed anti-
ANO stories in the official media. There is no
evidence, however, that Warsaw or East Berlin re-
stricted its commercial dealings with the ANO or
Najm al-Din
The ANO's relations with Poland and East Germany
are mutually beneficial. Officials of these states ap-
parently calculated that their ties to the ANO are too
deeply concealed to be discovered. The prospect of
earning hard currency from deals with the ANO is
clearly an important motivating factor for close ties
between Warsaw, East Berlin, and the ANO commer-
cial infrastructure. The East Germans and the Poles
use these companies as intermediaries to sell their
arms internationally. This disguises the identity of the
original seller from the buyer, allowing Warsaw Pact
officials plausible denial of direct involvement in
potentially embarrassing arms transfers.
There are also reports that ANO members have
traveled to and/or held meetings in other Warsaw
Pact countries and Yugoslavia, as well as maintained
official contact with them. In the past several years
Banna has spent some time in Budapest, and at least
one of the general ANO business meetings was held
there in April 1984. Access to Yugoslavia not only
provides the ANO with a valuable transit area, but it
is also a place where the group can openly disseminate
propaganda and recruit operatives from among the
local Arab student community. The ANO reportedly
has used the Yugoslav postal system to distribute its
magazine Filastin al-Thawra
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The ANO reached an agreement with Yugoslavia in
1981 by which Belgrade would permit the ANO to
conduct organizational and propaganda activities in
Yugoslavia in return for an ANO pledge not to
conduct operations on Yugoslav territory or against
Yugoslav interests. Yugoslavia initiated contacts with
the ANO following a series of incidents involving
ANO terrorist attacks against PLO officials in Yugo-
slavia. The ANO was permitted to maintain a liaison
officer in Belgrade who had direct contact with
Yugoslav intelligence officials. Banna attended a se-
nior-level meeting in Belgrade to finalize the agree-
ment. Although the ANO continues to maintain a
presence in Yugoslavia, it is not certain that the group
currently maintains an official liaison relationship
with representatives of the Yugoslav Government.
All of the East European states are concerned about
preventing terrorist acts on their home turf. Contacts
with known terrorists not only increase the influence
that security services may be able to exercise but also
allow them to develop intelligence about events in the
Middle East that could be politically useful.
Gray-Arms Marketeer
The ANO's economic network combined with its close
ties to Warsaw Pact countries has enabled the organi-
zation to become an important participant in the
international gray-arms market. Brokering arms for
Warsaw Pact and Middle Eastern governments not
only provides steady income for the organization, but
also gives it an independent source of equipment,
particularly the small arms that are the weapons of
choice for terrorists around the world. Among the
weapons available to the ANO through its gray-arms
dealings are pistols, submachine guns, assault and
sniper rifles, as well as such items as man-portable
antitank and antiaircraft weapons that terrorists usu-
ally can acquire only through the beneficence of a
state supporter. The ANO is also in a position to act
as a middleman between Warsaw Pact governments
and other terrorist groups seeking to acquire weapons.
By using the group's network of ostensibly legitimate
trading companies, these governments can distance
15
themselves from the terrorist end user, giving them
plausible deniability if their arms are used in terrorist
operations
The focal point for the ANO's gray-arms deals is the
SAS Foreign Trade and Investment Company, head-
quartered in Warsaw. As manager of this company,
Samir Najm al-Din is the key intermediary in the
ANO's international arms dealings. Working through
the Warsaw office and a sister company in East
Berlin, Najm al-Din has facilitated a series of deals
that work to the advantage of Warsaw Pact and
Middle Eastern states, as well as to the ANO itself:
(b)(3)
� In 1986 Najm al-Din assisted East Germany in
obtaining 115 Enfield antiriot weapons from the
United Kingdom by designating an African country (b)(3)
on the end user certificate. The shipment was
diverted to East Germany once it reached Rotter-
dam. The East German Government purchased 100
of the weapons, and the remainder were retained by
the ANO.
� In 1984 Najm al-Din handled a contract worth (b)(3)
$500,000 under which East Germany sent more
than 4,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles to Libya. The
rifles were shipped via Poland in order to conceal
East German involvement in the transaction.
� In 1985 Najm al-Din observed a live-fire demon-
stration of weapons that the East Germans hoped to
market. One was a shortened East German�made
Kalashnikov assault rifle that could be equipped
with a silencer. The other was a 9-mm Finnish
Jatimatic submachine gun that the East Germans
recommended for "street fighting." Both would be
useful additions to any terrorist's arsenal.
The East German Government also looks to the ANO
gray-arms network to help provide weapons for other
terrorist groups supported by East Berlin. In early
1984, the East German Government trading company
IMES approached Najm al-Din to handle arms sales
on its behalf and provide weapons for two radical
Palestinian groups, the PFLP-GC and the Democratic
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).
S et
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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SECret
Through ties to the official Polish company CENZIN
and arms dealings on behalf of other Palestinian
groups, the ANO gray-arms network intersects that
of Munzir Qassar.3 Like the ANO, Qassar procures
weapons for terrorist groups, falsifies end user certifi-
cates, and provides support that obscures the trail
back to the Warsaw Pact suppliers
Munzir Qassar, a notorious arms and narcotics traf-
ficker, has extensive commercial links to the Polish
Government, which provides him with office space,
special services, and staff. Qassar is recognized in
Warsaw as one of the primary arms brokers for the
Polish Government, although he also services other
Warsaw Pact governments. Qassar brokers millions of
dollars in arms sales and arranges shipping and
financing between Warsaw Pact states and various
Middle Eastern clients, including terrorist groups.
Qassar has worked directly with the SAS Company.
Documents found in his Alkastronic office in Vienna
in 1985 recorded the sale of ammunition and pistols�
some equipped with silencers�to SAS in Warsaw.
Outlook
Recent ANO attacks have been increasingly violent.
The hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73, the massacre at
the Neve Shalom Synagogue in Istanbul, and the
Rome and Vienna airport attacks suggest that future
ANO attacks may cause high numbers of casualties
among people with no connection to the Middle
Eastern conflict. The ANO continues to espouse
violence as the only effective way to achieve a Pales-
tinian homeland in present-day Israel. The ANO's
attacks in 1986 continued a trend toward operations
designed to cause a maximum number of casualties
with no concern for the innocence of the victims
ret
Figure 9. Alkastronic office in Vienna, Austria,
March 1987
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Se et
Figure 10. Istanbul, Turkey, 6 September 1986. The interior of
Neve Shalom Synagogue attacked by two ANO gunmen; 22 victims
died.
The ANO frequently launches attacks aimed at free-
ing imprisoned members (see table 3). Banna has
publicly threatened the United States with retaliation
if it extradites to Israel a Palestinian terrorist opera-
tive who claims to belong to Fatah; the operative was
arrested in New York in May 1987 on murder
charges filed by Israel. In 1986 an ANO political
spokesman warned, "Some of our people are impris-
oned in Europe. We are going to liberate them before
long; that we can guarantee."
The ANO has demonstrated its willingness to follow
through on its threats. For example, since March
1984, it has conducted a series of bombings and
assassinations against British targets in an unsuccess-
ful attempt to force the release of members impris-
oned there. The ANO has also sought to intimidate
other governments that hold ANO prisoners by con-
ducting attacks against third-party targets on their
soil.
17
e
In addition, the ANO has attempted to negotiate
deals with governments that hold its members
prisoner. In October 1986 ANO negotiated with
Greek officials for the release of three ANO members
from prison in return for a pledge that the ANO
would refrain from conducting attacks on Greek soil
or against Greek targets. Greek Government repre-
sentatives would not allow overt or covert ANO
offices to be opened, but they did concede to a
designated ANO representative being permitted to
live in Athens and serving as a liaison officer with the
Greek Government. In addition, the Greek represen-
tatives requested flexibility in timing the release of
the ANO prisoners�partly because one of the prison-
ers is the subject of an extradition request by Italy.
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Table 3
Suspected Abu Nidal Members in Custody
Country/Total
in Custody
Name
Date of
Incident
Sentence
(in years)
Remarks
Austria-5
Banij Muhammad 29 August 1981
Yunis
20 Jailed for the Vienna synagogue
attack. Yunis's 20-year sentence was
upheld in October 1985.
Hisham Rajah Life
Marwan Hasan Life
Ali Mufleh Abu 27 December 1985 Life
al-Higah
Mahmud Khalil Abdul- Life
lah Abd Al-Gawad
Jailed for the attack at the El Al
counter at Vienna's Schwechat
Airport.
Belgium-1
Nasir 27 July 1980
Life
Jailed for hurling a handgrenade into a
group of schoolchildren at a synagogue
in Antwerp.
Greece-3
Usama `Abd al-Hay 22 November 1982
al-Zumar
1 2/3 Arrested for possession of explosives.
Samir Hamit Salamah 30 August 1985
Amar Mabruki 29 November 1984
2 1/2 Arrested for planning attack against
the Jordanian Ambassador in Athens.
10 1/2 Jailed for attempted manslaughter of
Jordanian Charge d'Affaires in
Athens.
Italy-4
Husayn al-Nawajah 3 April 1985
15 Jailed for firing a light antitank weap-
on at the Jordanian Embassy in Rome.
Ahmad Husayn Abu 16 September 1985
Sereya
17 Arrested for the attack against the
Cafe de Paris in Rome.
Hasan Itab 25 September 1985
14 Arrested for the bombing of the British
Airways office in Rome.
Muhammad Abdullah 27 December 1985
Sarham
Arrested for the attack against the El
Al counter at Rome's Fiumicino
Airport.
Kuwait-1
Malta-1
Mustafa Mahmud
Mustafa Sald Biyari
Muhammad Ali Abd
al-Rizq
11 July 1985
23 November 1985
Death
Arrested for the bombings of two cafes
in Kuwait City.
Arrested for participation in Egyptair
hijacking in Valletta.
Footnote appears at end of table.
18
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Table 3 (continued)
Country/Total
in Custody
Name
Date of Sentence Remarks
Incident (in years)
Pakistan-5
Wandud Muhammad
Hafiz al-Turk
Zayd Hasan Abd al-La-
tif Musud al-Safarini
Muhammad Abdullah
Khalil Hussain
al-Rahayyal
Jamal Sald AM
al-Rahim
Muhammad Ahmad
al-Munawar
5 September 1986 a Arrested for attempted hijacking of
Pan Am Flight 73 in Karachi.
Spain-2
&Id Ali Salman and an 3 March 1980 24 Jailed for the murder of Spanish attor-
accomplice ney Adolfo Cotelo Villareal in Madrid.
Turkey-4
Sami Rushdi Ahmad
Washah
Nal(' al-Nadi
Basim Lutfi Fayiz Sald
al-Ahmad
Nader Hasanen
Habbush
24 July 1985
a
Arrested for the murder of a Jordanian
diplomat in Ankara.
United Kingdom-4
Husayn Ghassan Seid
Murwan al-Banna
Nawaf Nagib Mislih
Rusan
3 June 1982
30
30
35
Jailed for the attempted murder of
Israeli Ambassador Argov in London.
Rasmi Awad
22 September 1985 25 Arrested for conspiring to cause explo-
sions in London.
United States-1
Mahmud al-Abid Ah-
mad (a.k.a. Mahmud
Mahmud Ata)
12 April 1986
Arrested on provisional arrest warrant,
pending extradition to Israel. He is
wanted in connection with an attack on
a passenger bus at Dayr Abu Mishal
junction. (Claims to be member of
Fatah.)
a Individual not yet sentenced.
This table is . sified.
Reverse Blank
19
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Appendix
Chronology of Significant
Abu Nidal Organization
Terrorist Activities, 1974-86
1974
22 November
United Arab Emirates (UAE): Four terrorists; armed
with machineguns, handgrenades, and pistols, hijack
British Airways plane en route from Dubayy to
Tunis ... two people wounded during takeover...
plane took off with approximately 46 hostages; refu-
eled in Tripoli, Libya; and went on to Tunis ... oje
passenger killed on ground; hostages later released
Late 1974
Location unknown; probably Lebanon: Murder
planned by Sabri al-Banna against Yasir 'Arafat,
Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), and other prominent Pales-
tinian leaders uncovered by Fatah intelligence ..
Banna sentenced to death in absentia in October.
1976
26 September
Syria: Four terrorists, armed with machineguns and
grenades, take over Semiramis Hotel in Damascus,
taking 90 hostages ... Syrian troops storm hotel.
one terrorist killed and
killed and 34 wounded.
aptured; four hostages
11 October
Pakistan: Grenade attack on Syrian Embassy
Syrian Ambassador's residence in Islamabad
17 November
Jordan: Four Palestinians attack Intercontinental Ho-
tel with handguns and grenades, killing two employ-
ees and taking hostages ... Jordanian troops counter-
attack, killing three terrorists and wounding
one ... two soldiers one hotel guest killed; four hotel
guests wounded.
21
2 December
Syria: Syrian Foreign Minister `Abd al-Halim
Khaddam seriously wounded in assassination attempt
in Damascus
1977
October
UAE: Assassination attempt against Syrian Foreign
Minister Khaddam in Abu Dhabi results in death of
UAE Minister of State
1978
4 January
United
London.
: PLO representative murdered in
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
15 February
Cyprus: Two gunmen attack Afro-Asian People's
Solidarity Organization meeting in Nicosia and kill
its secretary general, Yusuf as-Sibal, a confidant of
Anwar El-Sadat ... leave country on aircraft with 11
hostages but refused permission to land in Libya,
Kuwait, Somalia, Ethiopia, or People's Democratic (b)(3)
Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) ... subsequently
return to Larnaca Airport ... Egyptian counterterror-
ism force conducts airborne assault on irnnit re-
sulting firefight kills 15 and wounds 16
15 June
Kuwait: PLO official murdered in Kuwait City.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
3 August
France: Two gunmen attack PLO office in Paris and
kill PLO representative to France (b)(3)
(b)(3)
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Suret
5 August
Pakistan: Four gunmen, armed with submachineguns
and grenades, attack PLO office in Islamabad and kill
radio operator, two Palestinian students, and Paki-
stani police guard.
1980
17 January
France: Manager of Arab bookstore murdered in
Paris
3 March
Spain: Gunman mistakenly shoots and kills Spanish
attorney Adolfo Cotelo Villareal. . . apparent target
in, leader of Spanish Jewish community.
22 April
Yugoslavia: Attempted murder of Fatah official Sa-
lah Khalaf in Belgrade; one bodyguard wounded.
5 June
Kuwait: Attempted murder of PLO representative in
Kuwait City.
27 July
Belgium: Attack on Agudat Israel syna o ue in Ant-
werp; one person killed and 20 injured.
1981
I May
Austria: Head of Austrian-Israeli Friendship Society
killed in Vienna
1 June
Belgium: PLO representative murdered in Brussels.
29 August
Austria: Two gunmen, armed with machine pistols
and handgrenades, attack Vienna synagogue. . . two
killed, 19 injured.
Se et
23 September
Cyprus:
Limassol
Two Arabs attack Israeli shipping firm in
with handgrenades, injuring five employees.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
8 October
Malta: Aborted
attempt in Valletta
to kill the PLO
representative to
Libya
(b)(3).
9 October
Italy: Senior PLO official murdered
in Rome
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
1982
4 February
Austria: Bomb explodes at residence of chief rabbi in
Vienna, causing
some property damage but no casual-
(b)(3)
ties
(b)(3)
1 March
Spain:
Nabil Arnaki, coleader of Arab People's Liber-
(b)(3)
ation
Movement (APLM),
a splinter
group of the
ANO,
killed in Madrid.
(b)(3)
3 June
(b)(3)
United Kingdom: Attempted assassination of Israeli
Ambassador Shlomo Argov
Israeli invasion of Lebanon
in London. . . precipitates
(b)(3)
5 June
India: First secretary
nated in New Delhi.
of Kuwaiti Embassy
assassi-
(b)(3)
17 June
Italy:
Deputy director
of PLO office in Rome mur-
dered
(b)(3)
9 July
Turkey: President
dered in Ankara.
of Palestinian Student
Union mur-
(b)(3)
23 July
France:
Deputy
director of PLO office murdered in
Paris.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
22
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9 August
France: Two gunmen with grenades and automatic
weapons attack Jewish-owned restaurant; six killed,
27 wounded
23 August
Kuwait: UAE Charge d'Affaires wounded in assassi-
nation attempt.
26 August
India: UAE Consul General in Bombay escapes injury
in assassination attempt
16 September
Pakistan: Attempted assassination of Kuwaiti Consul
General in Karachi.
18 September
Spain: First secretary of Kuwaiti Embassy assassi-
nated in Madrid, driver wounded
9 October
Italy: Grenade and machinegun attack against syna-
o ue in Rome kills a child and wounds 10 persons.
8 December
Greece: Kuwait Airways offices bombed in Athens, no
casualtie
1983
10 April
Portugal: Issam Sartawi, prominent PLO moderate
and close friend of 'Arafat's, killed in Lisbon
26 October
Italy: Jordanian Ambassador and driver wounded in
assassination attempt in Rome. (1-11(q1
(b)(3)
31 October
Jordan: Car bomb detonated outside main Jordanian
Army officers' club in Az Zarqa'; no casualties
reported.
(b)(3)
7 November
Greece: Two security guards of Jordanian Embassy in
Athens attacked; one killed, one wounded. (b)(3)
12 November
Jordan: Discover
Amman.
of car bomb in residential area in
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
19 December
Turkey: Car bomb discovered midway between
French cultural center and US officers' club in Izmir.
(b)(3)
20 December
Turkey: Car bomb injures one person and causes
extensive damage to apartment building near PLO
office and living quarters in Ankara.
(b)(3)
29 December
Spain: Two Jordanian Embassy employees attacked in
Madrid; one killed, one wounded (b)(3)
1984
8 February
France: UAE Ambassador to FranCe dssassinated in
Paris
20 August 24 March
Greece: Murder of aide to high-ranking Fatah official Jordan: Bomb defused outside British Consulate in
Khalil al-Wazir, Amman
23 September
UAE: Gulf Air Boeing 737 en route from Karachi,
Pakistan, to Abu Dhabi crashes, killing all 1 1 1 pas-
sengers and crew. .. . crash may have been caused by
bomb aboard aircrafl
25 October
India: Jordanian Ambassador wounded in assassina-
tion attempt in New Delhi.
23
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
24 March
Jordan: Bomb defused outside British cultural center
in Amma (b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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24 March
Jordan: Bomb explodes in parking lot of Interconti-
nental Hotel across street from US Embassy, damag-
ing two vehicles and slightly injuring two ersons;
second bomb discovered and defused.
28 March
Greece: British Embassy first secretary assassinated
in Athens
3 May
Cyprus: Chairman of Arab Writers' Union killed in
Nicosia
25 October
Italy: UAE vice consul wounded and student accom-
panying him killed in assassination attempt in Rome.
November
Lebanon: Bomb attack on British Airways office in
Beirut.
12 November
Austria: Bomb partially explodes at Israeli El Al
Airlines office; no casualties
12 November
Austria: Bomb explodes in entrance hallway of British
Consulate.
27 November
India: British Deputy High Commissioner assassi-
nated in Bombay.
29 November
Greece: Attempted assassination of Jordan's Deputy
Chief of Mission in Athens.
4 December
Romania: Deputy Chief of Mission of Jordanian
Embassy assassinated in Bucharest
14 December
Italy: Ismall Darwish, a leading milit
Fatah movement, murdered in Rome.
ure in the
1985
9 March
UAE: ANO member arrested for attempted sabotage
of Royal Jordanian Airlines flight.
21 March
Italy: Grenade attack on Royal Jordanian Airlines
office in Rome, injuring two
21 March
Cyprus: Unidentified man throws two grenades into
Royal Jordanian Airlines office in Nicosia.
21 March
Greece: Grenade thrown into Royal Jordanian Air-
lines office in Athens, injuring three.
26 March
Lebanon: British journalist kidnaped in Beirut.
3 April
Italy: Rocket fired at Jordanian Embassy in Rome
. . . misses Embassy and hits apartment on fourth
floor of the building, but causes no casualties.
4 April
Greece: Rocket fired at Jordanian airliner as it takes
off from Athens airport.. . projectile hits plane but
does not explode
23 April
Kuwait: Moderate newspaper editor wounded in mur-
der attempt.
15 May
Lebanon: UN Relief and Works Agency official
kidnaped but released the next day
1 July
Spain: Bomb explodes at British Airways ticket office
in Madrid, also damaging TWA office upstairs . . .
Royal Jordanian Airlines ticket office nearby hit by
automatic weapons fire and two grenades that fail to
explode. . . one killed, 27 wounded.
24
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(:3)0)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(31
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)\
Y�-'1\`-'1
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11 July 25 September
Kuwait: Two bombs explode within minutes of each Italy: Bomb explodes at British Airways
office in
other, killing eight and injuring 89 at two cafes about Rome, killing one and injuring 14.
(b)(3)
10 kilometers apart in Kuwait
City. ...
third bomb
defused at another cafe
23 November
(b)(3)
Malta: Three gunmen seize Egyptair Flight 648 en
21 July route from Athens to Cairo and force it to land in
Lebanon: Bomb explodes outside Kuwaiti
Airlines
Valletta, Malta ... when hijackers' demand for refu-
office in Beirut ... no casualties reported.
eling refused, they begin shooting selected passengers
(b)(3)
... ultimately, 56 passengers and two terrorists killed;
24 July
23 passengers and one terrorist wounded ... on 24
Turkey: First secretar
at Jordanian Embassy assassi-Nove
ptian military commando unit storms
nated in Ankara.
plane.
(b)(3)
8 August
24 November
Greece: Bomb explodes in kitchen
of
London Hotel in Jordan: Husayn al-Bitar killed in Amman as a result
Athens, wounding 13 tourists.
of financial dispute
over his house which
was alleg-
(b)(3)
edly owned by
Sabri al-Banna
(b)(3)
24 August
Turkey: Bomb discovered
in PLO office in Ankara. 27 December
Austria: Three gunmen attack El Al counter at
(b)(3)
Vienna's Schwechat Airport with grenades and
30 August
AK-47s, killing
two and wounding 39 ...
one terrorist
Greece: Palestinian arrested in Athens
for plotting
also died and two
were wounded.
(b)(3)
assassination of Jordanian Ambassador.
(b)(3)
27 December
3 September Italy: Four gunmen attack El Al ticket counter at
Greece: Two grenades thrown at swimming pool at Rome's Fiumicino Airport with grenades and
Glyfada
Hotel in Athens...
19 British tourists AK-47s, killing 12 and wounding
72 ...
three terror-
wounded.
ists also died and one was injured.
(b)(3)
16 September
Italy: Grenades
thrown at Cafe
de Paris in Rome, 1986
injuring 38 tourists.
(b)(3)
5 September
18 September Pakistan: Four men armed with automatic weapons,
Greece:
Palestinian
magazine publisher murdered in handguns, and grenades storm Pan Am
Flight 73 in
Athens
Karachi, killing 21 and injuring over 100
others
(b)(3)
22 September
6 September
United Kingdom: British authorities arrest an ANO Turkey: Two gunmen attack Neve Shalom synagogue
member found in possession of four handgrenades and in Istanbul with
grenades and machineguns
... 22
charge him with conspiracy to cause explosions and to killed and six
wounded.
(b)(3)
endanger life ... grenades providLhv
Libyan
con-
tact ... target identity unknown.
(b)(3)
Reverse Blank 25
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Secret
Figure 11
Abu Nidal Organization Activities, 1974-86
North
s. Atlantic.,
Ocean
Portu
Lisbon
ne et
London
North
Sea
russels
saris
France
Italy
Number of
Incidents
31* 10-13
0- 5-9
0- 1-4
Baltic
Sea
Poland
Belgrade*
Yugoslavia
4*Malta
Valletta
Romania
Bucharest
Bulgaria
�=i) izinir
Egypt
Caspian
Sea
*Ankara
Turkey
B. ut Syria
Ethiopia
Kuwat
oDubayy
1
People's De
Rep. of Ye n
Yemen)
Somalia
Reverse Blank
Dhabi Karachi
7 Indian claim
*�--Clrne. 7-
se
Islamabad cartel
Pakistan
Bombay
New Delhi
India
Bay
Arabian
of
Sea
Bengal
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
27
710411 1
5450300A
Secret
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Se et
Abu Nidal Organization
�Cardidate Members-Politburo
Revolutionary Committee
Central Committee
Politburo
Secretary General and Chairman of Politburo
Sabn Khalil Abd al-Qadir al-Banna (Abu Ntdal)
Deputy Secretary General and
Vice-chairman of Politburo
Isam Abd al-Rahim Maraqa l(Salim)
Mustafa Murad (Abu Nizar)
Sulayman Da ud Ali Simnn (Dr Ghassan Ali)
And al-Rahman Isa
Au( Abu Bakr
Sh iy,,ni Muhammad al- Sawafita (Munir)
IN trin Alit Awdah (Zakanya)
Ahdallah Hasan Musa Abu Mughaysib Abu Nabil)
Muhammad Wash Hanun (Wash)
� A ish Baciran (Abu Umar)
� Mustafa Firas
*Baps Harb Muhammad Hamdan (Mansur)
*Suhayr Muhammad Hasan al Abbas'
Military Office
Amir Muhamm id Salin
al- Mashm (Naji)
Lebanon Affairs Dept
Sulavaman Da ud Alt
Simon (Dr Ghassan Ali)
Political Department
Atif Abu Bakr
Deputy Baps Harb
Muhammad
Administration Dept
Mustafa Muhammad
Mustat a Saddinj
(Khaldun)
Organization Dept
Shawqi Muhammad
al- Sawahta (Munn)
Finance and Economic
Department
Khalid (Ibn al-Wand)
(Abu Ayman)
Information Department
Abd al-Rahman lsa
Deputy Mustafa Firas
Deputy Isam Abd al-Rahim
Hamdan (Mansur)
Sarni'. (Nairn al-Din)
Maraqa (Salim)
(Abu Nabil aka
(Najmeddin)
Tripoli Sector
Muhammad Wash Hanun
(Wash)
Beirut Sector
Isam Alit Awdah (Zakariva)
�
Sidon Sector
Mapd Akkawi
Bekaa Valley and
[he Mountains
Aish Muhammad Aish
al- Jahin (Ali Mai)
Southern Lebanon
Sector
-
A ish Badran I Abu Umar)
Public Relations
Committee
Rizaq Abd al-Mand
Sa id (Wand Ahmad)
Information Committee
Mihammad Amir Adnan
Isma it (Abu Hazim)
Reverse Blank
Arab Arena Committee
Abd al-Rahim Muhammad
Abd al-Ralum Sat id
(San)
International Arena
Committee
Harnia Ibrahim
Libyan Arena
Committee
Hamdan Mahmudl Abd
al Salarn Husayin
(Am) (Aznit Abd
al-Sattar)
Jordan-Palestime
At fairs Commit tee
Ali Muhammad Ali isa
at Batrm
Syrian Arena Committee
Thabit Abd al-Karnm
Mahmud (Zaudan)
Algerian Affairs
Committee
Abd al-Karim Salim,
at Banna (Husam ]Mustafa)
-
-
-
NOM,.
ANO
Commercial
Network
1--
Security and Information
Committee
Isa Ali Da ud Jaradat
(Salayman)
External Information
Committee
Mustafa Firas
-
Special Operations
Committee
Ali Zasdan (Havtham)
29 S et
-
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Secret
Figure 13
Abu Nidal Commercial Network
e
SAS Foreign Trade and Investment Company Inc.
Intraco Building, 25th floor
Stawki 2
ZibadoCompany
International Trade Center
Berlin (East), Ger. Dem. Republic
,
Manager: formerly Kamal Hasan Khalil
Warsaw, Poland
President: Samir Hasan Najm-al-Din
Berlin
3 Ger.
Poland
-Dem. Rep
North
Warsaw
Atlantic
Ocean
Intermador AG
Sagereistrasse 6
Zurich, Switzerland
Directors: Andrzej Urbaniak
Ibrahim al-Abid
Al Noor Ltd.
52 Solonos St.
Third floor
Athens, Greece
Manager: Mufid Tawfiq Musa Hamadah
Mediterranean Sea
Al Reem Trading Ltd.
43 Themostocles Dervis St.
Nicosia, Cyprus
Manager: Muhammad abd-al-Fatah al-Salwani
Zibado Company
Abu Sa'id St.
Nahas Building, Fifth floor
Damascus, Syria
Manager: Abdullah Salah
Syria
Damascus
Al Manar Restaurant
39 Themostocles Dervis St.
Nicosia, Cyprus
International Marketing Corporation
Al-Omariya
Kuwait, Kuwait
Manager: Musa Rashid Ramadan
\
Arabian
Sea
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Polish businessman Andrzej Urbaniak and ANO member Ibrahim
- ' are directors of the ANO company Intermador in Zurich.
ra1-4111
� ALNOOR LINITED
PAI,DI
;;;re trV�t�
ink}
Mufid Tawfiq Musa Hamadah managed the ANO company in
Athens, Al Noor, but may have closed or moved it in early 1987.
Kamal Hasan Khalil managed the ANO's Zibado Company,
located in the International Trade Center in East Berlin, before it
closed in late 1986
The ANO may have closed or moved
its company in Nicosia, Al Reem, in
early 1987. It was managed by Mu-
bd al-Fattah al-Salwani.
The most profitable ANO company, SAS Foreign Trade and
Investment, is run by Samir Najm al-Din in Warsaw and employs
suspected Polish intelligence officer Andrzej Marchewka.
AL INANAR ARABIC
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rant, the first Arabic restaurant in
Nicosia, but closed it in 1986.
(b)(3)
Musa Rashid Ramadan man-
ages the ANO company Inter-
national Marketing Corpora-
tion in Kuwait City
710878 045039) 7.87
Reverse Blank
31
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
313717 7'87 (b)(3)
Secret
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